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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to understand the judicial 
process in the primary courts of Kenya. The first chapter is a 
synthetic essay which explains how I originally framed the questions 
to be asked, how I came to change those questions, how I conducted 
the research, and how the succeeding chapters were written. The 
second chapter presents my research method, and seeks to justify 
it. I then offer an exposition of the judicial system of Kenya, 
and turn to an analysis of cases handled by the primary courts of 
that system. I place the analysis of specific cases in perspective 
by means of a statistical study of behavior in tiie primary courts. 
Finally, I offer comparative data on judicial process in the 
appellate hierarchy, and on the dispute process outside of the 
official court structure.
In the third chapter, I build upon this exposition with an 
attempt to construct a theory of the dispute process which will 
explain what I have observed in the institutions of Kenya, as well 
as what has been described for dispute processes elsewhere. After 
locating my endeavor within the traditions, and contemporary 
literature, of legal and social scientific scholarship, I offer 
two theories. The first, a microsocial theory, explains process 
in dispute institutions (of which the primary courts of Kenya are 
an example) in terms of the structure of those institutions, using 
such variables as specialization, differentiation, and bureaucra­
tization. The second, a macrosocial theory, explains the variety 
of dispute institutions we may expect to find in a society such as 
Kenya, and offers some tentative predictions about the future of 
those institutions.
Chapter four contains a comprehensive bibliography of 
published and unpublished materials concerning the customary law 
of Kenya. The appendix consists of published articles and reviews
on African law and the social theory of law.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
I* Chronology
The work contained in this thesis has all been done since 
my registration as a candidate for the Ph.D. in October 1965# 
Research was conducted during my two years' residence at the 
University (1965-67), and during a year of field work in Kenya 
(1967-68). (During the first period I was the recipient of a
s
Marshall Scholarship, and during the second, of a Foreign Area 
Fellowship. I am extremely grateful to the Marshall Aid Commemo­
ration Commission and the Foreign Area Fellowship Program for 
their support.) The reason that the writing itself has taken so 
many years to complete is that I entered full time law teaching 
when I returned to the United States in the fall of 1968. Because 
I have been writing over an extended period, my theoretical focus 
has continued to develop, and thus to change. This section of 
the introduction describes how the different parts of the thesis 
came to be written; the remainder shows how each contributes to 
an understanding of judicial process in the primary courts of Kenya.
The original title of my thesis was "The law of civil wrongs 
in Kenya." I therefore devoted my two years in residence to 
collecting materials on the English and other colonial law, both
11
statutory and decisional, received by Kenya and later modified, 
and on the customary laws of the several tribes. On the basis of 
the latter I drafted restatements of the customary law of wrongs 
for most of the major tribes (see Chapter XI, Part I, Infra; this 
chapter consists of my article "Case Method Research on the 
Customary Laws of Wrongs in Kenya," and X will refer to it here­
after by the short form, Method; X),
I spent the academic year 1967-68 in Kenya, engaged in field­
work directed toward ascertaining the substantive customary laws 
of civil wrongs. For reasons explained below (Introduction; XII.A)
I chose to look for those laws in the cases decided in the primary 
courts. I therefore collected and analyzed more than four 
thousand cases drawn from more than forty courts, as well as case 
materials on appellate review and extra-judicial institutions.
The following year, when I returned to the United States and 
began to teach, I compiled a comprehensive bibliography of all 
the materials I had collected for the purpose of studying the 
customary laws of wrongs in Kenya, which is included in Chapter IV 
of this thesis (hereafter referred to by the short fova Sources; 
the compilation was published as "A Bibliography of the Customary 
Laws of Kenya (with special reference to the laws of wrongs),"
VI(2) East African Law Journal 78 (1970); an earlier version will 
be found in 2 African Law Studies 1 (1969)). Using those materials,
and the cases I had recorded in Kenya, I wrote an essay 
describing how primary courts, appellate courts, and extra­
judicial institutions in Kenya handle cases involving civil 
wrongs (Method, published in V(4) East African Law Journal 247 
(1969), Vl(l) East African Law Journal 20 (1970); an abridged 
version was published as "Customary Laws of Wrongs in Kenya: an
essay in research method," 17 American Journal of Comparative 
Law (1969)). In the course of analyzing these cases as a source 
of substantive rules, I concluded that the procedures by which 
they were heard and decided were equally relevant for an under­
standing of how the several institutions operated, and perhaps 
even more Important. I therefore asked to be allowed to amend 
the titla of my thesis to "Judicial process in the primary courts 
of Kenya,11 which request was granted.
This attempt to offer a concise but comprehensive description 
of the operation of the primary courts within the legal system 
of Kenya forced me to confront the difficult problem of develop­
ing concepts appropriate to legal behavior, and a theory capable 
of explaining it. I approached that task over the next several 
years through a series of critical reviews in which I sought to 
define my own approach by reacting to those of others. (See the 
appendix to this thesis, hereafter referred to as Appendix, which 
contains reviews of:Ghai & McAuslan, Public Law and Political
Change in Kenya, in VII(2) East African Law Journal 180 (1971); 
Spalding, Hoover & Piper, One Nation, One Judiciary: the Lower 
Courts of Zambia, in 8 African Law Studies 97 (1973); Veitch,
East African Cases on the Law of Torts, in 17 Journal of 
African Law 124 (1973) ; and Rheinstein, Marriage Stability,
Divorce and the Law, in "Law Books and Books About Law," 26 
Stanford Law Review 175 (1973).)
Finally, last fall, I completed such a theoretical frame­
work, which constitutes Chapter III of this thesis ("A Comparative 
Theory of Dispute Institutions ;in Society," 3(2) Law and Society 
Review (Winter 1974, forthcoming); hereafter referred to by the 
short title Theory). That chapter includes the primary courts 
of Kenya within the concept of "dispute institutions" - an iden­
tifiable category of legal phenomena which also contains appellate 
courts and extra-judicial institutions. I construct a theory of 
dispute institutions, drawing upon the literature of sociology 
and anthropology. From this theory I derive an extensive set of 
propositions which help to explain judicial process in the primary 
courts of Kenya, as it changes over time, and as it differs from 
process in appellate hearings and extra-judicial institutions in 
Kenya, and in dispute institutions elsewhere. This chapter also 
offers some general explanations for the shape of dispute insti­
tutions in contemporary Kenya, and some speculations about the
future of those institutions.
This chronology brings me to the present; but I wish to stress 
that the work completed, which is contained in the thesis, forms 
the foundation for further research in and analysis of African 
legal institutions. An example will illustrate this. In each 
of my major articles I noted that behavior within a dispute insti­
tution is a product of interaction among judges and litigants 
(Met1 ~d: IV; Theory: IV.A.2). An adequate theory of the dispute
process must therefore include a description and explanation of 
litigant behavior. I am presently engaged in analyzing an exten­
sive body of statistical data on litigation in Kenya, and simul­
taneously seeking to develop a theory of litigation, in an article 
tentatively entitled: !fWhy Go To Court: a historical and
comparative study of patterns of local court use in Kenya.”
II Why Study Judicial Process in the Primary Courts of Kenya
A. Why Judicial Process
The dominant paradigm of contemporary western legal scholar­
ship an roughly be defined as the identification, organization, 
crit' . i-T, ancl restatement of legal rules within a particular 
substantive field. The original objective of this thesis - a 
systematic record of the law of civil wrongs in Kenya - was 
guided by that paradigm. I pursued that objective for two years, 
reading the relevant Kenya legislation and cases of the High
Court and the Eastern Africa Court of Appeals. I also surveyed 
all the available ethnographic data on Kenya, published and un­
published. With that data I drafted restatements of the law of 
wrongs for most of the major tribes, which I intended to use as 
the basis for questioning ethnic law panels about their substantive 
rules, much in the manner of the Restatements of African Law 
Project (e.g., Cotran, 1968).
I first modified this plan when X discovered copies of some 
five thousand Judgments of the Appeals Magistrates, collected by 
the former African Courts Officer, Mr. T.A, Watts, and filed in 
the Law Courts, Nairobi. Each judgment summarized the evidence 
and decision below, the grounds of appeal, and any additional 
evidence heard on appeal, and then presented a more or less 
reasoned opinion. My own background predisposed me to prefer 
this kind of data, for American legal education since the days 
of Langdell, and American scholarship under the Influence of 
legal realism, have both emphasized a case-method approach to 
legal rules. Indeed, the Restatement of African Law Project is 
itself modelled, to some degree upon the restatements of the 
American Law Institute, which rely almost exclusively on decided 
cases as a source of rules. I had looked for case materials in 
London, but had discovered that the only cases reported from the 
primary courts were those found in the column "Kotini Wiki Hii,"
in the swahill weekly newspaper Baraza; beyond this I had to be 
satisfied with reconstructing the history of the Kenya judicial 
system in as much detail as possible. Therefore, once exposed 
to the judgments of the Appeals Magistrates collected in Nairobi,
I turned immediately to the complete case files of the African 
Courts and the Appeals Magistrates Courts.
I was fortunate in being granted permission to examine these 
case files, and to borrow them while I made notes. I visited some 
forty courts throughout Kenya, and obtained records of more than 
four thousand cases (see Sources). But although I changed my 
method of research, preferring to analyze cases rather than inter­
view elders, my ultimate objective remained constant - the 
ascertainment of rules. In fact, I justified the methodological 
shift on the ground that case analysis provided a more specific, 
comprehensive, accurate, and contemporary portrayal of those rules 
(Method: I). I pursued that objective when I returned from the
field by using the cases to construct a restatement of the most 
complex body of law I had identified - the rules governing the 
liability of a man to pay customary compensation for impregnating 
an unmarried girl among the Kikuyu. This exercise confirmed for 
me the value of the case method as a source of rules, but it 
raised other doubts, for the substantive rules alone did not 
appear to offer an adequate account of the operation of the courts.
They undoubtedly played a significant role in framing the claim 
for relief, choosing the evidence to submit, and criticizing or 
justifying behavior. Yet rules were rarely made explicit in 
argumentation or discussed in judgment. And they seemed to be 
only one element among many others in a highly complex process.
This perception led me to reconsider whether X was asking 
the right questions about legal phenomena in Kenya. Rules have 
been the primary feeus of scholarship on African law because they 
have been the primary focus of scholarship on western law. But 
what is the reason for the latter focus? And is it persuasive 
in the African context?
An abbreviated answer to the first of these enormously compli­
cated questions is two-fold. Western scholarship rests upon an 
idealization of the legal system, according to which it functions 
in general harmony with substantive and procedural rules of law. 
Deviations from this model are handled by placing them in a 
residual category of "political" situations, to which legal rules 
do not apply and which legal scholarship, therefore, cannot ex­
plain (Theory: II.B.3). The model Itself is studied by the
method of legal science, which aims at the logical and aesthetic 
refinement of the system of rules, and the ethical criticism of 
those rules (Appendix: Review of Rhelnstein).
This focus upon rules is sometimes appropriate, and sometimes
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not. Rules may contribute Importantly to the way in which society 
is ordered outside the courtroom (see, e.g., Holleman, 1973;
Gluckman, 1973; and Appendix: Reply to Gluckman). And they may
play a significant role within the court as well. In either case, 
a restatement of rules may be a valid generalization about legal 
phenomena. The limitation of the method of legal science is that 
It assumes that the rules provide adequate generalizations. But 
J "if1 ’ *t ' spruden e of the last fifty years has weakened the hold 
of this assumption on legal scholarship; writers have repeatedly 
declared their 'rule scepticism and 'fact scepticism. And con­
temporaneous with this attack on rule oriented scholarship, an 
alternative tradition has developed as the social sciences - 
sociology, anthropology and political science - have begun to 
study legal phenomena. Unlike legal science, those disciplines 
do not make any assumptions about the significance of rules. 
Instead, that significance remains problematic, an empirical 
q V. o ,  ticn of the extent to which members of a given society engage 
in ’he interpretation and application of rules.
As betTeen these alternative approaches to legal phenomena,
I have chosen that of social science, for the reasons stated at 
length below (Appendix: Review of Rheinstein). In my first
article, therefore, I analyzed several cases in depth in order to 
determine how rules are in fact used in the primary courts of
Kenya (Method: III). I soon discovered that primary courts are
fact-minded, concerned with concrete histories, not with rules -
an observation that has since been confirmed by others (e.g., 
Fallers, 1969). This should hardly surprise us, for the expecta­
tion that rules will be of central importance in the judicial 
process derives from a 'false comparison' of western appellate 
courts with African trial courts (van Velsen, 1969). This com­
parison as introduced into ethnographic analyses of African law 
by Gluckman’s (1955) use of Cardozo (1921) and Fallers1 (1969) 
use of Hart (1961) and Levi (1948) - all lawyers in the Anglo- 
American tradition focussing exclusively upon appellate tribunals. 
But an appellate court concerned with interpreting and changing 
rules offers a poor model for understanding a trial court devoted 
to the ascertainment of fact.
Western models are inappropriate for another reason as well. 
The substantive and procedural rules which do participate in 
adjudication in primary courts in Africa do not resemble the 
corpus juris of western legal systems. Prior cases do not con- 
precedents for the future, and legislation is rare, if 
not unknown. The customary norms themselves tend to be vague, 
fairly abstract, often inconsistent, and unorganized; these 
characteristics limit the degree of constraint they can exert on 
the deci/ ion. Furthermore, those norms are rarely invoked expli-
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citly by either litigants or judge. Explicit reference begins to 
be found only where the norm is novel, and has been reduced to 
writing, as in the Gusii case discussed below (Method: III; see
also Gluckman, 1955: 58). As Michael Saltman (1971) has shown
for Kenya, the mere existence of the Restatements may have the 
consequence that they will be invoked more often, as a written 
source of law, and thus become a more powerful generalization 
about behavior.
I concluded from this analysis that ray study of legal phenomena
in Kenya would have to go beyond substantive rules and include 
other elements of the judicial process. This was not a decision 
that rules are irrelevant, but rather a recognition that their 
significance must remain problematic - a variable to be studied 
emi’ ' 'f ’ ly and explained theoretically (Theory: V.B.2.b). Nor
is 1t a claim that judicial process exhausts the phenomena we 
ordinarily perceive as law (Theory: II.B). If norms do not fully
explain the dispute process, they may perform a significant role 
outside fspute institutions; furthermore, the norms which per- 
fo ; th< role may differ from the norms which influence the 
dispute process. The study of normative systems - which would 
include such questions as how they are created, when they are 
invoked, in whom they are internalized and to what degree - is 
therefore a fruitful endeavor in its own right. Equally, behavioral
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regularities - Gluckman’s praxis (1973), Holleman’s non-conten- 
tious law (1973) - are not wholly explained either by norms or 
by dispute process, and therefore offer a third focus for investi­
gation. The interaction of these three categories of phenomena 
may be held out as the ultimate aim of a social theory of law.
But 9ince it is clear that we cannot build such a theory all at 
once (Theory: II.A), the decision to isolate one of these
intertwined strands should require no justification. I have chosen 
the dispute process for the reasons indicated below (Theory: II.B).
Having defined the boundaries of my subject, I then turned 
to the traditions of social theory for the general structure of 
the questions I wanted to ask: what patterns do we find in the
way disputes are handled in Kenya, and how do we explain those 
patterns? The phenomenon I seek to understand can thus be demar­
cated as the behavior of persons within dispute institutions in 
Kenya (Theory: II.B.l). Legal scholars and social scientists
have generally agreed that the most significant person within 
such an institution is the judge; and I, too, emphasize the 
behavior of the judge, under the awkward neologism of "intervener” 
(Theory: IV.A.3). More recently, however, social scientists
have stressed the contributions of litigants to behavioral patterns 
within the institution, and have begun to study how litigants 
choose a forum in which to dispute, and what they do once they
get there. I recognize the importance of such behavior (Theory:
IV.A.2), and have made a start at trying to describe it (Method : 
IV). Finally, the dispute institution does not operate in a 
vacuum, but interacts with the environing society. The character­
istics of that society influence the institution directly, as well 
as the behavior of litigants in using it; and behavior within the 
institution in turn has consequences for the society (Theory: VI),
If my subject matter - the dispute process - lies outside 
the boundaries of traditional legal scholarship, so does my 
objective. Legal scholars generally offer descriptions of and 
prescriptions for behavior; the declared aim of social science 
is to explain (Appendix: Review of Rheinstein; Review of Spalding, 
et al.). One of the accepted meanings of explanation is the sub­
sumption of concrete instances under general rules (Theory: III.A,
B). I have sought to achieve this goal by the following steps. 
First, I have conducted intensive case studies of dispute processes 
in a variety of dispute institutions in Kenya, and have tried to 
discern regularities (Method: III, V, VI). In order to determine
the causes of these regularities, I compared those institutions 
and processes with each other, and with examples from other 
societies (Theory: II.B.2, IV.B). This comparison required me
to develop concepts which would be applicable across societies 
(Theory: III.B.2). It also demanded the construction of theories
that would identify possible causal links between institution and 
process (Theory: V), society and institution (Theory: VI).
Finally, these theories must be tested by means of statistically 
significant populations, an operation that still largely remains
to be done (Method: IV).
B. Why the Primary Courts?
Although the theory advanced in this thesis was developed 
through a comparison of a variety of institutions, and claims the 
power to explain dispute process in any institution, I have always 
been principally concerned to understand the primary courts of 
Kenya. This choice, too, requires some justification (Theory:
II.B), for it also departs from both of the scholarly traditions 
upon which I draw. Legal scholarship in Africa, where it has been 
concerned with customary law, commonly shows a distinct preference 
for the higher appellate tribunals. Anthropological scholarship, 
by contrast, generally studies indigenous institutions outside 
the official court structure.
I would not wish to appear critical of either tradition; 
each is clearly necessary for a complete understanding of legal 
phenomena - legal scholarship seeks to understand the behavior 
of the state, anthropology investigates the behavior of the 
individual within the small community. But if we are interested 
in interaction between individual and national state - in the
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demands which the individual makes upon the state, or in the con­
straints the state imposes upon the individual - the primary 
court becomes the critical arena. By contrast with the appellate 
hierarchy, the primary court is highly accessible to the citizens 
of Kenya, however access may be measured - geographically, or by 
cost, or in terms of social and cultural distance (Method: II,
Theory; V.A.2). And this accessibility has been accompanied by 
high levels of use (Method: II, IV: see also Appendix: Review
of Spalding, et al,; Review of Veitch). On the other hand, when 
compared with the tolerance accorded indigenous institutions, the 
primary courts have been subject to a substantial degree of state 
control. I have described in some detail the changes wrought in 
that institution since its creation out of traditional and western 
elements at the opening of the colonial era (Method: II, Theory:
V.A). Indigenous institutions have also changed, but not as 
dramatically (except where they have died out through disuee); 
and much of the change has been a response to innovation in the 
primary courts (Method: VI; see also Collier, 1973; Fallers,
1969; Nicholson, 1973). Thus the focal point of tension between 
traditional and English methods of handling disputes in Kenya 
has been the primary court.
III. A Theory of the Judicial Process in the Primary Courts of
Kenya
As social scientists have recently shown (e.g., Collier, 1973),
a court may fruitfully be viewed as a semi-autonomous social 
field (Moore, 1973). Because it is partly autonomous, we may 
legitimately isolate behavior within it for study. X therefore 
begin with a theory about judicial behavior, and then turn to 
the behavior of other significant participants, the litigants.
But because the court is only partly autonomous, it is also 
necessary to understand how it is affected by, and affects, the 
larger society.
A. The Behavior of the Judge
I chose to concentrate on the behavior of the judge, under 
the generic name of intervener, and sought to explain that 
behavior as well as to describe it. In order to insure that my 
explanation did not collapse into tautology, I constructed a 
distinction, necessarily somewhat arbitrary, between the structure 
of the dispute institution - especially the role of the intervener 
and the behavior which it is offered to explain - the dispute 
process (Theory: III.B.l).
I approached an analysis of institutional structure through 
a brief history of the primary courts (Method; II). Although 
this narrative was largely descriptive, I necessarily engaged in 
comparison across time; I became more explicitly comparative when 
I turned to the structure of other dispute institutions in Kenya: 
the appellate hierarchy which surmounts the primary courts
(Method: V), and extra-judicial institutions (Method: VI).
Because a theory gains in power as it expands in generality 
(Theory: III.B.2), I extended my search for comparable insti­
tutions beyond the boundaries of Kenya (Theory: XV,B). But this
level of generality requires the development of new concepts 
capable of comparing the structures of highly disparate insti­
tutions (Theory: XX,A), For this purpose, X used the umbrella
notion of structural differentiation, which encompasses the con­
cepts of specialization, differentiation, and bureaucratization*
I then operationalized these concepts (Theory: V,A), thereby
creating a lengthy list of variables which allowed me to chart 
changes in the structure of the primary courts of Kenya over 
time, differences between these courts, the appellate hierarchy, 
and extra-judicial fora, and differences between each of those 
institutions and others outside Kenya.
Next, I analyzed judicial process in the primary courts of 
Kenya by means of case studies (Method: III), which suggested
regularities in the way judges defined the cause of action, 
admitted and evaluated evidence, handled legal rules, assessed 
praise and blame, and imposed penalties. I compared this process 
with dispute processes in other institutions in Kenya through an 
analysis of cases as they proceeded up the appellate hierarchy 
(Method: V) and as they were handled out of court (Method: VI).
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And again I looked at other societies in order to construct con­
cepts of sufficient generality to comprehend the variety of 
disputes processes I found there (Theory: II.B.2). I then
reviewed the literature of sociology and jurisprudence in a 
search for causal links between the structure of a dispute insti­
tution and its dispute precede (Theory: V.B.). This led me to
advance the following theory? as the structure of a dispute 
institution beccnes more specialised, differentiated and bureau­
cratized, the dispute process within that institution is pro­
gressively rationalized, adapts to the functional needs of the 
institution, and grows more bureaucratic (Theory? V.B.l). I
operationalized these latter concepts also (Theory: V.B.2),
deriving a set of variables that allowed me to describe and explain 
changes in the judicial process in the primary courts over time, 
and differences in process between those courts and other dispute 
institutions in Kenya and elsewhere. The theory is stated in a 
form that I hope will facilitate statistical testing of the kind 
1 began in Method: IV.
B. The Behavior of Litigants
Litigants are as Important to the dispute process as is fhe 
intervener; indeed, it can be argued that they are more important 
(Theory: IV.A.2). My case studies of process in the primary and
appellate courts and extra-judicial institutions of Kenya (Method:
28
III, V, VI) revealed patterns In the ways In which a litigant 
chooses his forum, frames his claim, selects and prepares his 
evidence and attacks that of his adversary, justifies his own 
actions and criticizes those of others, and responds to the 
decision. I made a preliminary effort to explore these 
patterns through the use of statistical data (Method; IV)• But 
because I lacked a framework for analysis comparable to that pro­
vided by my theory of judicial behavior, this effort often appeared 
troubled by "abstracted empiricism" (Mills, 1959; chap. 3) - a 
making of connections without a clear sense of direction. To 
remedy that flaw, I am now working to develop a theory of liti­
gant behavior which will permit a more sophisticated analysis.
C. The Primary Courts in Kenya Society
Theories of the behavior of judges and litigants tell us 
something hbout what occurs within a particular judicial insti­
tution. But we must also ask why a society such as Kenya has 
these institutions and not others, and further: What are the
consequences for a society of having such institutions? Are 
there pressures for change, or constraints upon deliberate 
change? And what consequences should we expect from these changes?
Theories of dispute institutions in society - what I call 
macrosocial theory (Theory: VI) - are presently much less satis­
factory than the microsocial theories offered above to explain
behavior within the institution itself. We are only beginning 
to realize that societies exert constraints upon their dispute 
institutions in different ways, and to different degrees. In 
all societies dispute institutions are connected to, and in­
fluenced by, other major social institutions (Theory: VI.A.l.a,
V.B.l.a). Thus extra-judicial institutions in Kenya can to some 
degree be explained by the structure of traditional Kenya society 
(Method: VI); and the history of colonial society illuminates
the structure of the contemporary judicial system (Method; II). 
But we may also find that in the latter situation the connections 
are more tenuous because of the greater autonomy of legal insti­
tutions in more developed societies. Societies also influence 
their dispute institutions through the mechanism of litigant 
choice (Theory: VI.A.l.b, V.B.l.b). Thus social structural,
cultural, and personality variables affect the frequency of 
conflict, its subject matter, and the relationship of the parties 
among whom it occurs (Method: II, IV; Theory: II.B.l). These
characteristics of conflict in a society in turn influence 
litigant choice among the available fora (Method: II, III, VI),
which determines the number and kind of cases confronting the 
primary court.
The impact of such social variables upon dispute institutions 
tends to be most significant in relatively stable societies
evolving gradually over long time periods - e.g., pre-colonial 
Kenya. In societies experiencing rapid, abrupt change as a result 
of external forces - such as Kenya since the advent of colonial 
rule - social structural variables may be more significant as a 
constraint upon the government's deliberate efforts at social 
engineering (Theory: VI.A.3, VI.B,3), Thus we are helped to
understand why primary courts depart from official substantive 
and procedural rules (Method: III) , why appellate courts fail
to control them (Method: V), and why extra-judicial institutions
continue to perform important functions (Method; VI). Such an 
understanding is essential for the intelligent development of 
judicial institutions in Kenya. Equally important is some notion 
of the consequences to society of possessing particular institu­
tions. Thus I have sought tentative answers to such questions 
as: what influence, if any, do dispute institutions have on each
other - e.g., the primary courts on extra-judicial institutions 
in Kenya and vice versa (Theory: VI.A.2.a, VI.B.2.a); and what
are the consequences of a change in the characteristics of dispute 
institutions in Kenya for the quality of social relations (Theory :
VI. A. 2. b. , VI. B. 2, b) .
Finally, we may begin to draw the interconnections between 
these pieces of theory in the form of a model - a pictorial repre­
sentation of dispute institutions in society which will help us
to ask the right questions about the future of the primary 
courts of Kenya (Theory: VI.C).
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Chapter 2. Case Method Research in the 
Customary Laws of Wrongs in 
Kenya
I. In tro d u c tio n 1
The literature on the customary laws of Kenya is probably more exten­
sive than that for any other country in East or Central Africa. The 
Restatement of African law project has been able to compile a bibliography 
of approximately seven hundred entries touching on the subject.2 In
1 Field research on which this paper is based was conducted under a fellowship 
granted by the Foreign Area Fellow’ship Programme, from September 1967 
to November 1968. However, the conclusions, opinions, and other statements 
in this publication are mine and not necessarily those of the Fellowship 
Programme. I wish to express my deep gratitude to the many members of 
the Judicial Department of Kenya who greatly facilitated my research: 
members and staff of the District Magistrate s Courts, the staff of the High 
Court library in Nairobi, and especially Mr. T. A. Watts, Administrative 
Secretary to the High Court, whose generous assistance permitted me to 
accomplish a great deal of work in a relatively short time.
2 Restatement o f African Law Project, D raft Bibliography fo r  East A frica  
(Kenya, Somali Republic, Sudan, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar) (n.d.) 
(cyclostyled, 83 +  iii pp.). See also Abel, “A  Bibliography of the Customary 
Laws of Kenya (with special reference to the laws of wrongs),” II African 
Law Studies (1969).
reviewing this literature preparatory to embarking on fieldwork,3 I 
found sufficient material concerning the larger tribes—Boran (Galla), 
Elgeyo, Em bu, Gusii, Iteso, Kamba, Kikuyu, Kipsigis, Kuria, Luo, 
Luyia, Masai, M eru, Mijikenda, Nandi, Pokot, Sam bum, Taita, and 
Turkana—to permit me to construct for each a broad working outline 
of the more limited field of customary wrongs. And yet the published 
descriptions I read seemed terribly lifeless. Charles Dundas, an early 
administrative officer in Kenya, wrote a detailed analysis of Kikuyu and 
Kamba customs which strikingly illustrates this characteristic. The follow­
ing passage is typical:
In Ukamba, if a man strikes a corpse, he is liable for full blood m oney; 
m Kikuyu he must pay approximately half (but in Ndia one-third). 
T he same payments are due if he should take any part in a fatal fight, 
although he may have inflicted only the slightest wounds, and in such
cases he must observe the ordinary ceremonies required for purifi­
cation.” 4
Do such statements in fact tell one anything about the nature or operation 
o f a legal system ? W hen would a man strike a corpse: in anger, in despair, 
contemptuously ? Would it be the corpse of an enemy, a friend, a relative ? 
W hat would the reaction of others be ? How would the alleged compen­
sation be claimed, and by whom, and in what forum ? The second rule 
invites similar questions: under what circumstances might a fatal fight 
occur; what actions would be considered to constitute “ taking part” ? 
W hat is a slight wound ? T he rules offered by Dundas are so dehumanized 
as to be almost absurd. Indeed, some are absurd :
“ [The law of homicide does not consider the accused’s state of mind.] 
So strict is this broad rule that Kikuyu elders have told me that if 
a man were seized by a lion, and his friend wishing to save him were 
to throw a spear, he would be liable for compensation if he inadvertently 
struck the man instead of the lion.” 5
M y own legal syntheses, constructed upon such data, therefore consisted of 
totally disembodied propositions, mere abstracts of abstracts. I find in 
my notes a schedule of compensation among the Kikuyu for bodily 
injuries: for loss o f an eye, amounts ranging from ten to sixty goats; 
for loss of a tooth, from one sheep to ten goats and a ram. These con­
3. I did the preliminary work on this subject in London during the two years 
I was a Marshall Scholar, from September 1965 to September 1967. I would 
here like to thank Professor A. N. Allott and Mr. Eugene Cotran, of the 
African Law Section, School of Oriental and African Studies, for allowing 
me access to the files of the Restatement of African Law Project.
4. Dundas, “The Organization and Laws of Some Bantu Tribes in East Africa”,
45 J. Roy. Anthrop. Inst. 234, 263-64 (1915).
5. Ibid.
flicting assertions cannot be reconciled by particularization to the circum­
stances in which the injury was inflicted because such information is 
simply not available anywhere in the vast body of ethnographic description.
I am increasingly convinced that the reason for these failings is that 
few, if any, of the numerous ethnographic accounts contain any de­
scriptions of actual cases. Either investigators failed to observe or to inquire 
about cases,6 or else they deleted all information about the actual con­
troversies from their reports.7 Instead, many appear to have proceeded 
by asking informants, believed to be especially knowledgeable about 
the customary law, to make conclusory statements about the consequences 
of a particular course of action.8 This procedure seems inevitably to elicit 
rules empty of content, of which D undas’ writing is a particulirly 
egregious, though not atypical, example. Anxious to avoid these pitfalls, 
I considered an alternative approach to fieldwork—the case method— 
suggested by my training in the common law tradition.9 This technique 
appears to possess several distinct advantages for the study of customary 
law, which can best be demonstrated by contrasting the kinds of rules 
produced by the two methods.
These rules may be tested by two criteria: whether they adequately 
portray the full range of experience within the society; and whether they 
are distorted by bias in the investigator or the informant. Satisfaction 
of the first criterion may in turn  be judged according to several sub­
ordinate standards, among which a re :
1. Specificity. Statements by an informant will often be vague and 
general: “ Our rule is that a m urderer is killed” . There are many reasons 
for this lack of specificity: ignorance of the detailed variations of a rule 
in different factual situations; inability to think about, or to express,
6 See, e.g., Hamilton, “Some Notes on Native Laws and Customs,” 
I E. Afr. Prot. L. Rep. 97 (1906); Leakey, “Some Notes on the Masai of
Kenya Colony,” 60 J. Roy. Anthrop. Inst. 185 (1930).
7. See, e.g., Kenyatta, Facing M ount Kenya (1938); P. Mayer, Gusii Bridewealth 
Law and Custom (1950); Ngala, Nchi tux Desturi za  Wagiriama (1949); 
Orchardson, The Kipsigis (1961); Othieno-Ochieng*, Luo Social System, 
with a special analysis of marriage rituals (1968).
8. See, e.g., Bostock, The Taita (1950); Snell, N andi Customary Law (1954).
9. I certainly claim no originality in the use of this method. Indeed, the most 
venerable guide to anthropological methodology emphasizes that the inves­
tigator must concentrate on eliciting concrete instances of reputed customs. 
Roy. Anthrop. Inst, of Great Britain and Ireland, Notes and Queries on 
Anthropology 36-37 (6th ed., 1951). But in view of the widespread agreement 
on the value of case materials, their neglect by legal researchers is that much 
more striking and unforgivcable.
the rule in terms of situational variables ;10 or simply response to an over­
broad question, such as: “ what is your rule for m urder?” This last 
difficulty is not easily avoided. No outsider can be sufficiently familiar 
with a society to be able to formulate as a hypothetical problem every 
occasion on which the type of wrong might occur in that society. The 
alternative solution, using the elements of the wrong taken from another 
legal system—for instance, the English law of homicide— as the source 
for hypothetical questions, distorts the significant detail, lending the data 
a false specificity.11 It is this lack of culturally significant detail which 
makes many reported rules absurd: certainly all “ m urderers” are not, 
in fact, killed. T he case method avoids these dilemmas by deriving rules 
from disputes. Rules are thus specified by the factual details of a real 
com oversy, so that each significant variable may be identified, and no 
fictitious variables are introduced by the interrogator’s questions. Speci­
ficity no longer depends on the knowledge or abilities o f the informant 
since the decision maker, the source of data, is forced to fashion a rule 
to meet the disputed issues, and need not know how variant situations 
would be resolved.
2. Comprehensiveness. I f  rule-directed interviews fail to uncover the 
details of any single rule, they are also inadequate to explore the full range 
of legal prescriptions governing a society. The experience of any individual 
is necessarily limited, and his memory imperfect. Consequently no in­
formant, nor even any group of informants, can be expected to know all 
the roles of conduct.12 Further, they are not likely to be able to give a
10. See A. L. Epstein, “The Case Method in the Field of Law,” in The Craft 
o f Social Anthropology 205, 210 (Epstein ed. 1967):
“In m y  own fieldwork among the Bemba, and later in the African 
urban courts of the Copperbelt, I found that court members could 
expound the points involved in a case they had just been hearing with 
great command and infinite patience, but they were much less at home 
in the discussion of hypothetical issues which I would sometimes 
have to put to them. This was not because they were unintelligent or 
lacking in legal insight and imagination, but because their mode of 
legal thinking was particular rather than abstract: the rules of law they 
expounded were not conceived as logical entities; they were rather 
embedded in a matrix of social relationships which alone gave them 
meaning.”
Bohannan appears to be making a related point when he says: “Tiv have 
Taws’ but do not have Taw’ ... In Tivland there are atindi or ‘rules’, but 
they have not been especially organized for jural purposes.” Justice and 
Judgment among the T iv 57-58 (1957).
11. Cf. Roy. Anthrop. Inst., op. cit. supra note 9, at 36 (criticizing the use of 
questionnaires). But cf. Poirier, Questionnaire d'ethnologic juridique apphqui 
d I'enquile de droit coutumier (1963).
12. See Hall, “The Study of Native Court Records as a Method of Ethnological 
Inquiry,” 11 Africa 412, 413 (1938) (example of rule discovered from study 
of cases which had not been reported by previous investigators); cf. Her- 
skovits, “The Hypothetical Situation: A  Technique of Field Research,” 
6 Southwestern J. Anthrop. 32, 36 (1950) (informants may omit vital infor­
mation because they take for granted that everyone knows it).
spontaneous recitation of all the rules they do know. T he investigator is
then brought up against the dilemma suggested above, of his own in­
complete knowledge of the society under scrutiny, and the danger of 
ethnocentric bias in the use of questions based on a model drawn from 
another society. T he case method circumvents these difficulties by perm it­
ting an investigator, even one substantially ignorant of the scope of the 
indigenous legal system, to obtain as comprehensive a report as he desires 
merely by continuing the collecting of cases until repetition convinces 
him that all but the most aberrant situations have been identified. It is 
probably true for African societies, as Holmes has said of American,13 
that most, if not all, possible controversies occur within the history of a 
single generation.
3. Representativeness. Rule-directed inquiry appears to seek for broad 
r  rinciples rather than the unique example. As a result, the rules it produces
quire  an undeserved facade of generality. But in fact an informant 
may have based his conclusory statement on a single, unrepresentative 
instance. M ultiplying informants does not avoid the risk that all may in 
fact be relying on the same atypical situation. T he danger is inherent in 
th e  method which fails to discover, and consequently to disclose, the factual 
experience underlying the asserted prescription. It may lead the investi­
gator to accept unquestioningly a proposition which is absurd on its face. 
Goldschmidt, writing recently about Sebei law, asserts: “one informant 
indicated that the middle child of triplets always [my italics] is squeezed 
by his siblings and dies.” 14 How many triplets could the informant have 
been familiar w ith?15 Certainly not enough to justify the conclusory 
adjective “always” . By contrast, when research focuses on actual cases it is 
immediately clear whether a stated rule is evidenced by numerous, 
m utua lly  confirming, applications, or is merely the reflection of isolated, 
and therefore suspect, happenstance.
Not only must the rules be adequate—specific, comprehensive, repre­
sentative—they must be the right rules. I have already suggested above
13. Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897): “The 
reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty 
much the whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of 
view.” Cf. Hall, “Nyakyusa Law from Court Records,” 2 Afr. Stud. 153 
1953): “It would indeed have been surprising if there had been any aspect 
of Native law not covered by the Courts, since the annual average of civil 
cases heard over the years 1936-1940 has been 5,450.”
14. Goldschmidt, Sebei Law 95 (1967).
15. Triplets occur statistically about once in every 5,800 births, see Guttmacher,
Pregnancy and B irth 214 (rev. ed. 1962) (statistic for black Americans) or, 
among the 24,000 Sebei, no more than a handful of times a generation. 
In a society lacking mass communications the rule could not have been 
based on personal knowledge of more than one or two instances.
several ways in which the structure of an interview can condition the
nature of the product:
1. Asking the wrong questions. Unless the investigator is willing to 
produce an incomplete record of the customary law he must model the 
questions he asks not on the indigenous social structure, which he knows 
incompletely or inaccurately, but on a legal system—real or analytic—with 
which he is familiar. T he questions he then asks, for instance: “what 
happens when a son murders his mother ?** may be meaningless in indige­
nous terms, and the informant will frequently answer: “ that never 
happens.” An investigator who refuses to accept such a reply may finally 
elicit a rule, but it will be a rule designed to fit the analytic system, not 
out derived from indigenous experience. “ It never happens” is in fact 
a truer description. A study of cases will uncover the fact that it never 
happens and accept that fact as a highly significant element m the de­
scription of what actually does happen.
. Asking questions in the wrong way. Just as the subject of a question 
ma demand information about a course of conduct that has no social 
re ;ty, so the form of a question will prefigure the way in which actual 
conduct is analyzed. An investigator may ask: “ Is a man liable for abuse 
uttered when he is d runk?” and receive the reply: “ no” . He can only 
understand that reply in terms of the question, which was in turn drawn 
from an analytic system in which “ intoxication” is a significant category. 
He will then derive a rule that intoxication is a defence in abuse cases. 
Tht informant may in fact be answering the question by reference to an 
indigenous category: there is no liability for abuse when it is part of a 
non-serious exchange of insults, and the fact that the defendant was 
dr ;n k can only mean that he was at a drinking party, one example of such 
a non-serious occasion. The case method would use as its data instances 
of abuse, including drinking parties, from which the analyst would have 
a better chance of seeing those categories which are significant in in­
digenous terms.16
’'he informant may introduce further distortions, in addition to those
discussed above.
1. Bias against indigenous practices. In any interview situation the 
subject is under pressure to give those answers he believes the investigator 
wishes to hear. These pressures are intensified where, as in contemporary 
Africa, the investigator is of a higher social status than the informant, 
and often of a different race. It is widely known that Europeans, and many 
educated Africans, condemn a practice like infanticide, disapprove of 
bridewealth payments, and disbelieve in witchcraft. An informant may
16. See Bohannan, op. cit. supra note 10, at 4-5.
conceal or misreport actual practices in order to win the investigator’s
approval, and perhaps also to protect those practices from change.17 
Decisions in actual disputes are, of course, just as subject to the pressures 
o f modernization as is the testimony of informants. But use of such dis­
putes as data insures that the investigator will be recording real changes 
in the customary law, and not just a facade of change erected to appease 
the perceived biases of the researcher.
2. Bias in favour of traditional practices. This is to some extent the 
obverse of the above danger. Instead of exaggerating the extent to which 
customary law has altered to meet modern conditions and new values, the
informant may glorify the pre-colonial experience, refusing to admit that 
any charge has occurred. T he likelihood of such bias is often substantially 
increased by the choice of informant, for today only the older men in many 
communities retain any extensive knowledge of customary law. T he use
of actual cases eliminates this bias, since every rule may be specified
chronologically by the date when the dispute occurred.
3 Ideal rather than actual rules: the is/ought distinction. T he two 
biases already mentioned—modernity and traditionalism—can be general­
ized as a defect inherent in rule-directed inquiry: the possibility that 
replies may refer to ideal rules rather than actual behaviour, to what the 
law ought to be rather than what it is. Statements of ideal behaviour are 
certainly an important element in the culture of any group, but they are 
not law. T o  paraphrase Holmes18 again, the prophecies of how disputes 
will be decided in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by the law. Perhaps the most significant merit o f the case method is its 
insistence upon concentrating on actual controversies without being misled 
by the prescriptions of ideal morality.
In  view of the advantages claimed for the case method, why has it not 
been used more extensively? Fifty years ago, at the time Dundas was 
writing, an explanation might have been found in the prevailing legal 
philosophy, whether explicitly held by the investigator or adhered to 
unwittingly. “ Legal absolutism”—the term  is Jerome Frank’s— denied 
to mere controversies any significant value as evidence of the law : “The 
decision of a court, determining a particular controversy . . . can in no 
sense be regarded in itself law, whether it be the doom of an ancient 
monarch, the decision of a popular court, or the judgment of a modern 
tribunal.”19 But today we are all more or less legal realists, accepting
17. Sec Herskovits, supra note 12, at 37; cf. Baines, “Some Ethical Problems 
in M o d e m  Fieldwork,” 14 Brit. J. Sociol. 118, passim (1963). But see Roy. 
Anthrop. Inst., op. cit. supra note 9, at 29-30.
18. Holmes, supra note 13, at 461: “The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”
19. Beale, Treatise on the Conflict o f Laws (1916) quoted in Frank, Law and the 
M odem  M ind 53 (6th ed. 1949).
Holmes’ emphasis on cases as the starting point of legal research. Signi­
ficantly, it was the leading proponent of this school, Karl Llewellyn, who 
joined with an anthropologist, E. Adamson Hoebel, to execute the first 
broad study of customary law based entirely on what they called “trouble
cases” .20
T hat this approach was not immediately imitated is therefore probably 
due more to the practical difficulties it posed than to any jurisprudential 
aversion, for the case method places a far greater burden on the field- 
worker. An interviewer, once he identifies a co-operative, knowledgeable 
informant, can survey an entire legal system in the course of discussions 
occupying a few days. It is true, of course, that an equally comprehensive 
collection of cases may be obtained with little more difficulty from an 
informant.21 But if reliance is not to be placed on the incomplete and 
warping memories of men then disputes must be recorded contempora- 
ne sly, which demands extended residence in the community, as well as 
considerable technical abilities.
The investigator cannot know in advance where, when, or by whom a 
dispute will be mediated. Even in those societies possessing formal 
agencies for settlement^ adjudication is not conducted according to a 
predetermined calendar. But in many tribes the very identity of the 
participants in the settlement process depends on the relationship of the 
litigants and the circumstances of the controversy, The investigator can 
insure his presence at the discussions only by being in the vicinity, 
“ on call” when the dispute first erupts. And then he must in addition be 
fluent in the vernacular or work through, or with the assistance of, 
inte *preters who have that ability. Only the anthropologist has combined 
the dedication and patience required to observe actual disputes with the 
technical skills necessary to translate observation into understanding.22
20. Llewellyn and Hoebel, The Cheyenne W ay (1941). See also Hoebel, ‘'Funda­
mental Legal Conceptions in Primitive Law,” 51 Yale L  J. 951, 966 (1942). 
For a more recent assertion of the realist position, see Seidman, Research 
in A frican Law and the Processes o f Change 12-13 (1967).
21. This was in fact the method whereby Llewellyn and Hoebel collected their 
case materials during the course of two summers. Op. cit. supra note 20,
at viii.
22. See Epstein, op. cit. supra note 10, at 222-23. Anthropologists have, in 
consequence, written the classic works in the jurisprudence of customary 
i.iw and die judicial process in Africa. See, e.g., Bohannan, op. a t .  supra 
note 10; Gluckman, The Judicial Process among the Barotse o f Northern  
Rhodesia (2nd ed. 1967); Gulliver, Social Control in an African Society 
(1963). Few anthropologists working within Kenya have turned their atten­
tion specifically towards legal problems, but an outstanding example of the 
use of case materials to illuminate the nature of authority and the process 
of dispute settlement is Spencer, The Samburu (1965).
Other investigators—settlers,23 travellers,24 missionaries,25 early adminis­
trators26—have been limited to rule-directed interviews.
In  recent years, however, the development and modernization of African 
legal systems has created a significant new resource for the study of 
customary law. Judicial structures, recognized or created by the colonial 
regimes to administer indigenous law and retained by the independent 
■rates w h’i some modifications, are increasingly producing written records 
of their proceedings, possessing ever greater detail and comprehensive­
ness.27 These materials have for some time been used by administrators,28 
who pci haps are favourably predisposed since they often sit at the appellate 
level of this judicial hierarchy. But other disciplines, while allowing court 
records n limited vah ir reluctant to use them extensively. Although
some anthropologists have supplemented observation with written data,29 
many appear to view both the courts and their records with suspicion.80 
And ir is unquestionably true th  e an alien institution which
modify traditional custom as they apply it. Lawyers, initially more attracted 
to court judgments by their similarity to the subject matter of orthodox
23. See, e.g., Shaw, “Some Preliminary Notes on Luo Marriage Customs,” 
45 -46 J. E. Afr and Ug. Nat. Hist. Soc. 29 (1932); Augustiny, “The Tribes 
of Ukamba, their History, Customs, etc.,” 2 E. Afr. Q. 405-13 (1905).
24. See, e.g., Gregory, The Great R ift Valley: being the narrative o f a journey to 
M ount Kenya and Lake Baringo (1896); New, Life, Wanderings, and Labours 
in Eastern Africa (1897).
25. Sec, e.g., Cagnolo, The A kikuyu (1933); Stain, “Bantu Kavirondo of Mumias 
District (near Lake Victoria),” 14-15 Anthropos 968 (1919-20).
26. See, e g., Beech, “Sketch of Elgeyo Law and Custom,” 20 J. Afr. Soc. 195 
(1921); Mnssam, The C liff Dwellers o f Kenya (1927).
27. Again, I must acknowledge that I am merely following the lead of earlier 
investigators in utilizing this source. See, e.g., Allott, “Methods of Legal 
Research inti nary Law,” 5 J. Afr. Admin. 172, 173 (1953); Hall,
supra note 13; Hall, supra note 12; Lewin, “ I hc Recording of Native Law 
and Custom,” 37 J. Roy. Afr. Soc. 483, 485 (1938); African Studies Branch, 
Colonial Office, “Methods of Recording Native Customary Law,” 1 J. Afr. 
Admin. 130 (1919).
28. See, e.g., Penwill, Kamba Customary Law (1951) (District Commissioner, 
Machakos District);Edgar,Notes on Kipsigis Customary Law (1958) (cyclostyl- 
td; copy in Nairobi) (District Officer, Kcricho). Nevertheless,
■ explicitly that they rely on court records, neither 
‘ ■ ‘ts ol a single case. Compare Howell, A M anual o f N uer Law  
(1954) (Asst. Disr. Commr. Zcraf Dist., Sudan; extensive quotation of cases).
29. See, e.g., Bohannan, “Homicide and Suicide in North Kavirondo,” in 
African Homicide and Suicide 154 (Bohannan ed. 1960); Wilson, Luo  
Customary Law and Marriage Laws (Justoms (1961); LeVine, “Gusii Sex 
Offences: a studj ial control,” 61 Axner. Anthrop. 965 (1959); cf. 
Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law (1962); Crawford, Witchcraft and Sorcery in 
Rhodesia 1-8 (1967); Fallers, Law without Precedent (1969).
30. Sec, e.g., Goldsclimidt, op. cit. supra note 14, at 21: “On the whole, however, 
these court cases are the least satisfactory of my data, not only because it is 
difficult to assess the influence of other cultures on actions taken, but because 
they were always fragmentary. ... I find that court cases are relatively unim-
nd I have used them with caution.” Cf. Cory, 
Sukutna Law and Custom (1953) (Tanganyika Government Sociologist).
legal research,31 seem to have been disenchanted for a reason just the obverse 
o f that of the anthropologists. Customary courts, to lawyers, are in­
sufficiently like their European models—generally highly informal and 
frequently tainted with corruption—and their judgments are sadly
lacking in judicial reasoning.32
In  preparing my own research plan, I knew beforehand that I lacked
the skills to observe actual cases. Persuaded by the complementary ob­
jections of anthropologists and lawyers to court records, I anticipated 
that I would concentrate on rule directed interviews. Instead, my initial 
exposure to court records convinced me that here was an invaluable
source of information on customary law, far superior to any other acces­
sible to me. Consequently, I devoted almost the entire year I lived in 
Kenya to the selection and summary of case reports, collecting a total
I > i i o n  in South Africa (1961) j Elias, 
The Mature m a ry  I J (1956). In discussing the methods
he employed to determine the rules of customary law, Elias refers to “the 
increasing volume of recorded judicial decisions of statutory courts established 
i many areas of the Continent- -by far the most reliable source of information 
for the legal theorist no less than for the professional lawyer.” Nevertheless 
lie does not quote or cite a single such case in his extensive treatise.
See, e.g., Allott, supra note 27, at 173: “The potential investigator should 
be warned that: (i) records of proceedings are frequently imperfect (perhaps 
containing little more than the claim and the decision without any reasons 
daerefor), or unintelligible, or not in English; (ii) native court records are 
often disappointing for one seeking a statement of the rules of customary 
law (it may be necessary to read the whole case, including the evidence as 
recorded to get an idea of the point at issue); (iii) bias or perversion of justice 
may intrude into a decision. . . .” Compare Allott, Essays in African Law  
84-94 (1960); Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law 83-97 (1963). See also 
Cotran, Report on Customary Criminal Offences in Kenya 2-6 (1963) (no use 
made of case materials); Cotran, Restatement o f African Law, K enya, vol. 1: 
The Law  o f Marriage and Divorce (1968) (no use of the vast bulk of case 
material from the primary and appellate courts). But anthropologists have 
recognized, and demonstrated, how legal principles can be derived from a 
study of the entire body of testimony when read in conjunction with the 
judgment of a case. See, e.g., Fallers, "Customary Law in the Ne w  African 
States,” in A fiican  L aw : New Law  for New  Nations 71, 82 (Baade ed. 1963). 
Nevertheless, the most recent evaluation of the utility of primary court 
decisions, representing a consensus of lawyers and anthropologists, has been 
generally unfavourable. See Allott, Epstein and Gluckman, “Introduction”, 
in Ideas and Procedures in A frican Customary Law 1, 8-9 (Gluckman ed. 
1969).
“First, how far can a clear rule of law, in its full context, be derived 
from a single judicial decision ? Where one has only a short statement 
of a decision, without full presentation of the arguments and judicial 
reasoning, it is difficult to see how the decision was arrived at to fit the
particular set of circumstances before it. . . . Secondly, since only a few, 
or even no, cases in certain areas of dispute may occur in any period of 
time, information has to be collected by discussions both with customary 
judges and with ordinary citizens, on remembered disputes and on cases 
stated, varied as much as possible, as well as on statements of what 
customary rules were and are.”
Tt will be clear from m y  previous discussion of research methods that I 
question the theoretical underpinnings of the techniques advocated. I hope 
that the asc analyses presented below will answer some of the criticisms of 
the case merhod which this quotation expresses.
of more than 4,000 from about forty courts. I found it necessary to supple­
ment these materials in only one significant respect, with data on out-of- 
court arbitration, in order to place the role of the courts within the wider 
perspective of conflict resolution.
T he purpose of this paper is to describe the case materials available 
or the si iidy o; customary law in Kenya, with illustrations from the data
I gathered, and locate them  within the context of the judicial and extra­
judicial structures for dispute settlement. In  the process I will try  to 
demonstrate how these resources justify the claims of the case method, and 
to answer the criticisms o f anthropologists and lawyers. Although my
research tricted to. Kenya, I hope this analysis of techniques and
materials will have some value for those engaged in similar work elsewhere, 
especially in those parts of anglophonic Africa which possess comparable
legal systems.
II. Ju d ic ia l S y s tem 33
As early as 1897, only two years after the declaration of the East 
Africa Protectorate34 (as Kenya was then known), the British adminis­
tration formally recognized certain indigenous agents of dispute settlement 
by granting jurisdiction to existing “courts” of local chiefs and councils of 
elders.35 Although avowedly based on traditional institutions, these courts 
were an integral part of the unitary judicial system of the Colony.36
33. For a comprehensive history of the primary courts of Kenya up to 1945 
see Phillips, Report on N ative Tribunals (1945). More recent descriptions 
are: Phillips, “The African Court System in Kenya”, 4 J. Afr. Admin. 135 
(1952); Carson, “Further Notes on the African Courts System in Kenya”, 
10 J. Afr. Admin. 34 (1958); Cotran, “Kenya.” in Judicial and Legal Systems 
in A frica 89 (Allott ed. 1962); Watts, “The Court of Review, The Appeal 
System, African Courts: Chapter 11 of the Laws of Kenya”, 2 E.A.L.J. 151 
(1966); Cotran, “Integration of Courts and Application of Customary Law 
Kenya”, 4 E.A.L.J. 14 (1968). See generally Colony and Protectorate o f 
K enya: N ative Affairs Department, Annual Report (1925-47); Colony and  
Protectorate o f Kenya: African A ffairs Department, Annual Report (1948-57); 
Mungeam, British Rule in K enya, 1895-1912: The Establishment o f Adminis­
tration in the East A frica Protectorate. (1966).
n July 1, 1895. Hardinge to Salisbury, 2 July 1895, F.O.C.P. 6761; London 
G azette, 15 June 1895. Cited in Low, “British East Africa: The Establish­
ment of British Rule, 1895-1912”, in II History o f East A frica 1, 6 (Harlow 
and Chilver eds. 1965).
35. Native Courts Regulations, 1897, No. 52, ss.2 (£>), 46 (East Africa Protec-
ate). At the same time, the government established the beginnings of 
what it hoped would be a system of direct rule, in the form of Native Courts 
oresided over by European officers. s,2 (a). Nothing ever came of this idea 
and it was abandoned about 1908. See Phillips, Report on N ative Tribunals 
7-10 (1945).
36. See Phillips, op. cit. supra note 35. Lawyers were also allowed to appear.
Native Court Regulations, 1897, No. 52, s.81 (East Africa Protectorate); 
tules for the Administration of Justice in Native Courts under the East 
897,s.52 (Oct. 21,1899); Native Court Practitioners
if 9 ffioq (Oi t 23 1899) (Fast Africa Protectorate)
Five years later the administration moved a step further from tradition, 
strengthening the powers of those chiefs already recognized,37 and dele­
gating additional judicial authority to the newly instituted official head­
men.3" In 1910, noting the erosion in the influence of indigenous elders 
as a result of the novel powers conferred on chiefs and headmen, the new 
Governor, Sir Pei y Girouard, sought to reaffirm their position, guided 
by the principle of indirect rule.39 But little was changed until 1930, 
when a major revision separated the judiciary from the executive powers 
of the chief or headman and further segregated the African judicial 
machinery from the structure serving the rest of the population.40 Re­
vitalized panels of elders, explicitly constituted “in accordance with the 
native law or custom of the area*’41 now formed the base of a judicial 
hierarchy in which appeal lay to Native Appeals T ribunals,42 and then
37. East Africa Native Courts Amendment Ord., No. 31 of 1902. Section 2 
authorized the Commissioner to proclaim any district a special district to 
which the 1897 Regulations would not apply; he made such a proclamation 
that same day with respect to all the es apart from the coast: Ukamba,
Naivasha, Kisuniu, Kenya and Jubaland. However, s.15 (1) of the Ordinance 
perpetuated the chief’s courts: Nothing herein to affect the power o f the Com­
missioner to recognize the jurisdiction o f a tribal Chief over the members o f his 
tribe, or the exercise by such tribal Chief o f such authority as may be lawfully 
vested in him, or may be granted to him by the Commissioner.
38. Village Headman Ord., No. 22 of 1902, s.6 (East Africa Protectorate): 
The Commissioner may make rules conferring upon any headman or any body 
o f headmen in any village or group o f villages the power to hear and determine 
petty native cases to such extent and upon such conditions as to appeal and pro­
cedure as the Commissioner may determine. The jurisdiction of both types of 
court was limited to members of the tribe, and in some cases only of the 
vill hich the court sat. Courts Ord , No. 13 of 1907, s.10(1) (East 
Africa Protectorate); Rules Under Section 10 of the “Courts Ordinance, 
190, ss.2, 9 (Mar. 30, 1908).
39. Native Tribunal Rules, 1911, s.2 (1) (Apr. 4, 1911) (East Africa Protectorate): 
The powers conferred by these rules shall be exercised only by such Councils 
o f Elders as are constituted under and in accordance with Native law and 
custom and are recognized by the Governor [emphasis added]. Native Authority 
Ord., No. 22 of 1912, s.2 (1) (East Africa Protectorate): The Governor may 
appoint any Chief or other N ative or any Council o f Elders to be Official H ead­
er Collective Headmen . . . See Phillips, op. cit. supra note 35, at 13-15.
This emphasis on indirect rule appears to have been short-lived, for the 
the 1911 Rules were eliminated two years later by the 
then Governor, H. C. Belfield. Narivc Tribunal Rules, 1913, Government 
No. 43, ss.2, 3 (Feb. 6, 1913) (East Africa Protectorate). See also 
Courts Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 5, s. 11 (1926).
40. Native Tribunals Ord., No. 39 of 1930 (Kenya). Advocates were now exclud­
ed. s.24. Authority was extended to all causes of action arising within, 
crimes occurring within, or defendants residing within, the jurisdiction of
the court, ss.10, 11.
41. s.4.
42. s.33 (1). The Provincial Commissioner, with the approval of the Governor, 
could appoint a Native Tribunal, presided over by a headman, or senior
elder, or composed of thre to be a court of appeal. In Coast
Province, the Moslem LitodK or mudir was later included as an intermediate 
app Native Tribunals (Amendment) Ord., No. 38 of 1940,
to District43 and Provincial Commissioners.44 On the recommendations
of the Phillips report45 this structure was reformed in 1951.40 A start 
was made toward assimilating the judicial system of the African community 
to the pattern of that principally used by non-Africans:47 tribunals were 
’enamed African Courts and ultimate judicial review was transferred 
from the Fiovincial Commissioner to a newly created Court of Review.48 
L iter, a single level of lay magistrates replaced both the African Courts 
of Appeal49 and review by administrative officers.50 Finally, seventy 
years after the introduction of a plural legal system in Kenya, the Magis­
trate’s Courts Act51 substantially eliminated the remaining dualism, 
transforming African Courts into District Magistrate’s Courts,52 com­
petent to he > involving all residents of Kenya,53 with a single
route of appeal to First Class54 or Resident M agistrates,55 then to the 
High C ourt60 and in the last resort to the Eastern Africa Court of Appeal.57
the indigenous institutions recognized by, or novel 
ments predating 1930 were not recorded,58
43. Appc<iis were later transferred to the District Officer. Native
Tribunals (Amendment) Ord., No 31 of 1933.
44. s.34 (3). Provision was made for ultimate review in the Supreme Court by 
means of a case stated, s.34 (4), bur none was ever taken. See Phillips, op.
cit. supra note 35, at 5; Watts, supra note 33, at 156.
45. Op. cit. supra note 35.
46. African Courts Ord., No. 65 of 1951.
47 In establishing these courts, the Provincial Commissioner was no longer 
bound to follow native law and custom, but could determine the constitution 
of the court, order of precedence, method of deciding in cases of dispute, 
limits of jurisdiction, quorum and use of assessors, s.6.
consisted of a chairman appointed by the Governor, the 
of Native Commissioner, the African Courts Officer, and an African 
apf r (Shadrark Malo a former President of the Central
Nyanza African Court of Appeals). African Courts Ord., No. 65 of 1951, 
s.4 (2). In 1962 the Chief Native Commissioner was replaced by a second 
African. African Courts (Amendment) Ord., 1962, No. 50 of 1962, s.4 (1).
49. Allowed to die out through lack of appointments in the early 1960’s.
50. African Courts (Amendment) Ord., No. 50 of 1962, s.38.
51. No. 17 of 1967.
52. ss.8, 43 (1), Second Schedule s.2.
53. Compare M  No. 17 of 1967, ss.9, 10, with African
Courts Ord., No. 65 of 1951, s.9.
54. Appeals from a Third Class Magistrate’s court in civil cases are to a First 
Class Magistrate, s. 12.
from a Third Class Magistrate’s court in criminal cases are to a 
Resident Magistrate, s.4.
56. Appet Second or First Class Magistrate or a Resident Magistrate 
are to the High Court in both civil matters, Civil Procedure Ord., Laws of 
Kenya, cap. 5, s.65 (1) (1948), and criminal, Criminal Procedure Code, 
Laws of Kenya, cap. 75, s. 347(1) (rev. ed. 1962), as amended by Magistrate’s 
Courts Act, No, 17 of 1967, s.30.
57. Criminal Procedure Code, Laws of Kenya, cap. 75, s.361 (1) (rev. ed. 1962); 
Civil Procedure Ord., !,aws of Kenya, cap. 5, s.72 (1948).
as, supra note 33, at 155. At that time this was thought to be too 
obvious to require expression in the legislation, but it may be seen indirectly 
in the fact that European administrators, in exercising their powers of revision, 
were to treat the controversy as an original case and hear it de novo. See, e.g., 
lea under Section 10 of the “Courts Ordinance, 1907”, s.5 (Mar. 30, 
1908); Native Tribunals Rules* 1913, Government Notice No. 43, s. 14 
(Feb. 5, 1913).
and hence are lost to scholarship except as they may be studied through 
the memories of informants. T he 1930 Ordinance reorganized these 
disparate bodies into several hundred native tribunals,59 each consisting 
of as many as fifty or more elders. These, like their predecessors and 
successors, were instructed to apply “ the Native Law and Custom pre­
vailing in the area of the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” 60 The elders were 
presumed to know this customary law as an integral part of their inherited 
tradition, a reasonable presumption since they were men of little education, 
few European contacts, and served exclusively within their own tribe.
During the next three decades the administration gradually attempted 
to restructure these tribunals according to a European model. Their 
numbers were reduced to a fairly stable figure of just over a hundred 
in 1966.01 T he membership of each court was transformed from a large 
group of elders participating irregularly for nominal pay to a much 
smaller, more professional body, earning substantial salaries for fixed 
duties, and hearing individual cases in panels of no more than ten ;62 
by 1966 few courts had more than four members. Although the Native 
Tribunals Ordinance did not make explicit provision for the recording 
nf prot eedings, the literate clerks attached to these courts were encouraged 
to do so as far as they were able; useful records began to appear in the 
1950’s, and improved dramatically in the next fifteen years.63
59. In 1943 there were 139 tribunals, already a substantial decrease from the 
situation ten years earlier. See Phillips, op. cit. supra note 35, at 6. Between 
1930 and 1937, in Kavirondo Province, for instance, 78 locational tribunals 
were reorganized into 20 divisional courts. Id. at 17.
60. Native Tribunals Ord., No. 39 of 1930, s.13 (a). Similar provisions can be 
found in all legislation pertaining to the judiciary, from the earliest, Native 
Courts Regulations, No. 52 of 1897, s.4 (Aug. 12, 1897), to the most recent, 
Magistrate’s Courts Act, No. 17 of 1967, ss.2, 10(l)(a); Judicature Act 
1967, No. 16, s.3 (2).
6 1. See Phillips, op. a t. supra note 35, at 13-15; Watts, supra note 33, at 155. 
See also the warrants establishing each court, which state when the court 
was created, when abolished, and list its personnel. These are kept in the 
offices of the Prov mmissioners and in the Law Courts, Nairobi.
62. See generally Phillips, op cit. supra note 35, passim. In Kavirondo Province, 
for instance, by 1913, elders were earning as much as Shs. 65/- a month, 
and the t ribunal president up to Shs. 150/-. Id. at 20 In Kisii District panels 
of six elders chosen from a pool of 18 heard individual trials. Id. at 29.
63. See Watts, supra note 33, at 155. The 1930 Ordinance omitted the require­
ment, contained in earlier enactments, that appeals be heard de novo. By 
1950 parti- s were requesting copies of the record and judgment with sufficient 
frequency to require die setting of a fee for this service. Native Tribunals 
(l ees and Tines) (Amendment) Rules, 1950, Government Notice No. 867 
(July 21, 1950). The African Courts Ordinance, No. 65 of 1951, provided 
for revision based on the record alone, s.39 (l)(a). During the 1950’s a series 
of handbooks for the gu- it African Courts gave detailed instructions
concerning the recording of evidence and the writing of judgments. See 
[Watts], Standing Orders for African Courts, ss.23-28, 104-18 (1956); 
Tennent, Notes and Instructions fo r  the Guidance o f African Courts 2-7, 
11 -14 (1959) (Kakamega District); Notes and Instructions fo r  the Guidance 
of African < ' (1959) (Machakos District). While the above were
merely advisory, the Chief Justice promulgated, under the authority of 
Afri urt8 Ord., No. 65 of 1951,-*.62 (A), binding rules requiring the
t Courts Civil Pro­
cedure Rules ss.42, 49 (n.d.); Criminal Procedure Rules for African Courts 
ss,54, 59 (n.d.).
T he Magistrate’s Courts Act of 196784 completed this process, eliminat­
ing several more courts to leave a total o f ninety,66 each staffed by one 
to four magistrates sitting individually.86 Because these were men of 
superior English literacy, often clerks of the former African Courts, 
their reports of cases developed from a mere listing of the names of parties 
and fhe result to a full, if  not verbatim, record o f the evidence followed 
by a reasoned judgment. These lay magistrates are currently receiving 
intersi re instruction in law emphasizing the basically English procedure 
and Kenya substantive legislation they must apply. 'Training in customary 
law is limited, even though familiarity with it can no longer be taken for 
granted.67 The present younger generation of magistrates have often
64. No. 17.
65. As of August, 1967, hese were: (by province and district, with the principal
tribe in parentheses)
1. Nyanza Province
{a) Central Nyanza District: Kisumu (or Winam), Ukwala, Nyando,
Maseno, Bond , Siaya (Luo).
(£) South Nyanza District: Doho Kosele, Suba Kuria, Bura Ndhiwa, 
Burs Rongo, Iloma Bay (Luo).
(r) Kisii District: (Ritongo) Kisii, (Ritongo) Kuja, (Ritongo) Manga, 
(Ritongo) Gesima (Gusii).
2. Central Province (Kikuyu)
(а) Nyeri District: Nyeri, Othaya, Karatina, Mukurweini.
(б) Thika District: Thika.
(c) Kiarnbu District: Kiambu, Limuni, Gatundu, Kikuyu, Githunguri. 
(id) Murang’a District: Fori Hall, Kigumo, Kandara, Kagima.
(e) Kirinyaga District: Kerugoya, Gichugu, Wambugu.
(/) Nyandarua District: Nyandarua, Thomson’s Falls.
3. Rift Valley Province
(a) Nakuru District: Nakuni, Naivasha, Molo.
{b) Trans Nzoia District: Kitale (Elgeyo, Marakwet).
(c) Uasin Gishu District: Eldoret, Chcpkorio (Elgeyo, Marakwet).
(d) Nandi District: Kapsabet, Kabiyet (Nandi).
(<?) Kcricho Lhstrict: Kericho, Silibwet, Sotik, Sosiot (Kipsigis).
(/) Baringo District : Baringo (Pokot)t
(g) Narok District: Narok (Masai).
(h) Kajiado District: Kajiado (Masai).
(t) I.aikipia District: Nanyuki (Masai).
4. Coast Province
(a) Mombasa District: Mombasa (or Tononoka).
(/)) Kwale District: Kwalc (Duruma), Gazi (or Gwirani) (Digo).
(c) Kilifi District: Kiliii, Kalolcni, Malindi (Giriama).
(J) laita District: Voi, Wundanyi (Taita, Taveta).
5. Western Province (Luyia)
(a) Bungoma District: Bungoma, Sirisia, Kimilili, Broderick Falls.
Ib) Busia District: Funyula, Nambare.
(r) Kakamega District: Kakamega, Hamisi, Emuhaya, Ikolomani,
Mumias, Butali, Mbale, Khwisero.
6. Eastern Province
Machakos District: Machakos, Uaani, Siatltani, Kikumbulyu, Nziu, 
Kilungu, Kangundo (Kamba).
(b) Kitui District: Mig^vani, Kitui (Kamba).
(c) Embu District: Embu, Siakago, Runycnje’s (Embu).
(d) Meru District: Meru, Maua, Miathene, Nkubu, Chuka (Meru).
7. Nairobi: Makadara, Kibera.
66 . 8.8( 1).
67. s.18: A  magistrate's court m ay, \ j  it thinks fi t ,  call fo r  and hear evidence o f the
African customary law applicable to any case before it.
been isolated from their homes at an early age, attending boarding school,
living in urban areas, and later at university. Furthermore, some are now 
being posted outside their tribal jurisdiction altogether. The rules they 
administer are therefore going to bear a diminishing resemblance to 
traditional practice.
How does this structure function, and what information does it provide 
about the administration of customary law? A rough estimate suggests 
that in 1966 the primary courts decided about 50,000 civil and nearly 
200,000 criminal cases.68 Civil cases were almost all governed by customary 
law, i.e., an unwritten rule whether traditional or modern.69 But legislation 
figured prominently in most criminal prosecutions.70 Indeed, the Con­
stitution abolished all unwritten criminal law as of July 1, 1966.71 M ore­
over, little more than a tenth of all prosecutions were brought under the 
Penal Code,72 the remainder consisting of contraventions of administrative 
regulations concerning trespass,73 boundary markers,74 markets,75 licen-
68. The last official statistics available are those for criminal cases in 1961, 
when 153,441 cases were decided. Republic o f Kenya, Judicial Department 
Report, 1961-1963, at 17 (1965). But I abstracted from the annual returns 
of each court, kept in the Law Courts, Nairobi, some data on the quantity 
of litigation for 1966. M y  own totals,, perhaps somewhat inaccurate, show 
51,225 civil and 191,914 criminal cases. These figures have steadily increased 
iu the recent past.
69. The only civil statute which the courts were authorized to administer was 
the Affiliation Ord., No. 12 of 1959, Law, of Kenya, Cap. 12, s.2 (rev. ed. 
1962) since repealed. In 1966 m y notes show 789 affiliation proceedings. 
jIk Magistrate’s Courts Act No. 17 of 1967, does, however, anticipate a 
general civil jurisdiction, cither under the customary law, s.l0(l)(u), or, 
subject to a jurisdictional limit determined by the amount in claim, under the 
common or statutory laws of Kenya, s. 10( ))(/>).
70. In 1966, when courts had authority to punish customary crimes during the 
first six months, they heard only 2,049 cases, or about one per cent of all 
prosecutions. Hence even prior to 1966 customary criminal law was not 
very signifh ant. However, the percentages varied greatly from area to area. 
In Nyando African Court, a Luo tribunal, for instance, violations of the 
Pena! Code were only tfi es more frequent than customary crimes. 
But in Sosiot African Court, in Kipsigisland, Penal Code prosecutions were 
more than one hundred times as frequent.
71. Kenya Ordc icil 1963, S.I. 1963/791, Schedule 2, The Constitution 
of Kenya, ss.8(H), H(16). 'This section was implemented by African Courts 
Officer, Circular No. A C  13/1/11/70 (June 18, 1966) which instructed African
natc all pending prosecutions under customary law, with 
leave to the complainant I nil suit upon payment of additional fees.
Set. e.g., Maseno African Court Criminal Case 454/66 (July 22, 1966) 
(prosecution for removing a married woman from the custody of her husband 
under I uo customary law; plaintiff informed he can pay Shs. 50/- in addition 
to the initial Shs. 16/- fee and sue for the return of his wife).
M y  total for 1966 shows 22,875 prosecutions under the Penal Code, or just 
about 12 per cent of all criminal cases.
73. Trespass Ord., No. 48 of 1962, Laws of Kenya, Cap. 294 (rev. ed. 1963).
74. Land Adjudication Act, Laws of Kenya, Cap. 283, s.35(4)(a) (rev. ed. 
1964), as amended by Land Adjudication Act 1968, No. 35 of 1968, s.34(d); 
Registered Land Act, Laws of Kenya, Cap. 300, s.24 (rev. ed. 1964).
75. Marketing of African Produce Ord., Laws of Kenya, Cap. 320 (rev. ed.
1962).
sing,78 taxation,77 stock movement,78 production or consumption of 
alcohol79 or narcotics,80 or non-compliance with the orders of adminis- 
ive personnel.81 Nevertheless, the prim ary courts can82 and do award 
compensation to the victims of criminal offences according to what is 
basically an unwritten law, derived, at least in part, from the customary 
law of wrongs.83 An individual court, on average, may hear about 500 
civil84 and 1,000 criminal85 cases each year. Court records generally 
date back several decades, sometimes to the 1930’s, though physical 
condition of course deteriorates radically with age. All are stored in the 
office of the court which passed judgment, unless the case has been 
appealed.86 Although none are in vernacular many, especially in Coast, 
Nyanza and Western Provinces, were recorded in swahili, at least until 
very recently. (A more detailed statistical analysis of the utilization of 
primary courts may be found in Part IV of this article.)
76. I niders Licensing Otd., Laws of Kenya, Cap. 497 (rev. ed. 1962).
77. Personal T ax Ord., Laws of Kenya, Cap. 470 (rev. ed. 1962).
78. Animal Diseases Ord., Laws of Kenya, Cap. 364 (rev. ed. 1962).
79. African Liquor Ord., Laws of Kenya, Cap. 122 (rev. ed. 1962).
80. Dangerous Drugs Ord., Laws of Kenya, Cap. 245 (rev. ed. 1962).
81. Native Authority Ord., Laws of Kenya, Cap. 128 (rev. ed. 1962).
82. African Courts Ord., Laws of Kenya, Cap* Hi ss.19(1) 22, 23 (rev. ed.
1963); Magistrate’s Courts Act, No. 17 of 1967, s.9(1); Criminal Procedure 
Code, I.aws of Kenya, Cap. 75, ss.175, 176 (rev. ed. 1962).
83. See, e.g., Kosele African Court Criminal Case No. 33 of 1966 (Jan. 20,
1906) (court ordered accused to pay customary compensation of the heifer
for virginity in a prosecution for indecent assault, Penal Code, s.144); 
Bungoma District African Court Criminal Case No. 493 of 1967 (June 22, 
1967 ) (court ordered accused to pay customary compensation of a sheep in a 
prosecution for common assault, Penal Code, s.250). The following abbre­
viations will be used hereafter in citing cases: African Court— AC; District 
African Court— D A C ; African Court of Appeal— ACA; District Officer—  
DO; Appeal Magistrate— Mag; Court of Review— COR: Civil Case— CC; 
Criminal Case— CrC; Civil Appeal— CA; Application— Appl. Each case 
wul be cited by number and year, e.g., 234/65, followed by the presiding 
judge, where significant, and date of decision, where available, e.g. (ainley, 
C. J , Jan. 1, 1966). Although it is customary to cite cases by the names of 
the pa-tics, I have omitted the names in all the citations that follow in order 
to pu servc the anonymity of the individuals involved, since the case numbers
L adequate identification for anyone wishing to do further research 
in this area.
84. The numbers range from 93 for the Kil^ oris African Court, in the Masai 
•nr i of Narok District, Rift Valley Province, since closed down, to 1,694 
in 'he Kavujai African Court, serving the Luyia of Western Province.
85. The statistics range from 146 in the Kapkatct African Court in the Kipsigis 
area of Kcricho District, Rift Valley Province, since closed down, to 3,231 
in bet African Court, Nandi District. In the urban areas totals are 
much higher, e.g., Tononoka African Court — 17,714 (Mombasa); Makadara 
African Court— 10,087 (Nairobi).
86. See African Courts Officer, Circular No. 1 of 1963 (Jan. 25, 1963) amending
Standing Order No. ; file to be kept in highest court which has
passed judgment). Compare African Courts Civil Procedure Rules ss.77-79
(n d.) (case file to be returned to court of first instance).
HI. Case Studies
In  the light of this sketch of the quantity of material available, the 
value of information obtainable from illustrative cases may be placed in 
proper perspective. T he following ease*7 is quoted in full, as far as possible 
in the same form as the original record. T he parties are all Luo.88
P la in tiff: Augustino, Kanyawegi village, Kisumu location, Central 
District, Nyanza Province.
D efen d an ts : Isabella
C la im : Shs. 200/- damages for defamation (filed Aug, 18, 1966).
P la in tif f  (Male, Christian, duly sworn, states):
T he defendants said on 13 August [1966] that I am a witchcraft 
man, that I have killed their son, that I am a jadak89 in their area 
and should go to Nyakach90 which is my original home (loka [in 
dholuo]). The reason for this is that their son, Ogalo Onyango, 
disappeared from their hom e; he was searched for and finally a 
report was received that he had died. T hen  the defendants broke 
out with cry (sic) with my name that I killed him ; they cried in 
their koma91 in the absence of their husband. When Onyango returned 
he collected money and went to search for his son in Sakwa.82 But 
later it was revealed that Ogalo is alive, and living up the lull at 
Kapotman.0' I did not see Ogalo myself when he returned—he stayed 
iust one night—but my boys told me. Then Ogalo went back to where 
he is living in order to escape the summons of the court, for he had been 
accused by another boy. (Examined by Atieno): There was no outstand­
ing gr-idge between me and Ogalo. (Examined by Court): 1 am only a
87. Kisumu D A O  C O  '7,99/66 (Aug. II, 1966). Because of limitations of space 
I have had to select shorter cases. For the same reasons as stated earlier, see 
note 8  ^SUpra, I have deleted all the names of parties and witnesses, using 
what I hope are appropriate pseudonyms in their place.
A Nilotic tribe numbering just over a million and occupying most of Central 
and South Nyanza Districts of Nyanza Province. See Kenya, M inistry of
■ nt, Statistics Division, I I I  Kenya Population 
Census, 1962, at 36 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Kenya Census, 1962].
89. “An unrelated person who is given land on a permanent usufruct which is 
determined by his fulfilment of customary obligations”. Wilson, Luo Cus­
tomary Law and Marriage Laws Customs 12 (1961).
Name of a Luo lineage (or tribe), and also of a location, in Central Nyanza, 
between the Nyando and Sondu Rivers; about 25 miles southeast of Kisumu 
location and lineage, where the defendants live.
91. A  swahQi word, literally meaning fort, but widely used for home. Among 
the Luo it refers to the living area surrounded by an ojuok (euphorbia) hedge.
92. Luo lineage (or tribe) and location in Central Nyanza, about 40 miles west 
of Kisumu.
93. In Nandi District, Rift Valley Province, and thus outside the jurisdiction of 
African Courts cm? Administrative Police in Central Nyanza District, Nyanza
Atieno w/o Onyango
l a i i i c  i v o i u w i v v v
few yards from the boma of defendants. 1 went there on bicycle
quickly alone. I saw Omolo and Oburu standing there; they also 
heard the defamation. I did not report the defendants to the joduong’ 
gzvmg'9/l before suing them  here because I was angry.
P la in tif f 's  w itness, O b u ru , (17 years old): On Saturday, 13 August, 
I was in the boma of Onyango when the defendants, returning from
the lake (nam [in dhoiuo]) broke out into a cry for their son who was 
alleged to have died. Atieno entered the boma carrying a karai9b 
and a basket (odheru [in dhoiuo]) and threw them  down and said: 
“ Aaa. Augustino, how have you killed the son of Onyango 
so badly like this.” Isabella started to cry: “ Augustino, let all your 
wives give birth to many children and name them after Ogalo.” 
T hen  she said : “ let Onyango take any cattle he would have slaughtered 
for the people who came to the funeral (joliel [in dhoiuo]) and use 
them to employ a clever man to take revenge against Augustino for 
killing his son. {Examined by Isabella): When you came from the 
lake I was in the house (simba [in dhoiuo]) of your son Odhiambo. 
(Examined by Court): Augustino was present in the boma at the time 
that the defendants started crying.
D efe n d an t 1 (Isabella) (female, Christian, duly sworn, states): I 
did not defame Augustino’s name. I only said that it is ridiculous 
how the boy Ogalo died in a far place where we do not know. (Exam­
ined by Augustino): We only received a letter which informed us 
that Ogalo is vomiting blood and is likely to die, but we did not cry.
D e fe n d an t 2 (A tieno) (Female, Christian, duly sworn, states): I did 
not defame Augustino's name. We had no grudge against him which 
could make us mention his name. I did not see him come to our 
boma at all. (Examined by Augustino): Our son did not die, but 
we received a letter saying that he is likely to die, but we did not cry. 
I went to Sakwa where my son died and slept there on 13 August.
D e fe n d an ts ' w itness , M a th ia s: A letter came from Sakwa on 13
August to say that the defendants* son was beaten there. So the two 
defendants went there that very day to see him. I never heard them 
cry anything. (Examined by Court): I live in the boma of defendants 
because they are the wives of my uncle (nera [in dhoiuo]).
D e fe n d a n ts ' w itness , O tien o : I live near the defendants. W hen I 
entered their boma I heard them say, why had their son Ogalo died 
outside ? They were only talking, not crying.
94. Elders of a locality. See Wilson, op. cit, supra note 89, at 13.
05. f believe that this is a knife or spear, probably used in fishing.
Ju d g m e n t [The court awarded the full claim and Shs. 32/- costs.]
Plaintiff’s evidence was corroborated by the testimony of his eye­
witness, but defendants offered mere denials. T he court does not 
believe that the defendants contented themselves with the mild 
words they state now. Always when the mother received information 
that her son or daughter has died she usually cried very loud according 
to Luo customs.
The total sequence of events in this case can be re-constructed in 
outline. Ogalo, the son of one of the defendants (co-wives of Onyango) 
got into a fight away from home, in which both he and his adversary
were injured. He fled the scene and hid to avoid prosecution, but a letter 
rcnched his horn , whore people were already alarmed by his prolonged 
absence, which contained an inflated rumour that he was dead or dying. 
T he defend) uely burst into a lament, blaming the tragedy
on Augustino’s witchcraft, Aug heard their cries, and when he 
came to inv« he accusations were repeated. T he women then rushed
off to see the dying boy, but failed to find him, as did their husband 
in a later search. In fact, Ogalo did not die but was merely hiding to 
escape justice and when he revisited his family the witchcraft accusation 
1. Augustino then w >ht to court, filing his complaint
live clays aftei the incident, as scon as ice was able to collect the necessary 
Shs. 32 - fees.80 He failed to submit the dispute to arbitration because, 
in  his anger, he wanted quick action, In  the event, he received his full 
claim less than three weeks after tbe incident.
T here is little to be learned from the three sentence opinion taken in 
isolation, and this paucity of reasoning, typical of many primary court 
judgments, may be one reason for their neglect by lawyers. But when the 
court record is read as a whole, patterns of assertion, adversarial response, 
and judicial determinant her implicit or explicit) may be discerned
which identify the sources of conflict and illuminate the way in which 
controversial conduct is defended and evaluated. Let me try to demons­
trate this through a detailed analysis o f the relatively simple facts of this 
case, with the aid of Luo ethnography.
Although Augustino stated his claim as one for defamation,97 thus
90. Couit ties in most civil cases are proportioned to the amount claimed. A  
demand for Shs. 200/- requires a fee of Shs. 26/-, plus Shs. 61- for service of 
an additional defendant. See African Courts ( Fees and Fines) Rules, Laws of 
Kenya, Cap. 11, Subsidiary Legislation, Schedule, ss.2, 3 (rev. ed. 1963). 
Many rural Africans would not have that amount available in cash, and 
would have to borrow or sell some produce.
97 Augustino is in fact illiterate, ns shown by the fact that he signified his 
accept .nee of the record of his testimony by a thumb-print rather than by 
signing his name. Therefore it is likely that it was the court clerk who filled 
out the forms, and introduced Hnglish legal terminology.
dignifying it with the prestigious terminology of the English common law, 
the gravamen of his complaint was in fact that the defendants had spoken 
words which were insulting to him. Both Isabella and the court demons­
trated this by focusing their questions on the critical failure o f Augustino 
and his . fitness to allege that Augustino was present at the incident, an 
essential ingredient of the cause of action where the injury is personal 
affront but not where it is damage to reputation.08 By far the more serious 
of the two insults alleged was the first that Augustino was a witch who 
had killed the defendants’ son. This accusation was made explicitly by 
Atieno but was also given more subtle utterance by Isabella in her cry 
that Augustino’s wives should bear children named after Ogalo. One 
itution for homicide in Luo customary law is for the clan 
of the murderer to provide a girl to bear progeny to the name of the 
iSCd.M It is Important to recognize tin t the defendants, in placing 
responsibility fot the death of their son on Augustino’s witchcraft, were 
not denying that the physical injury had been incurred in an ordinary 
fight with another m an; rather, witchcraft was invoked to explain wl.y 
Ogalo had become involved in the fight in the first place, and then 
why he h ious harm. Widespread belief in witch­
craft among the Luo has not greatly changed in the last sixty years,100 
as illustrated by the readiness with which these women—nominal Christ­
ians, if illiterate resorted to it in trying to comprehend their tragedy. 
Because witches are so greatly feared they are generally avoided, and 
Augustino was at least thueatened with ostracism if the accusation was 
believed. Indeed, Isabella urged more drastic action—the use of anti- 
witchcralt medicine107 to take revenge for the death of her son.
The second insult alleged - that Augustino was a jadak, or tenant, 
who should go back to his clan’s home was much milder. Jo dak}02 are
98. Augustino and his witness concurred in this characterization by affirming 
on examination that Augustino had been in the defendants’ boma at the time. 
Fincher, neither argued that the words were published outside the boma 
or that Augustino’s reputation was damaged.
two Social S y stem 9— 10 (1968)} Southall,
1..-i. ge f ormation .1 mnrig the I.uo 22 (1958). Where the slayer and victim are 
of the same lineage, so that this solution is precluded by the rules of exogamy, 
the slayer may himself marry a girl whose children arc named after the 
deceased Butt, The Nilotes o f the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda 109 
). Isabella appears to be uiging this latter remedy, which is surprising 
since it accepts Augustino as a member of her son’s lineage, precisely the 
fact she was denying in culling him jadak.
100. Compare Northcote, “ ihe Nilotic Kavirondo, ’ 37 J. Air. Soc. 58, 63 (1907) 
with Wilson, “Homicide and Suicide Among the Joluo of Kenya”, in African  
Homicide and Suicide, 179, 185, 188-89 (Bohannan ed. 1960).
101. According to one informant, shch medicine can cause witchcraft to turn 
against a man who uses it aggressively, and kill him.
102. PIum) of jadak^
members of foreign lineages who have been granted land for purposes 
of cultivation but who suffer from insecurity of tenure and an inferior 
status in society.103 To call attention to  this in public is clearly derogatory.104 
Moreover, the two insults aie interrelated. Augustino, as a jadak, was 
subject to immediate md automatic expulsion from his lands if the com­
munity found him to be a witch.105 But quite apart from the possible 
consequent es of the accusations (which would have been more signi­
ficant had the action been grounded in defamation) the insults were 
intrinsically injurious to dignity and had to be redressed. In  seeking to 
do so Augustino was not only preset ving his own self-respect but also 
that of the ancestor after whom he was named and whose spirit was 
believed to inhabit Augustino’s body:
tive about his juok [ancestor name] and 
‘spoiling i name’ is a serf us matter. An insult is not merely an insult
insult to the ancestors with who [hr] ego shares a 
common juok, and it the insult is not avenged, they will be angry and
punish the insulted man. While the origins of the belief arc now largely 
forgotten by the young, the sensitivity remains. . . .” ,,m
Luo do feel that the obligatory response to abuse, if honour is to be 
buse or physical violence.107 T hat Augustino did 
not indulge in either may be due to a combination of causes including 
fenr o f 'rgal liability,108 and a recognition that his accusers were only 
women, irresponsible in the absence of their husband. But because 
honour requires a vigorous reply to abuse the traditional mode of arbi- 
tration by local eiders is even less appropriate than violence since these 
arbiters are ultimately powerless to extort redress. In the circumstances 
of i' ver, Augustino may have apprehended that
the clan elders would be biased against him, as an outsider. For these
103. See Wilson, op. cit. supra note 89, at 56-62.
104. See, e g., Kisumu D A L  C C  180/66 (June 13, 1966)'(Shs. 300/- damages 
for being called jadak, among other things). See also Evans-Pritchard,
is”, 7 Rhodes-Livingstone T. 24, 37 (1949): lijadak is
a harsh word”. It was not, however, defamatory because it was apparently 
true.
105 See Wilson, op. cit. supra note 89, at 87-88.
106. Whisson, The W ill o f God and the Wiles o f M an 4-5 (1962) (cyclostyled 
paper read at a conference of the East African Institute for Social Research,
Jan. 1962). See also Southall, op. cit. supra note 99, at 25.
. A  • . iA ( Offence n African Customary Law (n.d.) (microfilm,
library of African Law Section, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
London).
African Courts has thus “created” the civil action of
insult in two ways. A1 lss which were traditionally
-p If < uo'. Aire an 1 violence, arc no longer permissible, and
o"ipe-is:>tir* i, inch *1 ( ' is no precedent in tradition, is available.
reasons a demand for substantial civil damages109 allowed him to vindicate
his name promptly and effectively.
Augustino presented a strong case to the court. His own testimony 
contained a clear, detailed, and internally consistent statement of the 
facts on which he based his claim. More im portant, he produced an 
independent eye-witness who generally corroborated his evidence. 
Despite minor contradictions—Augustino and his witness differed, for 
instance, as to whether Augustino was present in Onyango’s boma at 
the start of the incident—O buru’s testimony carried conviction through 
its wealth of additional detail, for example, the precise words of the 
defendants, and what Atieno was carrying. This confirmation gained 
probative force from the fact that Oburu was required to wait outside 
the court until he spoke: failure to obey this rule would have led to his 
disqualification as a witness.110 Against O buru, the defendants could only 
counterpose two very weak witnesses, one of whom the court quickly 
revealed as their close relative and member of their boma. In  relying on 
plaintiff's eye-witness an-3 discounting the testimony of the parties as 
well as that of defendants’ relative the court was making the implicit 
judgment, frequently found in the reasoning o f primary courts, that 
interested persons and their relatives can be expected to lie.111 Equally 
significant is the court’s observation that, whereas the plaintiff specified 
the particulars of defendants’ wrongful conduct, the defendants contented 
themselves with general denials. Facts, the court appears to have reasoned, 
must be met with facts, not mere conclusions. T he defendants may well 
have anticipated this criticism for they offered an alibi, which was repeated 
by the first defence witness. But the story they chose— that they had 
gone to Sakwa to see their son immediately on hearing of his misfortune 
—was irrelevant since they could easily have insulted Augustino before 
they left.
>n assessing the evidence the court did more than simply weigh the 
quantities of independently corroborated factual detail on each side.
J O< 1 li: amount claimed was largely arbitrary, though comparable to that request­
ed in similar cases. The range is generally between Shs. 100/- and Shs. 500/-.
mu DAG CC 8/66 (Feb. 8,1966) (Shs. 150/-); Kisumu D A C  CC 
5/66 (Jan. 12,1966) (Shs. 500/- against each defendant). Because the action is 
not founded in custom there are no real standards. Courts will generally award 
the amount claimed, as in this case, although judgments are sometimes 
reduced where the insult is trivial or in some way justified. See, e.g., Kisumu 
D A C  C C  394/66 (Nov. 24, 1966) (claim of Shs. 500/- reduced to judgment 
of Slis. 100/- because defendant was a young boy unable to pay the full 
amount).
110. African Courts Civil Procedure Rules, s.33 (n.d.): The presiding member 
shall then order the witnesses to withdraw from  the court and shall ensure that 
no witnesses hear the evidence given by the plaintiff, defendant or any other
witness. See Kericho D A C  C C  16/66 (Mar. 10, 1966) (defence witness
disqualified because present during hearing).
111. Cf. African Court-; Civil Procedure Rules, s.49 (n.d.); The judgment shall 
shcto . . the evidence that the court hcliettes and the evidence it docs not believe.
It employed as evidentiary rules perceptions about modal behaviour in
Luo society, comparing conflicting allegations with the conduct which 
it believed could be expected in the circumstances.117 Both defendants 
admitted receiving the news that their son was dead or dying, but denied 
uttering cries of grief. The court explicitly rejected this contention as 
inconsistent with its own experience: mothers always cry when they 
hear of the death of their children.113 Thus the women, by foolishly 
alleging a course of behaviour that was inherently incredible, destroyed the 
cogency of their subsequent defence. In answering this defence the court 
relied on two further implicit perceptions. T he first, that mothers in 
their grief accuse those they believe responsible for their misfortune,114 
was not contested. But Atieno forcefully challenged any inference that 
she or her co defendant would tend to name Augustino as being respon­
sible. And, even granting the court’s first two perceptions, what reasons
112. In the analysis that fallows I must acknowledge a debt, which anyone writing 
in this field shares, to Max Gluckman, for introducing the fertile concept 
of the “reasonable man” into legal anthropology in The Judicial Process 
Among the Barotse o f Northern Rhodesia (1955). However, I believe that 
Gluekman’a use of the term suffers from some confusion between an eviden­
tiary test of credibility and a substantive, standard of right conduct. He 
writes; “Legal truth involves the assessment of what happened in terms of 
both legal and moral norms. For the judges have to find out who has con­
formed with the law, and who has broken it ... it is by these norms that the 
judges examine and attack evidence”. Id. at 82. It is the primary task of a 
judge to determine whether the defendant has conformed to the law. In 
doing so the court may also make normative comments about the conduct 
of other parries and witnesses, and these may well be as important in their 
social effect as the formal judgment. But surely a judge does not make an 
“assessment of what happened” by measuring testimony against “legal and 
moral norms” such as those quoted, “respect and help your father”, “treat 
your wife well”. Ibid. The credibility of testimony rests on whether the 
conduct asserted is typical behaviour under the circumstances, not whether 
it is nurally correct. The evidentiary standard I employ, therefore, is one 
drawn from modal behaviour. Indeed, the perceptions about modal behaviour 
that 1 find in the court’s evaluation of the evidence are clearly not standards 
of right conduct. Nevertheless, I still think that Gluckman’s normative use 
of the concept of a reasonable man has great value in understanding the 
nature of substantive standards in customary law. Furthermore, he has 
since i fined the concept of the reasonable man to recognize this distinction. 
See Id. at 393 (2nd ed. 1967).
11.3. Cf. Kisumu D A C  C C  484/66 (Jan. 6, 1967) (court believed plaintiff’s evidence 
at the funeral of her brother, accused plaintiff of having 
killed that brother, another brother, and a brother's son by witchcraft). 
But cf. Kisumu D A C  C C  371/06 (Oct. 25, 1966) (first defendant, husband 
of deceased, alleged to have cried out accusations of witchcraft against 
plaintiff when he heard of death, but the court believed the evidence of 
defendants that they merely expressed their sorrow over the death).
114. See Whisson, The School in Present D ay Luo Society 44, 47 (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1963): “Death, it was said, could not be wholly 
for natural causes. . . . Anyone with whom he (the deceased] had been in 
conflict might be cited as having been responsible for the death. . . . Death 
was caused by supernatural means and by the same means it should be 
avenged. The more important the man and his connections, the greater the 
number of explanations for his deat e wider the range of accusations
would be. If the death was sudden and unexpected, more stories would be 
spread”.
were there for the defendants to malign Augustino ? He himself proffered 
none, and was forced to admit, in response to Atieno, that he and Ogalo 
had harboured no grudges against each other which could cause the 
defendants to suspect him. Nor, according to Atieno, did she bear Augus­
tino any hatred which would lead her to accuse him falsely; she further 
contended that he had never entered her boma, and hence could not have 
stimulated a spontaneous accusation.
Although the court never spoke to this issue, an explanation of the defend­
ants’ motives is implicit in Augustino’s allegation that he was called a jadak 
as well as i witch. A jadak  is by definition an alien, a member of a foreign
lineage; as such he is a potential enemy, viewed with considerable sus­
picion.115 T h e  defendants, themselves members o f foreign natal clans by 
reason of the rules of exogamy,116 also occupied somewhat insecure 
positions id additional incentive to fix the blame on Augus­
tino. M oreover, at least one of the defendants was the co-wife of Ogalo's 
mother, a relationship typically characterized by rivalry.118 M isfortune 
suffered by the child of one wife is most commonly attributed to the jealousy 
of another,119 in this case the defendant, unless a more suitable suspect 
can be found. T his Augustino provided, not only as an outsider, but as 
the occupier of badly needed land. Central Nyanza, one of the most 
densely populated areas of Kenya,120 suffers from a significant land short­
age. By accusing Augustino, a jadak, of witchcraft, the women provided a 
ground for his subsequent expulsion by the local clan. Thus they sought 
to sj ft 'suspicion from themselves by appealing to the revanchist senti­
ments of their husband’s group.121 They may even have stood to benefit 
materially from the redistribution o f Augustino’s holdings, since they 
were his close neighbours. For this combination of reasons a jadak, 
often the object of witchcraft accusations, was a particularly suitable
115. “Distant dans were regarded as being dose ro enemies. Tn times of peace 
they were treated as foreigners and in case of invasion they fought with 
spears [rather than clubs]”. Othieno-Ochieng’, op. cit. supra note 99, at 4.
116. See Southall, op. cit. suj 99, at 20; Wilson, op. a t. supra note 89, at 137.
117. See Southall, up. cit. supra note 99, at 22: “the groups with which marriage 
is possible tend to be those between whom hostility is the usual atittude. 
The 1 uo recognize this correlation, and regard oche (in-laws) and zvasigu 
(enemies) as almost interchangeable terms. ...”
118. Id. at 20.
119. See cases cited in Wilson, op. cit. supra note 100, at 191-92.
120. Three hundred and fifty-nine persons per square mile. This compares with a
national density of 39. Nyanza Province is the most densely populated of
the whole country. See Kenya Census, 1962, at 19, 20.
121. “[WJe find today in the overcrowded tribal areas considerable mterlincage 
enmity about land.” Evens Pritchard, op. cit. supra note 104, at 38.
target here;122 the court may well have considered this in ignoring Aticno’s
protestations that she lacked any motive to accuse Augustino.
Having found that the defendants did utter the insulting words in 
plaintiff’s presence, the court next had to pass on possible defences. The 
defendants and their witnesses appear to have sought to convey the 
impression the Ogalo had actually died, for it was only on cross-examina­
tion that Atieno admitted that this did not in fact occur. Augustino 
clearly feared that the court might be deceived on this point, and conclude 
therefrom that the abuse was justified, for he took great pains to emphasize 
that Ogalo was still very much alive and missing from the village only 
because he was a fugitive from justice. However, the court was not misled 
and hence did not have to answer the very difficult question whether 
that death was caused by Augustino’s witchcraft. Moreover, the court 
never confronted with the less controversial issue, which was raised 
by the facts, whether a good faith or reasonable belief by the women 
that Augustino had killed Ogalo would constitute a defence. The defend­
ants could not propose this argument because they refused to concede 
that they had accused Augustino and to plead the defence merely hypo- 
thes£ft&£fuch a concession would probably appear to a legally unsophis­
ticated court to constitute that very admission. Nevertheless, the reiteration 
in the testimony of defendants and defence witnesses that defendants 
did receive a letter w'arning of their son’s imminent death, and did believe 
it to the extent of going straight to Sakwa to investigate (a journey of 
many hours) may be seen as an attempt to put forward evidence of at 
least a good faith belief in their son’s death. In ignoring this belief as a 
possible defence, the court may have been following Augustino’s implicit 
distinction between the precipitate, and thus unjustified, charges by the 
two women and their husband’s more cautious reaction in organizing 
a careful investigation of the incident at Sakwa.
W hen view'ed against the background of available ethnography this 
case report Is a fertile source of hypotheses about law', though of course these 
mus^ still be tested against numerous other disputes before general prin­
ciples c k be induced. Where a rule-directed inquiry might have produced 
an a statement of the wrong—“ compensation is paid for abuse”—
attention to the details o f this case illuminates the social environment 
in which the wrong occurred. We learn that the “ m others” of a 
young man, hearing that be had been suddenly injured and might die,
1 2 2  Jt should not be thought, of course, that jodak are intentionally singled out 
for false accusations of witchcraft in general or by the defendants in this 
case. Rather, a functional interpretation of witchcraft requires not only that
belief in the existence of supernatural phenomena be given an explanation
in teims of social rather than pi ysical phenomena, hut also that the identities 
of accuser and accused be understood in the light of stresses in the social
srructure,
uttered witchcraft accusations against a near neighbour who is a jadak.
Available remedies are not merely listed as fungible alternatives: counter­
abuse, assault, arbitration, civil action for damages; the choice made 
under the circumstances of this case provides some data indicating when 
certain remedies are chosen, and why.123 Existing biases cannot be dis­
pelled by a mode of inquiry, but the case method does help to reveal 
them and thus avoid their consequences. An investigator working, perforce, 
vith an elderly informant who reported only traditional conduct might 
never have learned of the wrong of insult even though it constitutes a 
substantial portion of the work of the primary courts.124 On the other 
hand, the case lawyer is immediately alerted to the prestige accorded 
anything connected with English law by these courts. But this negative 
ethnocentrhro, unlike the elder’s blindness towards change, is a significant 
element of the contemporary legal system, and an analysis o f the case 
' eveals the precise extent of English influence: the language may be 
that of the common law, but the elements of the action are unmistakably 
indigenous. An interrogator might well have been too easily content 
wilh the discovery that his tetminology--defam ation—coincided with that 
oj his informant to inquire further. Finally, the case suggested indigenous 
formulations of other legal rules, auxiliary to the general principle of 
compensation for abuse, which an investigator might not have thought 
to elicir nor an informant to volunteer. These were both evidentiary: 
how is conflicting testimony to be balanced, how is credibility to be 
te s t 'd ;  and substantive: what constitutes justification for abuse.
V i < igs are not orly redressed by the payment of money conpcnsation; 
other remedies are also significant. The following two cases illustrate 
how a husband employed the traditional remedy of witchcraft to control 
an unfaithful wife, and how she then sought protection from the primary 
courts by means of an action for divorce and a private prosecution for 
witchcraft. J'be participants are all Gusii.126
123. Ser A f Epstein, “The Lise Method in the Field of Law,” in The Craft 
of 5 tthropology 205, 227 28 (Epstein ed. 1967): “the problem is not
:ly to distinguish and classify the various types of sanction, but to estab­
lish the relationship between them. In what kinds of situation is a particular 
uin 1 of sanction likely to be invoked and why, indeed, within one social 
system are so many different kinds of redressive mechanism necessary ?”
124. See Table IV in Part tVof this article.
125. The Gush are a Bantu tribe which numbered just over 500,000 in 1962. 
See Kenya Census, 1962, at 36. They live in Kisii District (a European 
corruption of the tribal name), Nyanza Province, between the Luo on their
it, and the Kipsigis and Masai on their north, east and south. Again, for 
rca note 83 supra, I have deleted the village and sub-
1c ations of the parties, and replaced the names of parties and witnesses 
by what I hope are appropriate pseudonyms.
P la in tif f /C o m p la in a n t:  Agnes, K itutu location, Kisii District
D efen d an t/A ccu sed : Barnabas, K itutu location, Kisii District
Case l 126
C la im : divorce (Filed August 24, 1966)
P la in tiff: Barnabas married me and we had good love. After I had 
stayed with him for three months they started to show me witchcraft 
documents. Barnabas’ mother told me to listen to her but I refused. 
W hen the witchcraft exhibit was brought down from the house called 
irongo it was a skull in a basket. I went out of the house and started 
saying that I am not listening to them. Barnabas took my underwear 
and bid it. T hen  he told me he did not want me because I would 
i.. >i lv -mi to him. uni he chased me and said he would come and ask 
'hr his r.iitie My father told him to wait until I remarried. When 
Barnabas chased me I stayed with my sister. Barnabas and three 
* me ml oof me by force; I agreed to go because he was 
my husband. W hen we readied his home he caught me and shaved 
my head and pubic hair and then they chased me. I did not sleep 
that day. I returned to my lather and told him what they had done. 
(Examined by Defendant): You showed me witchcraft at midnight 
when you called me in your m other’s house. There were two of you 
who shaved me at home. (Examined by Court): I cried out when they 
were shaving me but no one came because it was 7 p.m. and raining. 
T he child does not belong to Barnabas because I was pregnant when I 
went to him. I stayed with him for eight months. They had some 
dried out skulls and some fresh heads.
P la in t if f 's  w itness, M oseti: I agree that Agnes, my daughter, should 
divorce Barnabas. They showed her witchcraft documents (ibinto 
biorogi); he shaved her hair even on her private parts. Since I have 
been [alive ?] I have never seen people doing such practice. I asked 
B i u ibas to >:o :u \ bring die clothes which he took from my daughter, 
and the hair which he shaved off her. He took her young child from 
h e  bui i -lurned it after three days. (Examined by Defendant): My 
d: -lghter’s hair which you took was very long. You were three people 
(1 her. (Examinedby Court): T he child does not belong 
to Barnabas when my daughter went to him she was pregnant.
D e fe n d an t: I do not want to divorce my wife. One day when I returned 
from chool I found her missing. Then I heard that she had been 
taken by someone. I went to her father who said she was with her 
risicr. 7 went there and took her home. But she left after one day, 
leaving her child behind. I sent my boy to take the child to her. 
(.Examined by Plaintiff): I never helped my mother to bring down 
the basket which contains witchcraft documents.
126. Kisii D A C  < C 342/66 (Oct. 5, 1966).
Ju d g m e n t: It is very bad for a man to marry a girl and then show her
witchcraft unknown to her parents. According to Kisii Law Panel 
M inutes 3(b)(1)127 divorce shall be granted if one of the parties 
practices witchcraft. This was proved by the plaintiff who saw the 
witchcraft documents. T he divorce is granted with [Shs. 66/-] costs. 
T he defendant can claim the child in a civil suit.
C o u rt:  t he case is adjourned a week. The defendant is to bring the 
clothes and hair which he took. Me will be prosecuted for failure 
to comply. [A week later the defendant had failed to bring these 
articles and was prosecuted by the court.]
Case 2 ,?H
C h arg e : pretending to exercise witchcraft, contra section 2 of the 
W itchcraft Act.'20 (Filed September 6, 1%6.)
O  m p ia b u in i : 1 w. at iny sister’s home. The accused came and took 
me to his home. He was with two oilier men, Nyamao and Oroko. 
Te took me on 2 September. He i my husband. He bought the men 
pombc.*3" After drinking the pombe the defendant caught hold of me 
while Oinwayo shaved me. He shaved my head and my pubic hair. 
He shaved me with a pair of scissors. T he accused kept the hair. 
T he accused ch that night at 10 p.m ., after taking my child
from me. I went to my home. After two days I came to charge him. 
He shaved me at 7 p.m. (Examined by Accused): You chased me at 
night after the other men left. (Examined by Court): You can see that 
my head is shaved. I did not tell anybody at the accused’s house 
about this. I told my father. I accused him so that he may return my 
hair and knickers to me.
C o m p la in a n t's  w itness, M akore : Agnes is my sister-in-law [wife’s
sister]. She had gone to visit me. After two days the accused came 
to collect her on 2 September. He took her away. At about 7 a.m.
127. Kisii Law Panel, Minutes of Meetings held at Kisii on Dec. 10-11, 1962,
( , !.a-.v of Marriage; 7, Dissolution; A, Divorce; 3, Grounds; (a) by wife; 
(.)) witchcraft (Oborogi). “A woman may divorce her husband if he is a 
witch as understood in the Kisii sense, or if he has been convicted of witch- 
( raft under the Witchcraft Ord.” See Cotran, Restatement o f A frican Law: 
L m y a , vol 1: 7 he Law o f M ai ridge and Divorce 69 (1968) [hereinafter cited 
as Cotran].
128. Kisii D A C  CrC 1288/66 (Oct. 19, 1966).
j. 1962): A n y  person who holds himself out as 
a witch-doctor able to cause fea r, annoyance or injury to another in mind, person 
or property, or who pretends to exercise any kind o f supernatural power, witch­
craft, sorcery or enchantment calculated to cause such fear . . . shall be guilty  
o f an offence and liable to imprisonment fo r  a term not exceeding five  years.
• Kisii District African Couit, by its warrant, was not permitted to 
impose sentences of imprisonment exceeding 12 months.
130. Native beer (swahili).
the next day she returned to me. Her head was shaved. She told
me that the accused and two other men had shaved her. 
C o m p la in a n t (Re-examined by Court): T he accused said he did not 
want me, but that the hair was his cattle.
ecused: Agnes left my home on 25 July. I discovered this when I 
returned from school. She took her bedding and utensils. On 28 
July she went and eloped [sic]131 another man, Mosigisi. I found 
her there. The man is here in court. Mosigisi wanted to fight me. 
They chased me. Agnes ran away and returned to her sister’s. On 
2 September I went and collected her. T he next day at about 7.30 
a.m. she left me and returned to her parents. She left the child behind. 
I did not shave my wife. (Examined by Complainant): You wanted to 
hit me with a piece of piping.
A ccused’s w itness, N y am ao : We collected Agnes from her sister’s. 
I I v , mom ng Barnabas told me that she had deserted (Examined 
by Complainant): We did not shave you. [Accused’s witnesses, 
Oroko and Omwaya gave the same testimony as Nyamao.]
Ju d g m e n t: When Agnes appeared before the court on 4 October 
her hair was quite short. Her sister’s husband testified that her hair 
was shaven when he saw her on 3 September. T he accused does 
not deny that Agnes was shaved. We have no doubt that she was 
shaved. She was deserting her husband. He took her back to him. 
I t was on this evening that he shaved her head and private hair to fright­
en her so that she may not leave him. Agnes would be afraid of being 
bewitched by the accused if she left him. He would use her hair 
to bewitch her. This has been a practice with the Kisii husbands 
whose wives tried to desert them. This court can infer that this is 
the practice the accused employed to frighten his wife. We find 
him guilty.
S en tence : Shs. 40/- fine or two months’ imprisonment, and to pay 
Shs. 16/- court fees to the complainant. [Barnabas paid the fine
in full].
As in the Luo case the entire record, here of two inter-related controver-
131. African dialect usage of English verbs can sometimes be quite revealing 
about the nature of responsibility for the act described. The effect here is to 
transform the woman— in English a passive accomplice who “elopes with” 
a man— into a responsible agent who “elopes” the man. This is particularly 
remarkable in light of the fact that most dialect changes emphasize the 
active role of the man. In Kenya a man “wombs”, “pregnants”, or “conceives” 
a girl; proper usage would speak of a woman becoming pregnant, or con­
ceiving. Similarly, in Kenya, a man “engages” a girl; in English she becomes 
engaged. These modifications may be a consequence of assimilating English 
to swahili grammar. In the latter, a man marries a woman (ku-oa, an active 
verb), but she is married by him (ku-olewa, a passive form); both men and 
women marry in English.
sies, must be analyzed as a whole. This time I will be less concerned with 
unravelling the reasoning of the court, which is plainly stated, and more 
intent to appreciate the legal tactics employed by each party to advance 
facts and imply interpretations favourable to his case. A brief chronology 
of events whose occurrence was not contested may be a useful preface 
to the wildly divergent stories told by husband and wife:
December 1965: Barnabas and Agnes were married
July 25, 1966: Agnes left Barnabas
August 24: Agnes sued Barnabas for divorce
September 2: Barnabas took Agnes from her sister’s husband’s home
September 3: Agnes returned to her father
September 6: Agnes filed a private prosecution against Barnabas
under the Witchcruft Act 
October 5: Divorce granted
October 19; Barnabas convicted under the W itchcraft Act
Agues had no children at the time of her marriage to Barnabas, which 
itself suggests that she was quite young and that she had almost certainly 
not been married before. Gusii girls marry early, so that Agnes was 
probably no more than fifteen.132 Nevertheless, she alleged that she had 
become pregnant before marriage. This may well have been true since 
pre-marital intercourse is common.133 Indeed, her parents may have 
rushed her into the marriage in order to conceal such a pregnancy which 
could, if discovered, reduce the bridewealth they were expecting134 
and might have even more serious consequences if her lover were of her 
own exogamous group.135 But whether or not the allegation was true 
it is surprising that Agnes should have made such an embarrassing 
admission in court, and even more so that her father should corroborate 
testimony apparently impugning his daughter’s character. T he most 
likely motive for the assertion was to establish that Barnabas was not 
the father of the child, and thus to defeat the right a man usually has 
upon divorce to the custody of children born to his wife during marriage.136 
Although Barnabas was clearly anxious to keep the child he did not 
challenge the allegation. Perhaps he was too preoccupied with avoiding 
the divorce and hoped that his wife’s admission would constitute some
132. R. LeVine and B. LeVine, Nyansongo: a Gusii Community in K enya 41 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Nyansongo]. A  man is at least 18 to 20 when he 
marries— older if his father is poor and cannot afford the high bridewealth—  
which would make him considerably more mature; there is also some 
evidence that he was a schoolteacher, and thus educated and westernized.
133. Ibid.
134. P. Mayer, “Bridewealth Limitation among the Gusii,” in Two Studies in 
Applied Anthropology in Kenya 19, 21 (1951).
135. Id at 42-43.
136. P. Mayer, Gusii Bridewealth Law and Custom 57-58 (1950); cf. C O R  Appl. 
5/53 (Dec. 11, 1953).
evidence of her promiscuous character, on which he planned to base the 
justification for the acts with which he was charged. His caution did no 
harm, for the court, following common practice,137 deferred the issue of 
paternity to another case, recognizing that there were enough complica­
tions already.
Agnes conceded that she had lived happily with Barnabas for three 
months, but complained that he and his mother had then begun instructing 
her in the unnatural mysteries of witchcraft. W hen she tried to protect 
her innocence by refusing to listen he used his nefarious powers to threaten 
her, taking underwear which he could use to bewitch her.138 Did any of 
this actually happen ? LeVine, an anthropologist who spent two years in 
Gusiiland, observes that it is difficult to determine the empirical found­
ation of beliefs in witchcraft activities because witchcraft is almost never 
adm itted by those accused, and rarely even discussed openly. His con­
clusion is :
“ there are some women who believe themselves witches and perform 
some of the acts customarily attributed to them. However, even if this is 
true of certain Gusii women, it seems obvious that the beliefs and 
images of the average Gusii concerning witches go far beyond the facts 
which can be empirically ascertained.” 139
W hether Agnes actually perceived the acts she described, or offered a 
naive and fearful interpretation of ambiguous behaviour, or simply 
invented a fictitious story, there were substantial reasons why she should 
feel considerable hostility towards her husband and his mother, and why 
she should express it in terms of witchcraft. A girl’s first months of 
marriage are a time of great strain. She has been uprooted from her home, 
family, and friends while still young, probably for the first time, and sent 
to live in a foreign clan (eamate) among people she has been brought 
up to regard as enemies.140 There she is placed under the control of her
137. T he approach of primary courts today contrasts strikingly with that of 
traditional councils of elders in this regard. In the past, any arbitration called 
tv decide a single issue would quickly be expanded to consider all outstanding 
disputes between the par* es and among their relatives in an effort to promote 
;i ru re general and lasting settlement. Contemporary primary courts, because 
of their greater powers of enforcement, do not need to obtain the agreement 
of the litigants to the decision. Therefore, they seek to narrow the issue as 
far as possible so as to limit the evidence and facilitate decision. See, e.g., 
Kiambu Mag. C A  188 66 (Mar. 22, 1967), allowing appeal from Limuru 
A C  C C  626/66 (n.d.). Plaintiff brought a claim for compensation for illegitimate 
pregnancy with respect to three children allegedly fathered by the defendant 
with plaintiff’s daughter. He conceded that defendant had paid some bride- 
pxice, which defendant sought to raise as a set-off against the claim. The 
court nevertheless deferred this counterclaim to another case.
138. R. LeVine, “Witchcraft and Sorcery in a Gusii Community”, in W itchcraft 
and SorcetM in East A frica 221, 228 (Middleton and Winters ed. 1963) [here­
inafter cited as W itchcraft).
139. Id. at 229-30.
140. P. Mayer, The Lineage Principle in Gusii Society 10 (1949).
husband’s mother, on whom she is dependent for food and in whose 
home she must cook and eat. Although she is treated courteously her 
insecurity is manifest in her eagerness to do household and agricultural 
chores so as to earn the approval of her new home.141 Sexual relations 
with her husband are probably unhappy for he has consummated their 
marriage on the first night with a prodigious display of sadistic virility 
and continues to view coitus as an occasion for inflicting pain.142 There 
are few outlets through which a newly married wife can express the 
hostility thus generated. Physical aggression is quite generally condemned 
in Gusii culture,143 and unthinkable towards a husband or mother-in- 
law, whom a wife must treat with respect and obedience.144 T he same 
norms inhibit the display of aggression through abuse, though less 
strongly;145 but vituperation is in any case an unrewarding weapon 
where one’s audience is unfriendly and withholds its support.
Two alternative means remain to the Gusii wife to express her un­
happiness. The first is an accusation of witchcraft. Although this would 
fall within the category of impermissible abuse if  made before the general 
public,140 it is privileged if made to an appropriate authority;147 Agnes 
was careful here to confine her charges to the courts in which she brought 
her two actions. Gusii give recognition to the predicament of a young 
wife in their belief that such women are generally subjected to the lure 
of witchcraft by their mothers-in-law. Instruction in witchcraft partakes
141. Nyansongo 51-52.
142. Id. at 47-48, 54, 191.
143. Id. at 156-57.
14-4. Id. at 21-23, 51-52.
145. Id. at 157.
I *6. See Kisii D A C  C C  64/66 (Feb. 14, 1966) (Shs. 100/- compensation awarded 
against defendant on his admission that he had called plaintiff a witch who had 
kill'd his c hild). But see Kisii D A C  C C  47/66 (Mar. 16, 1966) (plaintiff alleged 
that defendant had called her an adulteress, and claimed Shs. 200/- compen­
sation , the court dismissed her claim as based on mere vulgar abuse uttered 
during a quarrel).
147. S' Kisii D A C  C C  87/66 (Oct. 19, 1966). The defendant here believed that 
plaintiff had killed one of his children by witchcraft, and that two others were 
•hr' .k J with a similar fare. He reported this to the sub-chief, and repeated 
the charge at public meetings called by the sub-chief, at which plaintiff 
refused to appear. The court dismissed plaintiff’s claim of Shs. 400/-, stating: 
“The sub-chief is a government servant who, when he receives a report of 
anything, is under a duty to investigate . . . when the defendant’s three 
children died [uc] he suspected that man [the plaintiff] and reported to the 
sub-chief. The sub-chief summoned the parties and investigated. Then the 
two other children of defendant, who were seriously ill, recovered. This is 
no defamation of name. For example, if the defendant could go and announce 
this matter where there were many people and not including the sub-chief, 
the court might think that the defendant defamed plaintiff’s name. But on 
this we have found that the defendant did not use the name of plaintiff in a 
bud way”. LeVine notes that appeal to authority as the preferred means of 
dispute settlement is an integral part of the Gusii personality structure. 
Nyansongo 8t 186.
of all the horror of the practice itself. Gusii assert that it is difficult to
resist an invitation to learn, and that to interrupt tutelage once begun 
may lead to illness or insanity. Yet to attain the status of a witch is even 
more terrible, for a novice is required to sacrifice her own child to the 
greed of her fellow-witches, and ultimately gains her infernal powers 
only at the expense of all friendship and respect in the community.148 
Agnes’ accusation of her mother-in-law was thus culturally sanctioned. 
Her accusation of Barnabas followed naturally, for a witch is even more 
successful in seducing her own children to the craft than she is in enticing 
her daughters-in-law.140 These allegations also laid the foundation for 
the other, more total solution to the conflicts in Agnes’ position, to which 
she was later driven, namely divorce.150
N ot only did Agnes' description of her marital discord tally with Gusii 
conceptions about the early course of marriage, but the details in her
recitation of the witchcraft practices of her affines—the midnight tryst, 
a basket containing fresh heads and dried out skulls—also coincided 
with the ascribed behaviour of such persons.151 Indeed, Agnes appeared 
to rely on the arche-typicality of this part of her story to convince the 
court, since she offered little other persuasive evidence. Her father’s 
testimony about the “witchcraft documents” , like his confirmation 
that Barnabas had taken Agnes’ underwear, could clearly be no more 
than hearsay repetition of Agnes’ own story. She also failed to call the 
only eye-witness, Barnabas’ mother. Even so, her father’s support for 
charges of witchcraft likely to result in a divorce, to which he would 
normally be opposed, did carry some weight. And she could draw upon 
the later threats of witchcraft, for which there was considerable evidence, 
to lend credence to this earlier incident. In offering all this testimony 
Agnes’ primary intent was to portray herself as an innocent dutiful wife, 
tormented without provocation by husband and mother-in-law even to 
the point of being seduced into and threatened with witchcraft.
This was not at all the gloss put upon events by Barnabas. His testimony, 
questions; nd witnesses tended to show Agnes as a disobedient, unfaithful 
wife I himself !r the indulgent, forgiving husband. Her accusations 
of witchcraft were simply a fabrication intended to justify a divorce and 
leave her free to chase other men. Barnabas could find some evidence 
that the allegations had been concocted as a justification after the fact
148. W itchcraft at 229.
149. Id. at 228.
150. Divorce is quite common during the first year of marriage, which is viewed
as a trial period. A  wife generally visits her parents within the first three
months, and often tries to persuade them then not to send her back to her
husban 1 Nyansongo at 49; P Mayer, Gusii Bridewealth Law  and Custom
50-51 (1950).
151 W itchcraft at 226-28.
in Agnes’ delay in making them : she remained with him five m onths
after learning about the witchcraft, and waited yet another m onth after 
deserting before suing for divorce. At the same time, Barnabas did not 
unequivocally deny these charges. Though he disavowed participation in 
his m other’s m idnight witchcraft practices he did not deny that they 
occurred. Perhaps he feared to diminish the force of his argum ent by 
opposing such a widely held belief that women teach their daughters-in- 
law witchcraft; moreover, his m other’s character by itself could not sustain 
a divorce or penal sanctions. But this cannot explain his failure to con­
trovert his wife’s allegation that he had taken her underwear. T he contrast 
between Barnabas’ outright denial of any part in the first witchcraft 
incident at. Tis admission by default of the second suggests that there 
might have been a distinction in his mind, which he was trying to imply 
io ihe court, between unmotivated, pu rdy  malicious witchcraft, and the 
jusi ified use of witchcraft. I f  he had taken Agnes’ underwear it was not 
to coerce her into becoming a witch but to deter her from adultery and 
desertion. In support of this construction Barnabas offered persuasive 
evidence that Agnes had not been driven from his home but had run 
away voluntarily. She had left in his absence and had taken all her belong­
ings, something which no husband would allow16’ and which indicated 
that she did not intend to return. Barnabas had gone to her father to 
ask her to come back only to learn she was not there but had, after an 
indecently short time, gone to live with another man. This couple were 
now so morally depraved that when Barnabas went to demand his wife 
both of them  violated fundamental Gusii norms, Mosigisi offering a 
fight and Agnes threatening her own husband with a piece of pipe.
Agnes, naturally, did not allow this story to stand unchallenged. She
had not run away, though the presence and threats of witchcraft might 
well be reason to do so. It was her husband who had told her to leave 
because she would not become a witch. He had further asserted that he 
would reclaim his bridewealth cattle, and after driving her away had 
visited her father for this sole purpose. Her father could hardly compel 
her t remain with such a man and agreed to the divorce which Barnabas 
had demanded.
Although an unqualified choice cannot be made between the com­
pering interpretations, the evidence on balance appears to support Barna­
bas. Agnes must have left voluntarily, without her husband’s knowledge, 
sir.ee sb" -ltd n t k  * cakv her belongings. Moreover, had he chased
152. See, eg., Kisii D A C  C C  3/66 (June 17, 1966). Plaintiff sued defendant 
for taking certain clothing. Defendant admitted doing so; he had eloped with
plaintiff’s sister and when the girl left him she had stolen the clothing,
which he had gone and taken back. See also Kisii D A C  C C  131/66 (May 9, 
1966), Plantifr here sued the sons of his former wife for assisting her in 
taking her goods when she deserted him one night.
her, he would not have followed her to her father’s after only three days. 
There is good reason to believe that she had formed an attachment with 
another man, either prior to her departure or shortly thereafter. She 
seems in fact to have been living with him, since she was not at her father’s, 
and her allegation that she stayed with her sister was contradicted by her 
sister’s husband, who testified that she had been there only two days 
when her husband recovered her. While living with this man she sued 
her husband for divorce. Though most Gusii fathers would try to preserve 
a daughter’s marriage163 so as to retain the brideprice, Moseti advocated 
a divorce. He may well have been motivated principally by a genuine 
fear for his daughter’s safety, but this sentiment by itself would probably 
not have been sufficient to overcome pecuniary considerations without 
the. expectation of a second brideprice.154
W hy, then, did Barnabas not make a more determined effort to prove 
Agnes’ adultery with this man, thereby justifying himself? Why did he 
fail to call Mosigisi as a witness since he claimed that Mosigisi was actually 
present in court ? T he reason lies in the legal dilemma in which Barnabas 
found himself. He wanted to keep his wife, and yet any defence he made 
to her charges could lead the court to grant the divorce. I f  he argued 
that Agnes had left him  for Mosigisi then the court might reason, as it 
in fact did, that Barnabas had chosen the response of a typical Gusii 
husband and threatened his wife with witchcraft. The court might then 
dismiss Agnes* story o f the pot of skulls, but would still find grounds 
for divorce in Barnabas’ threat to use his wife’s underwear to bewitch 
her. I f  Barnabas concealed his suspicions of adultery, then the most 
probable cause of her desertion wras that he and his mother were witches. 
Were this to be believed, Barnabas would not only lose Agnes, but find 
it nearly impossible to obtain another wife.165 And if Barnabas success- 
full v convinced the court that Agnes had had no reason to leave, it might 
conclude that he had chased her away, another adequate ground for
153. Nyansongo at 49.
154. Brideprice or bridewealth is a transfer of property from the family of the 
groom to the family of the bride which, among the Gusii, is essential to the 
validity of the marriage and necessary to establish a man’s rights to his 
wife’s children. In 1951 the amount was 12-16 cows, one bull and 12-18 
goats. P. Mayer, “Bridewealth Limitation among the Gusii”, in Two Studies 
in Applied Anthropology in Kenya 19, 25 (1951). The assurance of another 
sui; x  for Agnes meant at east that Moseti would suffer no loss from the 
divorce. He might even have anticipated a gain, for Mosigisi may have 
been prepared to pay a higher amount than Barnabas has given. In any case, 
Moseti would have had the temporary use of two brideprices and might, 
/ike many Gusii fathers, delay considerably before completing the return of 
the first. See Nyansongo at 49.
155. Nyansongo at 45 46,
divorce.158 Barnabas compromised with this problem by offering a weak 
presentation of all three possibilities. Agnes too, was in an ambiguous 
situation. I f  she insisted on her moral purity, then the only evidence of 
witchcraft was her uncorroborated testimony of the midnight ceremony. 
I f  she admitted that her husband’s use of witchcraft was motivated 
by her own unfaithfulness, then the court might disregard her whole 
complaint as the fabrication of an adulteress seeking the freedom to run 
after other men. Agnes chose to maintain her own innocence; fortunately, 
the court did not believe her.
When Agnes left Barnabas, he followed her to her father after a few
days, seeking an early reconciliation. But upon learning that she had 
gone to live with another man he took no immediate further action, 
obeying Gusii norms which urged that he avoid a confrontation that 
could only lead to an open conflict.157 Tim e might work a solution, and 
Agnes might return to him on her own. Notice that she had fled  an action 
for divorce showed this hope to be vain. Threatened with the permanent 
loss of his wife, he surprised the couple and in a heated controversy 
succeeded in driving Agnes away from Mosigisi. He traced Agnes to her 
father and then to her sister’s husband and took her back to his home. 
However, harmony could not be re-established, and she left him again.
The versions which the litigants gave of the events of the night of 
September 2-3 were consistent with the legal strategies each had adopted. 
Agnes alleged, with apparent inconsistency, both that she went with her 
husband voluntarily and that he and two other men took her by force. 
Either situation could be turned to her advantage: the former to show her 
as the obedient wife, the latter to dramatize her husband’s wrongful 
intentions. After the men had drunk beer to nerve themselves her husband 
held her while his brother shaved her. Then the other men left; her 
husband took the child from her and drove her out into the night. Barnabas 
admitted that he had brought his wife home, but not that he had shaved 
her. She had peisisted in her disobedience and had run away again the 
n e n  morning, abandoning her child, w'hich he voluntarily returned 
three days later.
Agnes’ evidence was considerably more persuasive. First, there was 
the indisputable fact that her head had been shaved. T he court could see
this for itself, and indeed commented on her short hair. Real evidence
156. Sec Kisii Law Panel, op, cit. supra note 127, at C.7 A.3.b.4.
157. Nyansongo at 76-78: “unsociability ... is itself a reaction to aggression, and 
the preferred method of handling it.”
often has a disproportionate effect in primary courts :158 for instance, cattle
trespass may be proved by producing a broken maize plant, or an assault 
by the rock alleged to have been thrown. T he shaving was also corrobo­
rated by witnesses; not only Agnes’ father, who could be expected to lie 
in her behalf, but also her sister’s husband, member of another lineage 
and hence less biased who in addition had seen Agnes just before and 
after the incident. All that remained was a link between Barnabas and the 
shaving, which the court itself was able to deduce from circumstantial 
evidence combined with its knowledge of the modal behaviour of Gusii 
husbands. Second, it was clear that Agnes had been driven away by 
Barnabas that same night. There were no eye-witnesses, since his brother 
and friends had already left, but again circumstantial evidence was con­
clusive. That her departure had occurred at night was confirmed by her 
brother-in-law, Makore, who testified that she arrived at his home at 
an hour which would have required her to travel during the night. Gusii 
are extremely fearful o f being out alone at night, when wtiches 
are om nipresent.15" Agnes would not have ventured to do so 
voluntarily under normal circumstances; the coercion must have been 
considerable for her to brave the dark immediately after being 
threatened with witchcraft. Furtherm ore, Agnes left her infant child 
behind; few mothers would do so freely, and none would willingly 
entrust her baby to a man she believed to be a witch.160 Barnabas’ 
answer was extremely feeble. He did not even attempt to deny that his
158. See e.g , Kisii D A C  C C  103/66 (May 17, 1966): Kisii D A C  C C  39/66 
(l?eb. 4, 1966). In the first case plaintiff claimed compensation for bedding 
and clothing which he alleged defendant’s cattle had eaten. He produced in 
court the remains of a blanket and sheet, and stated that another blanket 
and two shirts had been entirely consumed. The court allowed damages 
only for the articles shown to it, stating: “W e  cannot assume that the same 
cattle had eaten the [other] blanket and shirts”. In the second case, plaintiff 
sued defendant for assault, seeking compensation for a torn shirt and vest. 
He testified that his wife had used the shirt to make clothing for his children. 
The court dismissed the action, stating: “Although he [plaintiff] alleged 
that his shirt was torn, he did not produce the shirt itself, but he showed a 
shirt of his child which had been sewn by his wife from that which had been 
torn” . See also Tononoka A C  C C  180/66 (Oct. 10, 1966). Plaintiff sued 
defendant for assault, claiming that defendant had bit off part of her ear. 
She produced the piece in court, which clearly impressed the judges, who 
stated: “Since the ear was normal before the fight and it is not shown that 
it was injured apart from the fight, the court finds that defendant did bite 
it. T lie court has examined the ear and found that a portion is bit off”. The 
real evidence here appears to have shifted the burden of proof from plaintiff 
to defendant.
159. Nyansongo at 146; W itchcraft at 226.
160. The attachment between a mother and child is very strong, and mothers
generally make vigorous efforts to retain their children upon divorce, as
shown !>y the number of appeals dealing with this issue which reach the 
highest court. See, eg., C O R  Appl. 4/53 (Dec. 10, 1953); C O R  Appl. 5/53 
(Dec. 11, 1953).
wife had been shaved. His bare disavowal o f personal responsibility
was merely reiterated by his alleged accomplices, all of which testimony 
was suspect as being self-exculpatory. T he allegation that Agnes had 
deserted the following morning could not even draw upon such self- 
serving declarations; his witnesses only repeated what Barnabas himself 
had told them.
The motivation and significance o f an act is inevitably more ambiguous 
than the act itself, but the evidence available here does permit an inter­
pretation of the events of this case, based on the above reconstruction. 
Barnabas took his wife home on September 2 impelled by a complex
of conflicting emotions: he sought to reassert his authority, challenged 
by her elopement with M osigisi; to punish her disobedience; and to 
frighten her into future submission. His ultimate aim was reconciliation, 
a return to the “good love” they had had originally. Agnes’ willingness 
to accompany him must have encouraged this hope. But his strategy 
backfired, frightening Agnes into revulsion rather than submission. 
Threat and repulsion fed on each other until Barnabas was driven to 
employ a technique which, past experience suggested, would terrify her. 
He shaved her hair and kept the shavings, exuviae traditionally capable 
of being used to bewitch the person from whom they come.161 This was 
the most potent means he possessed to retain his wife. In  addition, the 
act had symbolic value. As the court observed, such shaving is a practice 
among Gusii husbands. A woman with a shaved head would be publically 
branded by the Gusii equivalent of a “ scarlet letter” as a disobedient 
wife and suspected adultress. T he same construction could be expressed 
by another symbolic route. 1. A woman who has committed adultery 
must acknowledge the error to her husband in order that she may be 
purified before she sleeps with him again; failure to do so may cause his 
death.162 2. The head of a widow is shaved.163 Agnes’ bald head may thus 
have stigmatized her as a prospective widow, a woman who had sought 
to kill her husband by willful refusal to admit her adultery. Shaving 
Agnes pubic hair, however, was an act without traditional precedent. 
Even her father testified with horror that he had never heard of such 
a practice. I can find no direct explanation in the ethnographic literature
161. Witchcraft at 128.
162. Nyanscngo at 100-01. In Kisii D A C  C C  47/66 (Mar. 16, 1966) plaintiff 
sued defendant for defamation alleging that defendant had accused her of 
committing adultery, and thereby killing her husband through supernatural 
means. The court accepted that this accusation of amasangia was recognized 
by Gusii belief, but found that plaintiff had not proved that the accusation 
had been made.
163. Nyansongo at 94.
with which I am familiar.164 Analogies with the shaving of her head and 
with the retention of her underwear suggest strongly that these cuttings 
too were to be used to threaten witchcraft more specifically contingent 
upon a recurrence of adultery.
Barnabas himself indicated an additional symbolism of the shaved 
hair: it was his cattle and represented the return of bridewealth. Yet 
despite this implicit act of divorce Barnabas’ efforts were consistently 
directed at keeping his wife. Even when she was driven by his behaviour 
and threats to seek protection from her relatives he retained her child 
in the hope of enticing her back. Only when Agnes prosecuted him for 
witchcraft did he begin to perceive that strong-arm tactics produced 
terror, not respect. Then he surrendered the child, fearing that his custody 
m ight be construed as one more attempt to threaten its mother, and 
further that any misfortune to the delicate infant would constitute ultimate 
proof of his witchcraft.
For Agnes to bring a private prosecution against her husband under the 
W itchcraft Act was a highly unusual step for several reasons. First, the 
practice of witchcraft is commonly dealt with by traditional, extra-legal 
m ethods; only the circumstances of this case rendered these procedures 
inappropriate. In the past, when a community had been able to reach 
agreement on the guilt o f a witch, it might act together to kill him or 
drive him away.165 But today resort to self-help is illegal, and consequently 
increasingly rare.186 Moreover, a woman who married into the village 
from a foreign lineage could never instigate such action against her own 
husband Agnes could have obtained the assistance of certain quasi-legal 
specialists in anti-witchcraft medicine: the sorcerer (omonyamosira) who 
kills the witch by magic, or the witch-smeller (<omoriori) who discovers 
and removes witchcraft substances.167 Yet such men were impotent here, 
since Barnabas had subjected his wife to the threat of witchcraft, but had
164. One incident, however, is suggestive. As mentioned earlier, sexual relations 
among the Gusii are permeated by aggression. Not only does a man seek to 
jnflict pain during intercourse, a wife generally tries to avoid intercourse, 
and in particular attempts to frustrate it on her wedding night. LeVine tells 
of girl who was found to have knotted her pubic hair so that her husband 
was unable to achieve penetration for a week, until this was discovered and 
the hair cut with a razor blade. Nyansongo at 48. Assuming that Barnabas 
and Agnes had not escaped the endemic sexual conflict, shaving Agnes’ 
pubic hair may have been another expression of sexual hostility, perhaps 
symbolic of her accessibility to other men. The presence of Barnabas’ brother 
and friends was also a means of shaming Agnes, for Gusii women are generally 
extremely modest. Nyansongo at 142-43, 170-72.
165. See South Nyanza District Law Panel, Kisii Section. Minutes of a Meeting 
held on December 12-14, 1950, No. 38. “Any person convicted of causing 
the death of [persons] by means of witchcraft was polted [ju t] or stoned by 
a crowd of his relatives until he was dead”. See . Iso Witchcraft at 231.
166. Nyansongo at 83.
167. Witchcraft at 233-39.
not yet exercised his powers. Second, the easiest and most effective 
way for a wife to protect herself against affnies she believed were bewitching 
her was desertion and divorce. But pursuit of this remedy had only 
infuriated her husband, driving him to increase his threats and thus 
aggravating her terrors rather than relieving them. T h ird , married women 
do not frequently resort to the courts,168 and almost never sue their 
husbands, except for divorce.169 But Agnes* legal representative under 
ordinary circumstances, her husband, was of course disqualified. In 
marital disputes a woman’s agnatic kin may conduct an informal arbi­
tration with her affines; Agnes’ father, on at least two occasions, did seek 
to persuade Barnabas to abandon his threats. But persuasion was in­
effective, and a court action can only be initiated by the person wronged. 
Finally, the W itchcraft Act is itself an unsatisfactory compromise between 
English scepticism about witchcraft and African demands that it be con­
trolled.170 Only the pretense of possessing or using witchcraft to cause 
fear, annoyance or injury is punished, not the possession or practice 
itself. Yet it was precisely this pretense that Agnes wanted terminated. 
She was not concerned to punish her tormentors for she accused only 
Barnabas, who had custody of the materials used to frighten her, but not 
his equally culpable accomplices. Rather, she prosecuted her husband 
for the same reason that she sought to divorce him, “so that he may 
return my hair and knickers to me.” It is ironic that the inadequacy of
168. See Table I in Part IV of this article.
169. W o m e n  do sometimes sue their husbands for assault, but only when divorce 
is pending or has been granted. Sec, e.g., Kisii D A C  C C  13/66 (Feb. 8, 
1966); cf. Kiambu Mag. C A  117/65 (July 5, 1967), dismissing appeal from 
Githunguri A C  C C  330/64 (June 22, 1964) (Kikuyu). A divorced woman 
may also sue her former husband for the return of property which he has 
retained. In Kisii D A C  C C  193/66 (June 30, 1966) plaintiff claimed that she 
had been “eloped” by defendant, and then sent away by him four months 
later She sued for the value of her labour during the time she was living with 
him. The court rejected her claim as contrary to customary law.
170. Very few prosecutions are brought under the Act. In 1966 there were only 
464 in all of Kenya, or a mere .2 per cent of all criminal cases. Convictions 
are difficult to secure. See, e.g., Kisii D A C  CrC 1313/66 (Sept. 20, 1966) 
(accused acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove the three essential 
ingredients of the offence under Section 5: the articles must be ones usually
used in the exercise of witchcraft; they must be carried for the purpose of 
causing fear or annoyance; the accused must have them without reasonable 
excuse. Che accused here claimed that the medicine was for his own protection
against devils). Even when the accused is proved guilty sentences are rela­
tively light. See, e.g., Kisii D A C  CrC 1029/66 (July 21, 1966) (Shs. 150/-
fine or three months imprisonment); Kisii D A C  CrC 1006/66 (July 26, 
1966) (Shs. 30/- fine or one month extra-mural penal employment; charms
to be destroyed). This attitude is in sharp contrast with the concern which 
Africans demonstrate about witchcraft in the numerous defamation cases 
which concern such accusations. See, e g., Kisii D A C  C C  298/66 (Sept. 13, 
1966) (claim of Shs. 200/- compensation for being called a witch); Kisii 
DAC CC 241/66 (July 21, 1966) (claim of Shs. 200/-for being called a witch).
traditional remedies against this form of witchcraft compelled Agnes 
to turn for protection to the ‘agnostic’ state which had the power to do 
just this.171
The court encountered little difficulty in reaching a decision on the 
basis of the evidence presented in these two cases. Any ambiguities in 
Barnabas behaviour were resolved by his shaving of Agnes, which un­
mistakably identified his entire course of conduct with the common 
Gusii syndrome of husbands using witchcraft to control unfaithful 
wives.17* Consequently, the court’s examination of Agnes and her witnesses 
was most perfunctory. It was easily satisfied with her responses to questions 
of fact; there could be little doubt that the possibility of informal re­
conciliation had been exhausted; the issue of custody was postponed to 
another case. Even though Barnabas had voluntarily testified under 
oath,’73 his statements were so little worthy of credence that the court 
would not even take the effort to question him. Nor did Barnabas exert 
himself greatly on his own behalf; he failed to bring any witnesses in the 
divorce case. To the extent that he was relying on Agnes’ adultery to 
justify his resort to witchcraft, his hopes were vain. Adultery was certainly 
wrong, but a husband has other remedies: he could chastise his wife by 
beating,174 he could claim compensation from her father for the adultery,176 
he could prosecute her param our170 or sue him civilly for the return of
171. Witchcraft Act, I.aws of Kenya, Cap. 67, s.5 (rev. cd. 1962): the charm or 
other article [usually used in the exercise of witchcraft for the purpose of 
causing fear] shall be fortfeited and destroyed or otherwise dealt with in such a 
way as the magistrate may direct.
172. As in the Luo case, this court’s perception that Gusii husbands use witchcraft 
to control errant wives was a statement about modal, not normative behaviour; 
it was not a statement of what the “reasonable” Gusii does, or should do. 
Cf. note 87, supra.
173. The accused may elect to give a sworn statement, in which case he is subject 
to cross-examination; or an unsworn statement, in which case he is not; 
or no statement at all. See Criminal Procedure Rules for African Courts,
a.50 (n.d.).
174. Nyansongo at 22.
175. The wife’s father was liable to pay compensation of a cow worth Shs. 200/- 
and to provide a goat worth Shs. 30/- to cleanse his daughter. Sec Kisii 
District I.aw Panel, Special Meeting to Record Customary Criminal Offences,
s.l (Aug. 16, 1961).
176. Id. ss.1-2. Both adultery and removing a married woman without the 
consent of her husband were customary offences for which the penalty was a 
fine of up to Shs. 500/- and/or imprisonment of up to six months. See, e g., 
Kisii D A C  CrC 117/66 (Feb. 23, 1966) (Shs. 350/- fine or four months’
imprisonment for removing married woman) See also Cotran, Report on 
C u s to m a ry  Criminal Offences in Kenya, Appendix A  at 10 (n.d.) (cyclostylcd; 
copy in possession of author). These offences were abolished as of July 1, 
1966. See reference cited note 19, supra.
the woman,177 or in the end he could divorce her.178 T hat witchcraft 
had traditionally been used by Gusii husbands in such circumstances 
did not legalize the practice. W itchcraft was fai too extreme a response 
to this kind of misbehaviour, and was in any case now illegal.
Having concluded that Barnabas had employed witchcraft threats, the 
court still had to determine the proper remedy. Since witchcraft has 
always been sufficient ground for divorce, Agnes’ first plea clearly had to be 
granted. Moreover, divorce is almost never refused when it has the support 
of a girl’s father. Moseti's advocacy of his daughter’s cause may have 
served a selfish motive, but his eloquence clearly showed that he honestly 
• hired  her fear that she would be bewitched and was seeking to protect 
her. To award the divorce, however, did not itself secure that protection. 
T he court therefore accompanied its decree with an order that Barnabas 
relinquish the materials by means of which he wielded his unlawful 
power. I i do ing  no it hoped to avoid recourse to penal sanctions which 
could only intensify Barnabas’ anger and resentment, and thus augment 
rather than mitigate Agnes’ danger. But this command merely placed 
Barnaba in a further legal dilemma: if he defied the court’s mandate 
he risked the penalties of the law; if he surrendered Agnes’ clothing and 
hair he stood confessed as a witch. T he severity of social sanctions against 
witches apparently proved more fearsome than punishment for contempt, 
even when contempt made inevitable a conviction in the criminal case. 
T hus, in effect, the traditional power of a husband to discipline an un­
faithful w ife by witchcraft was preserved, in defiance of courts and modem 
law, at a relatively small price.
The substantive law for which this case stands can be stated very 
simply: a husband who threatens his wife with witchcraft may be divorced 
by her, and may also be fined Shs. 40/-. T he rule could easily have been 
elicited from any informant. But I hope my analysis has shown that a 
great deal more can be learned from the case. First, the genesis of the 
dispute is discovered in the strains inherent in the early stages of Gusii 
marriage. Second, the choice of a means for expressing this conflict 
is illumiuated. A young wife is deprived of most outlets for her hostility, 
and hence must speak through the language of witchcraft to justify her 
desertion and lay the foundation for a divorce. Moreover, she must
177. Sic, eg., Kisii DAC CC 327/66 (Sept. 7, I960) (plaintiff claimed for and 
received his wife from the defendant). The husband may also claim for the 
expenses he incurred in tracing and retrieving his wife. See Kisii District 
Law Panel, op. cit. supra note 175, s.2. Those criminal cases which were 
pending on July 1 1966 were often transformed into civil claims for the 
return of a wife. See, e g., Kisii D A C  C C  280/66 (Nov. 25, 1966), transferred 
from Kisii D A C  CrC 692/66 (originally filed on May 17, 1966). See Cotran 
at 68 Sec also note 71, supra.
178. K;sii l aw Panel, Minutes of Meetings held at Kisii, Dec. 10-11, 1962, 
C.7.A.3.a (3) Habitual adultery (oburomam). See Cotran at 70.
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address the appropriate authority—here the courts—and hence is con­
strained by the form of colonial legislation. Thirdly , once the parties 
are in court the judicial process is seen to be more than the mere mechanical 
application of rules to a clearly perceived factual situation.17u T he evidence 
is too inconclusive for this. Although Agnes had the benefit of the real 
evidence of her shaved head, Barnabas could point to the absence of 
eye-witness testimony. In the end both litigants and court had to rely 
on perceptions of modal behaviour to resolve conflicts in the circum ­
stantial evidence—creating inferences o f fact, colouring actual incidents, 
and discrediting inconsistent testimony. Thus Barnabas could suggest 
that, when an absconding wife takes her belongings with her, she has 
probably deserted voluntarily. But Agnes could reply that when she runs 
off into the night leaving her infant behind she has certainly been driven 
away. T he court could accept both propositions, finding that when a 
woman does desert, with the connivance of her father, there is likely 
to be another prospective suitor involved; and that Gusii husbands have 
in the past been driven by jealousy to resort to witchcraft to control 
errant wives, f  in ally, the product of these evidentiary principles— the 
judgm ent—must itself be subjected to scrutiny, for it is seen that though 
Agnes had the benefit of the court’s decision in each case, both judgments 
were ineffective to counteract the threat of witchcraft. T he  skeleton of 
substance- the anatomy of the law—is thus lleshed out with an under­
standing of how that skeleton functions in the settlem ent of disputes— 
the physiology of law.180 
IV. L ow er C o u rts
An examination of cases in depth, such as that presented in the first 
part of this article, permits valuable insight into the process of dispute 
settlement in the primary courts. For example, witchcraft disputes fre­
quently reach the courts in the form of an action for damages for being 
called a witch—as in the Luo case—but only rarely does the victim of 
witchcraft seek to penalize the practitioner him self181— a_s in the Gu.sii
179. Cf. Epstein, cp. cit. supra note 123, at 212: “few disputes centre upon the 
application ot a single unequivocal rule, and the more usual content of a 
dispute is a dialogue of norm and C O u n  te r-T lo rn V 1,
180. Cf. Radclitfe-Brown, “On Social Structure”, 70 J. Roy. Anthrop. Inst. 
(1940), reprinted in Structure and function  in Primitive Society 188, 195 
(1962):
“Besides this morphological study, consisting in the definition, com­
parison and classification ol diverse structural systems, there is a phys­
iological study. The problem here is: Mow do structural systems 
persist? What are the mechanisms which maintain a network ol social 
relations in existence, and how do they work ?”
181. The only tribe in Kenya which to my knowledge uses the legal process 
extensively to identity and denominate witches is the Taira. In the Tuita 
District African C ourt ji V ’undanyi there is a unique series of cases in which 
the plainti-.f sues ti c def-i.dam for having be* jicr.ee! him, seek;rg a decla­
ration that the dcfendam b a witch. If the court finds suificbni evfience to 
support the cfi.it ;•.* it vvi.i order the plaintiff to provide a goat i..r skcter 
so that the enn.uh may be examined oy a traditional divinct. it the c;targe 
is confirmed the dekndmc uni ce ordered to repay to p L . m u  the goat 
(worth Shs. 2n -) and .ms. 2o - court costs. See, e g., Te.ita D.A.C. C.C. 
222/06 (Sept. 20, 19o6),
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case. Consequently, intensive study of a sample of cases must be supple­
m ented by statistical analysis o f the entire body of litigation heard by 
each court.18* I his cannot be performed accurately by means of case 
files alone, for few courts possess a complete "set: cases awaiting appeal 
are filed with the appellate court;1113 others, in which there lias been a 
final decision, may still be unavailable for reference until the judgment has 
beeu fully satisfied, often a m atter of years. However, each court also 
maintains separate civil and criminal registers*'1 li: ting every case initiated 
and describing its progress through the primary court. T c .;ah e r, these 
sources provide essential statistics which may be analysed to create 
a reasonably exact and comprehensive picture o f the activity of litigants 
and courts. T he following information is available about civil litigation;185
1. Names of the parties.
2. Residence of the parties, by village, sub-location (or sub-chief), 
and location.
3. Religion o f the parties. T he court m ust determine this in order to 
swear in a party, or any other witness, before he testifies, and will
lfi2. Anthropologists have increasingly come to recognize the need to provide 
some statistical data for the representativeness of their assertions. Gluckman, 
for instance, has argued that “the mode of presenting ethnographic material 
through the combination of quantitative statements and extended cases is 
important not only in terms of fieldwork technique, but also because it 
will enable us to cope better with certain developments on the theoretical 
side of the science.” “Introduction” to The Craft o f Social Anthropology xi, 
xvii (A. L  Epstein ed. 1967). See generally Van Velsen, “The Extended-case 
Method and Situational Analysis,” in Id. at 129. See also Goody, “ ‘Nor­
mative,’ ‘Recollected,’ and ‘Actual’ Marriage Payments among the LoWiili 
of Northern Ghana, 1951-1966,” 39 Africa 54 (1969).
A  sinflai technique h. ■; previously been used by Laura N:. icr m  Mexico, 
see “A n  Anah sis ot i tec i a v Ca vs,” 3 Ethnology 404 1 1964), reprinted 
in Law and V% a. fare 11. Jk hann.in cd. 1967), and Lloyd Labors in Luanda, 
sec Lcav VPith.cut Precedent (l*«o9).
183. African C< . r. Circular No. 1 of 1963: Disposal of Case Files
and Suits in bornu lviupetis : j .n. 25, lvt>3). “When a case nas been ibi.aUy 
decided or \vh:n the p rioJ allowed tor appeal has expired the whole case 
file v.ill be deposited in the highest court vsn:cfl has passed judgment in 
the case.”
184. Sec, e.g , Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Standing Order* for African 
Courts, s. 2Q1 (lfC'N. Addition.il tcv»i>ters arc bpt for deputes concerning 
title to I .e. 1, pri.se .uions lor non-p.ivrc.ent or the Gradu. vd Personal lax, 
and actions to: nniiruen.-nce under the A.filiation Au. \v ltd the exception 
of the last, these repute is h.i\ e generally been maintained tor the past 
30 years and, though often limited iu content, ofier the most promising 
source lor historical studies ol the development of customary taw during die 
colonial era.
185. Data deaenhed within brackets is contained in the case files; other infor­
mation will be‘found in die rvifisters. la niparuble data is available concern­
ing criminal prosecutions. However, because the pervasive intiuence of 
legislative enactments has relegated vu loniarv iaw to a subsidiary rule in 
this urea, 1 on!\ nnaly/cd the work ol the Kitunbu (Kikuyu) and Machaxos 
(Karnbat courts in 19oo.
usually note it in the case file. However, such religious affiliation
(Christian, Moslem, pagan) is often quite nominal and must be 
used with care.
4. Occupation of the parties. Some courts will ask this, and note the 
answer at the beginning o f the party’s testimony.
5. Sex of the parties. T his is usually clear from the nam e; (if not, 
most courts note it at the beginning of the record o f testimony).
6. Literacy of the parties. A rough estimate of this may be obtained 
when a party is required either to sign his name, or give a thum b­
print. However, there may be literate individuals too embarrassed 
to sign, and illiterates who can write their names. A successful 
plaintiff will be asked to acknowledge the receipt of money paid 
into court in satisfaction of the judgment. (Both parties are required 
to acknowledge their testimony.)
7. Cause of action, and the amount o f money, or other relief claimed.
This is always stated in the register (and in the case file).
8. Judgment, including ex parte judgments, whether or not these are 
subsequently set aside. These are contained in the register and
case file.
9. Court costs. Each fee, its purpose, and the date paid, is always 
stated in the register (and may be repeated in the case file).
10. Chronology.
(a) T he date o f the incident. This can usually be found in the
course of die testimony.
(b) Filing date. This is always contained in the register (and case
file).
(c) Judgment date. Same.
(d) Dates of motions in furtherance of execution {e.g., interrogation 
of a judgment debtor, attachment warrant). Same.
(e) Dates of payments made in satisfaction of judgment. Same.
Analysis of this data can illuminate four distinct facets o f the legal 
process: (a) to what extent do different groups use the prim ary courts; 
(ib) what are the characteristies of litigants; (c) what kinds o f claims do 
they make; (d) how does the judicial process dispose of those claims. I
cannot give a full presentation of such an analysis, nor would it be appro­
priate in an article concerned primarily with methodology. W hat follows
are some partial and tentative results, offered as examples of what can be 
done.18*
(a) T he relative litigiousness of different groups can be estimated by 
com ptring population statistics187 with the annual total o f customary 
cases188 to obtain a ratio of the number of persons for whom there is 
one case filed a year. Although the ratios themselves are not precise,18® 
they do permit a rough ranking of various tribes: Luyia (97), Kikuyu (102), 
M eru (102), Nandi (122), Kamba(182), Giriama (202), Gusii (210), Kipsigis 
(272), Luo (281), Digo/Dururna (292). No explanation is immediately 
apparent for this ordering. In some instances it appears to follow the 
degree of modernization (e.g., the Kikuyu are second), but in others it is 
just the reverse (the Nandi substantially precede the cognate Kipsigis;1®0 
the highly westernized Luo are next to last1®1). W ithin a given tribe the 
order of its sub divisions is equally perplexing. Kamba of Machakos 
District (174), wliich bordeis on Nairobi, are somewhat more litigious 
than those of the more isolated Kitui District (197), but the traditionalist 
Luo of South Nyanza (228), are well in advance of their more modern 
counterparts in Centnil Nyanza (338), and among the Kikuyu a similar 
reversal occurs between the allegedly traditional M urang’a District (93)
186. I have analyzed the entire body of tort litigation for 1966 for the following 
16 courts: Kiainbu (Kikuyu), Iveti (Kamba), Kilungu (Kamba), Gwirani 
(Digo), Kinango (Duruma), Kalolcni (Giriama), Kilifi (Giriama), Wundanyi 
(Taita), Kericho (Kipsigis), Sotik (Kipsigis), Lurambi (Luyia), Mumias 
(Luyia), Hamisi (Luyia), Maseno (Luo), Doho Kosele (Luo), Kisii (Gusii). 
In addition, I have data on litigation in Kiambu in 1948 which offers at least 
some historical perspective.
187. See Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Statistics 
Division, III Kenya Population Census, 1962, at 20 (1966) [hereinafter cited 
as Kenya Census, 1962J.
188. The figures chosen represent the total number of civil cases except those 
involving title to land, or maintenance of an illegitimate child under the 
Affiliation Act. The former have been excluded because the process of land 
consolidation and registration, which withdraws such cases from the courts, 
has proceeded at differential rates among various groups. The latter are not 
customary law controversies. These figures are calculated from the 1966 
Annual Returns of the African Courts, filed with the African Courts Officer 
in the Law Courts, Nairobi.
189. Loss of accuracy is due to a number of factors. Population statistics were 
calculated four years prior to 1966, the year for which litigation has been 
analyzed; areas may have grown at differential rates in the intervening 
period. The geographic areas for which population is calculated and those 
on which courts draw are not in every case identical, although they diverge 
only slightly. However, the fact that the ratios are all of the same order of 
magnitude is a rough confirmation of their validity.
190. This anomaly may be due to the presence of a large number of Kikuyu in 
Nandi District (there are about 280,000 throughout Rift Valley Province, 
as opposed to fewer than 138,000 Nandi within Nandi District) who engage 
in a great deal of litigation among themselves. See Kenya Census, 1962, 
at 35-36.
191. This inversion may be due to the persistent vitality of indigenous institu­
tions for the settlement of disputes, at least where the litigants are fellow 
clansmen. See Table II and accompanying explanation.
and Kiambu (109), whose residents often work in Nairobi, only a few 
miles away. Perhaps the only unambiguous conclusion is that, throughout 
Kenya, the courts arc accessible to and utilized by Africans with con­
siderable frequency. Each case involves at least two parties, often up to 
a dozen witnesses, and a large audience of relatives, friends and loungers 
—perhaps a score or two of people. Given a ratio of one case for every 
one or two hundred people each year it appears likely that most Kenya 
Africans attend a civil dispute every few years.,e,li
(b) Attributes of the litigants, of claims, and of the judicial process 
may vary from tribe to tribe for a given wrong, and from wrong to wrong 
within a single tribe. Therefore each independent variable, e.g., literacy 
of litigant, periodicity of filing claims, or length of time between filing 
and final judgment, must be correlated separately with each dependent 
variable, tribe and tort. To illustrate the significance of the first category 
of indices, litigant character, consider how the proportion of parties of a 
given sex may fluctuate:
T ab le  I: Sex o f  L itig an ts
Percentage of parties who are female, by tribe and by wrong:
Number
1 ribe Court Wrong of cases Plaintiffs
0/
Defendt
I .uyia K aka mega defamation 31
/o
23
, o 
12
assault 10 70 0
damaging property lb 10 0
Hamisi defamation 22 22 8
assault 6 43 0
damaging property 12 25 15
Mumias ' defamation 32 9 5
assault 16 31 4
damaging property 20 15 7
Luo Mnseno defamation 32 14 16
assault 18 11 4
damaging property 40 10 4
Gusii Kisii defamation 18 61 29
assault 28 61 10
(taking property) 30 20 8
Kikuyu Kiambu defamation 56 37 23
assault 74 32 6
damaging property 39 24 12
191a. The only other estimate I know of for Africa is that of Fallers for Busoga 
in Uganda. He states at one point that one in every ten, and at another
place one in every 45, Busoga appear in court as a party each year. However, 
this figure includes appeals as well as original cases. Op. cit. supra note 182,
at 22, 57.
Among the Luyia the most striking variation, repeated in all three courts, 
is that women are far more often plaintiffs, and far less often defendants, 
in assault cases than in either of the other kinds of aggressive wrong. It 
cannot be simply that women are more or less often involved in assaults 
than in other disputes, for this would not give rise to the great disparity 
between women as plaintiffs and as defendants. A more likely explanation 
assumes that women participate in each type of controversy with com­
parable frequency but choose different remedies according to the situation. 
It then appears that women are either unable or unwilling to defend 
themselves against physical attack, whereas they can return insult for 
insult or rake adequate revenge for damage to property; and further that 
litigation is viewed as a more appropriate remedy for a woman who has 
been beaten than for one who has been abused or has lost her property. 
An inverse reasoning would tend to explain the prevalence of male 
defendants generally, and in particular the reluctance of men to seek 
redress for assault.
Turning for comparison to other tribes, very different patterns emerge. 
Neither the Luo nor the Kikuyu show any substantial variation in the 
num ber of women plaintiffs as among the several wrong:.. In all three, 
women are rarely accused of assault but are frequently sued fot d»use 
confirming the general impression that words arc one of the few avenues 
open to women to express aggression or resentment. But rhe most 
remarkable contrast is between the extreme litigiousness of Gu-o women 
and the reluctance of Luo women to go to cou- t. This accord*, with the 
divergent behaviour o f the parties in the two cases already described m the 
first part of this article. I he Luo “ mothers” in the first case cried out that 
Augustino was a witch, but did not bring this accusation to court. Agnes, 
confronted with threats of witchcraft, immediately sought a judicial 
hearing to express fear and anger against her husband. Similar con elation* 
could be made with the literacy, occupation, anti religion of the parties to 
test the impact of education, wealth or status, and conversion on ihe i hoice 
of a judicial forum for dispute settlement in preference to self-help or 
informal arbitration.
Patterns of co-residence—the proximity of parties to one another— 
cast further light on the genesis of disputes and the means available to 
resolve them :
Data for both the Luyia and the Gusii illustrate one important pattern. 
Most wrongs—defamation, assault, cattle trespass, damage to crops or 
p roperty -occu r between members of the same village or sub-location, 
persons who live no more than a mile or two apart. This is hardly sur­
prising, since controversies can only arise between people in contact 
and, at least outside the immediate family, greater contact tends to increase 
the chance of friction. In light of this generalization the three exceptions
Table II: Proximity of Parties
Percentage o f parties who live within a given geographic unit, by tribe
and by wrong:
Parties live in same:
Tribe Court Wrong
Number 
o f Cases Village
Sub-
Location location
Luyia Kakamega defamation 31 68% 23% 10%
cattle trespass 35 77 20 3
cutting crops 8 50 25 25
damaging
property 8 62 25 12
impregnating
girl 9 22 33 44
assault 8 88 0 12
taking property 8 25 75 0
I.uo Maseno defamation 38 5 82 13
cattle trespass 20 15 85- 0
cutting crops 40 12 75 12
assault 27 7 74 19
taking property 5 0 40 60
Gusii Kisii defamation 18 83 17 0
cattle trespass 47 77 21 2
affiliation 14 14 21 64
assault 30 43 40 17
removing wife 8 0 12 88
taking property 33 33 30 36
acquire significance. Sexual offences and instances of theft occur more
often between different villages, and with considerable frequency between 
different sub- locations. Some tentative explanations should be investigated. 
Small-scale communities offer an individual little privacy with respect 
to his activities or his property. W here material possessions are few, and 
generally familiar to the whole neighbourhood, it would be impossible 
to hide stolen goods. A fortiori, a woman married within the locality 
could uot be concealed, and her presence would create intolerable tensions. 
T hat unmarried girls tend to take strangers as lovers is probably a con­
sequence of incest rules in societies which proscribe members of the 
localized descent group as potential sexual partners.192 Luo litigation 
supports these hypotheses, but is distinguished by an astonishing paucity 
of disputes between fellow villagers. Perhaps this is an indication of the 
continuing vitality of indigenous arbitral institutions within the village. 
Such an explanation finds confirmation in the reticence of the otherwise 
highly westernized Luo to invoke the courts, compared with most groups 
in Kenya. Apparently, despite advances in education and the impact
192. See, e g . ,  LeVine, “ Gusii Sex Offenses: A Study in Social Control.” 61 
Ainer. Antbrop 965, 974 (1959). Even if the man actually responsible is a 
close neighbour, the girl will probably accuse someone outside the neigh­
bourhood, with whom sexual relations would not be incestuous. The 
stigma of incest not only is greater than that of illegitimate pregnancy, 
but the latter appears to fall more heavily on the man than on the girl. 
Both members of an incesmous couple may frequently be expelled from the 
community, but the remedy for simple pregnancy stresses the man’s res­
ponsibility by requiring him to pay compensation to the girl’s father.
of missionaries, traditional elders—the joduong* gweng*—still exercise 
considerable authority over localized controversies.193
(c) If we turn our attention from the identity of litigants to the 
characteristics of the claims they assert, an initial discrimination among 
tribes is possible in terms of the proportion of total litigation devoted to 
tortious disputes:194
Table Ills Tortious Disputes
Percentage of total disputes which are tortious, by tribe and by court:
Tribe Court
Tortious
Disputes
Kipsigis Kericho 53
Kikuyu Kiambu 34
Luo Maseno 31
Luyia Mumias 42
Gusii Kisii 41
Kamba Iveti 36
P igo Gwirani 31
Luyia Humisi 30
Luyia Lurambi 26
Duruma Kinungo 24
Girirma Kiim 18
Luo Kosele 18
Taita Voi 12
I suggest that this sequence, like that shown in the utilization of the courts, 
roughly follows the degree of westernization.195 Kikuyu, Luo, Luyia,
193. See Wilson, Luo Customary Lara and Marriage Laws Customs 4  (1961). 
The allocation o f primary courts in Kenya further illustrates this difference. 
In the Kikuyu districts o f Kiambu, Murang’a and Nyeri there is, on average, 
one court for every 76,900 people; in the Luo districts o f South and Central 
Nyanza there is only one for every 103,000. Each Luo court is thus capable 
of serving about 50 per cent more people.
194. It is very difficult to formulate an entirely satisfactory definition o f a tortious 
dispute for the purposes o f African customary law. I worked with the 
following concept: A wrong is any act or omission which injures another 
person physically, emotionally, materially, or in his personal relationships, 
where the injury docs not consist o f (1) failing to fulfil a pre-existing obli­
gation or (2) failing to perform an agreement. T he first exception was 
designed to exclude such claims as that by a sister’s son against his mother’s 
brother for a gift o f cattle among the Luyia. See Wagner, II The Bantu 
of North Kavirondo 110 (1956), The second exception was intended to 
exclude debt and bride-wcalth cases. I identified more than 50 distinct 
wrongs among the several tribes, but there is not room or occasion here to 
list them.
195. See notes 190-91 supra and accompanying text. Here, too, some o f the 
apparent departures from the proposed hypothesis can be satisfactorily 
explained. Kakamcga is the principle administrative centre o f the Luyia, 
an urban community with good schools, which clearly possesses a highly 
westernized population. However, the judges o f  the Lurambi African 
Court, which serves this area, operated under the mistaken belief that 
any wrong which was even colourably a violation of the Penal Code had to 
be brought as a criminal prosecution rather than as a civil action. Sec, e.g., 
Lurambi A.C. C.C. 477/66 (Oct. 24, 1966) faction for abuse dismissed on 
the grounds that the words were likely to cause a breach o f the peace, and 
hence could only form the basis for a criminal complaint under Penal 
Code s. 182(d)]. On the other hand, the Kcricho African Court, used by 
the less advanced Kipsigis, encouraged litigants to seek compensation for 
nssult—the most common source of controversy—through civil actions.
Gusii and Kamba generally bring more tort actions than do the more 
conservative coastal peoples, and the Luo of Maseno, for many years 
the site of an important mission station more than those of Kosele. 
Since there is no reason to assume that European contact alters the relative 
incidence of torts, it may be that such contact increases the willingness 
of wronged persons to seek redress for those torts in court. The readiness 
of people to use a foreign institution like the primary courts depends 
in part on the degree to which it is consistent with, and supportive of, 
other aspects of their culture. The collection of a debt by means of the 
imported judicial system docs not essentially change the nature of the 
obligation and consequently the first claims to be raised, and those which 
continue to preoccupy courts among the less developed peoples, are 
debts—the return of cattle loaned or money borrowed, the payment of 
outstanding wages or sales price, the transfer of brideprice owing or to 
be returned. By contrast, an injured individual who complains to the 
court that he has been wronged must expect customary substantive 
rules and procedures to be significantly altered by alien attitudes and 
techniques. This can be seen most clearly in witchcraft disputes, but 
even in assault or defamation cases, or where a girl has been impregnated, 
the remedy provided transforms the traditional right. Therefore only 
those groups prepared to accept such modifications are likely to entrust 
their tortious disputes to the courts.
Finer distinctions between groups are made possible by examining 
variations in the content of tortious litigation:
Table IV: Incidence o f Wrongs:
Relative incidence of wrongs, expressed as a percentage of total tortious 
disputes, by tribe and by court:
Tribe
Luyia
Court
Hamisi 119 17 5 21 23 4 4 3 6 1 1
Mumins 152 21 11 29 6 6 5 11 5 1 1
Kakamega
Kosele
157 20 6 22 21 8 7 4 6 - -
Luo 62 26 6 26 3 — 2 6 24 — 6
Maseno 143 22 13 12 3 11 2 26 5 — 2
Gusii Kisii 216 8 13 22 17 8 6 7 15 1 —
Kikuyu
Kipsigis
Kiambu 318 10 23 3 41 — 6 7 3 — —
Kericho 152 17 58 1 6 — 6 1 7 — —
Sotik 62 — 55 30 2 — 3 — 6 —
Giriama Kilifi 53 2 15 2 2 70 — 6 4 — —
Digo Gwirani 38 13 13 5 5 55 — 8 _ _ — —
Durum a Kinango 53 6 5 3 19 54 — — 9 -
Kamba Iveti 143 15 9 10 12 8 5 29 6 I -
Isolated differences are immediately apparent in the unusual frequency 
of a particular wrong within certain tribes: impregnating an unmarried 
girl among the Kikuyu, adultery along the coast, assault for the Kipsigis. 
Moreover, if wrongs are grouped into broader categories even more 
striking divergencies emerge. Invasions of exclusive sexual rights represent 
between 60 and 73 per cent of all wrongs among the Digo, Duruma and 
Giriama. Away from the coast only Kikuyu frequently seek to redress 
such rights in court, and they are concerned entirely with pre-marital 
pregnancy which figures significantly only among the Duruma. Invasions 
of property rights—cattle trespass, damaging property or crops, and taking 
property—constitute half of all wrongs among the Kamba. In no other 
court is the proportion comparable except Maseno, where land consoli­
dation has generated numerous controversies over title, often conducted 
by damaging crops on the disputed land, thus temporarily inflating the 
number of such cases. Violations of the right to integrity of person by 
assault or abuse constitute three-quarters of all wrongs among the Kipsigis, 
a proportion which 110 other group approaches. If to these torts arc added 
damage to or theft of property or crops, as constituents of a class of 
aggressive wrongs, the percentage almost reaches 90, again far exceeding 
the next nearest tribe, the Kamba. Caution is definitely advisable in 
interpreting these statistics, but they do at least suggest that tribes may 
differ not only in their willingness to submit different kinds of disputes 
to the judicial process, but also in the relative importance of sex, property 
and aggression as a source of these disputes.
Claims for the redress of wrongs can be analyzed in other ways which I 
can here only mention. The time of filing suit may illustrate a variety of 
periodicities. First, a given wrong may occur more frequently at a specific 
season: cattle trespass is most destructive when crops are ripening; 
assault increases just after harvest when people are idle and beer is plenti­
ful. Second, the delay between tortious act and filing may depend on the 
availability of informal means of arbitration as well as on the intensity of 
plaintiff’s desire to redress the injury. Finally, the requirement that 
cotnt costs be prepaid may render litigation subject to the economic 
cycle of agricultural communities, or to competing financial demands 
represented by personal taxes or school fees.
The amount sought as compensation for a given wrong may also 
vary from tribe to tribe. Certain claims, for instance those in adultery 
or pregnancy cases, still represent traditional remedies, the monetary 
award corresponding to a customary number of livestock. Others seek 
restitution for property damage which can be precisely calculated in 
monetary terms, for example cattle trespass; here tribal differences may 
possibly be correlated with the degree of economic development. But the
quantum of damages demanded for verbal and physical assault is largely 
arbitrary; customary standards are accorded little respect today,196 and 
it is difficult to assign an objective value to the injury. In view of this, 
it is surprising that there is so little variation in the average claim asserted:
Table V: Assault and Abuse
Characteristics of claims and awards in assault and abuse cases, by 
tribe and by court:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ASSAULT CASES ABUSE CASES
.1
Tribe Court
Giuii Kisii 28 506/- 22
Luyia Hamisi 6 376 2
Mumias 15 334 10
Kakamega 9 211 6
Luo Kosele 4 150 2
Maseno 16 262 8
Kipsigis Kericho 85 254 52
Sotik 34 233 30
Taita Wundanyi 6 175 6
Giriama Kaloleni 8 213 7
Kamba Iveti 9 293 6
Kikuyu Kiambu (‘66) 74 212 47
Kiambu (‘48) 11 381 10
’ Percentage of claims made which are successful
I 1
2381- .79 .47 16 282/- 3
483 .33 1.29 22 171 8
194 .67 .58 31 268 13
82 .67 .39 31 266 13
25 .50 .17 16 218 5
163 .50 .63 30 248 12
158 .61 .63 26 205 10
173 .88 .74
118 1.00 .67 25 100 11
140 .83 .66 15 160 10
140 .67 .48 30 194 13
164 .64 .77 56 105 32
218 .91 .57
150/- .19 ,53
75 .36 ,44
262 .42 .98
227 .42 .85
146 ,31 .67
178 .40 73
103 .38 .50
100 .44 1.00
61 .67 .38
185 .43 .95
91 .57 .87
’ ’Average award expressed as percentage of average claim.
Departures from this general uniformity therefore acquire added sig­
nificance, especially the claims made by Gusii victims of assault and 
abuse, which are as much as twice those of most other peoples. Here is 
further evidence that physical, and to a lesser degree verbal, expression 
of hostility is strongly condemned by Gusii, who react by seeking legal 
redress. Such statistical data as the average claim and the distribution 
of claims within the range of variation can help to place individual cases 
in better perspective.
The response of defendants in the course of litigation can exhibit 
patterns just as significant as the demands of plaintiffs, and must be 
subjected to a similar analysis. Within the Kiambu District African
196. See, e.g., Khwisero A.C. C.C. 146/66 (July 26, 1966), appeal dismissed, 
Kakamega Mag. C.A. 132/66 (N . K. N yang’era, Sept. 20, 1966). Plaintiff 
sued defendant and defendant’s daughter for Shs. 1,000/- damages because 
the second defendant had blinded the eye o f  plaintiff’s daughter by accident. 
T h e parties agreed that the Luyia customary compensation for such an 
injury was a cow and a sheep. Nevertheless, the lower court awarded 
Shs. 600/-, reducing the claim only because the injury was accidental. 
T h e Magistrate referred the injury to the Provincial Surgeon who assessed 
it as a 40 per cent disability under the Workman’s Compensation Act. 
T he court rejected this as in?levant, but nevertheless affirmed the award 
b .'lOk/ as fair.
Court, for instance, nearly everyone (93 %) who was sued for assault 
contested the claim, but more than a third (38 %) of those accused of 
impregnating an unmarried girl conceded, either expressly or by failing 
to appear. The former statistic is not surprising: an assault case which 
reaches the courts is likely to be the expression of some underlying 
conflict which cannot easily be resolved amicably. The latter figure is a 
survival of the historical willingness of Kikuyu men to accept an allegation 
of paternity and marry the girl who made it. What requires explanation 
here is rather why 62 per cent of the defendants now resist liability. One 
hypothesis is that unmarried mothers are advancing a greater number of 
unfounded claims, either out of uncertainty as to the identity of the true 
father117—a result of modem promiscuity—or with the intent of naming 
an innocent man who is more likely to pay the substantial customary 
compensation (Shs. 700/-) and maintenance under the Affiliation Act, or 
marry the girl,1** This development is confirmed by the increase in un­
successful suits, from only three per cent in 1948 to 13 per cent in 1966.
The proportion of contested cases varies even more between courts 
than between torts within a court. Only 16 per cent of a sample of 140 
cases initiated in the Kapsabet African Court of Nandi District in 1966 
were contested; the rest were withdrawn, conceded, or decided in the 
absence of one party. A court which concludes 84 per cent of its judicial 
business without a hearing is clearly performing a very different function 
from one in which most disputes are hotly contested. What occurs in 
court is then not the most important dement of the process of dispute 
settlement. Rather resort to court appears to be a threat designed to 
persuade an opponent to compromise, and a decree once obtained is 
merely another element in the extra-judidal bargaining process. This, 
at least, is one hypothesis to be explored, and one which would not have 
been discovered by concentration on .individual contested cases.
(id) With knowledge of the social environment of the legal process— 
who goes to court and what they do there—court statistics may now be 
analyzed with the more traditional aim of describing judicial behaviour. 
Within a given tribe specific claims have varying probabilities of success.
197. See, e.g., Kiambu Mag. C.A. 168/66 (Mar. 8, 1967), dismissing appeal 
from Githunguri A.C. C.C. 647/66 (Sept. 24, 1966) (Action dismissed; 
“Could be she was conceived by defendant who had taken her as a wife 
for a couple of days or perhaps by another friend of hers. She seems really 
confused/’); Kiambu Mag. C.A. 61/64 (Dec. 17, 1964), dismissing appeal 
from Githunguri A.C. C.C. ?/64 (Oct. 13, 1964) (Action dismissed; “She is 
uncertain who caused her pregnant.”)
198. See, e.g. Kiambu Mag. C.A. 46/63 (G. N . Cooke, Sept. 7, 1963]), allowing 
appeal from Kiambu ACA CA 46/63 (May 21, 1963), dismissing appeal 
from Kikuyu AC CC 175/63 (Apr. 25, 1963) ("In cases o f this nature, 
the girls are attracted by the wealth and advantages they would get from the 
putative father.”)
In Kiambu, for instance, these range from almost 90 per cent in paternity 
suits to only a third for complaints concerning damage to growing crops.
Table Vlt Success in Kiambu Cases 
Percentage of actions filed which are successful in Kiambu District 
African Court, by wrong:
Frequency of success appears to follow the difficulty of proof, A pregnant 
girl will generally know and be willing to identify the father of her child, 
and courts have in the past given great weight to such testimony,3m 
although they are becoming more suspicious,800 By contrast, the compar­
able offence of adultery is more difficult to detect and prove absent ft 
wife’s co-operation,801 Offences at the lower end of the scale evince the 
same pattern. People involved in boundary controversies often seek 
revenge by destroying crops on the disputed land; they are usually able 
to conceal their responsibility by working at night on farms far from any 
habitation.202 When cattle destroy crops, they do so during the day while 
they are grazing, and leave tell-tale hoof marks which can be traced; 
at the same time, this cause of action is subject to stringent rules of proof-
199. See, e.g., Kikuyu A.C. C.C. 413/65 (n.d.), appeal dismissed, Kiambu Mag. 
C.A. 145/65 (n.d.) (girl not likely to mention the name of a man with whom 
she has not had intercourse); Nyeri D.O. C.A. 4/64 (Apr. 4, 1964), dis­
missing appeal from Nyeri A.C, C.C. 23/63 (n.d.) ("I do not believe that 
the girl could merely mention him if he has no sexual intercourse with her.”)
200. Sec, e.g., Nyeri Mag. C.A. 26/64 (D. Gathira, June 15, 1965), allowing 
appeal from Nyeri A.C. C.C. 34/64 (July 27, 1964). The lower court had 
reasoned that the girl could not have manufactured the story if they had 
not had sexual intercourse. . . . she could not stand the discussion in her 
father’s presence if they had not had sexual intercourse.” The Magistrate 
commented, in reversing: "The way the lower court reasoned its judgment 
is bad if not ridiculous.. . .  I consider that it was unsafe for the lower court 
to assume that Leah was all through true. It is a common weakness in the 
Kikuyu minds to think in the old way, that all that a girl tells a man in 
sexual matters was true and to presume that the man was guilty. Time for 
that kind of thinking is gone. We are in a new era. I believe that it is necessary 
that such evidence of such a witness as Leah should be supported by other 
evidence before being wholly accepted.”
291. Among the coastal tribes, where wives are more willing to testify against 
their lovers (or are subject to greater coercion), the proportion of successful 
adultery cases is much higher.
202. If circumstances render evidence more readily available as where the 
crops were uprooted (1) during the day, or (2) near plaintiff’s home, the 
court may hold plaintiff to a higher standard, and find against him if he 
fails to produce eye-witness testimony. See (1) Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 
14/66 (J»m 25, 1966); (2) Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 82J9/66 (May 25, 1966) 
(tree cut down 40 feet from plaintiff’s house).
Wrong
Pregnancy
Percentage Successful
Adultery
Insult
Cattle trespass 
Property damage 
Crop damage 
Theft
Assault
87
67
64
60
57
54
56
33
the cattle must be discovered in the damaged field, shown to an eye­
witness, and taken immediately to the owner.803 Even easier of proof 
are cases of insult and assault, which by their nature require the presence 
of both parties and often attract other witnesses.
Nevertheless, divergencies between these last two wrongs do exist, and 
may be further illuminated by statistics showing their disposition by 12 
different courts. (See Table V.) Assault cases are everywhere the more 
successful of the two. Several factors may contribute to this. First, real 
evidence—physical injury and perhaps also a weapon—is only available 
for assaultsj as suggested earlier real evidence appears to have exaggerated 
probative value. Second, since abuse cases depend entirely on testimonial 
evidence, they are more easily fabricated, and courts are therefore more 
suspicious of such allegations. The apparent impact of modernization on 
the success of assault cases tends to support these hypotheses. Complaints 
of assault were proved less often in Kiambu in 1966 than in 1948, and 
less often in Kiambu or Iveti (both urban centres of advanced tribes) 
than in Kaloleni, Sotik, or Wundanyi (smaller villages in less developed 
regions). This is at first glance anomalous, for one would expect plaintiffs 
with a better education to present their claims more persuasively. If, 
therefore, they tend to fail more frequently, the explanation may lie with 
the factors suggested above. Real evidence loses its cogency as judges 
become more sophisticated,204 and the educated inhabitants of urban 
areas have so developed the ability to advance an effective case that they 
can, and do, put forward an increasing number of fraudulent suits.206
Another significant difference between assault and insult claims is 
the degree to which they are inflated. One way of measuring this is to 
compare the average award with the average claim. Surprisingly, this
203. See, e.g., Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 11/66 (Jan. 20, 1966): "From the evidence 
given there is no witness who saw defendant’s cattle in plaintiff’s shamba. 
The cattle were not handed to an elder to take them to the defendant. 
Plaintiff’s witness saw only tracks of cattle which he believed were made 
by the defendant’s cattle. Kikuyu custom was not followed properly in 
this case and therefore we uphold the defence that the damages were [not] 
made by plaintiff’s cattle.”
204. See, e.g., Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 185/66 (June 22, 1966) (Court examined 
plaintiff about his failure to produce teeth allegedly knocked out, but then 
accepted medical report showing they had been lost); Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 
148/66 (Apr. 21, 1966) (defendant argued: "plaintiff should have shown the 
tooth to the elders” who were arbitrating the matter; nevertheless, the court 
again accepted the medical report as sufficient evidence of the loss).
205. For a case with a fabricated defence, cf. Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 100/66 
(Mar. 24, 1966). Plaintiff there sued her husband for assaulting her at Karuri 
village. His defence was that he was in Nairobi that day. The court found 
for plaintiff, saying: "We wish to record that from Nairobi to Karuri 
where the assault took place is between ten and 11 miles and there is a
flow of buses to and from Nairobi almost every minute . . .  To say that 
Patrick was at N airobi. . .  is immaterial as the buses are available at any time 
during the day. The story given by the defence and his witnesses is a cooked 
one and we entirely disagreed with it.”
method of comparison indicates that assault claims are more inflated than 
complaints of abuse,806 My own expectations would have been quite the 
reverse. I would have thought it more likely that claims for abuse would 
be greatly exaggerated, since to determine a cash equivalent is more 
difficult for an injury inflicted by words than for a physical injury. More­
over, contemporary claims for abuse bear no relation to traditional 
remedies, except among the Taita,107 whereas the customary scale of 
damages for physical injury is stiU to some extent followed today.*00 
Perhaps abuse claims are in fact more inflated, and yet the awards are 
more closely proportioned to these claims for the two reasons just men­
tioned: since there is neither a customary nor a physical standard by 
which to assess abuse claims, the courts are compelled to accept or reject 
them in toto.
The record of the Kisii court conforms to this general picture while 
at the same time displaying the unique characteristics of Gusii litigation. 
Assault cases succeed four times as often as do claims for abuse; the 
former are more frequently and the latter less frequently successful than 
comparable cases elsewhere. In both kinds of cases the claims are inflated, 
but claims for assault are reduced more drastically by Gusii courts than 
by most other courts, whereas the treatment of abuse claims is not excep­
tional. From these facts there emerges a picture of Gusii litigants rushing 
to court with exaggerated claims as soon as they suffer the slightest verbal 
or physical offence. Gusii judges share the society’s condemnation of 
physical aggression, in that they allow an unusually large number of such 
claims, but not to the extent of acquiescing in the exaggerated value 
which Gusii plaintiffs place on their physical integrity. On the other 
hand, while Gusii culture also deplores the verbal expression of hostility, 
Gusii judges are less influenced by this attitude. Either they have been 
westernized to the extent of believing that “sticks and stones may break 
my bones but names will never harm me,” or else they feel that the abused 
man who seeks public satisfaction for his grievance has just as much
206. Two of the exceptional courts, Hamisi and Kaloleni, had too few cases to 
he statistically significant. Kericho, however, requires an explanation. 
It may be that the Kipsigis emphasis on physical violence, as shown in the 
unusually large number of assault cases, leads them to minimize the serious­
ness of injuries, with the result that it is not considered manly to complain 
too loudly about how badly one has been hurt.
207. See, e.g., Taita D.A.C. C.C. 212/66 (Sept. 13, 1966) (claim of a bull worth
Shs. 100/-).
208. See, e.g., Kiambu D.A.C. C.C, 88/66 (Mar. 17, 1966) (claim for a thenge 
or ram, and a kibemb§ or tin of honey, for assault); Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 
90/66 (Mar. 15, 1966) (same); Machakos Mag. C.A, 54/64 (R. Mullaa, 
Sept. 25, 1964), allowing in part appeal from Nziu A.C. C.C. ?/64 (n.d.) 
(customary compensation for minor assaults is a goat; for major assaults 
it is a bull and a goat).
violated the rule against aggressive acts as has the man who first uttered 
the abuse.*0*
Because standards of proof are quite rigorous in the primary courts, 
the success of a claim is a reasonably good indication that it represents 
a real injury. Granting such an assumption, it is possible to use infor­
mation from case files and registers to determine the efficiency of these 
courts in enforcing legal rights. This efficiency can be measured in two 
ways. First, an index of the economic cost of litigation can be developed 
by expressing the total court costs paid by the parties as a percentage of 
the ultimate award. The figures thus obtained could be compared by 
wrong and by tribe, os well as with the economic cost of redressing the 
same rights in other fora, for instance by informal arbitration.110 Second, 
the time consumed by each stage of the judicial process offers another 
index of the efficiency of the courts in resolving disputes. Comparisons 
of the sort suggested above could be made with respect to the length of 
time elapsed between tortious act and filing, between filing and judgment, 
and between judgment and its partial or total satisfaction. Clearly infor­
mation of this kind is absolutely essential to discriminate between what 
Llewellyn contemptuously called “paper rules1' end those practices which 
he sought to focus on as law-in-action.110* The significance of any remedy, 
no matter how often it is apparently granted by the judge of a primary 
court, is limited by its economic cost to litigants, and by the length of 
time required actually to secure it.
The interpretations offered above only skim the surface of the wealth 
of insights into the real workings of the judicial process which statistical 
analysis permits. Many other, more sophisticated correlations are possible 
between the numerous variables for which there is data. The sex of a
209. Indeed, litigation is seen by the Gusii as just such an aggressive act. See 
R. LeVine, "Witchcraft and Sorcery in a Gusii Community,” in Witchcraft 
and Sorcery in East Africa 221, 250. (Middleton and Winters ed. 1963).
210. In comparing judicial with extra-judicial procedures, it is necessary to look 
not only at the costs of the two, but at the possible compensation to be 
gained. It is not surprising that the court, which has coercive powers, will 
award higher judgments for such wrongs as abuse and assault than are 
likely to be obtained by informal compromise. What is interesting is that 
"customary” claims may vary in and out of court. The Kikuyu Law Panel 
has fixed compensation for impregnating an unmarried girl at 20 goats 
(worth Shs. 20/- each) and six rams (worth Shs. 50/- each). Meeting at 
Fort Hall, May 1-2, 1962. However, when agreement is reached out of 
court the compensation paid is only half the above, ten goats, a bull equiva­
lent to three rams, and beer. In an extremely interesting case decided 
recently it was held that, where such compensation has been paid out of 
court pursuant to an agreement, plaintiff may nevertheless sue for the 
balance of the official compensation if defendant failed to obtain a written 
release of liability upon completing the unofficial payment. See Mukurweini 
District Magistrate’s Court C.C. 42/68 (Mar. 26, 1968).
210a. See Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step,” 30 Colum. 
L. Rev, 431, passim (1930).
party may, for instance, bear a significant relationship to the success of 
his claim; the degree to which a claim is inflated may affect the speed with 
which it is enforced. Analyses of this sort remedy any lack of represen­
tativeness from which the study of individual cases may suffer. They are 
only now possible as the primary courts have begun to keep detailed 
accurate records.
V. Appellate Courts
The materials examined so far have been drawn entirely from the 
primary courts, an approach which may appear unusual to legal scholars 
accustomed to analyze appellate decisions. This portion of the article, 
therefore, will consider the extent to which African circumstances justify, 
and perhaps require modification of the techniques of conventional 
scholarship. Reliance on appellate judgments appears to derive from 
three interrelated assumptions. Central among these is the belief that 
lawyers should focus their attention on the interpretation and develop­
ment of legal rules. Procedures for the preliminary determination of the 
facts to which these rules arc applied are of secondary interest, relegated 
largely to the restricted field of evidence. In the American judicial system, 
indeed, issues of fact are generally entrusted to the jury, about whose 
functioning astonishingly little is known. Second, granting this concern, 
appellate judgments contain a better discussion of substantive rules, for 
two reasons. Since they are uncomplicated by factual controversies, issues 
of law are presented more sharply and in greater detail. Moreover, the 
level of judicial analysis is higher because there is an assumed correlation 
between talent and rank in the appellate structure. Finally, reliance on 
the judgments of the highest court is both permitted and required by the 
hierarchical nature of our judicial system: permitted because decisions of 
an appellate court are binding on the subsequent actions of an inferior 
tribunal; required because deviant behaviour in a primary court does not 
accurately reflect the “real” law enshrined in appellate decisions.
The following diagram summarizes the description of the Kenya appeals 
system contained in the first part of this article and will help in assessing 
the relevance of these principles to Kenya:
Judicial Structure o f Kenya 1930—Present
1. CIVIL CASES: High Court (1967—Present)
Court of Review (1951—67)
Supreme Court (1930-51)
CRIMINAL CASES: High Court (1964-67)
Supreme Court (1930-64)
2. Provincial African Courts Officer (1951—67)
Provincial Commissioner (1930-51)
3. Resident, or First or Second Class District Magistrate (1967—
Present)
Appeal Magistrate (1962-67)
District Officer (1932-62)
District Commissioner (1930-32)
4. African Court of Appeal (1951-64)
Native Appeals Tribunal (1930-51)
5. Third Class District Magistrate (1967—Present)
African Court (1951-67)
Native Tribunal (1930-51)
Can the central assumption of conventional legal scholarship-conccm 
with the analysis of legal rules—be retained in this judicial environment ? 
I think not. Of the several thousand cases which I read, very few of those 
decided by African Courts or Appeal Magistrates involved controversies 
about the identity or desirability of rules. Though parties might emphasize 
different rules they rarely challenged those advanced by an opponent, or 
urged judicial modification of an existing rule. Nor did courts engage in 
the development of substantive law on their own initiative. Rather, as the 
two case analyses presented in the first part of this article should indicate, 
attention was directed toward the determination of disputed facts. It was 
within this process of fact-finding that substantive rules played their 
role, being invoked by a litigant to strengthen his own evidence and 
discredit that of an opponent (as in the Gusii case), and being utilized 
by the judge to choose between inconsistent stories (as in the Luo case). 
The Kenya decisions thus seem to provide striking confirmation of 
Jerome Frank’s contention that “fact-uncertainty” is the principal source 
of legal uncertainty.811 If this view of the judicial process is correct, then 
surely legal scholarship should be concerned primarily to discover the 
critical rules governing the determination of facts and not allow itself to 
be limited by conventional preoccupations with the study of substantive 
principles which are relatively clear and static because they are isolated 
from the stress of controversy which might force them to develop.
211. Frank, Law and the Modem Mind xiv (6th cd. 1949). Although Frank, of 
course, made his assertion about the American legal system, his observations 
may be even more illuminating in the African context. Factual disputes are 
pervasive in the primary courts of Kenya because standards of veracity are 
extremely low. Litigants offer self-serving testimony and witnesses are 
expected to support the party who called them. In the course of a year of 
leafing through tens of thousands of cases, I came across only one prose­
cution for perjury (actually a citation for contempt by an irate judge). 
Issues of law receive relatively less attention, perhaps because there is no 
professional bar with a vested interest in raising them.
Conventional scholarship was best served by the examination of 
appellate decisions. To the extent that appellate courts in Kenya share 
with their English or American counterparts a devotion to the explication 
of rules, the radical change in focus just suggested may demand a re- 
evaluation of the utility of such decisions. In actuality, however, appeals 
in Kenya were conducted differently. Until recently reports of primary 
court proceedings were not adequate to allow an appellate court to restrict 
its review to the record alone. Hearings by African Courts of Appeal 
were always de novo, and District Officers and Appeal Magistrates often 
heard a great deal of additional testimony.111 However, subsequent 
appeals to the Provincial Commissioner, Provincial African Courts 
Officer, and Court of Review, were based entirely on the record and 
suffered from that limitation. But though it seems that the higher the judge 
the less opportunity he had to consider vital factual issues, may this 
disadvantage not be outweighed by his superior judicial ability? The 
answer is unclear. A judge's rank in the judicial hierarchy may well be 
correlated with his legal skills, but unfortunately such rank also appears 
to have varied inversely with knowledge of, and tolerance for, customary 
law and its social background. There was little difference in terms of these 
criteria between primary court judges and those who sat on the African 
Courts of Appeal, except perhaps in length of experience, since personnel 
circulated between the two. The rest of the appellate structure may be 
divided into two categories. The first, and by far the largest, was the expat­
riate bench. Prior to independence this included the District Officers, 
Provincial Commissioners, Provincial African Courts Officers,*18 Court 
of Review,*14 and High Court. Today, Asians and Europeans still occupy 
most of the higher levels—as Resident Magistrates*15 and judges of the 
High Court.*15 With significant exceptions the upper echelons of this 
group, though legally sophisticated, possessed little or no understanding 
of customary law. The attitude of the lower strata varied greatly, depending 
on term of duty and personal inclination, but few had any legal training.
212. That this was the practice despite explicit instructions to the contrary 
is some index of the inadequacy of many primary court judgments. See 
Waller, African Courts Handbook: Guide to Hearing of Civil Appeals by 
District Officers 1-2 (1961): "hear only such additional evidence as may be 
necessary to elucidate any ‘issue’ or may be necessary in the light o f the 
appellant’s statement. It may often happen that no additional evidence is 
necessary at all; do not start to record all evidence *de novo\ You arc hearing 
an appeal, not a case of the first instance;. ,
213. There are exceptions, for instance S. R. Karunditu, who was for some time 
acting Provincial African Courts Officer for Central Province.
214. One African, Shadrack Malo, a Luo, did sit on the Court.
215. There are two African Resident Magistrates; Mr, J. O. Nyarangi, a Gusii, 
and Mr. E. N . Aroka, a Luo. In addition, two Deputy Registrars of the High 
Court also function as Resident Magistrates: Mr. Mukele, a Luyia and 
Mr. Onyango Otieno, a Luo,
216. The first African, Mr. Mwendwa, was appointed to the High Court as 
Chief Justice in 1968.
The African bench is almost entirely confined to the primary courts 
and, since the early 1960’s, the first level of appeal—formerly the Appeal 
Magistrates and now the First Class Magistrates. Although the latter are 
a heterogeneous group they share certain advantages. All possess, as part 
of their culture, a sensitivity to customary legal thought and a familiarity 
with local behavioural patterns. As members of the educated elite, they 
have benefited from a superior secondary education and often have 
received some legal training as well.* Nevertheless, the value of cultural 
affinity is largely lost when these magistrates are posted outside their 
own community, as is often the case.117 Though customary legal systems 
may be uniform in general principles, detailed rules vary widely; magis­
trates must then apply these alien rules to an unfamiliar sociocultural 
environment, Moreover, they must often work through interpreters. 
And education is also of ambiguous value; the greater eloquence obtained 
may only be used to express a condescending rejection of customary law 
which exceeds, in cultural bias, the opinions of expatriate judges, Yet 
despite these drawbacks, I found that on balance many Magistrate's 
Appeals were both superior in evidentiary record and legal analysis to the 
decisions of the primary courts, and at the same time more valuable 
than the judgments produced by subsequent reviews.
Even if appellate decisions possess no advantages for the scholar, their 
use may be mandated by a hierarchical system which endows them with 
a more authoritative voice in the statement of legal principles. But again 
the Kenya judicial system, though formally hierarchical, does not function 
this way. Superior courts can exert authority over inferior tribunals in 
two ways: by reversing erroneous judgments in the relatively small 
number of cases actually appealed, and by requiring that the vast number 
of cases which do not reach them be governed by appellate precedent. 
Appellate courts in Kenya do indeed reverse, and enforce their reversals, 
but too small a proportion of the body of litigation is appealed for this 
first method to have any substantial impact on the legal process. Of the 
approximately 250,000 cases decided by primary courts in 1966, no more 
than two or three thousand, or about one per cent, were appealed to a 
magistrate, and only one per cent of this latter group reached the Court of 
Review. Nor is this lack of direct impact adequately supplemented by 
the influence of example. Appellate decisions fail to compel that degree 
of obedience from the lower courts which they secure in England or 
America for two reasons. First, they are simply not known. None of the 
opinions of the Appeal Magistrates are published and only a small selection
*Editor*s Note: See “District Magistrate Training in Kenya”, 5 E.A.L.J.
299 (December, 1969).
217. Of the 17 Appeals Magistrates about whom I have information, only nine
were posted exclusively within their own communities.
of those of the Court of Review. Only the lower court whose decision is 
being altered is notified, and even it receives a mere statement that the 
appeal has been allowed, unenlightened by reasoning. Communication 
from the top of the hierarchy is largely restricted to occasional circulars 
from, and personal contact with, the African Courts Officer.
An extreme example may help to dramatize the importance of this 
point. In 1961 Nehemiah removed a girl from the school where she was 
studying and took her to live with him.218 Josphat the girl’s father, sued 
under Luyia “customary law” since both parties were of that tribe, and 
claimed repayment of the school fees he had expended for his daughter's 
education, a total of Shs. 1,175/-. The Lurambi African Court awarded 
Josphat Shs. 800/- for school fees,219 and though this was reversed by the 
African Court of Appeal,220 it was reinstated by the District Officer.221 
However, the Court of Review reduced the judgment to a heifer, worth 
Shs. 250/-, which it found was all that customary law allowed. It relied 
on a memorandum by the African Courts Officer which stated:
“As the girl lived with Charles for some time, the father can claim one 
heifer as Luhya customary compensation for deflowering the girl 
which is presumed in a case of elopement. The claim for return of 
school fees even though interpreted by the District Officer as general 
compensation is untenable in this customary claim for compensation.'*
In another case, less than two years later, Abisai Hungulu sued Liveha 
s/o Amoyi and his father, Amoyi s/o Kidiya, because Liveha had impreg­
nated Abisai’s daughter Matride while they were in school together.222
218. Lurambi A.C. C.C. 227/61 (Apr. 19, 1961), appeal allowed, Kakamega 
A.C.A. C .A. 83/61 (June 3, 1961), appeal allowed, Kakamega D .O . C.A. 
83/61 (Nov. 27, 1962), appl. to C.O.R. allowed, Kakamega District Registry  
Appl. 12/62 (M ay 15, 1964), appeal allowed, C.O.R. Appl. 1/64 (Am ley, 
C.J., n.d.). T h e names used for the parties are pseudonyms.
219. It gave no explanation for this figure. T h e girl had completed Standard 
VI at Intermediate School. Josphat agreed to accept brideprice but defenc&nt 
refused to pay it. T he court reasoned that defendant had taken the girl 
from school and now refused to pay brideprice for no reason. Defendant 
had previously been prosecuted for the customary crime o f removing an  
unmarried girl and had been fined Shs, 100/-. Lurambi A.C. Cr.C. 578/60  
(n.d.). At that time he had agreed to pay six head o f cattle brideprice but 
had since failed to do so.
220. T h e Court o f Appeal found for defendant because he had agreed to pay 
seven head o f cattle brideprice and subsequently produced five head, 
which plaintiff had refused on the ground that they were too young. T his  
excuse was unsatisfactory because plaintiff could have asked the elders to  
require defendant to produce better animals.
221. T h e D istrict Officer stated: “ I consider that plaintiff has a justifiable daim  
to compensation for a clear departure from native custom . . .  Compensation 
in fairly assessed at school fees paid out to prepare the daughter for marriage 
to a good class husband. T his girl cannot expect to get any but an inferior 
husband.”
222. Ham isi A.C. C.C. 8/66 (Jan. 18, 1966), appeal allowed in part, Kakamega 
Alag. C.A. 89/66 (Aug. 26, 1966), re-hearing ordered by A.C.O. (letter o f  
D ec. 3, 1966), appeal allowed in part, Kakamega Mag. C.A. 89/66 (D ec. 22, 
1966), T h e names used for the parties are pseudonyms.
He claimed compensation for the Shs. 990/25 in school fees which he 
had spent for his daughter. The Hamisi African Court, located only a 
few miles from the Lurambi African Court, appeared to be ignorant of the 
Court of Review’s decision, and granted Abisai Shs. 661/- for the fees 
he had been able to prove. Only Amoyi appealed and the Appeals Magis­
trate, who had by then succeeded the District Officer, allowed this appeal 
on the limited ground that a father cannot be held liable for pregnancy 
caused by an adult son. The African Courts Officer happened to see this 
decision and wrote an irate letter:838
“What exactly does your judgment mean? Have you set aside the 
decision of the Hamisi African Court against both father and son, or 
only against the father ? May I remind you and all Western Province 
African Courts that the Court of Review has already decided that there 
can be no claim for refund of ALL a girl’s education costs because she 
becomes pregnant. She does not lose her education because fche has a 
child. A parent can of course recover school fees paid in advance for 
the period the girl does not attend school as a result of her pregnancy.’’
The Magistrate justified his failure to allow an appeal by Leveli.i on the 
grounds that Leveha had not taken an appeal, and replied plaintively :r  ‘
“Abisai and Amoyi are satisfied with my judgment, and Leveha with 
the judgment of the Hamisi African Courr, s.nee they have not complain­
ed. They are satisfied with it though it may be against the ruling of 
the Court of Review that there can be no claim for refund of all a girl’s 
education costs. I was not informed of this ruling except when you 
wrote to me on 26.10.66 [the above letter]. If it is against the ruling 
of the Court of Review of which I was not aware then I can see no 
justification when you say that you are NO!' satisfied with the manner 
in which this appeal was tried. Please you as my Senior Officer and 
as the African Courts Officer if my work does not satisfy you, say so 
and I am ready to accept any other duties that you may assign me”.325
More important than the impassioned tone of this exchange is the fact 
that once again its contents were not communicated to those primary 
courts in Western Province which were supposed to be bound by this 
ruling. Both before and after the letter from the African Courts Officer,
223. Letter o f African Courts Officer to Kakamega Appeal Magistrate, Oct. 26, 
1966.
224. Letter o f Kakamega Appeal Magistrate to African Courts Officer, Nov. 10* 
1966.
225. On re-hearing the Magistrate found that Adagala had paid Shs. 300/- for 
his daughter’s last year o f schooling, and that she had been expelled after 
completing half o f it because of pregnancy. He therefore allowed Shs. 150/- 
damages. He did not allow compensation for pregnancy o f two head of 
cattle because the boy and girl were related, and under such circumstances 
no compensation is paid.
in the Lurambi court whose judgment had originally stimulated the 
decision by the Court of Review, in the Hamisi court whose judgment 
was here reversed, and elsewhere in Kakamega District, plaintiffs sought 
and recovered compensation for all the school fees they had paid for 
daughters who had been removed from school and impregnated by 
defendants.22*
Yet ignorance is not the only reason for nonconformity with appellate 
decisions; even were copies of opinions available to the primary courts it 
is doubtful whether they would have commanded much respect. The 
elders of the African Courts felt with some justice that they knew better 
how to resolve disputes according to customary law than did the appellate 
judges—certainly they were more skilled than the European and Asian 
bench, and probably more adept than African magistrates, who were 
strangers to the local community and might even be from another tribe.” 7 
Moreover, were adherence to precedent not voluntary, it would be very 
difficult to compel. Direct review by an administrative official could be 
frustrated by recording a distorted version of the evidence to make it 
appear that an unpopular rule was being faithfully applied, when in fact 
it was being ignored. Even absent such distortion, effective administrative 
review of the vast mass of litigation was impossible within a system which
226. See, e.g., Hamisi A.C. C.C. 1/66 (Jan. 15, 1966) (claim for one head of cattle 
pregnancy compensation and Shs. 1,500/- school fees; defendant agreed 
to pay Shs. 500/- school fees Shs. 177/- court costs and Shs. 23/- transport, 
which the court approved); Lurambi A.C. C.C. 388/66 (Sept. 22, 1966) 
(judgment for one head o f cattle, customary pregnancy compensation; 
one sheep for cleansing since the parties were related, and Shs. 800/- school 
fees); Lurambi A.C. C.C. 441/66 (Oct. 10, 1966) (judgment for Shs. 450/- 
school fees); Lurambi A.C. C.C. 515/66 (Dec. 21, 1966) (judgment for two 
head of cattle customary pregnancy compensation and Shs. 700/- school 
fees; this case was decided after the letter from the A.C.O.); Khwisero 
A.C. C.C. 153/66 (Aug. 31, 1966) (judgment of Shs. 1,350/- school fees; 
this court is also subordinate to the Kakamega Appeal Magistrate); Emu- 
haya A.C. C.C. 78/66 (May 4, 1966) (judgment for Shs. 900/- school fees; 
this court also falls within the same appellate system). The Kakamega 
Magistrate who had received the reproof clearly learned his lesson, and in 
subsequent appeals he reduced all awards to the two head of cattle which 
traditionally constituted customary compensation. See, e.g., Kakamega Mag. 
C.A. 128/66 (Apr. 10, 1967), dismissing appeal from, but varying award of, 
Butali A.C. C.C. 535/66 (July 25, 1966) (original claim Shs. 1,200/-; lower 
court awarded Shs. 800/-; on appeal reduced to Shs. 300/- representing 
two head of cattle); Kakamega Mag. C.A. 178/66 (Jan, 3,1967), dismissing 
appeal from, but varying award of, Ikolomani A.C. C.C. 312/66 (Aug. 29, 
1966) (original claim Shs. 2,000/-; Shs. 1 ,000/-allowed below, reduced to 
Shs. 300/- on appeal). However, another magistrate who subsequently sat 
in the same court was apparently unaware of the ruling. See Kakamega 
Mag. C.A. 50/67 (Feb. 23, 1968) allowing appeal from Ikolomani A.C. C.C. 
388/66 (Oct. 15, 1966) (reversed lower court’s award of compensation for 
pregnancy for lack of evidence, but no mention made of the size of award, 
which was Shs. 756/- for school fees).
227. This attitude is undoubtedly changing as primary court judges receive 
more legal education, concurrently adopting Western attitudes, and as the 
appellate structure is Africanized,
aimed to provide inexpensive legal redress on a balanced budget.8*8
Nor was the informal supervision provided by the professional bar in 
developed countries available, since the Kenya bar was not interested 
in and in any case had little access to unpublished primary decisions.
Perhaps this somewhat abstract dicussion of the merits and drawbacks 
of various sources can be given substance by analysis of the progress of 
an actual case through a series of appeals. For, notwithstanding all the 
criticisms just offered, I did make extensive use of Magistrate’s Appeals, 
for two quite unrelated reasons.829 On balance, greater literacy and legal 
sophistication outweighed any unfamiliuniy with or bias against eoslomuiy 
law. Moreover, such bias might possess considerable significance for legal 
development since the Magistrates decided enough cases to have a sub 
stantial impact within the legal process. Finally, appellate case file 
contained a full record of primary court proceedings, as well as the evtdcuC'. 
heard and judgment tendered on appeal.a:i" Apart fiom th e v  coioidcra 
lions, however, there was an overwhelming advantage in terms h  con 
venience and efficiency. In the early 1%0’s the African Courts Olhco 
instructed the Appeal Magistrates to send him a typed carbon iopy ot 
every judgment.231 lie  has thus collected more than S,000 judgment 
handed down since about 1963, which are tiled in the Law Courts in 
Nairobi. I used these materials intensively during the first two months 
of my field work in order to obtain a synoptic view of the role of custumary 
law in the judicial process. From this source I have deliberately chosen 
a typical case to illustrate in extreme form the differences in ability «nd 
attitude among the several levels of the judicial hierarchy. T he panic ire 
all Kamba.232
228. District Officers, and subsequently Appeal Magistrates, did In..c if.c 
power to revise any decision of an African Court. African Court. O/d , 
Laws of Kenya, Cap. 11, s. 4-1 (rev. ed. 196}) as amended by African • 'ouro 
(Amendment) Ord., No. 50 of 1962, s. 33. M y  impression is that, .it least 
in civil cases, this power has not been widely used in the recent p.ist 1 t. 
eliminated by the Magistrate’s Courts Act, No. 17 of 1967.
229. There were only about a dozen decisions by the Court ol Review i levant 
to m y  subject during the decade or more that it functioned.
2}0. As stated earlier, all papers filed in a case are kept in the court which p.issi 
the final judgment. In 1966 there were 25 Appeal Magistrates Courts in 
Kenya: Kiambu, Murang’a, Thika, Kerugoya, Nyeri, Embu, Meru, 
Machakos, Kitui, Wundanyi, Kilifi, Kwale, Mombasa, Nakuru, Naivasha, 
Hldoret, Kitalc, Kericho, Kisii, Homa Bay, Kisumu, Kakamcga Bungoma, 
Kapsabet, and Nairobi.
231. These judgments contain a summary of the evidence and decision below, 
the grounds of appeal, any additional evidence heard, and a reasoned opinion. 
However, the record is not complete, and testimony and cross-examination 
are omitted.
232. Nziu A.C. C.C. P278/63 (n.d.), appeal allowed, Machakos Mag. C.A 
98/64 (R. Mullaa, May 5, 1965), appl. to C.O.R. allowed, Machakos District 
Registry Appl. P30/65 (A.C.O., May 19, 1965), appeal dismissed, C O.R. 
Appl. 7/66 (Ainley, C.J., Feb. 9, 1967). The Kamba are a Bantu people 
numbering about a million, who live in Eastern Province, just east of Nairobi. 
See Kenya Census, 1962 at 36. All the names used are pseudonyms.
Plaintiff: Paul.
Defendant: John.
Claim: Damage to reputation, Shs. 300/- (Filed Oct. 16, 1963).
Facts: Paul alleged that on 17th September, 1963, he was walking along 
a road with two old women, Esther and Lidia, on the way to address 
a political meeting when he was overtaken by John, John asked the 
women if they were going to vote for him, They replied that they did 
not consider that he would compete with Paul at the elections, John 
rebuked them, saying that they should vote for Paul because he gave 
them tnamivana (bread toasts) and slept with them. Paul asked John to 
repeat that, but John refused and rode off on his bicycle, John denied 
meeting Paul on that date. He said that he was speaking at a different 
place.
Judgment o f the Nziu African Court: For Paul, Shs, 300/- damages, 
Paul and John held political meetings at different places respectively 
on that date, but they had met and John had used insulting words to 
Paul in the presence of the two women.
John’s Grounds of Appeal: John again denied meeting Paul on that 
date and wanted to call an additional witness to support his denial. 
John also wished to swear a kithitu oath233 to prove his allegations.
Evidence on Appeal: John was allowed to call a witness, Kisuko, who 
confirmed John's alibi.234
Judgment of the Machakos Appeal Magistrate: For John. “Both 
parties in this case are politicians. During the month when this dispute 
arose both were contesting for one seat at the Machakos County Coun­
cil235 elections. They both belonged to one political party then.” The 
court was convinced that the parties held political meetings at different 
places on the day involved, but that they did meet on the road. . .  one 
tiling is that the defendant did not talk to the plaintiff but to the women. 
The alleged insulting words were said to the women. The question is
233. A kithitu is an object on which an oath is sworn; it is alleged to kill a perjurer 
or his near kin within six months. Traditionally it was greatly feared and 
highly effective at insuring truthful testimony. See Penwill, Kamba Cus­
tomary Law  56-66 (1951). That it has much less power today is shown by 
the instant case. John’s story was probably false yet he, an educated man, 
was anxious to swear to it on the kithitu in order to impress the more credible 
primary court.
234. That the court allowed John to call an additional witness who could easily 
have been produced below shows the readiness of appellate courts to hear 
further testimony. Compare note 212 supra,
235. Machakos District contains well over half o f the Kamba, and thus more 
than half a million people. The position of county councillor is one of 
considerable status.
whether the alleged words were said by John as claimed by Paul and 
his witness. And further did the words alleged spoken amount to 
defamation of Paul’s good name. It must be remembered here that the 
parties were great rivals over an election to a seat at the Machakos 
County Council. . .  In my humble opinion I consider that these words 
spoken by John were not defamatory to Paul but perhaps would have 
been so to the two women. This is because John was directly talking to 
these women, and as the Nziu African Court found the women were dis­
appointed [sic] with the defendant’s insults to them, I have also con­
sidered the circumstances under which the words were spoken, John 
was trying to convince the women to vote for him at the election, 
There were no other people around who heard the alleged defamatory 
words. The two women were the right wing [he] supporters of Paul. 
. . . the parties have had fitinaB3fl long before this dispute. Tliis ftlina 
is still existing.” The court refused to allow the oath,
[Paul then applied to the African Courts Officer for permission to 
submit the case to the Court of Review, which was granted.]
Judgment of the Court o f R e v i e w :  “This was a disgraceful thing ro 
say, but it is quite clear that John was merely being rude and abusive. 
It scarcely needs saying that the two old ladies would realize that, and 
there is not the slightest evidence on the record that anyone besides 
Paul, Esther and Lidia heard these words. The fact is then that Paul’s 
good name was not injured. . . . We wish to say, however, that Kamba 
custom may possibly permit a man to recover compensation for mere 
vulgar or scurrilous insults and abuse which have.not spoiled his name 
or lowered his reputation in the community, but which have caused him 
distress and affront. . . .  If there is such a custom, and a man wishes to 
base his claim on it, he must do so clearly and at the outset of the case 
so that the trial court knows precisely the issues which it has to try. 
. . .  It is not only a matter of law, it is a matter of common sense that 
there is a vast difference between saying ‘that man was rude and insult­
ing’ and ‘that man has lowered my reputation and damaged the 
character which I hold among my friends*. To say one thing is to make, 
on any showing, a trivial allegation. To say the other is to allege what 
may be a very serious wrong indeed.”
The substantive law in this area is unclear, and probably in a state of 
flux. Kamba historically had a system of age-grades; although membership 
had to be achieved by making certain payments, these grades served 
roughly to divide the male population into groups of coevals.237 A
236. Jealousy, contention (Swahili).
237. See Middleton &  Kershaw, The Central Tribes o f the North-Eastern Bantu 
74-75 (1965).
young man who had been disrespectful towards an elder would be required 
by his father to make the elder a gift of beer, at least equal in value to a 
goat.238 When courts were instituted insulted persons began to seek 
redress in novel situations, and to ask for money compensation in increas­
ing amounts. Some courts have continued to emphasize the age relation­
ship, restricting recovery to elders insulted by youths,*3# and denying it 
when the parties are of the same age,8*0 Others have extended the cause 
of action to allow a woman to sue a younger man.841 A few courts have 
held older men liable for insulting younger women248 or men,845 expressly 
rejecting the traditional basis of the tort:
“I am satisfied that the old custom of the Kamba whereby the aged were 
probably privileged to insult the young ones has died out in these 
modern civilized periods and days where no one is privileged to insult 
the other.244
But most cases simply grant recovery without any reference to the relative 
ages of the parties,24* recognizing that age-grades have lost their traditional 
significance,84* Similarly, there is no correspondence today between the
238. See Penwill, Kamba Customary Law  110 (1951). The official value of ft 
goat today for judicial purposes is Shs. 20/-.
239. See, e.g., Machakos Mag. C.A. 156/65 (Dec. 22, 1965), dismissing appeal 
from Iveti A.C. C.C. 450/65 (Nov. 30, 1965) (defendant said to plaintiff, 
an old man, in front of eight people, that he bad been spoiled by harlots 
and was a rascal; plaintiff awarded Shs. 200/- damages); Machakos Mag. C.A. 
23/66 (Mar. 4, 1966), dismissing appeal from Miu A.C. C.C. 2/66 (Jan. 24, 
1966) (defendants, members of an age grade inferior to that of plaintiff, 
said among other things that he was a dog and should die; plaintiff 
claimed Shs. 1,000/- compensation and was awarded Shs. 600/-).
240. See, e.g., PI, P2, and P3 v.D. Machakos Mag. C.A. 66/65 (Sept. 21, 1965), 
dismissing appeal from Miu A.C. C.C. ?/65 (Apr. 30,1965) (PI and P3 are 
of the same age group as the defendant and therefore cannot recover).
241. Ibid. (P2, a woman, is older than the defendant and therefore can recover.)
242. See, e.g., Machakos Mag. C.A. 14/65 (Mar. 20, 1965), allowing appeal 
from Iveti A.C. C.C. ? / ? (Jan. 8, 1965); Machakos Mag. 
C.A. 34/65 (Aug. 20, 1965), dismissing appeal from Kangundo A.C. 
C.C. ? / ? (n.d.): “The person abused is a woman and the person who 
abused her is on old man of about the age of the woman’s father . . .  I 
consider that the abusive words used by the defendant are bad [stupid dog, 
devil, kino] and especially when used by a man to a woman of a younger 
ogc than the man,”
243. Machakos Mag. C.A. 43/67 (June 19, 1967), dismissing appeal from Miu 
A.C. C.C. 5/67 (n.d.).
244. Ibid.
245. See, e.g., Machakos Mag. C.A. 31/65 (Aug. 19, 1965), allowing appeal 
from Kangundo A.C. C.C. ? / ? (Feb. 15, 1965) (upper and lower courts 
differed only on whether there was sufficient evidence of the abuse; plaintiff 
claimed Shs, 150/- for being called a stupid dog, and was allowed Shs. 100/-); 
Machakos Mag. C.A. 157/66 (Jan. 24, 1967), dismissing appeal from Miu 
A.C. C.C. 160/66 (n.d.) (plaintiff claimed Shs. 500/- for being called a dog, 
and was allowed Shs. 300/-).
246. My Kamba research assistant, a second-year student at University College, 
Dar es Salaam, did not know his age-gradc, though he had lived at home 
until going to the university.
traditional compensation of a goat and the money claims made or 
allowed.247
The Nziu African Court in the instant case apparently followed con­
temporary notions of abuse, since there was no evidence that Paul and 
John were of different ages, and since the compensation awarded was 
worth 15 goats, not one. Its application of those rules, however, showed 
little insight into the issues raised by the ease, nor even ait accurate per­
ception of the basic facts,248 The Machakos Appeal Magistrate wrote a 
judgment displaying considerably greater juristic ability in identifying 
and resolving the issues, although his presentation of them is somewhat 
disorganized. He found three basic questions: had the parties met; had 
John used the words allegedj did they create a cause of action? The 
answers to the first two were clearly positive, thus disposing of John’s 
alibi. As for the third, there were two possible claims-^customary insult 
and common law defamation249—and the magistrate appears to have 
understood this distinction, although he tends to use the two terms 
interchangeably. As 0 Kamba himself, he recognized the existence of an 
insult without difficulty, However, the facts in this case did not satisfy 
an essential element of the action, that the insulting words be addressed 
to the plantiff.260 Treating Paul’s complaint as one for defamation, the 
court again rejected it, on alternative grounds. First, it did not satisfy 
the common law requirement of publication and damage because the only 
persons who heard the defamatory words were Paul's own supporters. 
Second, the “circumstances under which the words were spoken” were 
such as to preclude an action for damages: the litigants were both politi­
cians, members of the same party, between whom there had long been
247. See cases cited in notes 239-45 supra.
248. As the Magistrate correctly noted, John had not used insulting words to 
Paul, but to the two women.
249. One o f the most fascinating aspects o f  the evolution o f customary law in 
Kenya is the gradual introduction o f  common law actions, for which there 
is no legal basis whatsoever. T h e African Courts Ordinance which grants 
the courts jurisdiction quite clearly states that the law to be applied is the 
“ African customary law prevailing in the area” (with other rules and statutes 
not relevant here). Laws of Kenya, Cap. 11, s. 18(a) (rev. ed. 1963). Nowhere 
were such courts authorized to administer the common law. Nevertheless, 
actions for “defamation” are widespread throughout Kenya, as are other 
claims clearly based on the English common law, e.g., breach of promise o f  
marriage, negligence, assault. 1 have never seen any discussion of this 
point, even in those cases which reached the Court o f Review. Indeed in 
the instant case the Court o f Review rejected a customary claim because it 
did not accord with the common law, although the governing statute required 
it to do just the opposite.
250. T he magistrate's recognition o f this point shows that he was talking about a 
distinct customary action for insult, since personal confrontation is not a 
requirement o f defamation. However, he may have been wrong that it is 
necessary in insult. See Machakos Mag. C.A, 23/66 (Mar. 4, 1966), dis­
missing appeal from M iu A.C. C.C. 2/66 (Jan. 24, 1966) (plaintiff was not 
present when defendants uttered the words).
ill-feeling; John uttered the words prior to a hotly contested local election 
in order to persuade the women, supporters of his opponent, to vote 
for him instead. The magistrate is here clearly seeking for a policy which 
might support a justification for defamation, although he never succeeds 
in making it explicit,261
The Court of Review reached the same conclusion but by a divergent 
route which revealed its premises to be fundamentally different from those 
of the two lower courts. There could of course be no liability in defamation 
because the words were only published to the two old ladies who would 
recognize them as abusive and not defamatory.252 Where this court 
differed from the others was in its attitude towards abuse. It had little 
sympathy with an action for “mere vulgar or scurrilous insults and abuse" 
[my italics] for it was a matter of “common sense” that such conduct 
was “trivial" when compared with words injurious to reputation which 
“may be a very serious wrong indeed”. Although customary actions could 
not be abolished263 the court was determined to hedge them about with 
procedural impediments: plaintiffs would be required to state clearly 
and precisely at the outset of the case the customary rule on which they 
wished to rely. This is in sharp conflict with the generally informal 
practice of the primary courts, whose official rules have never demanded 
strict pleading,264 and is indeed in violation of the express language of 
the governing Act.266
251. Cf. New  York Times v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
252. It is unclear where in the common law the court finds such a rule. It is 
clearly defamatory of a man to say that he sleeps with other women. Perhaps 
the court is arguing that the women would not believe such accusations, and 
hence would not lower their estimate of Paul as a result.
253. Courts may refuse to apply a customary law which is “repugnant to justice 
or morality” , but the granting o f compensation for abuse is hardly such 
a rule. African Courts Ord., Laws o f Kenya, Cap. 11, s. 18(a) (rev. ed. 1963).
254. See African Courts Civil Procedure Rules:
s. 4. Filing o f case: W hen a plaintiff wishes to file a civil action, the clerk 
shall open a “Case File” and shall record briefly in the space provided 
thereon the substance of the claim . . . 
s. 34. The Plaint: T he plaintiff shall give his evidence . . .  A t the close o f  
his evidence he may be questioned by the court and cross-examined  
by the defendant. From this evidence the court shall reduce to writing 
and enter the Particulars o f the Claim in the place provided in the 
“Care F ile ” [emphasis added].
Aside from the fact that these rules appear to be mutually inconsistent, it is 
ironic that they were promulgated by the Chief Justice o f Kenya, who also 
wrote the opinion for the Court o f  Review in the instant case, under his 
authority derived from the African Courts Ord., Laws o f  Kenya, Cap. 11, 
s. 62(1) (a) (rev. ed. 1963).
255. African Courts Ord., Laws o f Kenya, Cap. 11, s. 54 (rev. ed. 1963):
N o  proceedings under this Ordinance in the Supreme Court, the Court 
of Review, a magistrate’s court or any African court . . . shall be varied 
or declared void upon appeal, revision or review solely by reason o f any 
defect in procedure or want o f form , but all matters shall be decided 
according to substantial justice without undue regard to technicalities, 
[emphasis added].
These three judgments thus characterize, and perhaps even caricature, 
the approaches o f the several levels of the judicial hierarchy. Primary 
court judgments, while most significant from the point of view of numbers, 
may be empty of reasoning, and even misleading in the statement and 
interpretation of rules. The Appeal Magistrate here made a highly sophis­
ticated application of customary rules to the facts of the particular dispute. 
Indeed, he went beyond this and sought to adapt customary law to changed 
conditions, balancing the traditional concern to protect personal dignity 
by penalizing disrepectful behaviour against the modern desire to foster 
democratic government by allowing the freedom to compete for political 
allegiance through the use of loose language if  necessary. However, 
innovative decisions like this are rare and have a doubtful impact on the 
daily operation o f the law. Finally, the opinion of the Court of Review, 
while expressed with more elegance and better organization, showed an 
unfortunate insensitivity to customary legal principles and indigenous 
cultural attitudes. In a small-scale society the man who is subjected to 
abuse may well suffer a greater loss of self-respect and of standing in the 
community than the man who is defamed.258 It is strange that the CTilfcr 
Justice should have been so ignorant of this fact when, lirtle more than 
a century ago in England and throughout Europe, equivalent words 
would have been cause for a duel, possibly leading to the death of one 
of the participants.257 But regrettably such incomprehension is not unusual: 
lack of respect for differing values is always a danger when a person of 
one culture is required to pass judgment on the behaviour of someone 
from another. A display of even more serious ethnocentrism may be 
found in a similar case of customary abuse. Although the European 
magistrate allowed the “ trifling" damages he considered appropriate to 
what he viewed as a “ childish" case, he wrote:
“This is a typical storm in a tea cup so typical of the Somali people. 
. . .  In my opinion it was a vulgar slanging match and not calculated 
slander."258
Not only did the magistrate fail to see that abuse, and not common law 
slander, was the gravamen of the complaint, but he mistakenly assessed 
the “ trifling" damages by his own economic standard and not by that of 
people living at a subsistence level. Although this statement, and the 
opinion of the Court of Review in the principal case, are unusually egre­
gious examples of cultural blindness, they should stand as a warning 
against over-ready acceptance of the pronouncements of European judges
256. The vast number of complaints about abuse should be sufficient evidence 
of this. See statistical analysis, supra.
257. This is still true in many pans of Europe today. See generally, Honour and 
Shame (Peristiany ed. 1965).
258. Kakamega Mag. C.A. 24/64 (Oct. 28, 1964), dismissing appeal from Lurambi 
A.C. C.C. 207/64 (n.d.).
on customary law. For it is hardly surprising that primary courts do not, 
in practice, share this concern with reputation rather than public dignity 
or self-rcspect, but continue to award compensation, substantial in the 
eyes of the parties, for “mere” abuse or insult.2*9
VI, Extra-Judicial Dispute Settlement
The foregoing discussion has, I hope, justified my decision to rely on 
reports of actual disputes in investigating customary law, Case analyses 
have demonstrated that the files of primary courts, and to a lesser extent 
those of appellate courts, contain a wealth of information about sub­
stantive rules and their judicial application. Statistical analysis indicates 
that the courts deal with a very large number of cases, both absolutely 
and in relation to population, But I do not wish to suggest that the approach 
chosen discloses more than a small fraction of the controversies which 
arise and are resolved in the course of social life, In every society families 
are able to settle many disputes internally, other groups have the means to 
reconcile contentious members, and even strangers may compromise 
their differences outside of court. Throughout Africa, a substantial 
proportion of disputes may never reach court because each community 
possesses traditional, extra-familial institutions for mediation. In Kenya 
these include the Kikuyu kiama,280 the Kamba clan or uttti elders,2*1 
the Luo joduong* gweng* or anyuola elders,162 the Luyia liguru,*•* the 
Gusii etureti elders,2*4 and the Nandi26* and Kipsigis2** kokzoet. These 
are not, of course, structurally identical or of equal functional impor­
tance; moreover the jurisdiction and effectiveness of each has everywhere 
declined under the successive impacts of colonialism and development. 
Nevertheless the influence of the elders is still considerable. I referred to 
it earlier to explain why so few Luo controversies between villagers 
are brought to court; indeed, the continued vitality of indigenous autho-
259. See cases cited notes 239, 242, 243 and 245 supra, and Machakos Mag. 
C.A. 33/66 (Mar. 23, 1966), dismissing appeal from Kilungu A.C. C.C. 
465/65 (Feb. 11, 1966) (plaintiff claimed Shs. 100/- because defendant had 
called him a fool, shenzi (savage— Swahili), etc., and got full amount) and 
Machakos Mag. C.A. 112/64 (Nov. 17, 1964), allowing appeal from Nziu 
A.C. C.C. 1 /64 (n.d.).
260. See, e.g., Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya 217 (1938); Lambert, Kikuyu 
Social and Political Institutions 80-84 (1956).
261. See, e.g., Penwill, Kamba Customary Law 10,122 (1951).
262. See, e.g., G. Wilson, Luo Customary Law and Marriage Laws Customs 
12-13(1961).
263. Sec, e.g., Humphrey, The Liguru and Land 14-15 (1947). This is the term
used in Idakho and Isukha locations; other dialect variations are Hgutu, 
likuru, lokalupo, and omukasa. See G. Wagner, I The Bantu of North Kaviro- 
ndo 77-78, 80 (1949) [hereinafter cited as I Wagnerl.
264. See, e.g., P. Mayer, The Lineage Principle in Gusii Society 18 (1949).
265. See, e.g., Snell, Nandi Customary Law  10 (1954).
266. See, e.g., Peristiany, Social Institutions of the Kipsigis 176 (1939).
rides may be oae of the most significant factors affecting patterns of 
lidgadon. The African Courts Ordinance*”  gave explicit approval to 
"customary arbitration and ictdemcnt by the tribal elders", and primary 
courts today continue to reinforce their authority, Many require the 
parties to submit to arbitration before initiating litigation: the failure 
of a plaintiff161 or defendant1*1 to do so may prejudice his case. In the 
Luo case discussed in Part I the court noted that the plaintiff had by­
passed the joduong' gweng', although it did not penalize him for this. 
Whether or not there has been a preliminary submission to the elders, 
the court may send the case to them.170 Their views are given considerable 
weight, and will often determine the outcome.171
Although cognizant of the significance of extra-judicial dispute settle­
ment, I chose to concentrate on court proceedings instead. My legal 
skills were better adapted to the analysis of cases, and I lacked the anthro­
pological and linguistic training to observe informal arbitration, which of
967. Laws of Kenya. Cap. II . a. 32 (rev. ed. 1961). The M ure of the Magistrate's 
Courts Act, No, 17 o f 1967, to contain a comparable provision cannot 
be taken to intend any limitation on the work of Badidonal elders,
268. See, e.g., Emuhaya A.C, C.C. 162/66 (Mar, 16, 1967), Plaintiff sued defen­
dants for compensation for banana plants he alleged they had cut down, 
The court asked him why he had failed to report the matter to his liguru, 
and he claimed that he had, but that the liguru had refused to visit the site, 
One of the defendants replied that the liguru had originally ordered the 
bananas cut beeause they had been planted on an official road, The court 
found for defendants, obviously impressed by plaintiff's failure to 
consult the liguru and secure his support. But see Kiambu Mag, C.A, 45/66 
(Mar. 7, 1967), dismissing appeal from Kiambu D.A.C. C.C. 65/66 (Feb. 
24, I960). There defendant appealed an award of pregnancy compensation 
on the ground that plaintiff had failed to submit the dispute to the elders 
for discussion before sueing. The court commented: "It was quite in order 
to file the suit even before John and Grace [the couple involved] had dis­
cussed the pregnancy.”
269. Sec, e.g., Lurambi A.C, C.C, 327/66 (Dec, I, 1966) ("Plaintiff’s allegation 
has not been rebutted that be called Namale before the liguru but Namale 
failed to appear. The court accepts the decision of the liguru that Namale 
pay Shs. SO/- . , . " ) ;  Iveti A.C, C,C, P283/66 (Aug. 22,19660 Elders in the 
latter case attempted to settle the dispute on three occasions. First defendant 
refused to choose an elder to represent him; then he appeared very late at 
the second hearing without an elder; and finally, after the court had referred 
the case back to the elders, he did not give them time to consider the claim, 
The court found for plaintiff, stating: "We consider Kakulu's refusal to allow 
the elders to help me court [to be] discourteous and for this we accept 
that there was a sort of damage." Cf. Doho Kosele A,C, C.C. 155/66 (Aug, 
10, 1966). The court found for defendant on the basis of the decision of the 
anyuola elders, but then turned around and fined defendant for failing to 
appear at the discussion before those elders, and awarded the fine to plaintiff.
270. See, e.g., Iveti A.C. C.C. P283/66 (Aug. 22,1966); Iveti A.C, C.C. P493/66 
(Jan. 1, 1967) (case referred to utui elders by the court; they found the 
evidence inconclusive and returned the case to the court, whieh decided to 
dismiss plaintiff’s claim for lack of proof),
271. See cases cited notes 268-70 supraf and Lurambi A.C, C,C, 568/66 (Feb. 9, 
1967); Maseno A.C. C.C, 181/66 (Sept. 26, 1966) ("The court believes 
defendant’s evidence, which was confirmed by the testimony of the local 
elder, . , " ) .
course was not recorded in writing,272 Furthermore, I felt that the neglect 
of judicial records by past investigators, legal or anthropological, constitu­
ted the most important gap in our understanding of the operation of 
customary law. Consequently, I did not study out-of-court settlements 
with the degree of comprehensiveness that I sought in collecting court 
cases. Still, I wanted to gain some perspective on the role of the courts 
within the wider framework of dispute settlement by exploring extant 
unofficial institutions and their mode of operation, Two kinds of docu­
mentary sources were available, anthropological monographs and accounts 
of arbitrations contained in the reports of subsequent judicial decisions, 
I sought to supplement these materials with fieldwork conducted by 
research assistants:273 five university students employed during the long 
vacation to work at their homes where they were known to the local 
inhabitants, somewhat familiar with the customary law, and of course 
fluent in the vernacular. They were guided by a fieldwork manual describ­
ing the nature of the disputes to be studied27'1 (with a list of examples) 
and the data to be recorded about each. Research method varied according 
to the local situation and the abilities and personality of the investigator; 
in Nyeri District he attended the primary court275 and discussed the 
antecedents of disputes with litigants; in Kakamega he spoke to the local 
magutu2™ and sub-chief who resolved most minor disputes; in Central 
Nyanza he observed the sessions of the locational Land Adjudication 
Committee,877 composed largely of local elders; in South Nyanza he 
talked with friends and relatives about family and clan controversies in 
the neighbourhood. Each provided me with an account of about a hundred 
disputes, a few observed first-hand, but most related by other participants 
—litigants, witnesses, or mediators.
272. Today the elders may summarize the proceedings in writing, particularly 
if an agreement is reached. See, e.g., Kiambu Mag. C.A. 124/66 (Aug. 
31, 1966), ordering re-hearing on appeal from Githunguri A.C. C.C. 479/66 
(n.d.) (agreement between parties to suit for pregnancy compensation as to 
the date of intercourse and expected date of birth); Kiambu Mag. C.A. 146/65 
(May 5, 1966), allowing appeal from Githunguri A.C, C.C. 756/65 (n.d.) 
(same). Indeed, failure to insist on a written record may preclude a party 
from alleging on oral agreement as a defence. See Mukurweini District 
Magistrate’s Court C.C. 42/68 (Mar. 26, 1968) described supra note 210,
273. This fieldwork was supported by a grant from Yale Law School. M y assis­
tants were: Donald W, Kaniaru, South Tetu location, Nyeri District 
(Kikuyu); Tom  Mbaluto, Iveti location, Machakos District (Kamba); 
Robert Agufa Endusa, North Maragoli location, Kakamega District (Luyia); 
Luke Wasambo-Were, East G em  location, Central Nyanza District (Luo); 
and John C. N . Otula, East Karachuonyo location, South Nyanza District 
(Luo).
274 See note 194, supra, I am grateful to Professor Laura Nader for letting m e 
sec a copy of the field manual which she compiled for the Berkeley Com­
parative Villages Law Project, on which I drew in preparing my own,
275. Mukurweini District Magistrate’s Court.
276. Plural o f liguru, the elder who traditionally mediated disputes.
277. Appointed under the la n d  Adjudication Act, N o. 27 o f 1959, Laws o f  Kenya, 
Cap. 283, 8. 9 (rev. ed, 1964).
Differences among investigators--in personality! method! and social 
environment—produced materials too heterogeneous for capsule summary 
here, I offer a sample nevertheless to illustrate the kind of data obtained: 
the subject matter, its detail, and its pertinence to an understanding of 
the role of the courts, The parties are Maragoli, a Luyia sub-tribe,971 
and residents of the investigator's village; though he did not observe the 
initial incident, be was present at the heating. The version I give is drawn 
from the report he wrote, expanded by means of subsequent discussions 
with him.
Resba Musindi, a young married woman, member of the Friends' 
Church,879 has three sons and a daughter, She lives at the home of her 
husband, though be is away working in Nairobi. Throughout the 
village she has the reputation of being a mean, quarrelsome person,
One evening in August, 1967, she returned to her house to be told 
by her daughter that two of the boys, aged five and seven, had put 
sugar in their lunchtime porridge in her absence. It was not unusual 
for them to have sugar, but In tills case they had done so without her 
permission. Furious, she tied their hands and pushed them into the 
hot embers of the fireplace to punish them. Though she did not intend 
a serious injury, they were very badly burned and ran screaming to 
their father’s mother. When their grandmother understood what had 
happened she too started crying and abusing her daughter-in-law. 
Her cries attracted neighbours who rushed to the scene. When they 
questioned Mrs. Musindi about her action, she resorted to abusive 
language. The neighbours then advised the grandmother to take the 
matter to the ligutu of the village. Unfortunately, he was absent, and 
Mrs. Musindi took advantage of this to depart secretly for her parents’ 
home.
The ligutu was informed on his return that night, and called a 
baraza260 of village elders. It met the next morning and decided it 
could take no action until Mrs. Musindi was brought back and her 
husband summoned from Nairobi. It advised that the children be 
treated at the local health centre.
278. The Luyia are a Bantu people, numbering just over a million, see Kenya 
Census, 1962, at 36, who live in Western Province, between Lake Victoria 
and Mount Elgon, composed of 14, see Goldthorpe & Wilson, Tribal Maps 
of East Africa, Map 6 (I960), or of 17, see Cotran, Restatement of African 
Law, I  Kenya: The Law of Marriage and Divorce xvii (1968) subgroupings. 
The Maragoli are one of the most important sub-tribes, situated in the south­
eastern comer of the area, about 30 miles north of Kisumu. The names of 
the parties are pseudonyms.
279. The Friends Mission at nearby Kaimosi was founded in 1902 and has had 
a wide influence throughout this area. See Sangrce, Age, Prayer and Politics 
in Tiriki, Kenya 120—21 (1966).
280. Meeting (Swahili).
Mr. Musindi arrived from Nairobi, a little over 200 miles away, 
on a Saturday, and the case was heard the following day, The ligutu 
approached the sub-chief281 to send his K.A.N.U. Youth Wingers289 to 
Resba's home to arrest her. The meeting sat under the trees near the 
local primary school. In addition to the ligutu of the village, magutu 
from neighbouring villages had come, as well as many other people. 
Mrs. Musindi was accompanied by some of her fellow clansmen from 
home, but they did not speak in her support. The village ligutu stated 
the charge against her—burning the children was a punishment too 
severe for such a small offence; she should have caned them instead.
Mrs, Musindi, though angry at being arraigned by their husbands1 
clan, was clearly penitent about the act now that her anger bid cooled, 
and simply admitted her guilt, The two boys were asked to testify, 
and said that they were used to sugar in their porridge, though it was 
always their mother who put it in for them. Their grandmother, who 
had had custody of the children since the incident, sharply criticised 
her daughter-in-law, Hadn’t the sugar been bought with money pro­
vided by her son for the support of his children ? Mr. Musindi repeated 
this; he had always tried to send money home for his family at the 
end of the month. Why had his children been treated like this ? But 
he also urged the assemblage not to demand a heavy punishment, 
since his wife was a first offender.
Despite Mr. Musindi’s pleas for leniency, speaker after speaker 
then rose and demanded a heavy penalty. Such an act, they said, had 
never been known to happen in the time of their grandfathers. The 
ligutu, seeking to learn and mobilize public opinion, asked for recom­
mendations of specific sanctions. At first many urged that Mrs. Musindi 
be burned in a like manner. But others argued that this would in­
capacitate her from taking care of her children. Moreover, no one seemed 
disposed to execute the punishment; each feared he might be prosecuted 
under the Penal Code in official court. Some may also have been 
moved by the knowledge that there was an unfortunate precedent for 
the woman’s act. Mr. Musindi had himself suffered a serious cut on his 
finger inflicted by his own mother in one of her periodic outbursts, 
for the principal prosecution witness was herself a very quarrelsome 
woman.
The alternative adopted was a money fine. This was to be paid by 
Resba’s father, rather than her husband. It was ostensibly for the 
public benefit, but was, in fact, consumed by the magutu. The amount
281. The lowest administrative official, in charge of a sub-location.
282. Kenya African National Union, the ruling political party.
wa» determined partly by the heinousness of the offence, and partly 
by the economic standing of Resba's father, who was known to be 
very poor. After much discussion, it was fixed at Shs. 150/-. This was 
to be paid in two weeks, failing which Resba would be charged with 
assault in the chief’s court.1"  The whole proceeding had taken more 
than five hours.
As the people dispersed, there was a certain amount of grumbling 
at the sentence, which many thought too light. Innocent children had 
been maimed forever, a disservice to the community. Several women 
vowed never to associate with Mrs. Musindi again. But any threat of 
actual violence against her was quashed by her husband, who asserted 
his Intention to protect her. Mrs. Musindi managed to get Shs. 100/- 
from her father within two weeks, and thus was not token before 
the chief. She has not paid the rest, and may never be asked for it. 
she and her husband live together happily, and her children have 
recovered the use of their fingers, though they still bear scars and are 
missing their nails. They fear their mother, but are too young to har­
bour any permanent resentment.
In this dispute, unlike those discussed earlier, neither the facts nor 
the law were in controversy. Mrs. Musindi had intentionally burned the 
hands of her children. Although parents do have authority to discipline 
their off-spring by physical chastisement the injury inflicted here was 
far out of proportion to the misbehaviour.284 Our interest is therefore in 
the choice of persons and processes to resolve the conflict. An intra­
family dispute like this one can usually be settled internally. Had Mr. 
Musindi been home, the initial burden of corrective action would have 
fallen on him; in his absence his father or an elder brother might be 
expected to substitute: Mrs. Musindi might have been soundly beaten 
and the passions of family and clan thus pacified.286 Apparently, however, 
there was no man who could deputize as family head; the shortage of 
land in Maragoli and the attractions of wage-labour in the cities have 
deprived the location of many of its adult males.386 In consequence, not 
only were persons outside the family drawn into the dispute, but the 
delay in resolving it led to reliance on formal procedures involving a more 
severe penalty.
283. The chief administers a location. He has no official judicial authority, 
but his much greater influence, backed by the use of Administrative Police, 
may often achieve a settlement.
284. See I Wagner 46.
285. See Id. 44, 46, 49.
286. The population density for all of North Nyanza District is 506 persons 
per square mile, but this includes under-populated areas around Mount 
Elgon. Maragoli itself must have two or three times this density. See Kenya 
Census, 1962, at 20-21. In 1962, 15 per cent of all Luyia lived outside both 
North and Central Nyanza. Id. at 35.
The children’s grandmother was the first to intervene. Among the 
Luyia, as in many African societies,287 children look to their grandparents 
for protection against harsh parents, and generally for indulgence, Because 
marriage occurs between exogamous localized sub-clans and residence 
is viriloeal,288 a child’s father’s parents are most often involved. The 
grandmother had an additional interest in the present ease. In this pri­
marily patrilineal society children belong to their father’s lineage; a 
young wife is an outsider, and any interference with the rights of the 
lineage is deeply resented.189 This was made clear by the reaction of the 
audience at the later hearing. Active concern by the grandmother was thus 
proper for several reasons; moreover, she had been summoned by the 
children, Inquisitive n^hbours could claim no such justification; never­
theless, those within earshot felt no hesitation about gratuitously offering 
their assistance, Such a small-scale community allows little privacy; 
gossip and controversy provide the principal spice of life, and every 
disturbance attracts many observers, who are quickly transformed into 
participants, However, it is interesting that neither the grandmother 
nor the neighbours felt capable of proceeding beyond abuse in order to 
settle the matter. Kather here, as throughout the controversy, the par­
ticipants appealed to ever more powerful authorities until they had applied 
sufficient pressure to persuade Mrs. Musindi to accept the judgment of 
public opinion. This progression is characteristic of dispute settlement in 
the absence of coercive force, which cannot succeed until the sanctions 
threatened for non-compliance outweigh the distastcfulness of the demands 
being made.
The ligutu, to whom the people turned next, is the principal arbiter 
of cases settled out of court. Traditionally he was the head of a lineage 
segment, the eldest son of its senior line.290 Today, however, the sub-chicf 
appoints magutu from each of the sub-clans in a sub-location, and can 
dismiss them at will. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the position have 
not changed substantially. Magutu have no governmental status, and earn 
no salary, but instead receive a substantial gift from the litigants, usually 
in the form of food and beer. As in pre-European times, they are still 
guided by public opinion in reaching a decision, and rely largely on that 
diffuse sanction for enforcement. The ligutu here acknowledged this 
dependence by summoning a meeting of the elders of the village as soon
287. See Radclilfe-Brown, “Introduction” to African Systems of Kinship and 
Marriage 28 (Radcliffe-Brown & Forde ed, 1950).
288. See I Wagner 56, 383.
289. See I Wagner 43-45. A wife never becomes a member of her husband’s 
lineage, and consequently acquires no rights over her children. That the 
husband’s lineage is fiercely jealous of its rights is shown in the frequent 
battles over custody of children between husband and wife.
290. See Humphrey, op. cit. supra note 263, at 14-15; Wagner, II The Bantu of 
North Kavirondo 87 (Mair ed. 1956).
as he was informed of the dispute. This group also felt unable to resolve 
the matter, especially since it could no longer compel the appearance of 
Mrs, Musindi, who had by now taken refuge with her father in another 
village. Instead, they sought the assistance of the 6ub-chief. According to 
strict law, he too lacked coercive powers, and should properly have asked 
the chief for Administrative Police to arrest the woman. However, he was 
not willing to disturb the chief over such a trivial incident, and was 
anxious to avoid initiating a criminal proceeding. Moreover, like other 
sub-chiefs in Western Province, ho had sought to increase his authority 
by creating a private, unofficial police force drawn from the youthful 
supporters of the ruling political party. The consequence is to transform 
the magutu end lub-ehief from arbitrators into judges.
This dispute was thus passed from children to grandmother to neigh­
bours to ligutu to the sub-chief and his youth-wingcrg before it waa even 
possible to secure the presence of both sides at a hearing. Vet the co­
operation of still more people was necessary in order to reach a decision. 
Each of the origins! disputants brought representatives! Mr. Musindi 
spoke for his children and their lineage; men were present fmm the 
lineage of Mrs. Musindi'* father. The ligutu, anticipating difficulties in 
resolving the controversy, called for the help of his fellow magutu fiora 
nearby villages. Except in the most trivial case outside magutu will 
generally be summoned to serve as more impartial arbiters. But the 
influence of the magutu in turn rested on their ability to mobilize public 
opinion in favour of a compromise solution which the disputants could 
be persuaded to accept. Consequently, the most important element at the 
hearing was the public.
Once the required people had been assembled, their sole task was to 
discover a penalty agreeable to both sides, since Mrs. Musindi had already 
conceded both the fact of her conduct and its wrongfulness, In fact, the 
hearing itself represented the principal penalty. For five long hours 
each member of the community restated the ideals of conduct, condem­
ned the behaviour of the defendant, and vented any private grievances 
he had against her. Ethical standards were reaffirmed, the desire of the 
public for revenge was satisfied, and similar conduct was deterred. 
Moreover, the fact that Mrs. Musindi bore this all meekly showed at 
least some willingness to reform. This accomplished, a compromise 
could be reached between the two extreme positions. On the one hand, 
Mr. Musindi could not simply be allowed to forgive his wife, for this 
would suggest condonation of her conduct and leave unsatisfied the 
interests of the lineage in the well-being of its members. On the other, 
the demands of certain hotheads for talonic sanctions could not be granted, 
for these might invite police intervention, thus endangering the whole 
informal procedure, incapacitate Mrs. Musindi from caring for her
children, and preclude reconciliation. Therefore a money fine was chosen, 
to give material form to the communal disapproval already voiced and to 
provide the magutu with remuneration for their services. Such a solution 
could only succeed with the co-operation of all concerned. The agreement 
of Mrs. Musindi was necessary because the ligutu did not have customary 
authority to order payment of more than five chickens, the equivalent 
of Shs. 25/-. By paying the bulk of the judgment she showed her acceptance 
of the rightness of the decision. At the same time, the acquiescence of 
the magutu in this partial payment demonstrated their willingness to 
recognize a good faith expression of repentence. Finally, the public 
agreed to the decision by abstaining from further action in the form of 
self-help or legal redress. Only a few individuals intended to persist in 
ostracizing Mrs. Musindi, and undoubtedly they forgot their resolve 
after a time.
To understand why these persons and institutions were involved, and 
this remedy chosen, it is necessary to consider the judicial alternatives; 
for just as the availability of informal procedures affects the functioning 
of official courts, so the reverse is true. Had the sub-chiefs “police” 
been unable to produce Mrs. Musindi, or had she refused to bow to 
public opinion at the magutu*s hearing, the chief of the location might 
have been approached. He could have made one further attempt at 
conciliation, but would more probably have had Mrs. Musindi arrested 
by his Administrative Police, thus setting in motion the machinery of 
the law. The civil court, in this case the Hamisi District Magistrate’s 
Court, could then offer two remedies. Mr. Musindi would have had 
adequate grounds for divorce,281 and this was the preferred traditional 
solution. But, though some of the older members of the audience decried 
this departure from tradition, none of the principal parties favoured 
divorce. For Mrs. Musindi, it would have meant the loss of her children; 
for her family, the loss of her brideprice, most of which would have to 
be repaid;282 for her clan, a possible reputation for making bad wives, 
diminishing the prospects for marriage and the accompanying brideprice. 
Her family and clansmen were in fact present at the arbitration to vouch 
for her future good conduct, and thus stave off these dangers. Ultimately, 
the reason why the remedy of divorce was not entertained was that Mr. 
Musindi wanted to keep his wife; some muttered that his tolerance was 
due to her similarity in temper with his own mother. The civil court 
could also have awarded money damages for the bums. But such a suit 
is expensive, and the identity of the appropriate parties presented some
291. See Cotran, op. cit. supra note 278, at 54, 57 (failure of a wife to cany out 
her duties, one of which is to care for her children, is grounds for divorce).
292. See I Wagner 442-44; Cotran, op. cit. supra note 278 at 57. A number of 
cattle would be deducted from those to be returned depending on the 
number of children.
questions. The children were too young to sue for themselves,1"  Had 
their father acted as plaintiff, it would have seemed that he was trying to 
benefit from the sufferings of his own children; moreover, his action would 
have alienated his wife, with whom be wanted to be reconciled. Mrs, 
Musindi probably bad no property of her own from which to satisfy a 
judgment,” 4 Her husband clearly could not be both judgment debtor 
and creditor, and it is not likely that a modem magistrate would hold a 
married woman's father liable for her wrongs,” 4 A second alternative, 
criminal prosecution, was explicitly considered by the meeting and rejected 
because it would leave all of Resba's children without anyone to a rc  
for them while she languished in jail,” 1 In addition, since her husband was 
willing to forgive her, jail would have satisfied no one and have merely 
perpetuated the ill-feeling, Because the suit concerned an intra-family 
wrong, the parties were amenable to compromise—they wanted to 
preserve the relationships existing among them—and compromise alone 
offered the promise of a lasting solution, for coercion would certainly 
have embittered them beyond any possibility of reconciliation,
While there were thus persuasive reasons for not invoking official 
procedures, access to the courts and their authoritative sanctions un­
doubtedly affected the conciliatory process. Resort to self-help was 
severely limited. Mr. Musindi could have beaten his wife, had he been 
present; but his co-villagers could no longer make a retaliatory raid on 
her village nor was anyone of them even willing to risk wreaking personal 
revenge on her once she appeared at the hearing. At the same time, the 
pressure of public sentiment for a compromise, on Mrs. Musindi and her 
family, was strongly reinforced by the availability of civil and criminal 
redress for her wrong.
VII. Conclusion
This article has described the methods employed in investigating the 
customary laws of wrongs in Kenya, and has tried to show that some of 
the tentative conclusions drawn from this research may offer valuable
293. Cf. Kisii Mag. C.A. 40/63 (N. K. Nyang’era, Mar. 15, 1965), allowing appeal 
from Gesixna A.C. This was an assault case between two young boys about 
ten years old. The court reached the merits of the claim, but in the process 
commented: “It should have been plaintiff's parents who sued defendant's 
parents since the parties were young."
294. In traditional custom, a Luyia wife could own no property. See I Wagner 45.
295. The situation is further complicated by the fact that both the husband and 
the father of a married woman are jointly liable for her wrongs. See
I Wagner 47.
296. The offence could have been prosecuted under the Penal Code, s. 251:
assault causing actual bodily harm. The typical punishment is several
months' imprisonment. See, e.g., Kakamega D.A.C. Cr.C. 1352/66 (Nov. 
19, 1966) (Shs. 100/- fine or two months imprisonment and Shs. 116/- 
compensation and costs); Kakamega D.A.C. Cr.C. 1332/66 (Nov. 8, 1966) 
(Shs. 200/- fine or four months imprisonment and Shs. 50/- compensation).
insights into the nature and functioning of African legal systems. I have 
argued that analysis of the entire content of individual case files, including 
both evidence and judgment, leads to a much more sophisticated state­
ment of substantive rules than can be elicited from an informant. More­
over, only such analysis can reveal the application of rules to characterize, 
imply, and contradict facts—in the strategies of litigants and in the 
reasoning of judges—which I believe to be the central concern of the 
judicial process. However, detailed consideration of individual decisions 
must be placed in proper perspective in two possible dimensions, hori­
zontal and vertical. First, how does the behaviour of these litigants, the 
nature of this claim, and the reaction of this court compare with the 
norms for this type of litigation; this can be learned from statistical 
analysis of the business of the primary courts. Second, what is the role 
of these courts in the broader framework of dispute settlement—both pre­
judicial arbitration and appellate review. When case studies are supported 
by this kind of information they combine the essential criteria of depth 
and representativeness.
Chaoter 3. A Comparative Theory of Dispute
Institutions In Society
I. INTRODUCTION
W h y  study the legal systems of other times or places? Are 
there reasons beyond an antiquarianism or exoticism that seeks 
stimulation for a palate jaded by preoccupation with the mi­
nutiae of American law? The increased understanding to be 
gained by such intellectual exploration seems to me similar in 
origin to the pleasure any of us takes in travel. Differences of 
physical environment, modes of social intercourse, or patterns 
of culture awaken us to phenomena which at home are so 
familiar as io be almost invisible. When we resume our mundane 
round, the residue of such impressions compels us to recognize 
the contingency of our own ways, and leads us to look for ex­
planations.
Although the scholarly tradition of speculation about alien 
legal systems is long and distinguished, with roots in classical 
philosophy, Montesquieu is generally credited with the revival 
of such studies in the modern era, having journeyed imagina­
tively both in time and space (Montesquieu, 1949; Ehrlich, 1916). 
Inquiry into the past reached maturity in the historical juris­
prudence of the nineteenth century (e.g., Maine, 1950; see  
genera l l y Pound, 1923; Kantorowicz, 1937). Academic interest 
subsequently shifted to the anthropological exploration of con­
temporary exotic societies through extensive fieldwork.1 More 
recently, sociologists have turned inward to examine neglected 
regions of our own law —  the unofficial behavioral patterns 
discernible within every agency that administers official rules, 
the innumerable non-governmental legal systems functioning 
throughout our society.2
Nevertheless, the corpus of social theory concerned with 
legal institutions is small, and what little there is rarely en­
compasses contemporary non-Western societies. Anthropology 
and history abound ip empirical description but are notorious 
for their unwillingness to theorize; though sociology consistently 
strives to develop theory it has been parochial in its geographic 
and historical scope. This essay grows out of my efforts to un­
derstand the development of a particular legal system, that of 
Kenya —  a plural society which experienced rapid change under 
the impact of colonial rule, change that has further accelerated 
with the advent of independence. But here I have subordinated 
that immediate objective to a programmatic goal. Rather than 
contribute yet another case study to the proliferating literature 
in the ethnography of law,:i I have sought to synthesize that 
literafcqre in order to give, a sense of direction to further re­
search, my own and others.’ I will set forth several alternative 
approaches and state explicitly my reasons for choosing a par­
ticular path, although I make no pretense of having achieved 
a comprehensive theory.
, I begin with the most elementary of problems: How are 
we to understand the diversity of legal systems we discover 
through historical and comparative study? First, what differ­
ences seem important, and what concepts shall we use to 
describe and categorize them? I choose to concentrate upon one 
set of variations —  the ways in which disputes are handled. I 
then consider where we might turn for an explanation of those 
differences. What factors seem likely to be causative? I con­
clude that certain structural properties of the dispute are highly 
significant —  in particular, the role of the person who intervenes 
in the dispute. I therefore develop three related microsocial 
theories which explain the characteristics of a particular dis­
pute process in terms of the role of the intervener*, from these 
I derive a large number of structural and processual variables 
which are intended to provide the elements for a set of working 
hypotheses. This constitutes the framework within which to 
answer that half of my original question which concerned the 
internal organization of dispute institutions: we will explain 
behavior within a particular dispute in terms of its structure.
I then turn to the other half of that question, which concerns 
the relationship between such institutions and the larger society.
In much more tentative fashion I offer a macrosocial theory to 
explain, in terms of social structural variables, what kinds of 
dispute institutions w ill be found in a given society and w ith  
what frequencies, and how change in those institutions is re­
lated to change in social structure.
II. CHOICE OF A CONCEPT: WHAT IS TO BE STUDIED
A. Law
Many scholars have approached social phenomena in other 
societies by asking whether they are “law.” Implicit in such 
questions is the choice of “law ” as the subject of inquiry, and 
the concept by which to describe differences :and similarities
between societies. It n o t  s u rp r i s in g  that these pioneering ef­
forts to de v e lo p  c o m p a r a t iv e  social theory about legal phe­
nomena should d r a w  th e i r  conceptual apparatus from common- 
sen.se d isc o u rse ;5 p a ra l le ls  can bo found in the early history of 
the n a tu r a l  sc iences, as w ell as in  the contemporary travails of 
social science. V/e m a y  evaluate the selection of law by a variety 
of s ta n d a rd s .  A co n cep t  must, of course , have meaning, i.e., 
an a s c e r ta in a b le  an d  a g re e d  content. In addition, I w ill adopt 
other c r i te r ia  which arc not so generally accepted. I prefer to
use concepts which c a n  apply across as broad a spectrum o f  
societies as possible." Greater variation increases the, oppor­
tunities fo r  t e s h n g  th e  hypothesis; the more such tests it sur­
vives, t h e  g r e a te r  is its e x p la n a to r y  power (Stinchcombe, 1968: 
19). I will aslo seek  to d e f in e  concepts so that they are not 
dichotomous, i.e., r e s t r ic te d  to polar values (Stinchcombe, 1968: 
28-30). T h e  d if fe re n c es  w e  discern amowj social actions seem to 
m e to be continuous, and therefore unhappily distorted by such 
either/or characterizations.7 Moreover, dichotomies curtails fur­
ther refinement; once you learn that a variable is not present 
in a g iv e n  in s ta n c e ,  there is little more that can be said.8
L a w  does n u t  a p p e a r  to satisfy any of these requirements. 
To b e g in  w ith ,  th e  m e a n in g  of la w  is highly problematic. A l­
though a ll  d e f in i t io n s  a re  stipulative, agreement upon a defi­
nition of la w  h a s  b een  unusually difficult to achieve,1' Weber 
has stressed the ab sen ce  of sharp boundaries around what 
should be called “legal” within the domain of substantive rules:
Law, convention, and usage belong to the same continuum with 
imperceptible transitions leading from one to the o th e r . . . .
K is entirely a question of terminology and convenience at 
which point of this continuum one shall assume the existence 
of the subjective conception of a “legal obligation” (1054:20).
Bohannan (1968a) makes the point more generally: Law in all 
its manifestations is a noetic concept, whose content must de­
pend on o«r purposes - (see also Jack Gibbs, 1968). Because law  
is intimately connected with systems of ethical belief and poli­
tical ideology, definitional controversies are frequent, lengthy 
and heated.10 Each proponent is often unaware of his values, 
or of the way in which they color his strategy; as a result, 
the argument soon becomes circular and impossible of resolu­
tion.
A further pitfall accompanies the choice of law as a concept. 
A recurrent word in everyday usage, it carries a substantial 
cargo of cultural connotation; i.e., it is a folk rather than an 
analytic concept,11 If this folk meaning is unconsciously adopted, 
“law ” acquires abundant content, and thus a shared meaning, 
but only at the cost of warping the analysis by the introduc­
tion of a serious ethnocentric bias.
Radcliffe-Brown’s extrem ely influential conception of law 13 
exem plifies this last danger of adopting untested the assump­
tions of one’s own culture. Borrowed mediately from Pound 
(1942), it may be traced to legal positivism and in particular 
to John Austin’s perceptions of, or prescriptions for, English 
government in the nineteenth century (1954). Law is “social 
control through the systematic application of the force of po­
litically organized society” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1933a). When Rad- 
cliffe-Brown applied this definition outside the western context, 
he was forced to conclude: “in this sense, some simple societies 
have no law ” (Ibid.).  He did not question whether it was valu­
able to continue to use the word “in this sense”; on the con­
trary, he argued that such usage was “more convenient for pur­
poses of sociological analysis and classification" (Ibid.). His 
pupil, Evans-Pritcbard, utilized this conceptual framework in  
his fieldwork on the Nuer of the Sudan; predictably, he reached 
the same judgment in almost the same words.
In a strict sense the Nuer have no law. There are conventional 
compensations for damage, adultery, loss of limb and so forth, 
bu t there is no authority with power to adjudicate on such 
matters or to enforce a verdict (1940a: 162),
Although “conventional compensations” might satisfy the “sysr 
tem atic” or orderly elem ent of a legal system, they still could 
not be dignified as law because they were not backed by “the
force of politically organized society,” here understood to mean 
“the power to adjudicate on such matters or to enforce a vei> 
diet.”
The n^istsie of both anthropologists was to employ a con- 
cef^ derived from a parochial system of jurisprudence, which 
had been designed for description and understanding within a 
particular institutional framework. Used elsewhere, it rendered 
a verdict of “no law.” Because the concept revealed only dis­
similarities between domestic and exotic phenomena it over­
simplified comparison. However, this lack of fit between defink  
tion and data led Evans-Pritchard to expand his concept in ordexj 
to recognize the modes of social control and conflict resolution 
he had discovered.13 Shortly thereafter he published an article 
in which he acknowledged the existence of law among the 
Nuer: “within a tribe there is law: there is machinery for set­
tling disputes and a moral obligation to conclude them sooner 
or later” (1940b: 273).14 He perceived that legal institutions were 
jjot restricted to adjudicative bodies, and that they did not have 
to enforce a verdict as long as the dispute was ultimately settled. 
Legal authority could derive from moral obligation as w ell as 
from “the force of politically organized society.” Together these 
efforts at conceptual refinement provide us with a number of 
less general concepts and variables which have proved central 
to our understanding of legal systems: the processes of social 
control and dispute settlement; the orderly quality of all social 
life, to which convention contributes as much as coercion; the  
contrast between political force and a sense of moral obligation, 
between adjudication and other methods of decision; and the 
importance of finality, whether achieved through a verdict or 
by more flexible procedures. The value of such refinements may 
be seen in the sophistication with which subsequent investiga­
tors, familiar with Nuer ethnography and Evans-Pritchard’s in­
terpretations, have been able to discern and investigate legal 
phenomena where Radcliffe-Brown would have found none,15 
If ethnocentrism commonly leads the investigator to con­
struct a concept in the image of his own folk legal system, he  
may occasionally adopt the perspective of the society he studies 
instead.10 Malinowski strenuously criticized the error of “de­
fining the forces of law in terms of central authority, courts, 
and constables . . .” (1926: 14). For he perceived that Trobriand
I s lan d s  soc ie ty  w as  o rd e r ly  e v e n  th o u g h  th o se  fo rces  w e re  la c k ­
ing. To  a c co u n t  fo r  th is  o rd e r l in e ss ,  h e  o f fe re d  a “m in im a l  
d e f in i t io n ” of la w  ( Ib id .)17 w h ic h  w a s  in te n d e d  to be u n iv e r s a l ly  
applicable.
• ' (  ..
T h e re  m u st be in ail societies  a class of rules too practical to be 
b acked  up by  religious s&ncticns, too b u rdensom e to be left to 
m ere  goodwill, too personally  v ita l to the individuals to be en­
forced by any abstrac t agency. This is the domain of legal rules, 
a n d  I v e n tu re  to fo re te ll th a t reciprocity , systematic' incidence, 
p u b lic ity  and am bition  w ill be found  to be the main factors in the 
b in d in g  m ach in ery  of p rim itiv e  law  (Id. at 07-68; emphasis 
added).
B u t  in  m a in ta in in g  ta t  th e  l a w  of “a ll  soc ie t ie s” is character­
ized  b y  “ rec ip ro c i ty ,  sy s te m a t ic  inc idence , p u b l ic i ty  and ambi­
t io n ,” M a lin o w sk i  w as  c o m m it t in g  e x a c t ly  th e  same anthro­
pologica l s i r  os R a d c l if fe -B ro w n .,s F o r  a concep t  modelled 
w h o lly  u p o n  T ro b r ia n d  e th n o g r a p h y  overlooks  m a n y  significant 
p h e n o m e n a  c o m m o n ly  c a teg o rized  as lega l  in o th e r  societies  — 
fo r  in s tan ce ,  t h a t  v a s t  b o d y  of ru le s  r e l a t in g  to to r t s  in A nglo- 
A m e r ic a n  c o m m o n  law , w h ic h  a re  n o t  o b ey ed  ou t of a m b it io n  
no r  p r im a r i ly  m a in ta in e d  by  the  fo rces  of r ec ip ro c i ty  o r  p u b ­
l ic i ty .10 In  fact, M.M. G reen , one of the  few  a n th ro p o lo g is ts  w ho  
a d o p te d  M a lin o w s k i ’s concep t,  w as  soon p e rs u a d e d  to ad d  the  
in g re d ie n t  of sa n c t io n  so v e h e m e n t ly  r e je c te d  by  h e r  m e n to r  
(1947: Ch. 4-7) 20 N e v e r th e le ss ,  M a l in o w s k i’s e ffo rts ,  like  those  
of his* fe l lo w  co n tro v e rs ia l is ts ,  add to o u r  a rm o r y  of concep ts  
th e  p o s it ive  sa n c t io n  of rec ip ro c i ty ,  r e n d e r e d  p o te n t  by th e  
fo rce  of p e rs o n a l  a m b i t io n  a n d  re in fo rc e d  b y  th e  g la re  of p u b ­
lic ity . ,
T h e  conc lus ion  to be d r a w n  fro m  th ese  tw o  la n d m a rk s  in 
th e  h is to ry  of a n th ro p o lo g ic a l  in q u i ry  a p p e a rs  to m e  i rres is t ib le .  
Fo lk  co n cep ts  of la w  possess a m ea n in g ,  b u t  one ta in te d  w i th  
e th n o c e n tr i sm .  W h e n  a p p lie d  to d iv e rg e n t  societies  th e y  b l in d  
th e  in v e s t ig a to r  to s ig n if ic a n t  p h e n o m e n a .  M oreover ,  s ince  the  
c oncep t  is o f ten  d k 'h o t o m o u s — so m e th in g  e i th e r  is law  or  it 
is no t  —  a n e g a t iv e  c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  f r e q u e n t ly  d iscou rages  f u r ­
t h e r  in q u iry .  A n  a n a ly t ic  c o n c ep t  w h ic h  avo id s  th e  c o n ta m in a ­
t io n  of a n y  fo lk  sy s te m  (if t h a t  is possib le)  can  of cou rse  be 
g iv en  c o n te n t  a t  th e  w h im  of i ts  c re a to r ,  b u t  he  is no t  l ike ly  
to p e r s u a d e  o th e rs  of its  u t i l i ty .  T he  re s u l ts  a re  en d le ss  w r a n g ­
ling, of w h ic h  th e  G lu c k m a n -B o h a n n a n  c o n tro v e rs y  is a co n ­
te m p o r a r y  e x a m p le ,21 a n d  c o n t in u in g  p reo c c u p a tio n  w i th  th e  
d e f in i t io n  of concep ts  to th e  h in d ra n c e  of m o re  f ru i t f u l  e n ­
deavors .  F o r  th e  t im e  be ing , a t  least,  it  seem s c le a r  t h a t  w e  
m u s t  d isp lace  la w  f ro m  th e  c e n te r  of o u r  c o n c ep tu a l  focus as 
w e  a t t e m p t  to  b u i ld  social th eo ry .  G lu c k m a n  h im se lf  h as  u rg e d  
a s  m u c h  (1965b: 18-26).22
B. A n  A l te r n a t iv e  C o n c e p tu a l  Focus: Dispute
S o m e  n a r r o w in g  of v is ion  m u s t  th e re fo re  be  accepted, even 
i f  a n y  less in c lu s iv e  p e rs p e c t iv e  w ill  n ecessa r i ly  be incom ple te .  
I h a v e  chosen  to  c o n c e n t ra te  on d ispu tes .  I be lieve  I can  g ive  
t h a t  c a te g o ry  of p h e n o m e n a  a c o n te n t  w h ich  is bo th  u n a m ­
b ig u o u s  and  g e n e ra l ly  a ccep tab le ,  a n d  I sh a ll  t ry  to do so 
below . W hen  so c o n s tru c te d ,  the  concep t  can  be a p p lie d  m o re  
w id e ly  across  d i sp a ra te  socie ties  t h a n  a n y  of th e  d e f in i t io n s  
of law  a l r e a d y  d iscussed , an d  w ill  t h u s  he lp  to avo id  t h a t  d e a d ­
e n d  a n a ly s is  in w h ic h  th e  o b jec t  of ou r  co n cern  has  been  d e ­
f in e d  o u t  of ex is tence .  F in a l ly ,  d isp u te s  lend  th e m s e lv e s  to 
d e sc r ip t io n  in t e r m s  of v a r ia b le s  w i th  c o n tin u o u s  r a th e r  th a n  
d ich o to m o u s  va lues .
L e s t  th e r e  be a n y  confus ion , le t  m e  d isc la im  e x p l ic i t ly  a n y  
su g g e s t io n  t h a t  th e  co n cep t  of d isp u te  is an  e q u iv a le n t  for, or 
c o te rm in o u s  w i th ,  law . O n  th e  c o n tra ry ,  th e r e  a re  n u m e ro u s  
o th e r  b e h a v io ra l  p a t t e r n s  w h ic h  w e  d e n o m in a te  as legal a n d  
w h ic h  a r e  e q u a l ly  w orthy  of s tu d y :  social con tro l ,  th e  a r t i c u l a ­
t ion  a n d  c h a n g e  of no rm s , social e n g in e e r in g ,  a d m in is t ra t io n ,  
etc . R ecogn iz ing  th is ,  I h a v e  d e l ib e ra te ly  so u g h t  to a b s t ra c t  
f ro m  th e  to ta l i ty  of lega l  p h e n o m e n a  a c o h e re n t  su b c a te g o ry .
In  choosing  d isp u te s  r a t h e r  th a n  one  of the  a l t e rn a t iv e  p e r ­
spec t ives  to w a rd  law , I a m  m e re ly  fo llow ing  o th e r s  a lo n g  a n  
e s ta b l ish e d  p a th  of in q u iry .  I t  is w o r th w h i le  sp e c u la t in g  b r ie f ly  
on th e  o rig in s  of th is  p re fe re n c e ,  as a  m a t t e r  of th e  sociology 
of k n o w le d g e .2* fo r  social sc ien tif ic  in te r e s t  in la w  has  been  so 
la rg e ly  an  in te r e s t  in  d ispu tes .  In te l le c tu a l  m il ieu  has  c e r ta in ly  
e x e r t e d  a s t ro n g  in fluence .  E v e ry  n e w  d isc ip line  des ires  to  c a rv e  
o u t  a p r o p r i e t a r y  n ich e  fo r  i tse lf ;  th e  c o m p a ra t iv e  social th e o ry  
of law  is c le a r ly  in  j u s t  th is  position . If, p rov is iona l ly ,  w e  d e ­
m a rc a te  i ts  b o u n d a r ie s  as e n c o m p a ss in g  th e  fo rm u la t io n  of 
no rm s , t h e  a p p lica t io n  of th o se  n o rm s , an d  th e  b e h a v io r  to 
w h ic h  th e y  app ly ,  th e n  tw o  of those  th r e e  ca tego rie s  h a v e  a l ­
r e a d y  b e e n  p a r t ly  occup ied  b y  e s ta b l ish e d  social science. P o lit i-
ca l  sc ience  s tu d ie s  th e  leg is la t iv e  p rocess  ( a n d  n o w  also th e  
ju d ic ia l  p rocess)  b y  w h ic h  n o rm s  a re  a r t i c u la te d  a n d  c hanged . 
T h e  b e h a v io r  to  w h ic h  th o se  n o rm s  sp e ak  is la rg e ly  th e  p ro v in c e  
of econom ics , sociology, a n d  p sycho logy ;  f u r th e rm o re ,  th o se  d is ­
c ip l ines  h a v e  g e n e ra l ly  d isc a rd e d  lega l  n o rm s  as of l i t t l e  r e l e ­
v a n c e  in  e x p la in in g  b e h a v io r .24 B u t  in  th e  ro u t in e  o p e ra t io n s  
of th e  c o u r t ro o m  o r  a d m in is t r a t iv e  agency , w h e r e  n o rm s  a re  
ap p lie d ,  leg a l  s c h o la rsh ip  h a s  h e ld  u n c h a l le n g e d  sw ay , a t  l e a s t  
u n t i l  r e c e n t ly .2’1 A t  f i r s t  s igh t,  th is  is p ecu lia r .  L e g a l  rea l ism , 
w h ic h  h as  f u rn i s h e d  A m e r ic a n  lega l  sc h o la rsh ip  w i th  i ts  p r e ­
v a i l in g  p e rsp e c t iv e  fo r  m o re  th a n  h a l f  a c e n tu ry ,  h a s  r e p e a te d ly  
p ro c la im e d  t h a t  th e  key  to lav/ lies in  its  app lica t ion , t h a t  su c h  
a p p l ic a t io n  c a n n  ' r  i la te ly  be e x p la in e d  b y  lega l  n o rm s  a lone , 
a n d  th a t  social sc ience  o ffe rs  a f u l le r  u n d e r s t a n d in g  of t h e  
p rocess  of ap p lic a t io n  -’ Y e t  la w y e rs  h a v e  b e e n  e x t r e m e ly  a m ­
b iv a le n t  t w m  see 'a!  s c ien t is ts  w h o  r.::tually o ffe r  c o m p e t in g  
e x p la n a t io n : ,  fo r  lega l  d e c is io n -m ak in g W  P o l it ica l  sc ien t is ts  —  
th e  f i r s t  to e n t e r  th is  h i th e r to  exclusive d o m a in  w i th  t h e i r  
th e o r ie s  of b e h a v io ra l  ju r i s p ru d e n c e  —  w e re  im m e d ia te ly  c r i t i ­
c i z e d  a n d  s u b s e q u e n t ly  ig n o re d  (B ecker ,  1963; S tone , 1966: 687- 
95). F o r tu n a te ly ,  a n th ro p o lo g is ts  a n d  sociologists  a p p e a r  u n ­
d a u n te d  by  th e  t h r e a t  of a s im i la r  reb u f f ;  b u t  th e  c o rd ia l i ty  of 
t h e i r  u l t im a te  r e c e p t io n  by  leg a l  sch o la rs  is s t i l l  in  doub t .
Social m il ieu  has  a lso  b een  im p o r ta n t .  M ost re se a rc h  on 
n o n -W e s te rn  lega l  sy s te m s  h a s  been  co n d u c te d  w i th in  th e  c o n ­
f in es  of a co lon ia l  reg im e, a n d  th e re fo re  to som e de g re e  u n d e r  
i ts  aegis . W here ,  as in  th e  B r i t ish  a n d  D u tch  e m p ire s ,-8 co lon ia l  
po l icy  w as  one of in d i r e c t  ru le ,  a d m in is t r a to r s  r e q u i r e d  a t h o r ­
o u g h  u n d e r s t a n d in g  of in d ig e n o u s  in s t i tu t io n s  an d  processes, 
e sp ec ia l ly  those  th a t  d e a l t  w i th  d isp u te s .21' On th e  basis  of th e  
in fo rm a t io n  acq u ired ,  co lonia l a u th o r i t ie s  p ro ce e d e d  to “ rec o g ­
n iz e ” these in d ig en o u s  in s t i tu t io n s ,  in e v i ta b ly  t r a n s fo r m in g  th e m  
—  a p rocess  w h ic h  w a s  a c c e le ra te d  by  the  in te n s if ie d  d e m a n d s  
fo r  m odern iza t ion  w hich  a n t ic ip a te d  a n d  fo llow ed  in d e p e n d e n c e .  
W e s te rn  scho la rs  f r e q u e n t ly  e x h ib i te d  a ro m a n t ic  n o s ta lg ia  to ­
w a r d  th e  in s t i tu t io n s  th e y  h a d  s tu d ie d  a n d  n o w  saw  c hang ing . 
T r ib a l  in s t i tu t io n s  fo r  h a n d l in g  d isp u te s  s eem ed  to th e m  q u a l i ­
ta t iv e ly  d i f f e re n t  f ro m  c o n te m p o ra ry  w e s te rn  in s t i tu t io n s .  M a n y  
scho la rs ,  m o st  con sp icu o u s ly  th e  an th ro p o lo g is ts ,  sh a re d  a n e g a ­
t ive  e th m  u  ntri$m  w h ic h  v a lu e d  t r ib a l  in s t i tu t io n s  above  th e i r
western counterparts.20 Because those institutions were now  
seriously threatened, the study of disputes became a matte,r of 
urgency31 and real social consequence.
1. Definitions of concepts for analyzing disputes. My pur­
pose is to understand the great variety of ways in which dis­
putes are handled w ithin every society and across different 
societies. J  must therefore construct what Malinowski calls a 
minimal definition (1926: 14), a concept that will, as far as 
possible, incorporate all empirical instances of disputing, and 
also permit the differences between those instances to be de­
scribed in terms of continuous variables. I start from the per­
ception that a dispute is nothing more than a form of social 
relationship, a developmental stage through which any rela­
tionship may pass. As such, it has certain chronological ante­
cedents. In order to engage in a dispute relationship, the 
participants12 must f i r s t  m a k e  jshysicaJ contact with each other, 
and that contact must lead to significant interaction. Such 
interaction must contain an elem ent’ of conflict —- the parties 
must develop inconsistent claims to a resource.33 Disagreement 
about a matter of fact (for example, the name of the seven­
teenth president of the United States) is not conflict; i f  might 
become conflict if the participants desired not only factual 
vindication but also an admission of intellectual superiority. As 
the illustration suggests, intangibles like reputation can also 
be the subject of a dispute. Denial of another’s claim creates 
conflict just as effectively as the existence of a counterclaim. 
By characterizing conflict as a common developmental stage in 
any relationship, I seek to emphasize that it is not an instance 
of deviance.
Conflict may develop into a dispu te  if the inconsistent 
claims are asserted publically, i.e., if the claims, and their in­
compatibility, are communicated to someone.34 When a claim  
is  voiced, it is commonly justfiied in terms of a norm — the 
party oV- his spokesman argue that the claim ought to be satis­
fied. The extent to which this normative justification 's explicit 
or implicit, of central importance or m erely incidental, Will 
obviously vary greatly. It may be useful to distinguish two 
variants of dispute. In the first, one party asserts his claim  
directly to his opponent; I w ill call this an argument or quarrel.85 
Jn the second, both assert their claims to a third person, whom
1 0 - - Js
I shall call the in tervener;  I w ill use the terms case or con­
troversy for this situation. Obviously, many actual disputes w ill 
fall at the edge of either category, or somewhere between them.
Although a dispute presupposes conflict, and conflict assumes 
interaction, the chronological sequence is not otherwise in­
evitable or irreversible. Contact may not lead to significant 
interaction (brushing against a fellow  passenger on a bus); 
interaction may not produce conflict (one party to the above 
interchange immediately apologizes); and- conflict may never 
ripen into dispute (the injured party still harbors a silent 
grievance, but departs at the next stop). Moreover, the de­
velopmental sequence may be reversed: a dispute may subside 
into conflict if one of the parties ceases to assert his claim  
publically; conflict may disappear from interaction if he ceases 
to believe he has such a claim ;afl significant interaction may 
subside into mere physical contact, and contact itself may cease,
Because these social relationships are extrem ely fluid, I w ill 
refer to the situation in which the disputants find them selves 
at any given point in time as the outcome.117 When' I wish to 
emphasize greater finality I w ill use “decision”, a ,term which 
suggests both a choice between alternatives and a resting place 
in the dispute, if one which may be no more than transitory.
A decision need not be the unilateral utterance of a third per­
son; it can also result from agreement between the parties, 
t have deliberately avoided the mpre common phraseology 
“dispute settlem ent” and “conflict resolution, ”HH Anthropologists 1/  
and sociologists have tended to write as though “settlem ent”
must be the ultimate outcome of disputes, “resolution” the
inevitable fate of conflict.!1,, The prevalence of this perspective
may be due to the assumption of functional anthropology, and 
structural functional sociology, that every society tends toward 
an equilibrium state.10 Or it may simply be another instance of 
the romantic idealization of tribal societies.41 But it has recently 
become almost commonplace to observe that the outcome of , $
most conflicts and disputes are other conflicts and disputes, j-
with at most a temporary respite between them (see, e.g.,
MacGaffey, 1970; Burridge, 1957; Berndt, 1962; Kopytoff, 1961;
Tanner, 1970; Collier, 1973).
The definitions offered above mark the boundaries of the 
phenomena I wish to study, Although my notion of dispute
bears considerable resemblance to the judicial process — indeed, 
precisely because of this superficial similarity — it is worth 
emphasizing that the two are in no way equivalent. The vast 
majority of disputes in any society never enter its judicial 
institutions, however broadly the latter may be conceived. And  
a significant proportion of the business with which most judicial 
institutions are concerned does not involve disputes at all but 
rather the routine administrative processing of uncontested di* 
vorces, wage attachments, evictions, default judgments, bank­
ruptcies, and many criminal misdemeanors.42 A social theory 
of disputes is thus both more and less than a social theory of 
law.4*
In order to develop that theory we need additional con­
cepts tp analyze the phenomenon we hgve now circumscribed, 
The number of paths a dispute could conceivably follow is, of 
course, very large. Even within a given society, the 
number of paths actually taken may be substantial. 
Nevertheless, In every society most of the disputes 
will fall Into a relatively limited number of 
patterns. We speak of these recurrent patterns for disputing 
as being in s ti tu tiona lized  (Nadel, 1951: Ch. 6). What this means, 
at a minimum, is that the participants occupy roles within the 
institution which handles the dispute.14 These roles define the 
relationships among all of the participants in the dispute, and 
between each participant and the outside world; I call this 
role set the s truc ture  of the dispute or dispute institution. The 
definition of roles within the dispute affects the way in which 
incumbents of those roles perform; I call their behavior the 
process of the dispute or institution. Although we can usefully 
talk of structure as having some chronological, even causal, 
priority over process, or view process as action which occurs 
w ithin a structural environment, these concepts are obviously 
relative, and their interaction is reciprocal. Finally, the extent 
to which a dispute pattern is institutionalized is itself a variable: 
litigation in official courts is highly instituttoalfeed, m ar|^| 
squabbles are not;45 yet both, to some degree, possess a recur­
rent structure and display patterned behavior.
2. Parameters of the dispute process. By stripping the con­
cept of dispute, as far as possible, of those elements peculiar to 
fx particular instance, I simply postponed the job of charting 
the ways in which actual disputes differ. I w ill now turn to
■that task and try to identify significant parameters by which 
w e might measure variation in the ,processual dimensions of 
(disputes, selecting from previous analyses.40
Let me stress that this exercise is intended to illustrate 
•the feasibility of an approach, not to survey the literature ex­
haustively. The processual variables may conveniently be 
pharted by tracing the sequence of events in a paradigmatic 
jdispute; of course, no particular elem ent is essential, nor is their 
prder foreordained.
Before a dispute can arise, an individual must claim a 
resource to which another asserts an inconsistent claim.47 So­
cietal definitions of resource and scarcity obviously w ill affect 
the nature and frequency of such conflict.48 Its occurrence is, 
also governed by psychological factors: individuals in a society 
may react to a threat of conflict by repressing their desires.40 
Even if a person is himself conscious of conflict he may decline 
to publicize it, for all societies offer alternatives (Hirschman, 
1970): migration to avoid further discord,00 postponement of a 
grudge for. a more opportune time (P. Spencer, 1965: Ch. 7), 
and resignation, perhaps in the hope of vindication in an after­
life.81
If the individual does assert his claim, conflict becomes dis­
pute. There w ill be variation in the way this occurs: which 
claimant makes the assertion,82 whether he does so personally 
pr through a representative,™ and to whom he does so, especially  
in which forum or fora.34 Once initiated, the breadth of the 
dispute must then be defined along three dimensions: the num­
ber and scope of grievances raised, the number and identity of 
parties involved, and the historical depth in which the contro­
versy w ill be explored. Fallers has noted that a “case” is a 
, culturally variable unit, and has contrasted processes which  
only inquire into the violation of “a particular rule” with others 
which plumb “the full moral complexity of conflict situations” 
(1969: 11-12; see also A. L. Epstein, 1967b: 230). Nader, inde­
pendently and contemporaneously, offered a parallel distinc­
tion between situations where “the cause of the dispute is al­
ready known and proceedings function to settle” and others 
where a “variety of disputes is discussed to mediate the basis 
pf the dispute” (1969c: 87).r,!> Grievances may ramify not only 
between the nominal parties to the dispute, but, also among
o th ers ,  a n d  a m o n g  a ll  d i s p u ta n ts  across  time. At one extrem e 
is t h e  d isp u te  w h ic h  o n ly  in v o lv es  th e  “c o n te n d in g ,  parties” 
(£oHn, 1967: 156), “ to ta l  s t r a n g e r s ” (F a lle rs ,  1969: 13) whose 
r e la t io n s h ip  is l im ite d  to  th e  t r a n s ie n t  e n c o u n te r ,  frequently 
c o n tra c tu a l ,  w h ic h  g e n e ra te d  th is  d ispu te .  A t  th e  other is  the 
c o n tro v e rs y  b e tw e e n  p a r t ie s  l in k e d  b y  a  “substantial period of 
assoc ia tion  . . .  in  th e  c o u rse  of w h ic h  e ach  has done things 
to  th e  o th e r  of w h ic h  h e  o u g h t  t o . b e  ashamed” (Fallers, 1969: 
12); w h e r e  d i s p u ta n ts  a r e  e n m e s h e d  in  m ultiplex relations “it  
is t h e  w id e r  -social n e tw o rk s  t h a t  in f lu e n c e  a decision” (Nader, 
1969c: 88; cf. K a w a s h im a ,  1963); “ th e  case  which is the crux 
of th e  d isp u te  is on ly  a m in o r  e x p re s s io n  of a  long-standing' 
an ta g o n is t ic  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  tw o  fam ilie s  o r  groups” (Cohn, 
1967: 156).™
T he  d e f in i t io n  of issues  in te r a c t s  V ith  the nature of the 
f a c tu a l  in v es t ig a t io n .  Aufcert has  sk e tc h e d  tw o  divergent paths 
w h ic h  th is  in q u i r y  m a y  fo llow  (1963b), Jf those  engaged in the 
d isp u te  a re  m o t iv a te d  b y  c o n s id e ra t io n s  of u t i l i ty ,  t h e y  w i l l  be 
c o n c e rn e d  w i th  h is to r ic a l  f a c t  on ly  so f a r  as i t  assis ts  them  
in  fo re c a s t in g  th e  c o n seq u e n c e s  of a l t e rn a t iv e  accom m odations .  
T hese  p red ic t io n s  are , of course , su b je c t  to  v e r if ica tio n ,  and 
w il l  be  rev ise d  if sh o w n  to b e  in co rrec t :  th e  d isp u te  w i l l  ex­
tend  te m p o ra l ly  in to  th e  f u tu r e  r a t h e r  t h a n  th e  past.  Subjective 
fac ts  becom e c ru c ia l  — t h e  p re s e n t  e m o t io n a l  s e t  of the d is ­
p u t a n t s — and su i ta b le  m e a n s  fo r  a s c e r ta in in g  t h e m  w il l  be 
ad o p te d :  the  th e r a p e u t ic  r e la t io n s h ip  e x e m p l if ie s  th is  a p p ro a c h .  
A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  th e  p a r t i c ip a n ts  in  th e  d isp u te  m a y  se ek  to  a jK  
p o r t io n  p ra is e  a n d  b lam e , a n d  m u s t  th e n  a sc e r ta in  h is to r ic a l  
fac t  in  d e ta i l .87 T his  op t ion  b r in g s  in to  p ro m in e n c e  th e  pro­
c e d u re s  fo r  f a c tu a l  d e te rm in a t io n :  w h o  p re s e n ts  ev id e n c e  a n d  
h ow , w h a t  e v id e n c e  is a c ce p ta b le  o r  n e c essa ry ,  h o w  th e  e v i ­
d e n c e  is assessed  a n d  b y  whom , a n d  w h a t  is d one  if the evi­
d e n c e  is lack ing . S uch  an  in te r p re ta t io n  of h is to ry  is n o t  sub­
j e c t  to  m o d if ica tio n  in  t h e  l ig h t  of s u b s e q u e n t  even ts .
W h ile  th e  above  o b se rv a t io n s  by  sociologists a n d  a n th r o ­
po log is ts  a re  r e la t iv e ly  nove l,  leg a l  p h i lo so p h y  h a s  lo n g  r e ­
f le c te d  u p o n  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of n o rm s  a n d  th e  w a y  th e y  a re  
e m p lo y e d  in  d ispu tes .  P o u n d  a sse r te d :  “ A lm o st  a ll  of th e  p r o b ­
le m s  of ju r i s p ru d e n c e  com e d o w n  to  a  f u n d a m e n ta l  one  of r u le  
a n d  d isc re t io n  . . .” (1922: 70). This d is t in c t io n  h a s  b e e n  re f in e d
to recognize the clarity and discreteness of rules when con­
trasted with vague, overlapping standards (see Fallers, 1969: 
11; Yngvesson, n.d.; Eckhoff, 1969: 176; Dworkin, 1967: 25 ff.). 
Application of the norms may focus upon the general, repeti­
tive patterns of conflict situations, or the idiosyncratic features 
of the dispute (Pound, 1922: 70). The underlying thought proc­
esses have been described as falling along a continuum between  
the rational and the irrational (Weber, 1954: 63-64), or between  
intelligence and intuition (Pound, 1922: 70, following Bergson). 
The proctss may btcharactriztj by formal orderliness, expressed  
in adherence to a code or doctrine of precedent and achieved  
by means of legal conceptual reasoning; or it may subserve 
substantive ends and result in a series of them istes ,  disjoined 
from both past and future decisions (Maine, 1950: Ch. 1; see also 
Weber, 1954: Ch. 4). Norms may be advanced by a party in  
support of an argument, or by a third person urging a par­
ticular outcome; these arguments may be more or less explicit.08
Disputes differ in the outcome toward which they tend: 
some simmer indefinitely without firm resolution; others gen­
erate considerable pressure for a decision of any kind.™ This 
may be a clear, simple, dichotomous decree favoring one party 
to the excusion of the other; or it may be an ambiguous com­
promise which considers “all the rights and wrongs of this 
situation” (Falfcrs, 1969: 13), and awards to each party some 
of \bhat he seeks while denying other elements of his claim.00 
The outcome may be imposed unilaterally upon the parties, or 
an effort, greater or less, may be made to secure their assent 
by a variety of means (Fallers, 1969: 11; Aubert, 1963a). The 
remedy may be expressed in sanctions which are repressive or 
*estituijye; positive ornegative, diffuse or organized (Durkheim, 
1947; Radcliffe-ferown, 1933b). The judgment may be announced 
as final, or finality may consciously be avoided (Cohn, 1967; 
156); in either case there may be further opportunities for re­
view  or reinterpretation. And there w ill, of course, be varia­
tions in the manner in which subsequent behavior is affected  
by the decision.01
3, Are there two types of dispute, legal and political? In 
this brief survey of variations in the dispute process, I view ed  
the role that norms may play as simply another parameter, 
similar in nature to all the others, Some social scientists have.
a rg u e d  t h a t  th is  fa c to r  d iv ides  d isp u te s  in to  tw o  g roups,  f u n ­
d a m e n ta l ly  d i f f e re n t  in  k ind , w h ic h  r e q u i r e  d is t in c t  c o n c e p tu a l  
f r a m e w o rk s  fo r  ana lys is .  F a l le r s  c o n tr a s ts  th e  a d ju d ic a t io n  of 
r u le  v io la tio n s  w i th  w h a t  h e  calls  “ p o l i t ic a l” d ispu te s ,  “c o n ­
f l ic ts  of in te res t” a r i s in g  o u t  of th e  p u r s u i t  of in c o n s is te n t  p o l icy  
goals; s ince  in  such  c o n tro v e rs ie s  th e  cho ice  of dec is ional ru le s  
is i tse lf  t h e  issue, re so lu t io n  c a n n o t  b e  g o v e rn e d  b y  ru le s  (F a l ­
lers ,  1969: 12, i ta lics  in  o r ig ina l;  see also  A u b e r t ,  1963a). G u l l iv e r  
h a s  c a r r ie d  th e  an a ly s is  f u r th e r ,  a n d  c o n c e p tu a l iz e d  “ tw o  p o la r  
ty p e s  of p rocess  — ju d ic ia l  a n d  p o li t ica l  — b e tw e e n  w h ic h  t h e r e  
is  a  g r a d u a t e d  sca le  . , .
B y a jud icial process I m ean  one that involves a judge who is
vested  w ith  Ooth au th o rity  a n d  responsibility to make a ju d g ­
m ent, in accordance w ith  estab lish ed  norms, which is enforceable, 
as the se ttlem en t of a  dispute.. . .
T he purply politic' 1 process, on the o th e r hand, involves no I n t e r a c t i o n
b y  a th ird  p a rty , a judge. H ere  a decision is reached and  a 
se ttlem en t m ade as a resu lt of th e  re la tiv e  s tren g th s  of the two 
parties to 'th e  d ispu te  as th ey  a re  show n and  tested  in social 
action . T he stronger gains th e  power to im pose its ow n decisions, 
b u t it is lim ited  by th e  d eg ree  to  w hich its opponent, though 
w eak er, can in flu en ce  it. In this case th e  accepted  norms of be­
h av io r re le v a n t to  the  m a tte r  in d ispu te  a re  b u t  one element 
involved , and possibly  an  u h im p o rta n t one (1963: 297-98).
/G u l l iv e r  d e v e lo p e d  th is  typ o lo g y  in  a n  a t t e m p t  to p o r t r a y  dis- 
p u te  s e t t l e m e n t  am ong,*A rusha  of T anzan ia .  H e  has  s ince  m o d i ­
f ie d  h is  pos it ion  s o m e w h a t  in  o r d e r  “ to avo id  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  
of p rec ise  id ea l  ty p e s  o r  m o d e ls ” an d  to e m p h a s ize  t h a t  “ th e r e  
is no  a b so lu te  d iv id in g  l ine  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  m o d e s” (1969a: 
22-23). B u t  h is  no ised  fo rm u la t io n ,  w h i le  th u s  qua lif ied ,  is n o t  
f u n d a m e n ta l ly  ch an g ed .
E ssen tia lly  th e  d iffe ren ce  is b e tw een  ju d g m e n t by  an au thorized  
th ird  p a r ty , on th e  one hand , and  negotia ted  ag reem en t w ithou t 
judgment, on the o ther; th a t is, the  d ifference  b e tw een  the p re s ­
ence o r absence  of o v errid in g  a u th o r i ty .. . .
F ro m  th is  I w o u ld  suggest th e  hypothesis tha t, on th e  whole, 
th&re is g re a te r  re liance  on, appeal to and opera tion  of rules, 
stan d ard s, and  no rm s w here  ad jud ica tion  ra th e r  th an  negotiation  
is mode of dispute settlement (1969a: 17-19).
In d ee d ,  he  fo u n d  s u b s ta n t ia l  c o n f i rm a t io n  of th e  s c h e m a  in  
s u b s e q u e n t  f ie ld w o rk  a m o n g  th e  N denfeu li ,  a n o th e r  T a n z a n ia  
t r i b e  w h ic h  lacks  «ven those  in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  n o tab le s  w h o  in  
A r u s h a la n d  a re  a v a i la b le  to m ed ia te ,  th o u g h  n o t  to decide ,
d isp u te s .
d o
O bviously  in a m oot N d en d eu li/a ttem p t to en u n c ia te  these 
ex pecta tions I concerning reasonab le  ro le  perfo rm ance], and  they  
seek to m easu re  a m an’s conduct against them . On the o th e r 
hand, no t only are  the  expectations ra th e r  in d e te rm in a te  . . .  bu t 
th e re  is also no th ird  party , no ad jud ica to r, and no techn ique  to 
d e te rm in e  specifically  the  acceptable, operative, reasonable e x ­
pectations in the v e n t of a p a rticu la r disputa. A nd w hile  m en 
seek th e ir  ow n advan tages and  a ttem p t to avoid w hat is d isad ­
van tageous, the process of se ttlem en t m ust depend  also cn o ther 
considera tions no t d irec tly  re la ted  to the m erits  of the m a tte r  in 
d ispu te : the s tren g th  w ith  w hich  a de fen d an t can resist his claim , 
the deg ree  to w hich a p la in tiff can be persuaded  to reduce h is 
claim , the  degree  and k ind  of support each can obtain  from  o ther 
involved persons. (1909b: 66).
W h e re  F a l le r s  a n d  G u l l iv e r  c o n c e n t ra te  u p o n  d e f in in g  th e  po l i ­
t ica l  p rocess, Pospisi a r r iv e s  a t  a s im i la r  v iew  by  id e n t i fy in g  
th e  o th e r  pole  of th e  d icho tom y , th e  jud ic ia l ,  w i th  an  a t t r ib u t e
w h ic h  he  calls  “ th e  in te n t io n  of u n iv e r s a l  a p p lic a t io n  . . . th e  
a u th o r i ty  in  m a k in g  a decis ion  in te n d s  it  to be a p p lie d  to all 
s im i la r  o r  ‘id e n t ic a l ’ s i tu a t io n s  in th e  f u t u r e ” (1958: 262; see also 
K a w a s h im a ,  1963).
T h is  typo logy  is c e r ta in ly  no t  u n f a m i l i a r  to law y e rs .  T he  
ju d ic ia l  m ode ls  d e sc r ib ed  above  c le a r ly  fu lf i l l  th e  l a w y e r ’s 
id ea l  of the r u le  of law . Lon F u l le r  has  a rg u e d  th a t  a d ju d ic a ­
tion, as an  id ea l  type , is a p rocess  in  w h ic h  th e  p a r t ie s  p re se n t ,  
a n d  th e  ju d g e  is g u id ed  by, ev id en ce  a n d  rea so n e d  a rg u m e n t  
(n.d.: 29). A nd  H e r b e r t  W echsler ,  in a d v o c a t in g  “ n e u t r a l  p r in ­
c ip le s ” as th e  only  a p p ro p r ia t e  basis  fo r  ju d ic ia l  decision, e m ­
p lo y s  a s im i la r  s ta n d a rd :
A princip led  decision, in th e  sense I have  in m ind , is c-ne th a t 
rests on reasons w ith  respect to all th e  issues in the case, reasons 
th a t  in th e ir  genera lity  and th e ir  n eu tra lity  transcend  any  im­
m ed ia te  re su lt th a t is involved  (1961: 2 7 -2 8 )/'-
I f  th e s e  m ode ls  s h a re  a c o m m on  core  it  w o u ld  seem  to  lie 
in  t h e  c o n t r a s t  b e tw e e n  d isp u te s  w h ic h  a re  g o v e rn e d  by  n o rm s  
—  e spec ia l ly  those  c h a ra c te r iz e d  as e s tab l ished , u n iv e rsa l ,  g e n ­
e ra l ,  or n e u t r a l  — an d  c o n tro v e rs ie s  d o m in a te d  by n o n -n o rm a -  
t iv e  fac to rs , such  as “ po licy  goals ,” th e  “ im m e d ia te  r e s u l t , ” 
o r  t h e  “re la t iv e  s t r e n g th ” of a p a r ty  c a lc u la te d  in  t e r m s  of 
socia l  su p p o r t .  I t  is no  a c c id e n t  t h a t  l a w y e rs  a n d  social sc ie n ­
t is ts ,  s ta r t i n g  f ro m  th e i r  v e ry  d i f fe re n t  p e rsp ec tiv es ,  h a v e  con ­
v e rg e d  u p o n  th e  sa m e  d is t in c t io n /13 F o r  th e  d ich o to m iz a t io n  of
d isp u te s  in to  tw o  e x c lu s iv e  ca teg o rie s  is n o t  m e r e ly  a n  a n a ly t ic  
dev ice ;  i t  is th e  necessa ry ,  a n d  su ff ic ien t ,  a s su m p t io n  f ro m  
w h ic h  legal  s c h o la rsh ip  a n d  social sc ience  can  d iv ide  u p  th e  
p h e n o m e n a  to  be  u n d e rs to o d  in  such  a w a y  th a t  e a ch  d isc i­
p l in e  re ig n s  u n c h a l le n g e d  in  i ts  o w n  dom ain . If  d isp u te s  a re  
of tw o  d i f f e re n t  k inds ,  t h e y  r e q u i r e  d is t in c t  m odes  of u n d e r ­
s ta n d in g .  T he  c a te g o ry  of d isp u te s  g o v e rn e d  b y  n o rm s  is ob ­
v io u s ly  t h e  d o m ain  of law y e rs ,  w h o  h a v e  e la b o ra te d  h ig h ly  
s o p h is t ic a te d  te c h n iq u e s  fo r  e x p la in in g  th o se  d isp u te s  in  t e r m s  
of  th e  n o rm s  in v o lv e d  — th e  offic ia l s u b s ta n t iv e  a n d  p ro c e d u ra l  
ru les . L a w y e r s  m a y  d i f fe r  as to th e  b es t  m o d e  of a s c e r ta in in g  
th e  n o rm s , a n d  th u s  a rg u e  a b o u t  w h a t  th e  n o rm s  re a l ly  are , 
b u t  th e y  a re  a g re e d  th a t  a n y  o th e r  e x p la n a t io n  is im p e r m is ­
s ib le .04 W ith in  th e  ca te g o ry  of po l i t ica l  d ispu te s ,  on th e  o th e r  
h a n d ,  n o rm s  a re  by  d e f in i t io n  of l i t t le  r e le v an c e ,  a n d  c e r ta in ly  
c a n n o t  be a su ff ic ie r  e x p la n a t io n  fo r  th e  b e h a v io ra l  p a t t e r n s  
o bse rved . H e re  la w y e rs  gladly a b d ic a te  in f a v o r  of social sc ie n ­
t is t s  w h o  can  o ffe r  an  e x p la n a t io n  in  te r m s  of social fac to rs  
o th e r  t h a n  no rm s. T h e  d is t in c t io n  th u s  h a s  p ro fo u n d  conse ­
q u e n c e s  fo r  scho la rsh ip . '15 Y e t  i t  s eem s to  m e  to r e s t  u p o n  a 
f u n d a m e n ta l  fuzziness  c o n c e rn in g  w h a t  it  m e a n s  fo r  a  d ispu te ,  
to be  “g o v e rn e d  b y  n o rm s .” L e t  m e  c o n s id e r  th e  m e a n in g s  
s u g g e s te d  b y  th e  a bove  q u o ta t io n s .00
(1) T he  d i s p u ta n ts  o r  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts  th in k  th e y  a re  
a c t in g  in  a c co rd a n ce  w i th  n o rm s  in  u rg in g  a p a r t i c u la r  o u t ­
com e. T h is  a p p e a rs  to be  P o sp is i l ’s u sag e  w h e n  h e  sp e ak s  of 
a n .  a u th o r i ty  in te n d in g  u n iv e r s a l  ap p lica t io n .  I do n o t  b e l ie v e  
t h a t  th is  is a  f ru i t f u l  sociological ap p ro ach .  T h e  a u th o r i t y ’s in ­
te n t io n  a t  th e  t im e  of dec id ing  is s in g u la r ly  d iff icu lt ,  if riot 
im poss ib le ,  to a sce r ta in ,  a n d  Posp isi l  in d ic a te s  no w a y  of d o in g  
so.
(2) T h e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  th e  d is p u te  invoke  n o rm s  in  a d ­
v a n c in g  a so lu t io n  to  th e  d ispu te .  F u l le r  su g g es ts  th is  a sp ec t  
in  h is  e m p h a s is  on rea so n e d  a r g u m e n t  (n.d.: 20). As h e i r s  of 
th e  legal rea l is ts  we a re  n o t  l ike ly  to co n fu se  th e  invoca t ion , 
of n o rm s  w i th  th e i r  a c tu a l  in f luence .  B u t  if n o r m a t iv e  la n g u a g e  
is no g u a ra n te e  th a t  n o rm s  g overn ,  can  w e  d r a w  f ro m  th e i r  
ab sen ce  a n  in fe ren c e  t h a t  th e y  a re  i r r e le v a n t?  A n u m b e r  of 
w r i te rs ,  m o s t  re c e n t ly  F a l le rs ,  h a v e  o b se rv e d  th a t  n o rm s  m a y  
p lay  a m a jo r  ro le  in d isp u te s  w i th o u t  e v e r  be ing  m e n t io n e d  
e x p lic i t ly  by ju d g e  or l i t ig a n t  (1969: 320 ff .) .  H ence  in v o ca t io n
as a n  in d e x  does n o t  s e rv e  to c re a te  tw o  ca teg o rie s  of d ispu tes ,  
n o r m a t iv e  a n d  no rm less .
(3) N o rm s  de term ine  t h e  o u tco m e  of th e  d ispu te .  D w o rk in
has  a n a ly z e d  th is  “m o d e l  of r u le s ” (1967: 36; see also M oore, 
1970b: 323, 341) in d e p th ,  a n d  ag re e s  w ith ,  in d ee d  tr iv ia l izes ,  
th e  in s ig h t  of th e  lega l  r ea l is ts  th a t  i t  is th e  r a r e  n o rm  w h ic h  
can  or does d ic ta te  a decision ,"7 a n d  t h a t  m u c h  of th e  dec is ion ­
m a k in g  in m a n y  d isp u te s  fa l ls  b e y o n d  th e  p u rv ie w  of e x is t in g  
ru les .  F ro m  th is  s ta n d p o in t  v e ry  few  of th e  cases t r i e d  b y  offi­
c ia l c o u r ts  a re  lega l  d ispu tes .  A re  w e  to conc lude  t h a t  n o rm s  
p lay  no p a r t  in th e  r e m a in in g  co n tro v e rs ie s?  E m p h a t ic a l ly  not. 
A n o rm  of a d i f f e re n t  k ind , w h ic h  D w o rk in  re fe rs  to  as a 
s ta n d a rd ,  pi inc .pie, j po licy , “s ta te s  a r ea so n  th a t  a rg u e s  in
one d i r e c t io n  [ I t ]  is one  w h ic h  offic ia ls  m u s t  ta k e  in to
accoun t ,  if i t  is r e le v a n t ,  as a c o n s id e ra t io n  in c l in in g  in  one 
d ire c t io n  m o th e r ' '  en  w e  re a c h  o r  s u rp a s s  th e  p e n u m b r a  
of ru les ,  oi w h e n  th ey  r e q u i r e  c h a n g e  (1967: 26). N e v e r th e le ss ,  
th e  a p p lic ab i l i ty  a n d  r e la t iv e  w e ig h t  of th ese  s ta n d a rd s  a re  
a lw a y s  to som e d e g re e  u n c e r ta in ,  w i th  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  a fu l l  
u n d e r s t a n d in g  of th e  co u rse  of a d isp u te  can  on ly  be ga in e d  b y  
looking , as w ell ,  a t  fac to rs  e x tr in s ic  to i ts  n o rm a t iv e  con ten t .  
H e n c e  F a l le r s  c a n n o t  re a d i ly  d isc r im in a te  on th is  basis  b e tw e e n  
po li t ica l  d isp u te s  a n d  law su its ,  a n d  once  a ga in  th e  s im p le  
d ic h o to m y  b re a k s  dow n .
(4) i f  on ly  a fe w  ru le s  u n a m b ig u o u s ly  d ic ta te  a u n iq u e  
ju d g m e n t ,  s t i l l  th e  ju d ic ia l  p rocess  fo r  d e a l in g  w i th  d isp u te s  
can  b e  d is t in g u ish e d  f ro m  o th e r  such  p rocesses  by th e  fac t  
t h a t  a ll th e  n o rm s  it e m p lo y s  possess th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic  of n e u ­
t ra l i ty .  T h is  p roposi t ion  is obv iously  s u b je c t  to th e  l in e  of a t ­
ta c k  ju s t  o u t l in ed ;  indeed , i t  is p a r t i c u la r ly  v u ln e r a b le  s ince 
t h e  v e ry  n e u t r a l i ty  on w h ic h  W e ch s le r  in s is ts  in c reases  th e  
in d e te rm in a c y  f o u tco m e .(ih B ut, m o re  im p o r ta n t ly ,  th e  c r i te r io n  
of n e u t r a l i ty  does n o t  d iv ide  decisions in to  p r in c ip le d  an d  u n ­
principled, fo r  th e  d e g re e  of g e n e ra l i ty  r e q u i r e d  of a n o rm  is 
a r b i t r a r y  a n d  n e v e r  a d e q u a te ly  specified.""
I t  is n o t  n e c es sa ry  to  be  e n t i r e ly  sa tis f ied  w i th  th is  d is ­
c u ss io n  of the  t ro u b le so m e  issue  of ru le  a n d  d isc re tion  in  o rd e r  
to  re sp o n d  to th e  p ro b le m  w h ic h  s t im u la te d  m y  ex cu rsu s :  In  
c h a r t in g  re g u la r i t i e s  in th e  d isp u te  p rocess  is n o rm  a v a r ia b le  
t h a t  is n e c e s sa ry  a n d  su ff ic ie n t  to desc r ibe  one ca te g o ry  of d is ­
pu te s ,  w h i le  w h o l ly  i r r e le v a n t  to th e  o th e r?  T he  f i r s t  h a lf  
of th is  q u e s t io n  h a s  been  a d e q u a te ly  a n s w e re d  in th e  n e g a t iv e  
if, indeed , i t  is no t  th e  s t r a w  m a n  w h ic h  D w o rk in  a sse r ts  it 
to  be  (1967: 16) .7" T h e  o th e r  a l t e rn a t iv e  can  be d isposed  of 
m o re  qu ick ly .  Is th e r e  a s ig n if ic a n t  c a te g o ry  of d isp u te s  a t  th e  
“p o l i t ic a l” e n d  of th e  sp e c t ru m , in  w h ic h  n o rm s  p la y  no  ro le  
w h a ts o e v e r?  I t  is d if f icu l t  to im a g in e  th e  a sse r t io n  of a c la im  
w i th o u t  a n  appeal,  if on ly  im p lic i t ,  to som e g e n e ra l  soc ie ta l  
e v a lu a t io n  of h u m a n  c o n d u c t .71 G u ll ive r ,  a lone , h a s  o f fe red  
e th n o g ra p h ic  e v id e n c e  of d isp u te s  w i th o u t  n o rm a t iv e  co n ten t ,  
a n d  he  h a s  s ince  d isav o w ed  th a t  i n te r p re ta t io n  (1969a: 12; 
1969b: 66 n .12).72 It w o u ld  seem  Sensible, th e re fo re ,  to  p u r s u e  
o u r  analysis in  th e  e x p e c ta t io n  t h a t  n o rm s  w il l  p la y  some  p a r t  
in m o s t  d isp u te s  w e  e n c o u n te r  (Moore, 1970b: 330).
F ro m  t h a t  pe rsp ec tiv e ,  i t  m a y  p rove  v a lu a b le  to  r e t u r n  to 
t h e  d is t in c t io n s  j u s t  c ri t ic ized  fo r  h in ts  as to th e  w a y s  in  w h ic h  
n o rm s  m a y  be in v o lv e d  in a d ispu te .  D w o rk in  (1967: 25-29) 
d e m a rc a te s  ru le s  f ro m  s ta n d a rd s  on th e  bas is  of tw o  c r i te r ia :  
1) ru le s  e i th e r  d ic ta te  a decision o r  a re  i r r e le v a n t ;  s ta n d a rd s  m a y  
a rg u e  fo r  a decis ion  w i th o u t  n e c es s i ta t in g  it; 2) s ta n d a rd s  h a v e  
W’e ig h t  r e la t iv e  to  one  a n o th e r ;  ru le s  do no t .73 I do n o t  th in k  
th is  d ich o to m y  can be  m a in ta in e d  e i th e r ;  m o s t  n o rm s  w ill  f u n c ­
t io n  m o re  l ike  ru le s  a t  one  t im e, an d  m o re  l ike  s ta n d a r d s  a t  
a n o th e r  But I be lieve  th e  v a r ia b le s  D w o rk in  e m p lo y s  in  d r a w ­
ing  his  d is t in c t io n  a re  p o te n t ia l ly  usefu l:  th e  d e g re e  of c la r i ty  
w i th  w h ich  a n o rm  in c lu d e s  a fac t  s i tu a tio n ,  an d  p o in ts  to  a n  
ou tcom e, a n d  th e  w e ig h t  of th e  n o rm  in co m p e t i t io n  w i th  o thers .  
S im ila r ly ,  w h i le  W e ch s le r  fa ils  to  conv ince  m e  t h a t  c e r ta in  
p r in c ip le s  a re  n e u t r a l  in  a n y  a b so lu te  sense, th e  g e n e ra l i ty  of 
a n o rm  m a y  be a n  im p o r ta n t  v a r ia b le .73 A nd  F u l le r  is c e r ta in ly  
c o r r e c t  t h a t  th e  e x t e n t  to w h ic h  n o rm a t iv e  a rg u m e n ts  a re  
vo iced  a n d  r e sp o n d e d  to by  a ju d g e ,  sh o u ld  also in te r e s t  us 
(n .d . ) .70 O th e r  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  o v e r la p  s o m e w h a t  w i th  those  
j u s t  d iscussed  m ig h t  be: th e  d e g re e  to w h ic h  th e  n o rm s  a re  
c o n s is te n t  o r  in c o n s is te n t ,77 v a g u e ly  or c le a r ly  d e f in e d  (G u l­
liver ,  1969a: 18-19), f ix e d  o r  flexible,™ a n d  h o w  f a r  th e  u n i ­
v e r s e  of n o rm s  is op en  o r  c losed .79
T he  d ic h o to m y  w e  h a v e  ju s t  r e je c te d ,  h o w e v e r ,  b o r ro w s  
a d d i t io n a l  w e ig h t  f ro m  a s t r u c tu r a l  a rg u m e n t :  a l th o u g h  a 
d isp u te  m a y  w e l l  in v o lv e  no rm s ,  th e y  w il l  on ly  in f lu e n c e  th e
o u tco m e  if i t  is d e te r m in e d  by  a n  a u th o r i ta t iv e  t h i r d - p a r ty  
a d ju d ic a to r .  G u l l iv e r  m a k e s  th is  e q u a t io n  e x p lic i t  (1963: 297-98) 
b u t  e v e n  o th e rs  l ik e  A u b e r t  (q u o te d  in  N a d e r ,  1969c: 87) 
Posp is i l  (1958: 258 ff .) ,  w h o  id e n t i fy  th e  a u th o r i ty  of th e  a d ju d i ­
c a to r  as a n  in d e p e n d e n t  va r ia b le ,  assoc ia te  t h a t  f a c to r  w i th  
n o r m a t iv e  dec is io rw nak ing . P e r h a p s  th is  c o n ju n c t io n  is su g ­
g e s te d  b y  o u r  e v e ry d a y  e x p e r ien c e ;  c e r ta in ly  p o p u la r  m y th o lo g y  
a t t r ib u t e s  e v e n h a n d e d n e s s  to th e  ju d g e  a n d  se lf ishness  to th e  
p a r t ie s .  B u t  fo r  p u rp o se s  of an a ly s is  th ese  v a r ia b le s  must be 
k e p t  d is t inc t .  T h e y  b e lo n g  to d i f f e re n t  o rd e r s  of c o n c e p tu a l iz a ­
t ion : t h e  w a y  in  w h ic h  n o rm s  e n te r  in to  a d isp u te  is a proces- 
su a l  v a r ia b le ;  t h e  p re s e n c e  of an  a u th o r i ta t iv e  th i r d - p a r ty  is a 
s t r u c tu r a l  e le m e n t .80 T h e i r  c o r re la t io n  m u s t  th e r e fo r e  be made 
p ro b le m a t ic .
I f  i t  is, th e  p roposed  h y p o th e s is  fails, both theoretically and
em p ir ic a l ly .  Authoritative t h i r d -p a r ty  d e c is io n -m ak in g  is  n o t  
n e c e s sa ry  fo r  n o rm s  to  p lay  a s ig n if ican t  ro le  in  a d ispu te .  S u ch  
a p ro p o s i t io n  w o u ld  im p ly  t h a t  th e  on ly  poss ib le  s o u rc e  for 
t h e  in f lu e n c e  of n o rm s  upon  d i s p u ta n ts  is th e  a u th o r i ty  of a  
judge . B u t  c lea r ly  th e re  a re  o th e r  sources. O ne  of th e  d i s p u ta n ts  
m a y  possess a n  a u th o r i ty  to d e c la re  n o rm s  s im i la r  to  th a t  of' 
the judge think of q u a r r e l s  b e tw e e n  p a re n ts  a n d  c h i ld re n  
(Piaget, 1965: 107) .M1 And q u i te  a p a r t  f ro m  w h o  announces  th e m  
in the course of a d isp u te ,  th e  n o rm s  m a y  th e m s e ly e s  be  e n ­
d o w e d  with legitimacy d e r iv e d  f ro m  t ra d i t io n ,82 o r  c r e a te d  b y  
mutual agreement, as w h e re  th e  p la y e r s  in a g a m e  fo llow  th e  
ru le s  because of their desire  to k eep  p la y in g .83
Neither is the presence of an  a u th o r i ta t iv e  a d ju d ic a to r  a  
sufficient condition fo r  th e  d o m in a n c e  of n o rm s .84 J u s t  as th e  
participants may ad h e re  to n o rm s  fo r  rea so n s  o th e r  t h a n  th e  
authority of the judge, so th e  ju d g e  is s u b je c te d  to  in f lu e n c e s  
which are not exclusively n o rm a t iv e .  As G u l l iv e r  h a s  n o w  
realized, the degree of insulation from such  p re s s u re s  is a 
continuum along which the ju d ic ia l  p rocess  is on ly  m a r g in a l ly  
more sheltered than the political (1969a: 22). A s t r ik in g  in s ta n c e  
of a dispute process constantly ac co m m o d a t in g  to r e la t iv e  p o w e r  
is th e  Lebanese wasta  m a k e r ,  d e sc r ib ed  by  L a u r a  N a d e r  (1965c; 
see also H itchcock , 1960). An A fr ic a n  e x a m p le ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a y  
be  m o re  a p p ro p r ia te  in th e  p re s e n t  co n tex t .  J . A. B a rn e s  h a s  
described disputes among th e  Ngoni, a C e n t ra l  A fr ic a n  t r ib e
e n d o w e d  w i th  a t r a d i t i o n a l  h ie r a r c h y  of a u th o r i t a t i v e  courts ,  
som e  of w h ic h  w e re  a b s o rb e d  in to  th e  co lonia l leg a l  s y s te m  of 
N o r th e r n  R hodes ia  in  1929 a n d  g iv en  e n h a n c e d  p o w e rs  and m o re  
fo rm a l iz e d  p ro c e d u re s .
D espite  this m easu re  of legal assim ilation, th e  p resen t actions 
of Ngoni N ative C ourts  can be understood  only in te rm s of th e ir  
h isto rical roots in N gcni society, p rio r to 1929, and of the contem­
p o rary  political scene, as w e ll as in te rm s of the  B ritish  legal 
system . T he coun ty  ch ief w h o  presides in the  N ative  C ourt is th e  
political leader of his peop le  a n d  his actions as a ju d g e  a re  colour-, 
ed b y  his political position. T he  N gcni P a ra m o u n t C hief is 
political head  of the trib e , and  in add ition  presides over th e  Ngoni 
co u rt of appeal. T h e re  is th en  no c lear separa tion  of th e  courts 
from  po litics—  The N ative  C ourt is used  to im p lem en t th e  policy 
of the  N ativ e  A u th o rity . A ch ief anx ious to gain  fav o u r w ith  th e  
B ritish  A d m in is tra tio n  sees th a t h is co u rt en fo rces w ith  substarw  
tia l penalties  the vario u s regu la tio n s in w hich the A dm in istra tion  
is in te rested  for th< u m c  being. A chief w ho w ishes to obstruct 
th e  A d m in is tra tio n  w iil neg lec t these regu lations in his c o u r t . . . .
In  th e  court th e  m ag n itu d e  of th e  penalties im posed or 
dam ages aw arded  is in f lu e n c e d  by political considerations, am ong 
o thers. Ngoni society is n o t egalita rian , and  s ta tu s d ifferences are  
re flec ted  m  d ifferences in p en a lties  . , .  P o litical considerations of 
the m o m en t show them selves w hen  a chief o r othef court m em ber 
o b stru c ts  a su it b ro u g h t by  a  litig an t he  d is lik e s .. .  M issionaries 
en d eav o u r to p e rsu ad e  chiefs no t to g ran t divorces to  th e ir  con­
v e rts ; Ind ian  trad e rs  en d eav o u r to get th e ir  disputes w ith  A fricans 
h e a rd  in N ative  C ourts  r a th e r  th an  in these of th e  A d m in is tra ­
tion, as is req u ired  by th e  O rd inance  on N ative  C ourts; w hite 
fa rm ers  in s liu c t N ative  C ourts  to deal p ro m p tly  w ith  cases in ­
vo lv ing  th e ir  lab o u re rs  (1961: 179-82).
B a rn e s  conc ludes :  “T h e  leg a l  s y s te m  is n o t  a k in d  of c a lc u la t ­
in g  m ac h in e ,  w i th  a n  i n p u t  of w ro n g s  a n d  a n  o u tp u t  of r igh ts .
I t  is p a r t  of th e  social p ro ce ss  in  w h ic h  g ro u p s  a n d  in d iv id u a ls  
s t r iv e  a g a in s t  one  a n o th e r  a n d  w i th  one  a n o th e r  fo r  a  v a r i e ty  
of e n d s ” (1961: 193).85
I t  s h o u ld  n o t  be  t h o u g h t  t h a t  on ly  in th e  n o n - w e s te r n  w o r ld  
is t h e  d i s p u te  p rocess  d isso c ia ted  f ro m  its n o r m a t iv e  gu idelines .
I t  is n o w  w id e ly  rec o g n ize d  t h a t  s ig n if ic a n t  b e h a v io r  o c c u r r in g  
w i t h in  o u r  o w n  in s t i tu t io n s  fo r  h a n d l in g  d isp u te s  is on ly  p a r t ly  
g u id e d  by  official n o rm s .  W e  m a y  d is t in g u ish  th r e e  s i tua tions .  
S o m e  in s ta n c e s  of d e v ia t io n  a re  offic ia lly  reco g n ize d  a n d  a p ­
p ro v ed :  t h e  in s t i tu t io n  of t h e  j u r y  is th e  m o s t  p r o m in e n t  e x ­
a m p le ;80 th e  d ispos i t ion  of o f fe n d e rs  is a n o th e r .87 O th e r  fo rm s  
a r e  to le r a te d  w i th  g r e a t e r  a m b iv a le n c e .  N o rm s  a lo n e  do n o t
g o v e rn  th e  dec is ion  by  p r iv a te  in d iv id u a ls ,  o r  b y  th e  g o v e rn ­
m e n t ,  to a s se r t  a c la im ,88 o r  to  choose a p a r t i c u la r  fo ru m , 
d e sp i te  t h e  occasional p ro te s ta t io n s  of p ro se c u to rs  t h a t  th e y  
p u r s u e  e v e ry  in f ra c t io n .80 If  th e  d i s p u ta n ts  avo id  a c o u r t  — a n d  
th e  v a s t  m a jo r i ty  do —  th e r e  m a y  be l i t t le  p r e te n s e  of a d h e r in g  
to  th e  ju d ic ia l  m odel.  E v e n  if th e y  in i t ia te  lega l  p roceed ings ,  
t h e  d e f in i t io n  of t h e  c la im  an d  its  l a t e r  m o d if ic a t io n  d u r in g  
p r e - t r i a l  n e g o t ia t io n  o r  p lea  b a rg a in in g  m a y  n o t  be  e x p l ic a b le  
in  t e rm s  of th e  n o rm s  o ffic ia lly  p ro c la im e d ;  a n d  m a n y  d is ­
p u t a n t s  re a c h  a n  a g re e m e n t  a t  th is  s ta g e  w i th  th e  acqu iescence ,  
in d e e d  e n c o u ra g e m e n t ,  of th e  c o u r t .00 T he  o u tco m e  of th e  d is ­
p u t e  p rocess  is i tse lf  a c o m p le x  p ro d u c t  of b o th  n o rm a t iv e  a n d  
n o n - n o rm a t iv e  fac to rs , a  p r o d u c t  w e  h a v e  r e c e n t ly  b e e n  h e lp e d  
to  u n d e r s t a n d  b y  th e  in v e s t ig a t io n s  of po lit ica l  sc ien t is ts  in to  
ju d ic ia l  b a c k g ro u n d  a n d  ideo logy .01 F in a lly ,  som e fac to rs  co n ­
t i n u e  to  in t r u d e  in  sp i te  of th e  e ffo r ts  to e x t i r p a t e  th e m  o r  
d e n y  th e i r  p re se n c e ,0* e.g., c o rru p t io n , '^  a n d  in e q u a l i t ie s  a m o n g  
d i s p u ta n ts .04
T h e  sec t io n  n o w  c o n c h y  is o f fe red  as a ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r
t r e a t i n g  th e  s ign if icance  of offic ia l n o rm s  w i th in  th e  d isp u te  
p ro ce s s  as a v a r ia b le ,  o r  r a t h e r  a n u m b e r  of v a r iab le s .  This  
is a  dec is ion  of no  m e a n  im p o r ta n c e ,  fo r  on i t  re s ts  th e  pos­
s ib i l i ty  of a socia l th e o ry  of law  d is t in c t  f ro m  lega l  th e o ry  or  
j u r i s p r u d e n c e  (c/. A u b e r t ,  1969a: 10). In  a t t e m p t in g  to  co n ­
s t r u c t  social th e o r ie s  a b o u t  d isp u te s  I w ish  to e m p h a s ize  t h a t  
I a m  n o t  d ism iss in g  lega l  th e o ry  as e i th e r  su p e r f lu o u s  o r  s u p e r ­
fic ial, n o r  a m  I a rg u in g  fo r  som e fo rm  of sociological red u c -  
t i o n i s m 05 A s I h a v e  t r i e d  to sh o w  above, th e  a p p a re n t  c o n t r a ­
d ic t io n  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  a p p ro a c h e s  is an  o u tg ro w th  of id e ­
o log ica lly  b iased  m is u n d e r s ta n d in g  of th e  a c tu a l  cou rse  of d is­
p u te s .  I f  lega l  sch o la rs  p e rs is t  in  m a in ta in in g  t h a t  th e y  p ro v id e  
a c o m p le te  e x p la n a t io n  of “ le g a l” d isp u te s  w h e n  th e y  e x p lic a te  
th e  offic ia l  n o rm s  invo lved , th e n  an y  a t t e m p t  by  social sc ie n ­
t is ts  to  o f fe r  a n o th e r  e x p la n a t io n  w il l  be seen  as th r e a te n in g  
a n d  i l l e g i t im a te .00 I t  fo llow s t h a t  th e  on ly  possib le  a c c o m m o d a ­
t io n  b e tw e e n  th e m  is th e  r e c o g n i t io n  of a ca te g o ry  of n o n - lega l  
d isp u te s .  B u t  th e  tw o  d isc ip lines  c a n  c o o p e ra te  f a r  m o re  f r u i t ­
fu l ly  i f  th e y  w il l  a g re e  t h a t  n o rm s  a re  a s ig n if ic a n t  fa c to r  
a f fe c t in g  th e  cou rse  of d isp u te s  b u t  r a re ly ,  if ever ,  th e  e x ­
c lu s iv e  one. B y  no m ea n s  do I w ish  to m in im ize  th e  im p o r ta n c e
of th e  u n iv e r s e  of n o rm s:  i t  m a y  q u ic k ly  fo rec lose  th e  ou tcom e  
of m a n y  d ispu te s ,  a n d  d e f in e  th e  b o u n d a r ie s  of w h a t  c an  be 
a rg u e d  in  o th e rs .  Y e t  in  a ll  d isp u te s  t h e r e  is a g r e a t  d ea l  of 
b e h a v io r  w h ic h  n o rm s  do n o t  e x p la in " 7 —  a re a s  w h e r e  th e  n o rm s  
do n o t  speak , w h e re  th e y  a re  s u ff ic ie n t ly  f le x ib le  o r  in c o n ­
s is te n t  to  a l lo w  f re e d o m  of ac tion , o r  w h e r e  th e y  a re  o v e r r id d e n  
by m o re  p o w e r fu l  forces. O n ly  a com pos i te  of n o rm s  a n d  o th e r  
social fac to rs  c a n  a d e q u a te ly  p o r t r a y  th e  c o m p le x i ty  of be­
h a v io r  in  d ispu tes .
III. THE FORM OF SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW
A. Construction of Ideal Types
Social sc ience  has long  b e e n  d isc o n te n t  to s top  a t  th e  m e re  
d esc r ip t io n  of v a r ie ty ,  c la ss ify ing  p h e n o m e n a  a c co rd in g  to som e 
a r b i t r a r i ly  se lec ted  c o m m o n  t r a i t  (see, e.g., N ad e r ,  1969c: 99; - 
Leach, 1961: 3; Southall, 1965). O ne  m ea n s  of a d v a n c in g  o u r ’ 
u n d e r s t a n d in g  bey o n d  th is  po in t  is th e  c o n s tru c t io n  of a n  idea l  
type , w h ic h  W e b er  h a s  d e f in e d  as:
the  one-sided  accentuation  of one o r m ore points of view and 
. . .  the  syn thesis  of a g reat m any diffuse, d iscrete , m ore or less 
p re ren t and  occasionally ab sen t concrete  individual  phenom ena, 
w hich are  arranged  according to those one-sided ly  em phasized 
v iew points in to  a un ified  analy tic  co nstruc t (1968: 497; see gener­
ally  S chw eitzer, 1970).
I h a v e  a l r e a d y  a d v e r te d  to s e v e ra l  idea l  ty p es  of d ispu te :  th e  
d ich o to m y  of legal a n d  po li t ica l  w as  e x p l ic i t ly  s ta te d  in  th is  
fo rm , b u t  m o s t  of th e  o th e r  p ro cessu a l  v a r ia b le s  id en t if ie d  
above  w e re  a lso e x t r a c t e d  f ro m  a typo log ica l  c o n s tru c t .  T h u s  
w e  f in d  r e p e a te d  r e f e re n c e s  in th e  l i t e r a tu r e  to  opposit ions  
such  as: m e d ia to r  a n d  a d ju d ic a to r  (Eckhoff ,  1969; see also 
A u b e r t ,  q u o te d  in N a d e r ,  1969c: 87); lega l  a n d  sc ien tif ic  deci- 
sion-makir\g (A u b e r t ,  1963b); r e p re s s iv e  a n d  r e s t i tu t iv e  la w  ' 
(D u rk h e im , 1947); a d ju d ic a t io n ,  n e g o tia t io n  a n d  e lec tion  (F u l ­
le r ,  n .d .) ;  a n c ie n t  (M aine , 1950), o r  p r im i t iv e  (R adc liffe -B row n , 
1933a; see also R ed fie ld ,  1964; D iam ond , 1971, an d  e a r l ie r  w r i t ­
ings c i ted  th e r e in ) ,  or  t r ib a l  (G lu ck m a n , 1965a, 1965b; see also 
S ch a p e ra ,  1956; C ar ls ton , 1968), or A fr ic a n  (A llo tt,  I960; see also 
Elias, 1956; D r ib e rg ,  1934), or In d ia n  (Cohn, 1967; see also 
G a la n te r ,  1963), o r  J a p a n e s e  law  (K a w a sh im a ,  1963) on th e  one  
h a n d  — an d  m o d ern ,  o r  w e s te rn ,  o r  A n g lo -A m er ica n  law  on th e  
o ther .  A n d  of cou rse  W e b e r  h im se lf  d ev e lo p ed  a typo logy  of
ju s t ic e  w h ic h  is f r e q u e n t ly  im i ta te d  (1954: Ch. 4). S e v e ra l  fac ­
to rs  m a y  e x p la in  th is  p red i lec t io n  for i d e a l - ty p ic a l  th in k in g :  
re s id u a l  e th n o c e n tr i sm ,  a p r e d o m in a te ly  p ra g m a tic  o r  e th ic a l  
concern  co n jo in e d  w i th  th e o re t ic a l  im m a tu r i ty ,  o r  th e  u n a v a i l ­
a b i l i ty  of d a ta  w h ic h  w o u ld  be r e q u i r e d  to  te s t  h y po theses .
N e v e r th e le ss ,  i t  is n e c es sa ry  to ask  w h e th e r  th is  a p p ro a c h  
is th e  bes t  m e a n s  of p ro ce e d in g  a t  th e  p re s e n t  t im e. T he  a n w e r ,  
as a lw ays,  d e p e n d s  u p o n  w h e r e  w e  w a n t  to go. W e b e r  a rgues :
T his p rocedu re  can be ind ispensable for heu ristic  as- w ell as ex­
pository purposes. T he  ideal typical concept w ill help  tc develop 
our sk ill in im pu ta tion  in research: it is no "hypo thesis" but it 
offers guidance to t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f
hypotheses. It is
not a doscriytion  of reality but it titms to give an unam biguous 
means of expression to such a description (1908: 497).
W e h a v e  co n fi rm ed  th is  c la im  by  e x t r a c t in g  f rom  th e  idea l  
ty p es  of o th e r s  a  n u m b e r  of s ign if ican t va r ia b le s ,  a n d  poss ib le  
l in k a g e s  a m o n g  them. B u t  th is  m o d e  of thinking m a y  h a v e  
se rious  d ra w b a c k s .0" W e b e r  w as  ab le  to  m ob il ize  a v a s t  n u m b e r  
of h ig h ly  d iv e rse  p h e n o m e n a  in c o n s tru c t in g  his typo logy ;  a 
less e ru d i te  th e o r is t  m a y  re ly  upon  th e  few  socie ties  of w h ich  
h e  has  p e rso n a l  e x p e r ie n c e ,1,11 or u p o n  in a c c u ra te  desc r ip tio n s  
m o re  or less r a n d o m ly  chosen  f rom  l im ite d  r e a d in g  or  e x p e r i ­
e n c e .100 The q u a li t ie s  d e f in in g  th e  type ,  be ing  lu m p e d  to g e th e r ,  
a re  imprecisely specified . D icho tom ies  a re  com m on , a lm o s t  u n i ­
v e rsa l ,  in  s h a rp  c o n tra s t  to th e  m u lt ip l ic i ty  of ty p es  w h ich  
W e b e r  u s u a l ly  offered . T he  pa irs  of v a r ia b le s  on w h ic h  th e y  
a re  based  m a y  n o t  lie on  th e  sa m e  scale, or m a y  fail  to r e p r e ­
s e n t  th e  ex trem es  of th a t  scale, a n d  c e r ta in  p a ra m e te r s  m ay  
possess only a s ing le  value . W h a t  e m e rg e s  is no t  an  idea l  ty p e  
b u t  a s te re o ty p e  w h ich , f a r  f rom  in s t ru c t in g  th e  eye  of the  
ob se rv e r ,  b l in d s  h im  to d a ta  no t en c o m p a ssed  by  th e  ty p e ,  an d  
also  to th e  poss ib i li ty  of o th e r  types .
P e r h a p s  m y  c r i t ic ism s  r e d u c e  to a fe a r  th a t  w e  k n o w  too 
l i t t le  a b o u t  re la t io n s h ip s  a m o n g  th e  q u a l i t ie s  of d isp u te s  to 
b eg in  g r o u p in g  th e m  in th is  fash ion . L e t  m e  use L a u ra  N a d e r ’s 
r e c e n t  ty p o lo g y  to  i l lu s t r a t e  w h a t ,  to m e, is th e  a rb i t r a r in e s s  
of th e  c o n ju n c t io n ;  th e  e x a m p le  is chosen  w i th  d e l ib e ra te  u n ­
fa irness , fo r  h e rs  is s u re ly  one  of th e  m o st  f ru i t fu l  concep ts  
in  th e  l i t e r a tu r e . '01 N a d e r  f inds  a s ty le  of c o u r t  p ro c e d u re  a m o n g  
th e  Z apo tec  w h ic h  re se m b le s  t h a t  of socie ties  o th e rw is e  dis-
s im i la r  in  in s t i tu t io n a l  f r a m e w o rk  a n d  g e n e ra l  po l i t ica l  a n d  
econom ic  cond it ions .
The sim ila rity  is p rin c ip a lly  in the value placed on the mini­
max principle, ra th e r  than on the zerMum game. From this prin­
cip le  follow s a de-em phasis  on estab lish ing  past fact; a prc-spect- 
ive ly  o rien ted  reasoning; and  the use of proceedings as a techni­
q u e  for expression  and for find ing  out what the trouble really is 
before  reach ing  a se ttlem en t, even though this may b e . . .  an 
agreement to avoid a decision (1969c: 88).
T he  e le m e n ts  of th is  ty p o lo g y  m a y  b e  p a ra p h r a s e d  as; 1) mini­
m a x  vs. ze ro -su m ; 2) p ro sp e c t iv e  r ea so n in g  vs. e m p h a s is  u pon  
p a s t  fac t ;  3) b ro a d  d e f in i t io n  of th e  d isp u te  vs. focus u p o n  n a r ­
ro w , s u p e rf ic ia l  issues; 4) s e t t le m e n t  by  a g re e d  co m p ro m ise  vs, 
u n i l a t e r a l  decision. A re  th e se  tw o  s ty le s  so fu n d a m e n ta l ,  a n d  
m u tu a l ly  exc lu s ive ,  t h a t  w e  can  u se fu l ly  c lass ify  d isp u te  p ro c ­
esses  a c c o rd in g  to w h e th e r  th ey  re s e m b le  one o r  th e  o th e r?  
I t h in k  n o t .1"2 No reason is o f fe red  by N a d e r  fo r  h e r  a s se r t io n  
t h a t  t h e  c o m b in a t io n  is a  s ig n if ican t  one, as ide  f ro m  its  e m ­
p i r ic a l  o c c u rre n ce  in  a v a r i e ty  of societies. Y e t it  is n o t  d if f icu l t  
to  c i te  e x a m p le s  of o th e r  d isp u te s  w h ich  m ig h t  w e ll  a d h e re  
to t h e  “Z a p o tec ” s ty le  in m o s t  respec ts ,  b u t  d e v ia te  f ro m  i t  in  
one  p a r t ic u la r :  1) c o m p e t i to rs  d i sp u t in g  ove r  som e in d iv is ib le  
eco n o m ic  good, for in s ta n c e  a l iq u o r  license, w o u ld  s t i l l  be  
e n g a g e d  in  a z e ro -su m  g am e; 2) a p a r e n t  in te r v e n in g  in  a q u a r ­
r e l  b e tw e e n  h is  c h i ld re n  m ig h t  choose to e m p h a s ize  p a s t  b e ­
h a v io r  a n d  it;; d iv e rg e n c e  f ro m  n o rm s  in  o rd e r  to in te rn a l iz e  
th o se  n o rm s ;  3) a m a r r i e d  co u p le  q u a r r e l in g  o v e r  a m in o r  
i r r i t a n t 'w i l l  o f te n  s c ru p u lo u s ly  avo id  a ll  th e  d e e p e r  is su e s ;103 
4) a  p a ro le  b o a rd  co n s id e r in g  w h e th e r  to re lease  a p r is o n e r  
c e r t a in ly  r e n d e r s  a u n i la te r a l  dec is ion .1"1 Indeed , i t  is h a r d  to 
b e l ie v e  t h a t  s im i la r  d e p a r tu re s  f ro m  th e  “Z a p o tec ” s ty le  cou ld  
n o t  be  fo u n d  in  th e  Z apo tec  c o u r ts  t h e m s e l v e s / 0**
O n e  re sp o n se  to  th e  d isc o v e ry  of such  d isc o rd a n t  d a ta  
m ig h t  be to  multiply th e  n u m b e r  of idea l  ty p e s .1 (m This  is c le a r ly  
4 p rocess  w i th o u t  end, a n d  w o u ld  d e p r iv e  th e  typ o lo g y  of w h a t r  
e v e r  h e u r i s t i c  value i t  possessed. A n  a l te rn a t iv e  m ig h t  be  to  
r e f in e  th e  construct; b u t  th e  ty p o lo g is ts  o ffe r  no c r i te r ia  by  
w h ic h  w e m ig h t  choose a m o n g  p o te n t ia l  in g re d ien ts .  I p r e f e r  to 
p ro c e e d  d i f f e r e n t ly  a n d  reso lv e  each  p ro p o se d  ty p e  in to  its  
c o n s t i tu e n t  variables, w h ic h  c a n  th e n  fo rm  th e  in g re d ie n ts  fo r  
a d i f f e r e n t  kind of g e n e ra l iz a t io n .107
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B. C o rre la t io n  of V a r ia b le s
A n o th e r  m e a n s  o f  e x p la in in g  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of th e  d is ­
p u te  p rocess  is to  look  fo r  r e g u la r  c o n ju n c t io n s  w i th  o th e r  
social v a r iab le s .  T hese  w il l  be  of th e  g e n e ra l  fo rm  “if x, th e n  
y ,” w h e r e  y , t h e  d e p e n d e n t  va r ia b le ,  is t h e  q u a l i ty  of th e  d is­
p u te  p rocess  to  b e  e x p la in ed .  In  o rd e r  to n a r r o w  th e  in d e ­
p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le s  to a n u m b e r  t h a t  can rea l is t ic a l ly  be  e x ­
p lo re d ,1"* I w il l  ag a in  e m p lo y  th e  c r i t e r ia  invoked earlier; 
m e a n i n g f u l n e s s ,  u n i v e r s a l i t y ,  a n d  continuity.
1. S e p a ra b i l i ty .  T h e  se lec tion  of one  v a r ia b le  im poses  u p o n
th e  o th e r  an  a d d it io n a l  c o n s t r a in t  of in d e p e n d e n c e  o r  s e p a r a ­
b i l i ty .1"" I h a v e  s o u g h t  to  sa tis fy  th is  r e q u i r e m e n t  b y  choosing  
m y  in d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le s  f ro m  a m o n g  th e  s t r u c tu r a l  c h a ra c ­
te r is t ic s  of th e  d ispu te ,  as c o n t r a s te d  w i th  th e  p rocess  itse lf :  
th e  e n v i r o n m e n t  in  w h ich  t h e  partic ipants  ac t  as  opposed  to 
w h a t  th e y  do. T h is  d is t in c t io n ,  h o w e v e r ,  is n o t  as c le a r  as one  
m ig h t  like. T ru e ,  e x t r e m e  e x a m p le s  p re s e n t  no p ro b le m : th e  
s e a t in g  a r r a n g e m e n t  of p a r t i c ip a n ts  d iscuss ing  a d isp u te  seem s 
c le a r ly  s t r u c tu r a l  w h e n  c o u n te rp o s e d  a g a in s t  th e  b r e a d th  of 
issues  v e n ti la te d .  W ith in  th e s e  c o n s tr a in t s  I w il l  r e v ie w  e x is t ­
in g  th eo r ie s  ab o u t  d isp u te s  fo r  su g g es t ions  of v a r ia b le s  t h a t  
m a y  p ro v e  s ign if ican t,  i.e., t h a t  m a y  be ca u sa l ly  l in k e d  to  th e  
d isp u te  process. N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  labe ls  a re  re la t iv e :  th e  sa m e  
p h y s ic a l  s r t in g  m ig h t  be  seen  as an  e v e n t  in  th e  d isp u te  p rocess  
w h e n  se t  a g a in s t  a b a c k g ro u n d  of th e  social r e la t io n s h ip s  w h ic h  
l in k e d  p a r t ic ip a n ts  b e fo re  th e  d isp u te  a rose ;  an d  th e  issues  
w h ic h  a re  a i r e d  cou ld  be  v ie w e d  as a  s t r u c tu r a l  d im en s io n  of 
t h e  d i s p u te  w h ic h  h e lp s  us to  p re d ic t  t h e  k in d  of ev id en ce  
o f fe red . B ecau se  of th is  r e la t iv i ty ,  th e  de s ig n a t io n s  becom e 
s o m e w h a t  a r b i t r a r y  w h e n  a f f ix e d  to  c o n tig u o u s  e le m e n ts  in 
t h e  d ispu te ,  w h e r e  s t r u c tu r e  a n d  p rocess  m erge . A re  th e  choice 
of a  fo ru m  and  th e  d e f in i t io n  of  th e  c la im  a s se r te d  tw o  v a r ia b le s  
w h ic h  c a n  m e a n in g fu l ly  be  c o rre la te d ,  o r  a s ing le  d a tu m  m e a s ­
u r a b le  in  tw o  w a y s?  T h is  is, of course , an  e m p ir ic a l  q u e s t io n  
w h ic h  is n o t  a n s w e re d  by  c a ll in g  one  s t r u c tu r a l  a n d  th e  o th e r  
p ro cessu a l .
S til l ,  th e  c a teg o rie s  m a y  h e lp  us to  e v a lu a te  a l t e rn a t iv e  
s t r a te g ie s  fo r  in q u iry .  As th e  v a r ia b le s  a p p ro a c h  each  o the r ,  
c o r re la t io n s  b e tw e e n  th e m  b eco m e  m o re  l ike ly , b u t  also m o re
co m m o n p lace ;  m o re o v e r ,  an  a s se r te d  c o rre la t io n  m a y  o f ten  t u r n  
o u t  to  b e  s im p ly  th e  d iscove ry  of id en t i ty .  C hoosing  v a r ia b le s  
w h ic h  a re  m o re  d iss im ila r  red u c e s  th e  p ro b a b i l i ty  of id e n t i ­
fy in g  s ig n if ican t  r e la t io n sh ip s ;  b u t  an y  such  f in d in g  w ill  be  
less  obvious, a n d  th u s  a  m o re  s u b s ta n t ia l  c o n tr ib u t io n  to  o u r  
k n o w led g e ,  if also less p rec ise  a n d  m o re  s u b j e c t s  excep tions .  
B ecau se  th e r e  is no a c ce p ted  c r i te r io n  fo r  d ec id in g  b e tw e e n  
th e s e  a l te rn a t iv e s ,  I w il l  cons ide r  v a r ia b le s  fa l l in g  e v e ry w h e r e  
a long  th e  s p e c t ru m  f ro m  s t r u c tu r e  to process, t r y in g  to m a k e  
e x p lic i t  ju s t  h o w  s e p a r a te  each  s t r u c tu r a l  q u a l i ty  is f ro m  th e  
p rocess  i t  p u r p o r t s  to  ex p la in .
2. G e n e ra l i ty .  S t ru c tu re  te l ls  us  th e  d ire c t io n  in w h ic h  
to  look; th e  n e x t  ques tion , th e re fo re ,  is w h a t  s t r u c tu r a l  e le­
m e n ts  to in v es t ig a te .  I a rg u e d  e a r l ie r  th a t  social in q u i ry  sh o u ld  
focus u p o n  d ispu te s  r a t h e r  th a n  law  because  of th e  g r e a te r  
u n iv e r s a l i ty  of th e  funner concep t;  the poss ib i l i ty  of f in d in g  
a r e f e re n t  in ? w id e  v a r i e ty  of societies, T h e  sa m e  c o n s id e ra ­
t ion  leads  me to r e je c t  a s t r u c tu r a l  u n i t  too closely  id e n t i f ie d  
wri th  a n y  actual in s t i tu t io n a l  f r a m e w o rk  for d isp u t in g .  S t r u c ­
tu ra l  concep ts  m o d e l led  upon  W e ste rn  no tio n s  o f  a c o u r t  in ­
e v i ta b ly  incorporate id io sync rac ie s  w h ic h  h in d e r  c o m par ison , 
fo r  e x a c t  c o u n te r p a r t s  can  r a r e ly  be fo u n d  in  a lien  societies. 
W ith in  o u r  o w n  society , indeed , excess ive  p reo c c u p a tio n  w i th  
t h e  peculiarities  of courts has long  d iv e r te d  lega l  scho la rs  f ro m  
the n u m e r o u s  non-judicial in s t i tu t io n s  w h ic h  dea l  w i th  th e  v a s t  
m a jo r i ty  of dispu tes .  N or  do th e  s t r u c tu r e s  of o th e r  socie ties  
o f fe r  a n y  b e t te r  p e rs p e c t iv e  fo r  c o m par ison ;  t h e r e  a re  ju s t  as 
m a n y  o b s tru c t iv e  s in g u la r i t ie s  in such  in s t i tu t io n s  as t h e  leo p ­
a r d  sk in  c h ie f  of th e  N u e r  (E v a n s -P r i tc h a rd ,  1940a: 152 ff.) , 
th e  tonow i  ( r ich  one) of th e  K a p a u k u  P a p u a n s  (Pospisil,  1958: 
79 ff.) ,  th e  g ro u p  of m batarev  ( l ineage  e lde rs )  of th e  T iv  (Bo- 
h a n n a n ,  1957: 11 ff), th e  m ku ta n o  (m ee tin g )  of th e  N d e n d e u l i  
(G u lliv e r ,  1971: Ch. 5), or th e  ku ta  (council)  of th e  Lozi (G luck- 
m an ,  1955: 9 ff ). When e ffo r ts  a r e  m a d e  to c o m p a re  su ch  d is ­
p a r a t e  s t ru c tu re s ,  one  o r  th e  o th e r  is u s u a l ly  d is to r te d  (v an  
Velsen , 1969). A n d  th e  a t t e m p t  to c o n s tru c t  a ‘‘n e u t r a l ” co n ­
c e p t  a t  a lev e l  of c o m p le x ity  su ff ic ien t  to a c c o u n t  fo r  th e  
h e te ro g e n e i ty  of a c tu a l  in s t i tu t io n s  in e v i ta b ly  fo u n d e rs  on ob­
jec t io n s  of in c o m p le te n e ss  a n d  a rb i t ra r in e s s ,  co llo q u ia l ly  p h ra s e d  
as: “ w i th  us, w e  do it  d i f f e re n t ly .”1™
IV . C H O IC E  O F  A N  E X P L A N A T O R Y  C O N C E PT :
T H E  R O L E  O F  T H E  IN T E R V E N E R
A. T h e  C o n c e p t  of R o le
M a n y  of th e s e  p ro b le m s  d im in ish  o r  d is a p p e a r  if, fo r  law , 
w e  s u b s t i tu te  d isp u te  a n d  c o n s id e r  th e  s t r u c tu r a l  c o m p o n e n ts  
of tha t  p rocess  r a t h e r  th a n  th e  social a r c h i te c tu r e  of p a r t i c u la r  
co u r t - l ik e  in s t i tu t io n s .  M y d e f in i t io n  of a d isp u te  as “ th e  as ­
s e r t io n  of co n f l ic t in g  c la im s  b y  tw o  or m o re  in d iv id u a ls ” p r e ­
su p poses  a  m in im u m  of tw o  s t r u c tu r a l  un i ts :  a p e rs o n  a s se r t in g  
a c la im  a n d  a n o th e r  a s se r t in g  a c on f l ic t ing  c la im . T h ese  u n i ts  
a re  c o n v e n ie n t ly  d esc r ibed  in  te rm s  of th e  co n cep t  of role. 
A m o n g  th e  n u m e r o u s  d e f in i t io n s  w h ich  sociologists  h a v e  as ­
s igned  to  t h a t  c o n c e p t , '11 m a n y  ag ree  in  co n jo in in g  c h a r a c te r ­
istics  of th e  p e rso n  o ccu p y in g  th e  ro le  w i th  n o r m a t iv e  e x p e c ­
ta t io n s  a b o u t  "he b e h a v io r  in  w h ic h  he  w ill  e n g a g e  (B iddle  
a n d  T hom as, 1966: 29-30) The ro le  of p a r t i c ip a n t  is th u s  i tse lf  
a co m p o s i te  of s t r u c tu r e  and  process, n ice ly  e x p re s s in g  th e  
r e l a t iv i ty  of those tw o p e rsp e c t iv e s  upon  b e hav io r ,  w h ic h  I 
d iscussed  above.
1. D e sc r ip t io n  an d  p re sc r ip t io n .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  t h e r e  a r e
numerous ambiguities l a t e n t  in th e  concep t  of role, tw o  of 
w h ic h  I must clarify a t  t h e  ou tse t .  B e h a v io r  m a y  be c lass if ied  
in  many ways: I w il l  do  so in  te rm s  of process, a n d  sp e ak  of 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in t h e  d isp u te  process. Roles w il l  be  f u r t h e r  p a r ­
titioned by function w ith in  t h a t  process, e.g., a s se r t in g  a c la im , 
o r  listening to an  assertion. M ore  c r i t ica l  fo r  th e  p re s e n t  s tu d y  is 
th e  possibility of c on fus ion  b e tw e e n  d e sc r ip t io n  a n d  p re s c r ip ­
t io n  The concept of ro le  can  re f e r  e i th e r  to o b s e rv a b le  c h a r ­
a c te r is t ic s  of p e rs o n  o r  b eh av io r ,  o r  to social p re sc r ip t io n s  co n ­
cerning those c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  Th is  a m b ig u i ty  e q u a l ly  a ff l ic ts  
m y  definition of th e  d isp u te  process, w h ic h  m a y  b e  s tu d ie d  in 
terms of e i t h e r  th e  ac tions  of p a r t ic ip a n ts  or th e  p re sc r ip t io n s  
for action These e le m e n ts  d iv e rg e  in all societies, b u t  t h e  
sch ism  is especially m a r k e d  in C o lon ia l  an d  pos t-co lon ia l  s i tu a ­
tions  fo r  a n u m b e r  of reasons:  th e  rad ic a l  t r a n s fo r m a t io n  of 
b e h a v io ra l  patterns u n d e r  th e  im p a c t  of c h a n g e d  social, eco­
nom ic  a n d  po lit ica l  cond it ions ;  th e  in t ro d u c t io n  or in te n s if ic a ­
t ion  of n o rm a t iv e  p lu ra l is m  r e s u l t in g  f rom  su p e r im p o s i t io n  u p o n  
indigenous norms of a l te rn a t iv e s  p ro m o te d  by  th e  co lon ia l  ad-
m in is t r a t io n ,  th e  m is s io n a ry  chu rches ,  a n d  th e  s e t t le r  p o p u la ­
tion ; a n d  th e  in c o rp o ra t io n  of som e of th ese  a l ien  n o rm s  in to  
th e  legal sys tem . F u r th e r m o r e ,  because  d isp u te s  r e p r e s e n t  a 
f u n d a m e n ta l  p ro b le m  fo r  social o rder ,  and  th e re fo re  occupy  
such  a c e n t r a l  pos it ion  in  a ll legal sys tem s, th e y  a re  c o m m o n ly  
th e  s u b je c t  of ^ t e n s i v e ,  exp lic i t ,  offic ia l p re sc r ip t io n s  c o n c e rn ­
in g  bo th  s t r u c tu r e  a n d  process. B u t  a l th o u g h  th ese  d u a l  p e r ­
spec t ives  of d e sc r ip t io n  a n d  p re s c r ip t io n  a re  f r e q u e n t ly  no ted , 
in te r e s t  in th e i r  in te r re la t io n s h ip  h as  b e e n  d i re c te d  a lm o s t  e x ­
c lu s ive ly  to w a rd s  a s c e r ta in in g  th e  cond it ions  u n d e r  w h ic h  p r e ­
sc r ip t io n  is fo llow ed  by  action. T h u s  w r i te r s  h a v e  asked : w h e n  
is a law  effec tive ,  a n d  w h e n  n u ll i f ied ;  w h a t  a re  th e  p r e r e q u i ­
s ites  fo r  the  p e n e t r a t io n  of a lega l  sy s tem , a n d  w h a t  de fec ts  
w il l  re leg  te  th a t  sy s tem  to m e re  fo rm a lism ?  (See, e.g., ma­
te r ia ls  c o n ta in e d  in F r ie d m a n  a n d  M acau lay , 1969: Ch. 3.) O ne  
r e a s o n  we ssed  so l i t t l e  b e y o n d  the platitudinous
o b se rv a t io n  of inefle'. l ive  ness m ay  bi >ar fa i lu re  to in v es t ig a te  
o th e r  { anft act. P re sc r ip t io n  w h ic h  does no t  pro­
duce  th e  r e s u l t  p re s c r ib e d  m a y  y e t  lead  to o th e r  ac tions  or 
p re sc r ip t io n s :  r e n t  c o n tro l  leg is la t ion  passed  d u r in g  a h o u s in g  
s h o r ta g e  is n o t  “in e f fe c t iv e ,” ev en  th o u g h  re n ts  co n tin u e  to  
r ise , if a la n d lo rd  a l te r s  h is  b ehav io r ,  a t e n a n t  initiates legal 
ac tion , a ju d g e  dec ides  a case  d i f fe re n t ly ,  or a n y  pe rso n  invokes  
th e  n o rm  p ro c la im e d  by th e  s t a tu te  (Ball, 1960). A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  
th e  n o rm  m a y  be  c ited  as p re c e d e n t  — good or b a d  — for  an  
an a lo g o u s  n o rm , in o th e r  a t t e m p ts  to r e g u la te  the  e c o n o m y .n - 
A ction  m a y  lea d  to ac tion  (e.g., in c re a s in g  th e  sa la r ie s  of ju d g e s  
m a y  d im in ish  th e  t a k in g  of b r ib e s ) 11'' or  to p re s c r ip t io n  (e.g., 
a  ju d g e  chosen  f ro m  ou ts id e  th e  c o m m u n ity  h e  se rv e s  m ay  be 
r e a d ie r  to d e p a r t  f rom  its  n o rm s  in p ass ing  j u d g m e n t ) . 114 H a v ­
ing  l e a r n e d  n o t  to  e x p e c t  a one-to -one  c o rre la t io n  of th e se  e le ­
m e n ts ,  i t  seem s r e a so n a b le  to look in s te a d  for a m o re  com plex  
re la t io n s h ip  In  w h a t  follows, I w ill cons ide r  th e  in te ra c t io n  
a m o n g  th e  actual s truc ture  of d isputes , e.g., th e  p re se n c e  of a 
th i r d  p a r ty ;  prescriptions about structure, e.g., t h a t  t h e r e  sh o u ld  
be a s e p a ra t io n  b e tw e e n  a d m in is t r a t iv e  an d  ju d ic ia l  functions;  
prescriptions concerning process, e.g., t h a t  ev id en ce  sh o u ld  on ly  
be re c e iv e d  d u r in g  th e  fo rm a l  h e a r in g  of a d isp u te ;  a n d  th e  
actual process, e.g., t h a t  the  i n te r v e n e r  in fac t  b r in g s  to b e a r  
cons id e ra b le  p r io r  k n o w le d g e  of th e  d ispu te .  T h is  sh o u ld  no t
le a d  to m is u n d e r s ta n d in g  if w e  a re  c a re fu l  to specify  w h e th e r  
w e  a re  d iscuss ing  d e sc r ip t io n  o r  p re s c r ip t io n .110
2. T h e  e le m e n ta r y  s t r u c tu r e  of a d ispu te :  th e  ro le  of dis­
p u ta n t .  T h e  f ie ld  of i n q u i r y  d e m a r c a te d  b y  th e  c r i te r ia  chosen  
th u s  f a r  is s ti l l  m u c h  too la rg e  fo r  a  s ing le  s tu d y .  I can  bes t  
e x p la in  th e  a d d i t io n a l  l im ita t io n s  I h a v e  a d o p te d  by  m e a n s  of 
a d ia g r a m  of t h e  d isp u te  p rocess . T h e  s im p les t  s t ru c tu re ,  in 
t e r m s  of t h e  n u m b e r  of e le m e n ts ,  is one  in w h ic h  each  p a r ty  
p e r f o r m s  th e  ro le  of a u d ie n c e  fo r  th e  c la im s  of th e  o ther .
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H e re  th e  in v e s t ig a to r  is e f fe c t iv e ly  l im ite d  to s tu d y in g  th e  ro les
of th e  d isp u ta n ts ,  av j  t h e i r  r e la t io n  to each  o the r .  E v e n  in  th e  
p re s e n c e  of a  d is t inc t  a u d ie n c e  th e s e  a re  o bv iously  im p o r ta n t  
fac ts ,  a n d  a n u m b e r  of w r i t e r s  h a v e  p ro f i ta b ly  e x a m in e d  th em . 
G lu c k m a n  has  e m p h a s iz e d  th e  w a y  in  w h ic h  A fr ic a n  social 
s t r u c tu r e  p ro d u c e s  r e la t io n s h ip s  b e tw e e n  d i s p u ta n ts  d i f f e re n t  
in  k in d  f ro m  th o se  ty p ic a l  of E u ro p e a n  societies , a n d  th e  in ­
f lu e n c e  th i s  h a s  u p o n  th e  d i s p u te  p rocess  (1965b: 5). E v an s -  
P r i t c h a rd ,  in  h is  classic  s tu d y  of t h e  N u er ,  d e m o n s t r a te d  t h a t  
th e  s t r u c tu r a l  d is ta n c e  b e tw e e n  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s p u ta n ts  s ig n if i ­
c a n t ly  affe<$d th e  e v o lu t io n  of t h e i r  d isp u te  (1940a: 155; sec 
a lso Colson, 1953; M id d le to n ,  1960; N ade l ,  1942: Ch. 10; W inans ,  
1962: Ch. 6; G u ll iv e r ,  1963: Ch. 10; Collier, 1973). M ore  rec e n tly ,  
D o n a ld  B lack  h a s  s h o w n  th e  a p p l ic a b i l i ty  of th is  h y p o th e s is  to 
th e  dec is ion  b y  u r b a n  A m e r ic a n s  to  in v o k e  police  in te r v e n t io n  
in  t h e i r  p r iv a t e  q u a r r e l s  (1971). A n d  P h i l ip  G u l l iv e r  has  e x ­
p lo re d  th e  u n iq u e  h is to r ic a l '  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  d i s p u ta n ts  as 
a n  a id fb  u n d e r s t a n d in g  th e  d i s p u te  p rocess  Cl969b: 60).
3. A  m o re  co m p le x  d isp u te  s t r u c tu r e :  th e  ro le  of i n t e r ­
v e n e r .  A l th o u g h  th is  v e r y  f r u i t f u l  ap p ro a c h  sh o u ld  c e r ta in ly  
b e  p u r s u e d  f u r th e r ,  I w i l l  n o t  do so h e re .117 In s te a d ,  I w i l l  
e x a m in e  a spec ia l  in s ta n c e  of th e  d isp u te  process , w h ic h  can  
b e  d ia g ra m m e d  as fo llow s:
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T h e  a d d it io n a l  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w h ic h  d e f in e  th is  s i tu a t io n  a re :
a n  a u d ie n c e  foi the c a irns, o th e r  t h a n  th e  p a r t ie s  th em se lv e s ,  
w h o  hear.,  th e i r  c la im s, a n d  w h o  in te rv e n e s  in  th e  d isp u te  in  
som e m a n n e r .1; T h e se  l im ita t io n s  r e p r e s e n t  a s o m e w h a t  a rb i ­
t r a r y  c i r c u m s c r ip t io n  of a  b ro a d e r  f ie ld  fo r  p u rp o se s  o f  th e  
p r e s e n t  i n q u i r y  I do cot c 'a im  to h a v e  d e f in ed  a s ig n if ic a n t  ty p e  
of d ispu te ,  m u c h  less on e  w h ic h  is d is t in c t iv e ly  jud ic ia l .  N e v e r ­
the less ,  th e  s t r u c tu r e  th u s  d e l im i te d  seem s  to  m e  w o r th y  of 
a na lys is :  d i s p u ta n ts  c o m m o n ly  do b r in g  t h e i r  c la im s  to  a n o th e r  
pe rson , a n d  his re sp o n se  is r a r e ly  e n t i r e ly  p a s s iv e .110 W ith in  
th is  d isp u te  s t r u c tu re ,  I w il l  c o n c e n t ra te  upon  th e  ro le  of “in ­
t e r v e n e r  in the d isp u te .” I h a v e  d e l ib e ra te ly  a d o p te d  t h a t  u g ly  
neo log ism  b e c au se  it is f re e  of th e  c o n n o ta t io n s  w h ic h  a t t a c h  
to such  alternatives as ju d g e ,  m ed ia to r ,  o r  d isp u te  se t t le r ;  
w h e r e  those additional m e a n in g s  a re  a p p ro p r ia te ,  I w i l l  r e v e r t  
to  th e  m o re  com m on  te rm in o lo g y .  M y choice of th e  ro le  of in ­
t e r v e n e r  w a s  in f lu e n c e d  by  a d d i t io n a l  co n s id e ra t io n s  w h ic h  
s h o u ld  be  m a d e  exp lic it .  B ecause  so m a n y  d isp u te s  invo lve  
su ch  a ro le , i t  o ffe rs  a  co m m o n  d e n o m in a to r  fo r  co m p a r iso n  
b e tw e e n  g o v e rn m e n ta l  c o u r ts  a n d  uno ffic ia l  d isp u te  i n s t i tu ­
tions. T h e  in te r v e n e r  is, m o re o v e r ,  an  a p p ro p r ia te  fu lc ru m  fo r  
th o se  in trumentally i n te r e s te d  in  social ch a n g e ;  s ince t h e  ro le  
is p la y e d  by a l im ite d  se t  of p e rso n s  u n d e r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  of 
r e la t iv e  pu b l ic i ty ,  it  is m o re  rea d i ly  c o n t r o l l e d , th a n  a re  th e  
ro le s  of d i s p u ta n t  or o th e r  p a r t i c ip a n t  in th e  d is p u te .120 F ina lly ,  
th e  h is to r ic a l  e v o lu t io n  of t h e  ro le  o ffe rs  a f e r t i le  so u rc e  of 
e m p ir ic a l  d a ta  s ince  m a n y  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s ,  an d  e spec ia l ly  
K e n y a ,  rec o g n ize d  its  m u ta b i l i ty  as w e ll  as its  focal pos it ion  in 
t h e  lega l  process , a n d  d e v o te d  co n s id e rab le  e n e rg y  to t r a n s ­
fo rm in g  th e  in d ig e n o u s  in te r v e n e r  in to  a s e m b la n ce  of th e  
E u ro p e a n  ju d g e .121
B. P a r a m e te r s  for th e  Role  of Intervener.
J u s t  as th e  m in im a l  d e f in i t io n  a ss igned  to th e  d isp u te  
p rocess  r e q u i r e d  us  to deve lop  v a r ia b le s  b y  w h ic h  to d esc r ib e  
its  p ro te a n  fo rm s, so w e  m u s t  se lec t  p a ra m e te r s  w i th  w h ic h  to 
a n a ly z e  th e  ro le  of in te rv e n e r .  A ga in  I w ill  r e v ie w  th e  l i t e r a ­
tu re ,  th o u g h  m o re  se lec tive ly , for sugges t ions  of s t r u c tu r a l  
v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  m ay  h e lp  to  e x p la in  th e  d isp u te  process.
1. A u th o r i ty .  As w e  saw  in  th e  d is t in c t io n s  d r a w n  above  
b e tw e e n  lega l  a n d  po li t ica l  process, a u th o r i ty  is o f te n  iso la ted  as 
a c r i t ic a l  causa l  fac to r.  F a l le r s  has  a rg u e d :  “ th e r e  a p p e a rs  to 
be a q u i te  c le a r  c o rre la t io n  b e tw e e n  th e  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th e
b ench , in  t e r m s  of a u th o r i ty ,  and  th e  lega lism  of t h e  p ro ce e d ­
ings . . .” 0 6 6 9 :  329). W ith o u t  in q u ir in g  h e re  ju s t  w h a t  F a l le r s  
m e a n s  by iegalism , it is easily  reco g n izab le  as a p rocessua l  
v a r ia b le  w h ic h  he re la te s  to th e  s t r u c tu r a l  e le m e n t  of “ re sp e c t  
a n d  a u th o r i t y ” (1969; 328). A l th o u g h  th e  l a t t e r  no t ion  is n e v e r  
e x p lic i t ly  defined , i ts  c o n te n t  is su g g es ted  by F a l le r s ’ c o m p a r i ­
son  of s e v e ra l  A fr ican  legal sys tem s, a r r a n g e d  in o rd e r  of i n ­
c re a s in g  legalism . A m o n g  th e  A ru sh a ,  those  p e rso n s  w h o  in ­
t e r v e n e d  in  a d isp u te  possessed  in f lu e n ce  by  rea so n  of th e i r  
p e rs o n a l  q u a l i t ie s  a lone, b u t  lacked  in s t i tu t io n a l iz e d  a u th o r i ty .  
T h e  only  o th e r  p re s s u re  upon  th e  d i sp u ta n ts  w as  d i s p e r s e d  
a m o n g  the  to ta l i ty  of p a r t ic ip a n ts  a n d  th u s  cou ld  on ly  be e f ­
fec t iv e  w h e re  th e r e  w as  a c lea r  consensus. In d ig e n o u s  T iv  
le a d e rs  possessed  po lit ica l  a u th o r i ty  by v i r tu e  of th e i r  pos it ions  
a t  t h e  ap ices  of th e  s e g m e n ta ry  l ineage  sy s tem ; th e  co lonia l 
g o v e rn m e n t  c o n fe r re d  ad d it io n a l  ju d ic ia l  re sp o n s ib il i t ie s  u p o n  
a  chosen  fe w  by  m a k in g  th e m  civil  s e rv a n t  chiefs. M e m b e rs  of 
t h e  lozi ku ta  also c o m b in e d  a d ju d ic a t io n  w i th  po l i t ica l  an d  a d ­
m in i s t r a t iv e  tasks , b u t  a ll th e se  p o w e rs  w e re  d e r iv e d  f ro m  th e  
t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i ty  a n d  m e re ly  recogn ized  by E u ro p e a n  a u th o r i ­
ties. Soga ju d g es  w h o  o th e rw is e  r e se m b le d  th e i r  Lozi c o u n ­
t e r p a r t s ,  w e re  b a r r e d  f ro m  po lit ica l  a c t iv i ty  u n d e r  co lonia l 
ru le .  I t  is possib le  to iso la te  se v era l  v a r ia b le s  of a u th o r i ty  by  
m e a n s  of these  c o n tra s ts :  i n f lu e n c e / a u th o r i t y  a t t a c h e d  to  an  
office; g ro u p  a u th o r i ty / in d iv id u a l  a u th o r i ty ;  a u th o r i ty  e n ­
d o g e n o u s  to a  s o c ie ty /a u th o r i ty  im posed  f ro m  ou ts ide ;  a u th o r i ty  
l im i te d  to d i s p u te s /a u th o r i ty  e x e r t e d  ove r  a b ro a d  r a n g e  of 
a c t iv i ty .
P o sp is i l  a lso e n d o w s  th e  t e r m  w i th  a m u l t ip l ic i ty  of m ean in g s .  
H e  no tes  t h a t  th e  a u th o r i ty  of an  in d iv id u a l ,  d e f in e d  as th e  
e x t e n t  to  w h ic h  o th e r s  fo llow  h is  decisions (1958: 260-61),m  
v a r ie s  in  n u m e r o u s  w ays ,  of w h ich  he  sing les  o u t  fo rm a l i ty  a n d  
a b s o lu te n e s s .1- 1 A u th o r i ty  is fo rm a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  in fo rm a l  if its  
exerc ise  is c i r c u m s c r ib e d  by  n o rm s  a n d  s u r ro u n d e d  by  c e re m o n y  
a n d  p u b l ic i ty .  A u th o r i ty  is l im ite d  r a t h e r  th a n  ab so lu te  if i t  is 
s h a re d  w i th  o thers ,  c o n tro l le d  by  society, a n d  if san c t io n s  are 
im p o se d  w h e n  i ts  l im its  a re  exceeded . T hese  a n a ly se s  a re  a 
f e r t i l e  sou rce  of ideas. B u t  th ey  sh o u ld  also tea c h  us th e  fo lly  
of t r y in g  to s u b s u m e  u n d e r  t h e  s ing le  concep t of a u th o r i ty  w h a t  
is in  fact a com pos te  of r a t h e r  h e te ro g e n e o u s  q u a l i t ie s  c h a r ­
a c te r iz in g  the structure of a  d isp u te ;  c la r i ty  w o u ld  be a d v a n c e d  
by  u s in g  distinct terms lo r  the d if f e re n t  v a r ia b le s  invo lved .
2. T ra in in g .  W e b e r  f o l lo w e d S  d i f f e re n t  tac k  e n t i r e ly ,  p e r ­
h a p s  becau se  he w as  a l a w y e r  r e f le c t in g  u p o n  lega l  sy s te m s  
w h ic h  all s e em e d  re la t iv e ly  a u th o r i ta t iv e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  a n ­
th ro p o lo g is t  s tu d y in g  those  of A fr ica  o r  O cean ia . H e  took  th e  
e x t r e m e  posit ion  t h a t  th e  n a tu r e  of legal n o rm s  an d  th e  m a n ­
n e r  in  w h ic h  th ey  a re  e m p lo y e d  a re  p r im a r i ly  d e te r m in e d  by  
t h e  t r a in in g  r e q u i r e d  of lega l  specia lis ts .
rA 1 body of law can be “ra tio n a lized ” in various w ays and by 
no means necessarily  in the  d irec tion  of the  developm en t of its 
“juristic” qualities. T he d irec tion  in w hich these form al qua lities 
develop is, however, conditioned  d irectly , by  “in tra ju ris tic ” 
conditions: the p a rtic u la r  ch arac ter of the  ind iv iduals w ho a re  
in  a position tc  in fluence “professionally” th e  w ays in  w hich the 
law  is shaped. O nly ind irec tly  is th is  developm ent influenced, 
however, by g enera l econom ic and social conditions. The p rev a il­
ing type of legal education, i.e., the m ode of tra in ing  of the  prac­
titioners of the  law , has been  m ore im p o rtan t th an  any  o ther factor 
(1954: 97).
T h e  s ign if icance  of t r a in in g  m ay  bes t  be  a p p re h e n d e d  in  s i tu a ­
t ions  w h e r e  it in f lu e n ce s  t h e  b e h a v io r  of th e  in te r v e n e r  r e ­
g a rd le s s  of th e  a m o u n t  of a u th o r i ty  he  possesses. W e b e r ’s own 
th e o ry  w as  u n d o u b te d ly  a f fe c te d  by th e  e x t r a o r d in a r y  d iffu s ion  
of “ leg a l is t ic” t h o u g h t  a m o n g  C o n t in e n ta l  legal scho la rs  of th e  
n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry ,  w h o  w e re  w h o l ly  iso la ted  f ro m  th e  d ire c t  
e x e rc ise  of dec is ional p o w e rs  (R he in s te in ,  1954: xliii  ff .) .  The  
h y p o th e s is  ga ins  f u r t h e r  s u p p o r t  f ro m  a c o n te m p o ra ry  e x a m p le  
— the  b e h a v io r  of persons  t r a in e d  in  a n o th e r  d isc ip line , w h o  
a re  t h e n  e le v a te d  to a position  of legal a u th o r i ty ,  l h e  decis ion
in  M ’N a g h te n ’s Case in  1843 r e q u i r e d  t h a t  t h e  in sa n i ty  of an  
accused, w h e n  ra ise d  as a de fen se  in  a c r im in a l  p ro secu tion , 
be d e te rm in e d  by  a ty p ic a l ly  d ich o to m o u s  legal ru le :  t h a t  th e  
accused  did, o r  d id  not, k n o w  th e  n a tu r e  a n d  q u a l i ty  of h is  
ac t;  t h a t  h e  did, o r  d id  not, k n o w  th a t  it w as  w rong . W ith  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  of p s y c h ia t r ic  k n o w le d g e  d u r in g  th e  p a s t  c e n tu ry  
a n d  its  g r a d u a l  a c ce p tan c e  b y  th e  c r im in a l  law , p sy c h ia t r i s ts  
h a v e  b e e n  a sked  fo r  op in ions  a b o u t  th e  in sa n i ty  of a n  accused  
w i th  in c re a s in g  f re q u e n c y ,  a n d  th e se  op in ions  h a v e  b e e n  ac ­
co rded  e v e r  g r e a te r  respec t.  T he  confl ic t  b e tw e e n  th e  p sy c h i ­
a tr ic  m ode  of a s se s sm e n t  — e m p lo y in g  a w ide  ra n g e  of v a g u e ly  
defined , h ig h ly  a b s tra c t ,  p a r t i a l ly  in c o n s is te n t  ca tego rie s  — 
a n d  the  legal ru le  > ■ • rne so a c u te  t h a t  a choice b e tw e e n  th e m  
w a s  inevit  'ole. B u t  m te a d  of judges r e je c t in g  p s y c h ia t r ic  a d ­
v ice  as in co m p a tib le  w i th  leg a l  rea son ing , p s y c h ia t r i s ts  h a d  
a c q u ire d  su c h  u u t h o n 'y  w i th in  t h e  a d ju d ic a t iv e  p rocess  t h a t  
t h e i r  e v a lu a t io n s  cam e  to  d o m in a te  th e  ju d ic ia l  determination 
of in sa n i ty  w i th o u t  s ig n if ican t  a c co m m o d a t io n  to the  c o n s tra in ts  
of th a t  p ro ce s s .1-’4 H ence  p s y c h ia t r ic  t ra in in g  b e t t e r  e x p la in s  
th e  p rocess  by  w h ic h  in sa n i ty  is dec ided  th a n  does th e  p re se n c e  
of legal a u th o r i ty .  H o w e v e r  p e rsu a s iv e  th is  i l lu s tra t io n ,  W e b er 's  
c la im  for th e  c e n t r a l i ty  of t r a in in g  sh o u ld  n o t  be a c cep ted  u n ­
c ri t ica lly .  M y o w n  o b se rv a t io n s  a b o u t  K e n y a  a g re e  w i th  F a l l e r s '  
r e p o r t  o r  U g a n d a  t h a t  th e  d isp u te  p rocess  can  a l te r  s ign if i ­
es  i tly  w i th o u t  th e  necess i ty  fo r  a n y  c h a n g e  in  th e  p re p a ra t io n  
r e q u i r e d  of th e  in te rv e n e r .  A n d  th e r e  is also a g re a t  dea l  of 
ev id e n c e  t h a t  t r a in in g  w i th o u t  m o re  fails to a l t e r  p e r fo rm a n c e .125
3. An alternative s t r u c tu r a l  concep t:  ro le  d i f fe re n t ia t io n .
The  d ra w b a c k s  id en t if ie d  in th e  u se  of th ese  tw o  concep ts  m ay  
s e rv e  to p o in t  u s  in a m o re  f ru i t f u l  d irec tion . Each , a l th o u g h  
in f lu e n c in g  p rocess  in s ig n if ic a n t  w ays , a p p e a rs  to p ro v id e  on ly  
a p a r t ia l  e x p la n a t io n  fo r  th e  e n d  re su l t ;  e ach  h in ts  a t  o th e r  
r e l a te d  concep ts ,  a n d  y e t  is n o t  b ro ad  e n o u g h  to in c o rp o ra te  
th em . I p ro p o se  as an  a l t e rn a t iv e  a s y n th e t ic  concep t — ro le  
d i f f e re n t ia t io n  — a n  u m b re l la  ca p ab le  of s h e l te r in g  a n u m b e r  
of d isc re te  va r ia b le s ,  in c lu d in g  b o th  a u th o r i ty  an d  t r a in in g .12,i 
C a th o lic i ty  in e v i ta b ly  c a r r ie s  a d a n g e r  of vagueness .  B u t  th is  
m u l t i f a c e te d  n a tu r e  is also w h a t  gives ro le  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  th e  
p o w e r  to a n a ly z e  h ig h ly  d i s p a ra te  socie ties  an d  y e t  to rec o g ­
n ize  com plex  an d  s u b t le  d i f fe re n c es  a m o n g  them . F o r  th is  r e a ­
son, th e  d e g re e  of ro le  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  h as  f r e q u e n t ly  b een  m ad e  
th e  foundation of o v e ra rc h in g  social typo log ies  in te n d e d  to  e x ­
p la in  a ll  fac e ts  of society, in c lu d in g  th e  d isp u te  p rocess .127
D u r k h e im ’s th e o ry  of th e  d iv is ion  of lab o r  is u n d o u b te d ly  
th e  bes t  k n o w n  e x a m p le  (1947). D u r k h e im  w a s  p r im a r i ly  con­
c e rn e d  to sh o w  h o w  th e  d iv is ion  of social roles* c o n se q u e n t  
u p o n  an  in c re ase  in  “ m o ra l  d e n s i ty ” a n d  p o p u la t io n  size, i n ­
e v i ta b ly  t r a n s m u te d  th e  c e m e n t  of social in te g ra t io n  f ro m  m e ­
ch a n ic a l  s o l id a r i ty  based  on  l ik en ess  in to  o rgan ic  s o l id a r i ty  
b a s e d  on c o m p le m e n ta r i ty  an d  coopera tion . T h e  social in d e x  
h e  u se d  to  c h a r t  t h e  p ro g re s s  of th is  t r a n s fo r m a t io n  w a s  th e  
r a t io  of r e p re s s iv e  to r e s t i tu t iv e  law . H e  fo u n d  occasion, th e re -  
fore , to c o m m e n t  b r ie f ly  o n  th e  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th e  o rg a n s  
w h ic h  a d m in is te re d  t h a t  law .
While repressive law tends to rem ain  diffuse within society,
re s titu tiv e  law c r a t e s  organs w hich a re  m ore and m ore spec­
ialized: consular trib u n a ls , councils of a rb itra tio n , adminstrative 
tr ib u n a ls  of ev e ry  sort. E ven in its  m ost general part, th a t which 
p e rta in s  to  civil law. it is exercised  only th ro u g h  particu la r func­
tionaries: m agistra tes, law yers, etc., w ho have becom e apt in 
th is  role because of v e ry  special tra in in g  (1947: 113).
T his  th e o r y  of d i f f e re n t ia t io n  as a u n iv e r s a l  of social 
e v o lu t io n  of co u rse  h a d ^ p re d e c esso rs  (e.g., H. S p en ce r ,  1897-98), 
a n d  has  r e c e n t l y  e x p e r i e n c e d  a r e v i v a l . 128 A id a n  S o u th a l l  
h a s  p ro f i ta b ly  a p p lie d  th e  co n cep t  to s tu d y  c h a n g e  in p o l i t ica l  
ro les  in A frica , a s u b je c t  c losely  r e l a te d  to o u r  p re s e n t  c o n c ern  
(1965: 121, 125). A n d  R ic h a rd  S c h w a r tz  h as  s tr e s se d  th e  d i f f e r ­
e n t ia t io n  of spec ia lized  ro le s  fo r  social co n tro l  as a  c r i t ica l  s tep  
in  lega l  e v o lu t io n  (1954: 471).120
V. A  T H E O R Y  OF THE DISPUTE PROCESS
I w il l  e x a m in e  c h a n g e s  in  th e  ro le  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th e  
i n t e r v e n e r  as a poss ib le  e x p la n a t io n  fo r  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of 
t h e  d i s p u te  process. M y  s ta r t i n g  p o in t  is a h ig h ly  a b s t r a c t  
p ro p o s i t io n  p r e s e n te d  by  F a l le r s  (1969: 329) as a p a ra p h r a s e  of 
W eber .
F unctionally  d iffe ren tia ted  groups tend  to develop distinctive 
subcu ltu res  and  to pursue “interests” defined by these subcul­
tures. all the while further elaborating and refining ( “rationaliz­
ing”) them .
F o r  th e  re a so n s  g iv en  e a r l ie r ,  I w il l  s tu d y  th e  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  
of th e  role  of th e  i n te r v e n e r  in d isp u te s  r a t h e r  t h a n  th a t  of th e
g ro u p  of su c h  p e rsons ;  one  s ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le ,  a f te r  all, is 
w h e n  a n d  to w h a t  d e g re e  in te r v e n e r s  beg in  to fu n c t io n  as a  
g ro u p  r a t h e r  t h a n  as u n r e la te d  in d iv id u a ls .  In  o rd e r  to  c la r ify  
th e  p r e s e n ta t io n  of th is  th eo ry ,  I h a v e  c o n s is ten t ly  t r a c e d  th e  
w a y s  in  w h ic h  in c r e a s in g  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th e  ro le  of i n t e r ­
v e n e r  m a y  in f lu e n ce  th e  w a y  in  w h ic h  h e  h a n d le s  d ispu tes ,  
b u t  I w ish  to  s tre ss  t h a t  th is  is n o t  th e  on ly  poss ib le  r e l a t io n ­
s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e se  p h e n o m e n a ;  s t r u c tu r a l  c h a n g e  m a y  also 
occu r  in  t h e  d i re c t io n  of lesse r  d i f f e re n t ia t io n ;  a n d  c h a n g e  in  
th e  d isp u te  p rocess  m a y  i tse lf  a l t e r  th e  s t r u c tu r e  of th e  in ­
s t i tu t io n  in  th e  d i re c t io n  of e i th e r  g r e a te r  or le s se r  d i f f e re n t ia ­
tion .
T h e  development of th e o r ie s  a b o u t  h o w  an i n s t i tu t io n  h a n ­
d les  d ispu  cs m a y  p roceed  o r  m a n y  levels , f ro m  th e  m o s t  a b ­
s t r a c t  a n d  g e n e ra l  to th e  m o s t  co n c re te  an d  em p ir ica l .  I n  th is  
p a p e r  I h a v e  t r i e d  > advance our a n a ly t ic  c a p ab i l i ty  on on ly  
a few  of th ese  levels. My g e n e ra l  th eo r ie s  a re  la rg e ly  an a d a p ta ­
t io n  of th e  ideas  of o th e rs ,  as th e  in v o ca t io n  of W e b e r  a n d  Fal-  
l e r s  r e v e a ls ." 1" I see m y  p r in c ip a l  c o n tr ib u t io n  as be ing  r a t h e r  
to ap p ly  those  th eo r ie s  to d isp u te s  b y  id e n t i fy in g  a se t  of i n ­
s t i tu t io n a l  a t t r ib u t e s  w h ic h  can  t r a n s la te  h ig h ly  a b s t r a c t  co n ­
c e p t s — such  as d i f f e re n t ia t io n  on th e  one h a n d ,  an d  s u b c u l tu re  
or in te r e s t  on th e  o th e r  — in to  v a r ia b le s  a t  o r  n e a r  a level  of 
spec if ic i ty  w h e r e  th e y  can  be o p e ra t io n a l iz e d  a n d  s tu d ie d  e m ­
p ir ica lly .  B ecause  (he o r ig ina l  s t im u lu s  fo r  th is  e x e rc ise  w as 
th e  c o n s tru c t io n  of a f r a m e w o rk  t h a t  w ou ld  p e rm i t  m e  to  u n ­
d e r s t a n d  c h a n g es  in K e n y a ,  m a n y  of th e  v a r ia b le s  a re  in d u ce d  
f ro m  u n s y s te m a t ic  c o m p a r iso n s  a m o n g  th e  d iv e rse  in s t i tu t io n s  
of t h a t  c o u n try ,  t r a d i t io n a l  an d  c o n te m p o ra ry ,  in d ig e n o u s  an d  
im posed . I ho p e  to  r e v e r s e  t h a t  in te l le c tu a l  o p e ra t io n  in fu tu r e  
w o rk ,  u s in g  th e  v a r ia b le s  I h a v e  id en t if ied  to c o m p a re  i n s t i tu ­
t ions  o v e r  t im e, or  in  d i f f e re n t  social un its .  H ere ,  h o w e v e r ,  I 
h a v e  p o s tp o n e d  t h a t  ta sk  in o rd e r  to  ach iev e  w id e r  ap p lic ab i l i ty ,  
fo r  th e  f r a m e w o r k .1"  I h a v e  th e re fo re  n o t  indicated th e  specific  
in s t i tu t io n s  in K e n y a  f rom  w h ic h  I d e r iv e d  th e  v a r ia b le s  — 
each  is, in  fact, a co m p o s i te  of im p ress io n s ;  b u t  I h a v e  s o u g h t  
to a d a p t  those  v a r ia b le s  to a c co u n t  fo r  th e  s p e c t ru m  of d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n s  d e sc r ib ed  in  th e  e x is t in g  l i t e r a tu r e . " 12
The derivation of o p e ra t io n a l  v a r ia b le s  f ro m  g e n e ra l  th e o ry  
is not. of course, the end of the process,* th e y  m u s t  be  c o m b in e d  
in to  hypotheses that can  be t e s t e d .  T ra n s la t io n  f ro m  th e  a b ­
s t r a c t  to th e  c o n c re te  n e c essa r i ly  r e s u l ts  in a n  e n o rm o u s  p ro ­
l i f e ra t io n  of va r ia b le s ,  as w ill  a p p e a r  below . H y p o th e ses  l in k in g  
th o se  v a r ia b le s  t h e n  t a k e th e  fo rm :
I f  s truc tura l variables a, b, c . . . have values  a p b , ,  c , ,
. . . then  processual variables, A , B, C, . . . w ill have
values  A , ,  B ,,  C, . . . .
T h is  m u l t ip l ic i ty  of v a r ia b le s  can  be  h a n d le d  in se v e ra l  ways. 
M a n y  m a y  q u ick ly  be d isc a rd ed  as i r r e le v a n t ,  poo rly  conceived , 
o r  d iff icu lt  to o p e ra t io n a l ize ;  som e m a y  tu r n  ou t  to be su b ­
s ta n t ia l ly  iden tica l ;  o th e rs  m ig h t  be co m b in ed  in to  m o re  g e n e ra l  
concep ts .  If the  :-em n in g  v a r ia b le s  can  be q u a n ti f ie d ,  se v e ra l  
c o n s t i tu te n t jo f  structure a n d  process can be re la ted .  W h e re  th is  
is n o t  th e  case, all but one v a r ia b le  m u s t  be h e ld  c o n s ta n t  for 
a n y  c o rre la t io n  to be m ea n in g fu l .  A b se n t  an  e x p e r im e n ta l  s i tu a ­
tion, th a t  nearly im poss ib le  goal can  m lv  be a p p ro x im a te d  by 
choos ing  f c r  c om par ison  c i th e r  tw o  high.Iv s im i la r  u n i ts  o r  the  
sa m e  u n i t  at s l ig h t ly  d i f fe re n t  po in ts  in t im e. E ven  th ese  la t t e r  
a l t e rn a t iv e s  m a y  no t he ava ilab le :  jud ic ia l  a d m in is t ra to rs ,  p a r ­
t ic u la r ly  in  th e  d e v e lo p in g  na tions , a p p e a r  to h av e  conceived  
th e i r  office as a license  to  e n g a g e  in u n c o n tro l le  1 e x p e r im e n ta ­
t ion  (Phillips, 1945: 3) Thus a h o dgepodge  of in n o v a t io n s  m ay  
have b een  introduced s im u l ta n e o u s ly ,  no un i t  m a in ta in e d  as a 
control, and the  results e i th e r  n o t  o b se rv ed  or rec o rd e d  w ith  
insufficient accuracy ( c f .  C a m p b e l l ,  1 9 6 9 ) .  I f  t h e  
r i g o r o u s  s t a n d a r d s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p l a n a t i o n  c a n n o t  
b e  m e t ,  t h e  b e s t  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s
w il l  p e rm i t  us to ach ie v e  is w h a t  M erto n  calls  po s t- fac tu m  
sociological in te r p r e ta t io n  — a n  a c co u n t  of th e  o b se rv ed  d a ta  
w h ic h  m ak e s  sense  b u t  is n o t  s u b je c t  to fa ls if ica t ion  (M erton , 
1967d: 147). At. th e  least ,  th is  po in ts  th e  w a y  to w a rd  p lau s ib le  
hypotheses for further in v es t ig a t io n  in s i tu a t io n s  w h ic h  p e rm i t  
g r e a t e r  control of th e  o th e r  v a r ia b le s ." 1-' p rec ise  use  to
w h ic h  these variables can  be p u t  w ill  obv iously  d e p e n d  on the  
f a c tu a l  situation to be a n a ly z e d  a n d  th e  d a ta  a v a ilab le ;  ac ­
co rd ing ly ,  I h a v e  not p ro c e e d e d  an y  f u r t h e r  in th e  c o n s tru c t io n  
of h y p o th eses .
A. S t r u c tu r a l  D if fe re n t ia t io n .
I w i l l  begin w ith  th e  s t r u c tu r a l  d im e n s io n s  of d isp u te  in s t i ­
tu tions ,  and elaborate t h e  w a y s  in w h ich  th e  concep t  of dif-
fe re n t ia t io n  m a y  be o p e ra t iona l ized . ( S t r u c tu r a l  v a r ia b le s  w ill  
be  n u m b e r e d  SI, S2, etc., to d is t in g u ish  th e m  f ro m  th e  proces- 
su a l  v a r ia b le s ,  w h ic h  a re  n u m b e r e d  P I ,  P2, etc., a n d  a re  d is ­
c u sse d  in  P a r t  V.B.2 infra.)
1. S pec ia l iza tion . A n a ly se s  of t h e  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  of a p a r ­
t i c u la r  ro le  g e n e ra l ly  s tre s s  th e  e le m e n t  of fu n c t io n a l  spec ia li ­
z a t io n .1'4 T h e  sp ec ia liza t io n  of th e  in te r v e n e r  m a y  be m e a s u re d  
in  s e v e ra l  w a y s .
51. T im e  d e v o te d  to p e r f o r m in g  th e  ro le .155
51.1. A b so lu te :  H o w  m u c h  t im e  does th e  ro le  o c c u p a n t  ( in t e r ­
v e n e r )  d e v o te  to  th e  specif ied  fu n c t io n  ( in te rv e n in g  in d is­
p u te s )  ? P e r fo r m a n c e  m a y  v a ry  as th e  ta sk  is r ep e a te d ,
51.2. P r o p o r t io n a l :  W h a t  p ro p o r t io n  o f  h is  t im e  does t h e  in ­
t e r v e n e r  d e v o te  to  th is  t a s k  c o m p a re d  w i th  t h e  p ro p o r t io n s  he  
d e v o te s  to o t lm r t sk Tn a soc ie ty  w h e r e  m o st  peo p le  a l loca te  
t h e i r  t im e  f a i r ly  e q u a l ly  am o n g  a la rg e  n u m b e r  of task s ,  a 
s l ig h t  in c re ase  in sp ec ia liza t io n  in  one  o f^ th e m  m ay  h a v e  sig­
n i f ic a n t  consequences .  W h e re  som e d e g re e Aspec ia liza t ion  is co m ­
m on , o n ly  s o m e th in g  a p p ro a c h in g  c o m p le te  sp ec ia liza t io n  m a y  
in f lu e n c e  p e r fo rm a n c e .
51 .3. C u m u la t iv e :  F o r  h o w  m a n y  y e a r s  does th e  ro le  o c c u p an t
p e r f o r m  t h a t  task , e v e n  if on ly  sp o ra d ic a l ly ? " " 1 A gain , m e a su re s  
o f  b o th  t h e  a b so lu te  n u m b e r  of y e a rs  an d  th e  p ro p o r t io n  of th e
a v e ra g e  l ife  s p a n  m a y  b e  s ign if ican t.
52. H ole  in d ep e n d e n c e .
52.1. C an  th e  ro le  be p e r f o r m e d  in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  o th e r  roles?- 
To p u t  it t h e  o th e r  w a y  ro u n d ,  a re  th e re  o th e r  ro les  w h ic h  th e  
i n te r v e n e r  is o b l ig a te d  to p e r fo rm ?  H o w  m a n y  ro les  a re  th u s  
c o m b in e d  a n d  w h a t  a r e  t h e y ? 1''7 T he  m o th e r  w h o  in te rv e n e s  in 
a  d isp u te  b e tw e e n  h e r  c h i ld re n  is o b l ig a te d  to  p e r fo rm  a n u r -  
t u r a n t  ro le  as w e ll;  th e  p o l ic e m a n  w ho  in te rv e n e s  in  a  f a m ily  
s q u a b b le  m u s t  c o n t in u e  to p lay  a law  e n fo rc e m e n t  ro le ;" 'H b u t  
w e s te r n  ju d g e s  a re  la rg e ly  re le a se d  f ro m  o th e r  ro le  obliga tions .
52.2. D oes p e r fo rm a n c e  of th e  ro le  preclude  p e r fo rm a n c e  of 
a n y  o th e r  r o le s ? 110 w h ic h  a n d  how  m a n y ?  T h e se  a re  b o th  aspec ts  
of  one  of th e  m o s t  c o m m o n  d e f in i t io n s  of d i f f e re n t ia t io n :  th e  
d iv is ion  of w h a t  w a s  a s in g le  ro le  in to  tw o  ro les  w h ic h  are , 
o r  can, 01 m u s t ,110 be  p e r fo rm e d  in d e p e n d e n t ly .141 P re sc r ip t io n s
rm a y  be  less  im p o r ta n t  t h a n  soc ioeconom ic  c o n d it io n s ;142 fo r  
in s ta n c e ,  th e  ro le  of ju d g e  c a n n o t  be  d ise n g a g e d  f ro m  th e  ro le  
of  su b s is ten c e  f a r m e r  u n t i l  t h e  j u d g e ’s s a la ry  p e rm i ts  h im  to  
fo rego  th e  l a t t e r  a c tiv ity ,
53. N u m b e r  of ro le  occu p an ts .  W h a t  p ro p o r t io n  of t h e  p o p u ­
la t io n  p e r f o r m s  th e  ro le  of i n te r v e n e r  a t  a ll?  A  dec line  in  n u m ­
b e rs  — a b s o lu te  an d  p ro p o r t io n a l  — is on e  poss ib le  c o n seq u e n c e  
of in c re a s in g  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ; " ' it is also one p r e re q u is i te  fo r  t h e  
fo rm a t io n  of  a  g ro u p  of specia lis ts .
5 4 .  S p e c ia l iz a t io n  a m o n g  in te rv e n e r s .  W h e re a s  th e  f r a m e  of  
r e f e re n c e  a b o v e  w a s  in te r v e n in g  in a d isp u te  v is-a-v is  o th e r
fu n c t i t  les in , h e re  it  is th e  i n te r n a l  s t r u c tu r e  o f
th e  d i s p u te  in s t i tu t io n .  T h e  m odes  of in te r n a l  spec ia liza t ion  
d iscu ssed  be low  will h a v e  f u r t h e r  c o n seq u en ces  fo r  th e  t im e  
s p e n t  in : i • sub-r< he in d ep e n d e n c e  o f  th e  sub -ro le , a n d  th e  
n u m b e r  o f  o c c u p a n ts  in  t h e  sub -ro le .
54.1. Is  th e r e  fu n c t io n a l  spec ia liza t ion  w i th in  th e  d i s p u te  
process ;  i.e., is each  ro le  a s su m e d  by e v e ry  p a r t ic ip a n t ,  o r  a re  
d i f fe re n t  ro les  p e r fo rm e d  by  c e r ta in  in d iv id u a ls?  (B idd le  a n d  
T hom as. 1966: 34) T he  e x is te n ce  of an  in te r v e n e r  d is t in c t  f ro m  
th e  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts  is a l r e a d y  a fo rm  of in te r n a l  fu n c t io n a l  
spec ia liza t ion . W e s te rn  c o u r ts  im m e d ia te ly  sugges t  th e  ro les  of 
a t 'o rn e>  or p ro se c u ;o r  as in s ta n c es  of f u r t h e r  sub -spec ia liza tion , 
bu the  p re se n c e  of a ba il if f  o r  p ro c e s s -se rv e r  m a y  be e q u a l ly  
i m p o r t a n t /  14
54.2. Does th e  in te rv e n e r  specia lize  in th e  k in d s  of d isp u te s  h e  
e n te r ta in s ? " "  W e a re  f a m i l ia r  w i th  t h e  concep t  of s u b je c t  m a t ­
t e r  ju r isd ic t io n ,  w h ic h  m ay  a d m it  on ly  c e r ta in  issues  o r  o t h e r ­
w ise  e x c lu d e  d isp u te s  by  rea so n  of th e  a m o u n t  in c o n tro v e rs y  
o r  th e  n a tu r e  of th e  r e l ie f  c la im e d .110
S4.3. D oes th e  in te r v e n e r  specia lize  in h e a r in g  d isp u te s  on ly  
a f t e r  th e y  h a v e  b een  h e a rd  e lse w h e re ?A p p o llu te  r e v ie w  is th e  
m o s t  f a m i l ia r  e x a m p le ,  b u t  an  in te r v e n e r  m ay  also re fu se  to 
ac t  u n t i l  som e o th e r ,  o f ten  non - jud ic ia l ,  p rocess  has  f i r s t  been  
c o m p le te d .147
T h e se  v a r ia b le s  of spec ia liza t ion  a re  f r e q u e n t ly  s in g led  ou t  
fo r  e x te n s iv e  d iscussion: th e y  a re  u n q u e s t io n a b ly  im p o r ta n t ,  
t h e y  a re  c le a r ly  d is t in c t  f ro m  process, a n d  th e y  a llow  of q u a n ­
t i t a t iv e  m e a s u re m e n t .  F a l le rs ,  h o w e v e r ,  a p p e a rs  to c la im  m o re
— a causa l  r e la t io n s h ip  w i th  re sp e c t  to th e  e n t i r e  c u l tu r e  of 
th e  d isp u te  p rocess  (1969: 329). T h is  s t r ik e s  m e  as a du b io u s  
hyp o th es is .  T he  role of in te r v e n e r  c an  be d i f f e re n t ia te d  in  m a n y  
o th e r  w a y s ;  it  is c e r ta in ly  poss ib le  t h a t  som e such  d i f fe re n c e
— for  in s tan ce ,  a n  in c rease  in th e  a m o u n t  of r e m u n e ra t io n  — 
m ig h t  lea d  to  g r e a t e r  spec ia liza t ion , o r  to a c h a n g e  in p e r ­
fo rm a n c e  w i th o u t  specia lization . W e c le a r ly  k n o w  too  l i t t le  a t  
p r e s e n t  a b o u t  t h e  in te r re la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  fu n c t io n a l  spec ia li ­
za tion  a n d  o th e r  fo rm s  of ro le  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  to a sse r t  t h a t  one  
is p r io r  o r  m o re  s ign if ican t.
i
2. D if fe re n t ia t io n .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  w e  c a n n o t  in v es t ig a te
e v e ry  d i f fe re n c e  a m o n g  in te r v e n e r s  in d ispu tes . I t e n ta t iv e ly  
su g g es t  tw o  c a teg o rie s  of va r ia b le s ,  r e la te d  to those  a l r e a d y  
d iscussed , w h ic h  also a p p e a r  to m e to be s ig n if ican t  fo r  an  u n ­
d e r s ta n d in g  of process. T h e  f ir s t  I w il l  call th e  social d is tan ce  
of t h e  in te r v e n e r ,  his r e m o te n e s s  f ro m  th e  d isp u ta n ts .  T he  sec­
o n d  is t h e  c u l tu ra l  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th e  in te rv e n e r .  In  choosing  
th e  la t te r ,  I h a v e  t r a n s fo r m e d  a d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  su g g e s te d  
b y  F a l le r s  in to  an in d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  w h ic h  e x p la in s  the  
d isp u te  process. E a r l ie r  I a rg u e d  th e  r e l a t iv i ty  of th e  d is t in c t io n  
b e tw e e n  s t r u c tu r a l  an d  p rocessua l  va r iab le s .  T h e  s u b c u l tu re  of 
t h e  in te r v e n e r  can  u se fu l ly  be seen as a p rocessua l  q u a l i ty  
w h ic h  deve lops  w i th  fu n c t io n a l  spec ia liza t ion ;  b u t  t h a t  su b ­
c u l tu re ,  r e g a rd le s s  of i ts  o r ig ins , can  also be t r e a te d  as a s t r u c ­
tu r a l  p r o p e r ty  of th e  in te r v e n e r  w h ic h  is re sp o n s ib le  for o th e r  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of his b e h a v io r  in th e  d isp u te  process. B oth  
socia l d is ta n c e  a n d  c u l tu r a l  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  a re  l ike ly  to  be 
im p o r ta n t  v a r ia b le s  in a d e v e lo p in g  socie ty  w h e r e  s t r a t i f ic a ­
t io n  is r e p la c in g  e g a l i ta r ia n ism  a n d  t r a d i t io n a l  h o m o g en e i ty  
g iv in g  w a y  to  c u l tu r a l  p lu ra l i s m  e n g e n d e re d  by  ch an g es  w h ic h
are ,  o r  a t  lea s t  a re  seen  to be, im i ta t io n s  of a n  a l ie n  c o m p e t in g  
id eo lo g y .148
A s w e  saw  above, spec ia liza t ion  in th e  ro le  of i n te r v e n e r  
cou ld  be  m e a s u r e d  w i th  re s p e c t  to tw o  f ra m e s  of r e fe re n c e :  
th e  l a r g e r  society , a n d  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n .  T hus , th e  ro le  
of in te r v e n e r  m a y  be  func t iona l ly ,  in d e p e n d e n t  of o th e r  ro les  
in  th e  society , e.g., t h e  ro le  of f a r m e r  — o r  of o th e r  ro les  w i th in  
th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  e.g., th e  ro le  of r e c o rd e r  ( s e c re ta ry ) ,  
o r  of e n fo rc e r  ( sh e r i f f ) .  S im ila r ly ,  th e  social d is ta n c e  a n d  c u l ­
tu r a l  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th e  in te r v e n e r  m a y  h a v e  m e a n in g  f ro m  
e a c h  of th e s e  p e rsp ec tiv es .  W ith  re sp e c t  to  a g iven  social u n i t ,  
a n  in te r v e n e r  w h o  l u s t  be  v is i ted  in  a f a r - a w a y  c ap ita l  w il l  
b e  soc ia lly  m o re  d i s t a n t  t h a n  one  w h o  t r a v e ls  to th e  u n i t  to  
h e a r  th e  d ispu te .  W i th  re sp e c t  to  th e  d isp u te  inst i tut ion itse lf , 
a n  in te r v e n e r  m a y  be  socia lly  d is ta n c e d  f ro m  th e  o th e r  p a r t i ­
c ip a n ts  i f  h e  is giver, a d is t in c t iv e  phys ica l  loca tion  fo r  th e  
h e a r in g ,  e g., a r a is e d  dias. B ecause  th e  e x p la n a to r y  v a r ia b le s  of 
ro le  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  s h a d e  im p e rc e p t ib ly  in to  th e  p ro cessu a l  
q u a l i t ie s  I seek  to  ep la in ,  I w il l  a d o p t  th e  s t r a te g y  p roposed  
e a r l ie r  of p ro c e e d in g  f ro m  th e  m o re  to th e  less d is t inc t .  W h e re  
i t  is n o t  o th e rw is e  c le a r  f ro m  th e  co n tex t ,  I a lw a y s  descr ibe  
d i f fe re n t ia t io n  as in c reas in g .
S3. P h y s ic a l  locus  of t h e  in te rv e n e r .
S5 1. Is  th e  in te r v e n e r  p e r ip a te t ic  o r  f ix e d ? 14" '
55.2. I f  p e r ip a te t ic ,  is h is  loca tion  chosen  to su i t  th e  d isp u ta n ts  
(e.g., a t  o n e  of th e i r  h o m e s ) ,1’0 th e  s u b je c t  of th e  d isp u te  (e.g., 
a c o n te s te d  b o u n d a ry )  (H o llem an , 1952: 30) or th e  in te r v e n e r  
(a t  h is  h o m e  o r  office) ?
55.3. I f  f ixed , h o w  c o n v e n ie n t  is i t  to t h e  d isp u ta n ts ,  a n d  how
—   -
c o n v e n ie n t  to  th e  in te r v e n e r ?  T h is  is a fu n c t io n  of d is tance ,  
p o p u la t io n  d ens ity ,  ease  a n d  e x p e n s e  of transporta tion . T h e  po les  h 
m ig h t  be r e p r e s e n te d  b y  a ju d g e  f ro m  th e  p ro v in c ia l  c a p i ta l  
w h o  p e r io d ica l ly  v is i ts  e a ch  local c o u r t  on c irc u i t  a n d  a ju d g e  
w h o  r e m a in s  a t  th e  c a p i ta l  a n d  m u s t  be  v is i te d  by  all d isp u ta n ts .
S.G. T e m p o ra l  s c h e d u l in g  of h e a r in g  b y  in te rv e n e r .  V a r ia t io n s  
in s c h ed u l in g  th e  a i r in g  o f  th e  d isp u te  b e fo re  t h e  i n te r v e n e r  
m ig h t  b e  a n a ly z e d  in  m u c h  th e  sa m e  w a y  as v a r ia t io n s  in  p h y ­
sical locus.151
57. P h y s ica l  e n v i r o n m e n t  of t h e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n .152
57.1. E x te rn a l  e n v i ro n m e n t .  A re  th e  ph y s ic a l  s u r r o u n d in g s  o r  
p a r a p h e r n a l ia  of th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  d is t in c t iv e ?  T h e  d is ­
t in g u is h in g  f e a tu r e  co u ld  be a t r e e  u n d e r  w h ic h  th e  p a r t i c ip a n ts  
m e e t  o r  stools  o n  w h ic h  th e y  sit, o r  i t  cou ld  be t h e  o r n a t e  
c o u r th o u s e  th e y  occupy ; i t  m ig h t  be  s ig n if ic a n t  w h e th e r  t h e  
b u i ld in g  is m u l t i -p u rp o s e  o r  s ing le -pu rpose .  Does t h e  ph y s ic a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t  s e g re g a te  th e  p a r t i c ip a n ts  in  th e  d isp u te  f ro m  
o thers ,  fo r  in s ta n c e  by  enc lo s ing  th e m  in  a h o u s e ? 15'1 D oes i t  
fo rce  th e m  to  a ssoc ia te  w i th  s t r a n g e rs ,  by  o p e n in g  th e  h e a r in g  
to a  c o m m u n i ty  a l ie n  to  th e  d i sp u ta n ts ?
57.2. In tov  al se tt ing .  Does th e  ph y s ic a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  d e m a r ­
c a te  th e  in te r v e n e r  in an y  w a y ?  Does h e  sit  in a c irc le  w i th  
th e  other participants o r  does  h e  face  th e m ;  is h e  r a is e d  o n  
a' d ias?154
58. C o m m u n i ty  s e rv e d  by  th e  in te rv e n e r .  T h e  l a r g e r  a n d  m o re  
d iv e rse  the c o m m u n ity ,  th e  m o re  d i f f e re n t ia te d  th e  i n te r v e n e r .155 
B y o n d  th is ,  t h e  w ay  th e  c o m m u n i ty  is  d e f in ed  m a y  be im ­
p o r t a n t .150
58.1. A re  t h e r e  l im i t s 157 u p o n  th e  p e rso n s  w h o  can  u s e  th e  
d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  (p e rso n a l  ju r i s d ic t io n ) ?  T hese  m a y  be f ra m e d  
in  t e r m s  of k in sh ip  (a c tu a l  o r  f ic t iv e ) ,  m e m b e rs h ip  in  age- 
g roups ,  ’’eligion, e th n ic i ty ,  e tc . ,5K If  an  in te r v e n e r  o p e ra te s  ac ro ss  " 
such  c a te ; /  r i e y  how  h e te ro g e n e o u s  is th e  p o p u la t io n  s u b je c t  to  
h is  ju r i s d ic t io n ?
58.2. A re  th e r e  g e o g ra p h ic  b o u n d a r ie s  c i r c u m s c r ib in g  th o se  ’ 
w h o  can use  th e  d isp u te  p rocess  ( te r r i to r ia l  ju r i s d ic t io n )?  H ow  
la rg e  is th a t  u n i t?  P h y s ic a l  size m u s t  be in te r p r e te d  in th e  l ig h t  
of p o p u la t io n  d e n s i ty  a n d  ease  of c o m m u n ic a t io n .1511
59. Social iso la tion  of th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts .
59.1. S o m e  p a r t i c ip a n ts  ( th e  d isp u ta n ts ,  th e i r  w i tn es se s  a n d  
s u p p o r te r s )  m a y  be soc ia lly  i so la te d  f ro m  o th e r s  (ca su a l  o b ­
se rv e rs ,  in te r v e n e r s )  a n d  f ro m  th e  c o m m u n ity  in w h ic h  th e  
d is p u te  is  h e a rd ,  if t h e  f o rm e r  t r a v e l  o u ts id e  th e i r  ow n  co m ­
m u n i ty  fo r  t h e  h e a r in g .100
59.2. T h e  in te r v e n e r  m a y  be  iso la ted  f ro m  th e  c o m m u n i ty  in 
w h ic h  h e  sits, a n d  to w h ic h  th e  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts  b e lo n g
( w h e th e r  th a t  c o m m u n i ty  is d e f in e d  by k in sh ip ,  t e r r i to ry ,  lan -
guage , o r  c u l tu r e )  by  b e in g  p o s te d  avvay f ro m  his hom e, ro ta te d  
p e r io d ica l ly ,101 a n d  p r e v e n te d  f ro m  b r in g in g  h is  fam ily  w i th  
h im .102
510. E conom ics  of t h e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n .
510.1. Is th is  in s t i tu t io n  d is t in g u ish e d  f ro m  o th e rs ,  in t e rm s  
of t h e  costs to th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  o r  th e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  costs be 
p a id  in  m o n e y  r a t h e r  t h a n  in  k in d  o r  in s e rv ic e s ? 10:{
510.2. A re  th e f e  d i f f e re n t ia l  econom ic  c o n seq u en ces  fo r  th e  
p a r t i c ip a n ts  in  t h e  d i sp u te ?  Do bo th  d i s p u ta n ts  p a y  th e  fees, 
o r  lu s t  o n e ? I n  som e  cases, a ll p a r t i c ip a n ts  m a y  s h a re  th e  costs, 
in c lu d in g  th e  in te rv e n e r .  Do all p a r t i c ip a n ts  s h a re  e q u a l ly  in 
c o n su m in g  t h e  fees, fo r  in s ta n c e  by  feas t ing , o r  do on ly  so m e ' 
b e n e f i t ,  fo r  in s ta n c e  t h e  in te r v e n e r ? 1111 Is th is  in te r v e n e r  d is ­
t in g u is h e d  f rom  o th e rs ,  a n d  f ro m  th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  th e  d ispu te ,  
b y  th e  e n h a n c e d  s ta tu s  w h ic h  acco m p an ie s  a cash  s a la ry  in  a 
s e m i-m o n e tized  e c o n o m y  a n d  a h ig h  sa la ry  in any  socie ty?  Do 
o th e r  a t t e n d  th e  role, e.g., housing , o r  a car, t r ip s
to  th e  cap ita l ,  o r  t r a v e l  a b ro a d ?  Does he  rece iv e  r e m u n e ra t io n  
d i re c t ly  f ro m  th e  d isp u ta n ts ,  o r  f ro m  a n o th e r  s o u rc e ? 105
511. T r a in in g  fo r  t h e  ro le  of in te rv e n e r .
511.1.a. T ra in in g  m a y  be i n h e r e n t  in th e  p rocess  of soc ia liza­
t io n  e x p e r ie n c e d  by  all o r  a s u b s ta n t ia l  s e g m e n t  of th e  p o p u ­
l a t i o n — th ro u g h  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in d isp u te s  as w ell  as in  o th e r
w a y s .100
b. B ey o n d  th e  a c c u l tu ra t io n  c o m m on  to  soc ie ty  a t  large , 
ad d it iona l  e d u c a t io n a l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  m a y  be d e m a n d e d ,  w h ic h  
a r e  a c q u ire d  b y  on ly  a few . In  e x t r e m e  s i tu a tio n s ,  t ra d i t io n a l  
a c c u l tu ra t io n  m a y  d isb a r  one  f ro m  th e  ro le .107 If  e i th e r  e d u c a ­
t io n  itself, o r  th e  m o n e y  n e c es sa ry  to o b ta in  it, is d i f f e re n t ia l ly  
d i s t r ib u te d  a c co rd in g  to  soc ioeconom ic  class, e th n ic  g roup , o r  
re l ig io u s  o r  c u l tu r a l  b a c k g ro u n d ,  in c u m b e n c y  in  th e  ro le  of 
in te r v e n e r  w i l l  be  s im i la r ly  re s t r ic te d .
511.2. O c c u p a n ts  of the  ro le  m a y  rece iv e  f u r t h e r  t r a in in g  w h ic h
a c c e n tu a te s  th e s e  d if fe rences .
512. A u th o r i ty .108
S12.1. D oes th is  d is p u te  in s t i tu t io n  possess s ig n if ic a n t ly  m o re  
a u th o r i ty  th a n  o th e r  social in s t i tu t io n s ?  In  th e  e x t r e m e  s i tu a ­
tion , one in s t i tu t io n  o r  se t  of in s t i l i t ions  m ay  com e to  m o n o p o -
liz* th e  a u th o r i ty  to r e q u i r e  c e r ta in  ac ts  a n d  to  in f l ic t  c e r ta in  
p u n i s h m e n ts ,1™ o r  to a l t e r  s ta tu s .170
S12.2. W ith in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  is th is  a u th o r i ty  s h a re d  
a m o n g  a ll  t h e  p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  o r  is i t  m onopo lized  b y  t h e  i n t e r ­
v e n e r ? 171
513. S t r a t i f ic a t io n  b e tw e e n  in te r v e n e r s  a n d  o thers .  T h is  con ­
cep t,  of  course ,  is c lose ly  id e n t i f ie d  w i th  social d is ta n c e  a n d  a 
f r e q u e n t  c o n c o m ita n t  of c u l tu r a l  d i f fe re n t ia t io n .  I t  is im p l ie d  
b y  th e  p r e c e d in g  f ive  v a r i a b le s 172 a n d  h a s  co n seq u en ces  fo r  th e  
n e x t  th re e .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  m a y  be  u se fu l  to  r e g ro u p  th ese  
ind ices  a n d  ask  e x p lic i t ly  w h e th e r  th e  in te rv en e rs  com e f ro m  
a social s t r a tu m  th a n  th e  d isp u ta n ts ,  a n d  if so, how  m u c h  
h ig h e r .  S t r a t a  m ay  be s ig n if ic a n t  in  t e r m s  of th e  econom ic  
re so u rc e s  th e y  posses*, th e  po l i t ica l  a u th o r i ty  th e y  w ie ld ,  o r  th e  
p re s t ig e  th e y  rec e iv e  T h e y  m a y  be  d is t in g u ish e d  f ro m  th e  re s t  
of soc ie ty  b y  s u c h  m a r k s  as e th n ic i ty ,  re l ig ion , sex, c u l tu re ,  
age, e tc .173
514. D e v e lo p m e n t  of g ro u p  cohes iveness  a m o n g  in te rv e n e rs .
Do th e  in te r v e n e r s  fu n c t io n  in iso la tion  f ro m  each  o th e r ,  o r  
h a v e  th e y  b e g u n  to c o h e re  in to  a g ro u p  w i th  a d is t in c t  s u b ­
c u l tu r e ?  G ro u p  cohes iveness  m a y  be  fo s te re d  by:
514.1. S im ila r ,  d is t in c t iv e  social o r  c u l tu r a l  b a c k g ro u n d  (i.e.,
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n ) ;
514.2. R ec e iv in g  a p p re n t ic e s h ip  o r  e d u c a t io n  u n d e r  th e  sam e  
cond it ions ,  o r  as a  g r o u p ;174
514.3. L o n g  se rv ice  in th £  ro le;
514.4. C o n ta c t  am o n g  ro le  o c c u p an ts  as p a r t  of t h e i r  ro le , in
t h e  cou rse  of b u s in e ss  o r  b y  p e riod ic  m e e t in g s ;175
514.5. C o m m u n ic a t io n  a m o n g  ro le  o c c u p a n ts ;170
514.6. E x c lu s io n  of n o n -ro le  o c c u p a n ts  f ro m  th e  g ro u p ;
514.7. I n te r n a l  o rg a n iz a t io n  of t h e  g roup ;
514.8. C o m m o n  po lit ica l  o r  econom ic  in te r e s t s .177
515. P h y s ic a l  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  t h e  p a r t ic ip a n ts .
515.1. Do th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  th e  d isp u te  a s su m e  a d i f f e re n t  
d ress  f ro m  th e i r  o r d in a r y  a t t i r e ?  W e a re  a c cu s to m e d  to  a c e r t a in  
fo rm a l i ty  of d ress  in w e s te r n  c o u r t ro o m s .178
515.2. Is the  in te r v e n e r  so d is t in g u is h e d  f ro m  o th e r  p a r t i c i ­
p a n ts ?  T h e  m a r k  m ig h t  be a  m ask  (H a rle y ,  1950), th e  s ta f f  o r  
b la n k e t  of th e  A fr ic a n  e ld e r  (K e n y a t ta ,  1953: 201), o r  t h e  w ig  
a n d  g o w n  of th e  E n g l ish  ju d g e ,  w id e ly  cop ied  in  co lon ia l  
A f r ic a .170
516. B e h a v io r  of p a r t i c ip a n ts .180
S16.1 Do th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  b e h a v e  in a c h a ra c te r is t ic  m a n n e r  
d u r in g  th e  d i s p u te ? 181 T h e y  m a y  be m o re  so lem n, or r io to u s ;18- 
g e s tu re s  m ay  be e x a g g e r a te d  o r  s u b d u e d ;18'1 speech  m a y  be 
m o re  o r  less  e lo q u e n t ,  o r  e m p lo y  a d i f f e re n t  v o c a b u la ry 184 or 
language .
S16.2. Does b e h a v io r  d u r in g  th e  d isp u te  d i f f e re n t ia te  th e  in ­
t e r v e n e r ?  H e  m ay  e l f  act d i f f e re n t ly ;  fo r  he  m a y
fee' prjv. 1*5*4 to d isp lay  e m o tio n  a l th o u g h  o th e rs  a re  n o t ,18,7
6r com pelled  to  hold  a loof w h i le  th e  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts  so­
c ia lize . ,8H T h e  other:: too, m a y  iso la te  h im  b y  th e i r  r e s p e c tfu l  
d e m e a n o r  or, mod< HT th e y  m ay  even  be  p re c lu d e d
f ro m  c o m m u n ic a t in g  w i th  h im  a t  a l l .1"8 T he  i n te r v e n e r  m ay  
s p e ak  a n o th e r  la n g u a g e  f ro m  t h a t  of th e  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  o r  
th e  sam e  la n g u a g e  w i th  g r e a t e r  e lo q u e n c e .180
3. B u re a u c ra t iz a t io n .  T h e  concep t  of d i f f e re n t ia t io n ,  as 
a p p lie d  to th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  or  to th e  ro le  of in te rv e n e r ,  
does no t e n t i r e ly  sa tis fy  me. I t  can  re f e r  to  a n y  d i f fe re n c e  b e ­
tw e e n  or w i th in  in s t i tu t io n s ;  as th e  m isc e l lan y  of v a r ia b le s  ju s t  
d iscussed  rev e a ls ,  th is  a m o rp h o u s n e ss  is n o t  a l to g e th e r  elim-» 
in a te d  by re s t r ic t in g  o u r  v iew  to those  d if fe re n c es  I lab e l  social 
d is ta n c e  a n d  s u b c u l tu ra l  v a r ia t io n .  Is th e r e  a n o th e r  concep t  
w h ic h  w ill  f u r t h e r  se lec t  a m o n g  d if fe re n c es  a n d  g ro u p  th e m  
in som e  w a y ?  O ne  p oss ib i l i ty  is s u g g e s te d  by  W e b e r ’s th e o ry  
of b u re a u c ra c y :  th e  d isp u te  p rocess  m a y  ch an g e  as th e  s t r u c ­
t u r e  of th e  d ispu te ,  e spec ia l ly  th e  ro le  of in te rv e n e r ,  becom es 
in c re a s in g ly  b u r e a u c ra t iz e d  (G e r th  an d  Mills, 1946: Ch. 8 ) .1!"’ 
M a n y  of  the  v a r ia b le s  a l r e a d y  d iscussed  m a y  be e n c o m p a ssed  
w i th in  th e  concep t of b u re a u c ra c y .  Indeed , fu n c t io n a l  spec ia li ­
za tion , social d is tance ,  s u b c u l tu ra l  d i f fe re n t ia t io n ,  s t r a t i f ic a ­
t ion, an d  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n  a ll  o v e r la p  co n s id e rab ly .  N e v e r th e ­
less, i t  w il l  be h e lp fu l  to d iscuss  s e p a ra te ly  c e r ta in  a d d it io n a l  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of th e  b u r e a u c r a t ic  role.
517. C r i te r ia  fo r  se le c t in g  in te rv e n e r .
SI7.1. A re  th e  r e l e v a n t  q u a l i t ie s  a sc r ib ed  (e.g., age, sex, k i n ­
sh ip , m e m b e rs h ip  in som e o th e r  g ro u p )  o r  ach ie v e d  (e.g., 
e x p e r ie n c e ,  e d u c a t io n ) ? 101
517.2. If  a scr ibed , h o w  la r g e  a p ro p o r t io n  of th e  p o p u la t io n  
possesses  t h a t  q u a l i ty ?  H o w  m a n y  su ch  q u a l i t ie s  a r e  co n s id e red  
in  se le c t io n ?
517.3. I f  ach ieved , a re  th e y  q u a l i t ie s  w h ic h  r e f e r  to th e  w h o le  
p e rs o n  (m a n l in e ss ,  h o n e s ty ,  lea d e rsh ip )  o r  a re  th e y  n a r r o w ly  
d e f in e d  tec h n ic a l  skills  of p a r t i c u la r  re le v a n c e  fo r  th e  p e r ­
f o rm a n c e  of t h a t  fu n c t io n  ( l i te racy ,  e so te r ic  k n o w le d g e )?
S .18. M e th o d  of choosing  th e  in te rv e n e r .
518.1. D oes th is  occu r  by  ascr ip tion , se lf-se lec tion , e lec tion ,
o r  som e  c o m b in a t io n  of these ,  o r  is th e  in te r v e n e r  a p p o in te d  
by  a s u p e r io r  or by his p e e rs ?  T h is  v a r ia b le  is obv iously  c lose ly  
r e l a te d  to  th e  p re c e d in g  one.
518.2. H o w  is th e  in te r v e n e r  re m o v e d  — by im p e a c h m e n t  or 
reca ll ,  o r  b y  h is  s u p e r io r  o r  p e e r s ?'"-
518.3. Is t h e  in te r v e n e r  chosen  a n e w  to p e r f o r m  t h a t  ro le  in 
e c ah  in d iv id u a l  d i s p u t e  lo:‘ o r  does h e  fu n c t io n  in  e v e ry  case, 
o r  in a se lec tion  of cases  chosen  b y  som e m ec h a n ic a l  p r in ­
c ip le 104 i
S19. T ra in in g .  O nce  t h e  i n te r v e n e r  is a p p o in te d  on th e  bas is  
o f  his a c h ie v e m e n ts ,  t r a in in g  m a y  e m e rg e  as a n  im p o r ta n t  p r e ­
re q u is i te .  A n y  t r a in in g  w o u ld  d i f f e re n t ia te  th e  i n te r v e n e r  f ro m  
o th e r  ro le s  w h ich  do n o t  rec e iv e  it;  b u t  w i th  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n ,  
t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  e d u c a t io n a l  e x p e r ie n c e  changes.
519.1. T e c h n ic a l  c o m p e te n c e  is e m p h a s iz e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  q u a l i ­
t ie s  of th e  w h o le  m an , such  as s p o r t s m a n s h ip  o r  h u m a n is t ic  
k n o w le d g e .
519.2. T h is  c o m p e ten c e  is a c q u i r e d  b y  fo rm a l  t r a in in g  r a t h e r
t h a n  a p p re n t ic e s h ip .
519.3. I t  is  d e m o n s t r a te d  b y  e x a m in a t io n  r a t h e r  t h a n  b y  th e  
a c c u m u la t io n  of e x p e r ie n c e  m e a s u r e d  ch rono log ica l ly .
S.29. R e m u n e ra t io n  fo r  p e r fo rm in g  th e  role.
520.1. Is  t h e  a m o u n t  v a r i a b le  o r  f ix ed ?
520.2. Is i t  b a sed  on  th e  se rv ices  r e n d e r e d  ( in  te r m s  of q u a n ­
t i t y  o r  q u a l i t y ) ,105 o r  o n  r a n k  w i th in  t h e  u b r e a u c r a t ic  h ie r ­
a rc h y .100
S20.3. Is i t  p a id  o u t  of th e  p ro ceed s  of t h e  p a r t i c u la r  d isp u te  
(i.e., t h e  c o n tr ib u t io n s  of d i s p u ta n ts  a n d  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts ) ,  
o r  f ro m  som e o th e r  source , e.g., a  fu n d  d r a w n  f ro m  m a n y  d is ­
p u ta n t s ,  m a n y  in te rv e n e r s ,  o r  e v en  f ro m  o th e r  in s t i tu t io n s ?
' S21. O c c u p a tio n  of t h e  ro le  as a ca re e r .
521.1. P r e p a r a t io n  b ecom es  long, a rd u o u s  a n d  e x p e n s iv e ;  i t  
m u s t  b e  c o m m e n ce d  e a r ly  in  life; i t  is a lso c o n s tr ic t in g  — 
t r a n s f e r  to a n o th e r  c a re e r  is d i f f icu l t  o r  im p o ss ib le .107
521.2. T h e  o c c u p a n t  p ro g re s se s  u p  a g r a d u a te d  h ie r a r c h y  of 
ra n k s .
521.3. T e n u re  in  th e  ro le  is r e la t iv e ly  secu re .108
522. Social s ta tu s  c o n fe r re d  by  role. O c c u p a n c y  c a r r ie s  w i th  
it p r iv i le g e d  social s ta tu s ,  in p a r t  a c o n c o m ita n t  of econom ic  
p os it ion  b u t  a iso fo llow ing  from  th e  e d u c a t io n a l  p re re q u is i te s  of 
t h e  role. T h is  s ta tu s  m ay  com e to be  assoc ia ted  w i th  t h e  ro le  
itself, in d e p e n d e n t  of such  o th e r  c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  In t h e  e x t r e m e  
case, it m ay  be  g u a ra n te e d  b y  e x p re s s  ru le ,  e n fo rc e d  b y  sa n c ­
tions. T h is  complement* m y  e a r l ie r  su g g es t io n  t h a t  one  w a y  to 
d i f f e re n t ia te  th e  ro le  w as  to d r a w  o c c u p a n ts  f ro m  a p a r t i c u la r  
s t r a tu m  of socie ty ;  h e re  I a rg u e  t h a t  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n  of the. 
ro le  f u r t h e r  d i f f e re n t ia te s  t h a t  s t r a tu m .
523. T h e  ru le  is de f ined  by  e x p lic i t  p re s c r ip t io n s  r a t h e r  t h a n
im p lic i t  c u s tom  T hese  c h a n g e  f ro m  o ra l  to w r i t t e n ,  v a g u e  to 
prec ise , p a r t i a l  an d  in c o m p le te  to e x h a u s t iv e ,  few  to n u m e ro u s ,  
hodge-podge  to o rg a n iz e d ;1'''* t h u s  th e y  becom e a fo rm  of e so te r ic  
k n o w le d g e  possessed  on ly  by ro le  o c cupan ts .  T h e  n o rm s :
$23.1. D e m a rc a te  p r iv a te  life  f ro m  offic ia l bus iness ,  e sp ec ia l ly  
w i th  r e g a rd  to  f inances ;-00
523.2. D e m a n d  fu l l - t im e  c o m m itm e n t  to and  r e g u la r  p e r f o r m ­
ance  of th e  ro le  in p lace  of a c t iv i ty  w h ic h  w a s  p a r t - t im e  a n d  
e r ra t ic ;
523.3. O b l ig a te  th e  o c c u p a n t  to p e r fo rm  th e  ro le  as a  d u ty  
w h e re  h e  p rev io u s ly  p e r f o r m e d  it of h is  o w n  vo lition ;
523.4. C ircu m sc r ib e  th e  p o w e rs  of th e  in te rv e n e r ;
523.5. R e g u la te  co n d u c t  w i th in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n .
Sj24, E n fo rc e m e n t  of ro le  e x p e c ta t io n s .  A d h e re n c e  to  th e s e  
n o rm s  is e n fo rc e d  by e x te r n a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  w h o l ly  in te rn a l iz e d  
sanctions.- '"
524.1. I n te r v e n e r s  ac t in d iv id u a l ly  r a t h e r  t h a n  co lleg ia lly , a n d  
can be h e ld  p e rso n a l ly  respons ib le .
524.2. T h e se  ac tions  a r e  r e c o rd e d  in  w r i t in g  in  o r d e r  to  p r e ­
se rv e  th e m  a c cu ra te ly .
524.3. T h e y  a re  s u b je c t  to  r e v ie w  b y  a su p e r io r .
B. P rocess
W h a t  a spec ts  of th e  d isp u te  p rocess  w ill  r e s p o n d  to c h a n g es  
in  th e  s t r u c tu r e  of th e  in s t i tu t io n  a n d  th e  ro le  of th e  i n t e r ­
v e n e r?  T h e  e a r l ie r  rev ie w  of p rocess  f o re w a r n e d  us  t h a t  i t - 
is  a  h ig h ly  v a r ia b le  p h e n o m e n o n .  In  o rd e r  to n a r r o w  th e  scope 
o f  o u r  i n q u i r y  to a m a n a g e a b le  se t  of p a ra m e te rs ,  I w il l  begin 
by  c o n s id e r in g  th e  mechanism by w h ich  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  a ffec ts  
process. H.L.A. H a r t  h in ts  a t  sijch a co n n ec t io n  in h is  search 
fo r  " th e  k e y  to  th e  sc ience  of ju r i s p r u d e n c e ” (1961: 79). He 
p o s tu la te s  an  im a g in a ry  socie ty  — ”n sm a ll  c o m m u n i ty  c losely  
k n i t  by  ties  of k in sh ip ,  c o m m on  s 'en tim en t  an d  belief, a n d  p laced  
in  a  s ta b le  e n v i r o n m e n t ;” /lth e  on ly  m e a n s  of social co n tro l  is 
t h a t  g e n e ra l  a t t i tu d e  of th e  g ro u p  to w a rd s  its  o w n  s ta n d a r d  
m o d es  of b e h a v io u r  in  t e r m s  of w h ic h  w e h a v e  c h a ra c te r iz e d  
ru le s  of o b l ig a t io n ” (1961: 89). T h e  s t r u c tu r a l  q u a l i ty  w h ich  
c h a ra c te r iz e s  th is  soc ie ty  is c le a r ly  its  ove ra l l  h o m o g en e i ty ,  an d  
th e  c o n c o m ita n t  low  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  of th e  in s t i tu t io n a l  f r a m e ­
w o rk  fo r  social co n tro l  a n d  d isp u tin g ,  a l th o u g h  th ese  concep ts  
a r e  n o t  m ad e  exp lic it .  H a r t  c o n tra s ts  th is  idea l  “ p re - le g a l” 
soc ie ty  w i th  th e  t ru ly  legal  w o r ld  w h ic h  deve lops  w i th  in ­
c re a s in g  d if fe re n t ia t io n  of th e  d isp u te  s t r u c tu r e  (1961: 91).20- 
In  th e  la t te r ,  p r im a ry  ru le s  of ob l iga tion  a re  no lo n g e r  su ff i ­
c ien t ,  by  th em se lv es ,  to g u a ra n te e  the  r e g u la r i ty  a n d  p re d ic t ­
a b i l i ty  of b e h a v io r  w i th o u t  w h ic h  social life is im possible . 
P r im a r y  ru le s  becom e in a d e q u a te  in th re e  respec ts ,  each  r e m e ­
d ied  by a d is t in c t  c a teg o ry  of s e c o n d a ry  ru les ,  w h ic h  to g e th e r  
a r e  resp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic  process  of th e  d i f f e re n ­
t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n .  F irs t ,  u n c e r t a in ty  a rises  w h e th e r  th e  in s t i ­
t u t io n  w ill  em p lo y  all th e  s u b s ta n t iv e  b e h a v io ra l  ru le s  of the  
l a r g e r  soc ie ty  f ro m  w hich  i t  is n o w  d i f f e re n t ia te d  — a n d  on ly  
th o se  ru le s  — a n d  w h e th e r  i t  w il l  m o d ify  th e m  in  a n y  w a y ;  
th is  d im e n s io n  of choice  is r e g u la te d  by  se co n d a ry  ru le s  of 
rec o g n i t io n  (1961: 92-93). Second, d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th e  i n s t i tu ­
t ion  in su la te s  its  p r im a ry  ru le s  f ro m  th e  g ra d u a l  b e h a v io ra l  
c h a n g es  w h ic h  c o n s ta n t ly  o ccu r  in th e  l a rg e r  socie ty ; som e n e w
m e c h a n is m s  a re  n e c esa ry  to  a m e n d  those  p r im a ry  ru les ,  an d  
th e s e  a re  th e  s e co n d a ry  ru le s  of c h a n g e  (1961: 93-94). F in a l ly ,  
t h e r e  is th e  q u e s t io n  of h o w  th e  in s t i tu t io n  is to r e g u la te  its  
o w n  ac tions  in  h a n d l in g  d ispu tes ,  s ince th e  l a rg e r  soc ie ty  f ro m  
w h ic h  i t  sp r in g s  c o n ta in s  no  n o rm s  w h ic h  sp e ak  d i re c t ly  to 
su c h  n o v e l  b e h a v io r ;  s e c o n d a ry  ru le s  of a d ju d ic a t io n  se rv e  th is  
p u rp o s e  (1961: 94-95). If  th e se  th r e e  k in d s  of ru le s  c o n s t i tu te  
t h e  essence  of th e  m o re  d i f f e re n t ia te d  d isp u te  process, th e y  a re  
a n  obv ious  focus fo r  o u r  s tudy . H o w e v er ,  w h e r e  H a r t  is e n ­
g a g e d  in  ju r i s p ru d e n c e ,  a n d  th u s  co n c e rn e d  e x c lu s iv e ly  w i th  
t h e  ru le s  w h ic h  sh o u ld  g o v e rn  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s ,  I am  t r y in g  
to  dev e lo p  social th e o ry ,  a n d  th e re fo re  a m  e q u a l ly  in te r e s te d  
in  bo th  th e  n o rm s  a n d  p r a x is  of those  in s t i tu t io n s ,
1. G e n e ra l iz a t io n s  a b o u t  p rocessua l  c hange .
a. R a t io n a l iz a t io n .  Cun w e  g e n e ra l iz e  a b o u t  th e  v a r i ­
a t io n  in  th e  m ode  o choosing, m od fym g an d  a p p ly in g  n o rm s  
in  th e  course of h a n d l in g  d ispu te s ,  w h ich  m ig h t  fo llow  from 
t h e s e  s t r u c tu r a l  changes?  I w ill  p u r s u e  W e b e r ’s su g g es t io n s  
c o n c e rn in g  th e  con seq u en ces  of in c re a s in g  fu n c t io n a l  sp ec ia liza ­
t ion , ro le  d i f f e re n t ia t io n ,  a n d  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n ,  F a l le r s ’ p a r a ­
p h r a s e  of W e b e r  refers  to th e  g ro w th  of a d is t in c t iv e  s u b c u l tu re  
a n d  of c e r ta in  in te re s ts .  T h e  s u b c u l tu re  deve lops  in  th e  d i re c ­
t io n  o f  g r e a t e r  ra t io n a l iz a t io n ,  w h ic h  F a l le r s  in te r p re t s  in  th e  
lega l  c o n te x t  as m e a n in g  g r e a te r  “le g a l is m ” — an  “a b i l i ty  of 
ju d g e s  to  deal w i th  m o ra l  issues  ‘le g a l is t ic a l ly ’ — t h a t  is, to  
d e a l  w i th  ‘a r t i f ic ia l ly ’ n a r r o w  m o ra l  issues  . . .” (1969: 17).
A legal cu ltu re  cuts into th is  com plex  “o b jec tiv e” m oral rea lity  
in a h igh ly  “a rb itra ry ” w ay. It is characteristic  of the  legal m ode 
of social contro l th a t ru les are  used to a rr iv e  at sim ple dichoto *• 
m oral decisions - “y es” or “n o ” decisions th a t in e th e r con­
tex ts  w ould s e m  in to le rab ly  over-s im p lified  m orally . The legal 
process does no t ask: W hat a re  all the righ ts and  w rongs of this 
s itu a tio n  - on  bo th  sides? R ather, it  asks: Is John ' Doe gu ilty  as 
charged? (1969: 13).
R a t io n a l iz a t io n  in  la w  is t h u s  id e n t i f ie d  w i th  a rb i t r a r in e s s  a n d  
a r t i f i c i a l l y  n a r r o w n e s s  a n d  o v e r-s im p lif ica tio n ,  a n d  d ich o to m o u s  
dec is ion -m ak ing . T hese  q u a l i t ie s  do a p p e a r  to  s h a re  a  co m m o n  
core , b u t  th e y  a re  r a t h e r  vague , a n d  th e i r  c o n n o ta t io n  s t ro n g ly  
p e jo ra t iv e ;  it  is e sp ec ia l ly  d i f f icu l t  to  k n o w  w h a t  c o n te n t  to
a t t r i b u t e  to  t e r m s  l ik e  “ a r b i t r a r y ” or “ a r t i f ic ia l .”
W e b e r ’s o w n  use  of th e  concep t  of r a t io n a l i ty  as ap p lie d  
to  la w  w a s  v e ry  d i f fe re n t ,  a n d  c o n s id e rab ly  b ro ad e r .  W ith o u t  
e x p lo r in g  a ll  t h e  ra m if ic a t io n s  of th is  e x t r e m e ly  c o m p le x  idea ,203 
i t  is su ff ic ie n t  h e re  to  o b se rv e  t h a t  it can  r e f e r  to log ica l  o r  
a e s th e t ic  fo rm . A l th o u g h  all d isp u te  p rocesses  w il l  d isp lay  som e  
p a t t e r n in g  of behav ior ,-’"4 a n d  h e n c e  som e k in d  of r a t io n a l iz a ­
tion, t h e  m o d e  of ra t io n a l iz a t io n  w ill  d e p e n d  on th e  s t r u c tu r e  
of th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n .  M y e x p e c ta t io n  is th a t ,  as s t r u c tu r a l  
. d i f f e re n t ia t io n  increases ,  th e  logic, th e  a e s th e t ic  of b e h a v io r  
with*’r> th e  d isp u te  p rocess  w il l  b ecom e  m o re  a u to n o m o u s ,  in ­
t e rn a l ly  c o h e re n t ,  an d  in d e p e n d e n t  of p a t t e r n s  in t h e  l a r g e r  
sb c ie ty .2"5 O n e  e x a m p le  of such  a t r a n s fo r m a t io n  m ig h t  be  
th e  e v o lu t io n  M aine  c la im e d  to see in th e  o u tco m e s  of d ispu tes ,  
f ro m  th e  iso la ted , u n c o n n e c te d  them istes  of e a r ly  R o m a n  la w  
to th e  h ig h ly  o rgan iz ' d  body  of op in ions  in th e  l a t e r  p e r io d  
(1950: Ch. I). O nce th is  coh e re n c e  is ach ieved . H a r t 's  s e co n d a ry  
ru le s  of c h a n g e  a re  e s se n t ia l  to p re s e rv e  t h a t  coh e re n c e  in  an  
u n s ta b le  e n v iro n m e n t .
P ro cess  can b ecom e in te r n a l ly  c o h e re n t  on ly  a t  th e  cost 
of t u r n in g  a w a y  from  th e  o u ts id e  w orld . T h e  in s t i tu t io n  dev e lo p s  
a ca rapace ,  im p e rm e a b le  to e x te r n a l  in fo rm a t io n ,  p re sc r ip t io n ,  
o r  in f lu e n c e .20" B e h a v io r  g ro w s  in t ro v e r te d ,  p reo c c u p ie d  w i th  
its  o w n  n o rm s  a n d  ac tiv it ies .  T he  p ro b le m s  i t  h a n d le s  a re  the  
p ro b le m s  d e f in e d  by  th e  in s t i tu t io n ,  no t th e  so c ie ty ;207 th e  s o lu ­
t ions  it  g e n e ra te s  a re  so lu t ions  for th e  in s t i tu t io n ,  n o t  th e  so­
c ie ty .2,,s If c a r r ie d  to an  e x tr e m e ,  th e  d isp u te  p rocess  becom es 
w h o l ly  in v o lu ted ,  h e rm e tic a l ,  th e  e x c lu s iv e  d o m ain  of specia lis ts ,  
a n d  c o m p re h e n s ib le  to  th e m  alone.
b. F u n c t io n a l  a d a p ta t io n .  W e can also v ie w  s t r u c tu r a l
d i f f e re n t i a t io n  in fu n c t io n a l  t e rm s  as r e d e f in in g  th e  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t  w i th in  w'hich the  d isp u te  p rocess  m u s t  be a d a p tiv e .  W h e re  
t h e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  is c o m p le te ly  u n d i f f e r e n t i a te d  — w h e r e  
it is s im p ly  th e  w'hole •society v iew e d  f ro m  a p a r t i c u la r  p e r ­
s p e c t iv e  — i t  m u s t  r e sp o n d  to  t h e  d e m a n d s  of t h e  soc ie ty  i tse lf . 
B u t  as th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  is p ro g re s s iv e ly  d i f f e re n t ia te d ,  t h e  
c o n s t r a in t s  of th e  la rg e r  soc ie ty  a re  re la x e d ,  a l lo w in g  b e h a v io r  
w i th in  th e  in s i tu t io n  to b eco m e  in te rn a l ly  a d a p tiv e ,  to deve lop  
in  su c h  a w a y  th a t  its  co n seq u e n c e s  c o n t r ib u te  to  t h e  sm o o th  
o p e ra t io n  of th e  in s t i tu t io n .
F u n c t io n a l  in te r p re ta t io n s  of th is  so r t  h a v e  b e e n  repeatedly- 
a t ta c k e d  on  e p is tem o lo g ica l  g ro u n d s  (see, e.g., H em pe l,  1968; 
R u d n e r ,  1966: Ch. 5), a n d  th e  te l ic  im a g e ry  in  th e  p re c e d in g  
p a ra g r a p h  c le a r ly  c re a te s  se r ious  th e o re t ic a l  d iff icu lties .  B u t  
m a n y  c o n te m p o ra ry  w r i te r s  h a v e  in s is te d  t h a t  th e s e  p i t fa l ls  
c a n  be  av o id e d  (e.g., R a p p a p o r t ,  1968). T he  f ina l  a n s w e rs  to  
th e s e  f u n d a m e n ta l  q u e s t io n s  a re  n o t  a  p r e re q u is i te  to o u r  use  
o f  fu n c t io n a l  th e o ry  as a h e u r is t ic  dev ice  fo r  g e n e ra t in g  h y ­
p o th ese s  w h ic h  c an  th e n  be te s te d  e m p ir ic a l ly  w i th o u t  r e f e r ­
e n c e  to t h e i r  th e o re t ic a l  orig in . I w il l  t r y  to  d e m o n s t ra te  th is  
b y  c o n s tru c t in g  a m ode l  fo r  t h e  fu n c t io n a l  an a ly s is  of d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n s  a d a p te d  fro m  S t in c h c o m b e  (1968: 80-101). L e t  m e  
b e g in  by  c o n c ep tu a l iz in g  a soc ie ty  in w h ic h  th e  d isp u te  in s t i ­
tu t io n  is w h o l ly  u n d i f f e re n t ia te d  (H a r t 's  p re - leg a l  s i tu a t io n ) .  
In  th is  society, a ct in e e ry  o th e r ,  d&ily in te ra c t io n  is c o n s ta n t ly  
g e n e ra t in g  n e w  d isp u te s  and  c o n tin u in g ,  o r  e la b o ra t in g ,  old 
ones; I w il l  call th is  c a te g o ry  of d isp u ta t io u s  b e h a v io r  MD ”. A t  
an y  g iven  p o in t  in  t i m e  th is  d i sp u t in g  has  an  a g g re g a te  level 
w h ic h  I w il l  ca ll  “ H ” because  I be lieve  it m a y  be  r e p r e s e n te d  
by  a h o m eo s ta t ic  v a r ia b le .200 B y  th is  I m e a n  th a t  th e  level  
te n d s  to  be  re la t iv e ly  s ta b le  e m p ir ic a l ly ;  a l th o u g h  th e r e  is a 
fo rce  (D) w h ic h  c o n s ta n t ly  te n d s  to  d i s tu rb  th e  level, H fu n c ­
tions  like  a t h e r m o s ta t  w h ich , w h e n  d i s tu rb e d ,  s t im u la te s  o th e r  
a c t iv i ty  w h ic h  aids in  r e s to r in g  th e  p re -e x is t in g  ' leve l  of d is ­
p u t in g .210 T h is  o th e r  a c t iv i ty  is, of course , th e  b e h a v io r  of th e  
d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  (I) . W e c a n  i l lu s t r a t e  th is  se q u en c e  b y  a 
conscious ly  s im p lis t ic  anecdo te :  tw o  in d iv id u a ls  a s se r t  in c o n ­
s is te n t  c la im s to la n d  (D ),  th e r e b y  in c re a s in g  th e  leve l  of d is ­
p u t in g  in th e  soc ie ty  ( H - f l ) ;  th e  e n t i r e  soc ie ty  (I) m e e ts  to 
d iscuss  those  c la im s, a n d  re a c h e s  an  a c co m m o d a t io n  su ch  t h a t  
th e  p a r t ie s  cease  to  a s se r t  t h e  in co n s is te n t  c la im s  (H ) .  T h is  
can  be  d ia g r a m m e d  as fo llows:
# D
F IG U R E  3. F u n c t io n a l  A n a ly s i s  o f  W h o l ly  U n d if f f r e n h a t e d  
D is p u te  I n s t i t u t io n  ,
No a c tu a l  soc ie ty  r e sp o n d s  to  d isp u te s  a s  a  s ing le ,  u n d i f ­
f e r e n t i a te d  w hole . I n s te a d  it  h a s  a se t  of d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  
( I p I 2, I H . . . ) e ach  of w h ic h  is m o re  o r  less d i f f e r e n t i a te d  
f ro m  th e  society . N ow  w h e n  a n e w  o r  r e v iv e d  c o n t ro v e rs y  d is ­
tu r b s  th e  leve l  of d isp u t in g  in  th e  society , som e of t h e  d isp u te s  
(D j)  a re  c h a n n e le d  to  a  p a r t i c u l a r  d i f f e re n t ia te d  d i s p u te  in s t i ­
tu t io n  ( I , ) ,  d i s tu rb in g  th e  lev e l  of d isp u t in g  w i th in  t h a t  in s t i ­
tu t io n  (H ,) .  T he  in c re a se  in  H, e lic its  a r e sp o n se  w i th in  I t 
w h ic h  te n d s  to  r e s to re  H, to  i ts  fo rm e r  le v e h  But th is  response 
of t h e  d i f f e re n t ia te d  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  can .have either, or 
bo th ,  of tw o  v e ry  d i f f e re n t  co n seq u en ces  fo r  th e  larger society: 
i t  m a y  re d u c e  H; b u t  i t  m a y  not, a n d  m a y  in s te a d  contribute 
to  d isp u ta t io u s  b e h a v io r  in th e  soc ie ty  (D ). To i l l u s t r a t e  a g a in
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b y  a  v a r i a t i o n  u p o n  th e  a n e c d o te  above: tw o  in d iv id u a ls  a s se r t  
in c o n s i s te n t  c la im s to  l a n d  (D ),  th e r e b y  in c re a s in g  th e  leve l  
of d i s p u t in g  in  t h e  socie ty  (H  + l ) ;  th is  case (D ,)  th e n  goes 
to  a n  o ffic ia l  c o u r t  ( I , ) ,  in c re a s in g  th e  lev e l  of d i sp u t in g  w i th in  
t h e  c o u r t  ( H , + l ) .  T he  c o u r t  m a y  re sp o n d  w i th  a n  a c co m m o d a ­
t io n  su c h  t h a t  t h e  p a r t ie s  cease  to  a s se r t  th e  in c o n s is te n t  c la im s 
b o th  in s id e  t h e  in s t i tu t io n  ( H t ) a n d  in  th e  soc ie ty  a t  la rg e  (H ).  
B u t  t h e  c o u r t  m a y  also r e s p o n d  t h a t  i t  h a s  no  ju r i s d ic t io n  o v e r  
l a n d  d isp u te s ,  a n d  d ism iss  t h e  case. T h is  r e s to re s  th e  o r ig in a l  
le v e l  of d i s p u t in g  w i th in  th e  c o u r t  ( H , ) ,  b u t  i t  m a y  n o t  a ffec t  
t h e  le v e l  o f  d i sp u t in g  w i th in  th e  soc ie ty  ( H + l ) .  a n d  m a y  ac ­
tu a l ly  c o n t r ib u te  to f u r th e r  d isp u ta t io u s  b e h a v io r  (D ). T h e  
r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  .he d i f f e re n t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n  a n d  th e  so­
c ie ty  c a n  b e  d i a g r a m m e d  as  fo llow s;
FIGURE 4: F u n c t io n a l  A n a l y s i s  o f  D if f e r e n t ia t e d  D i s p u t e  
I n s t i t u t i o n
T hese  m o d e ls  m a y  h e lp  u s  to  u n d e r s t a n d  differences be­
tw e e n  th e  d isp u te  p rocess  of th e  m o re  a n d  t h a t  of the less 
d i f f e re n t ia te d  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  i.e., b e tw e e n  the response of 
I a n d  th e  re sp o n se  of I r  F u n c t io n a l  th e o ry  suggests that as  
is d i f f e re n t ia te d  f ro m  th e  socie ty , i ts  structure, by  definition,
* j  i
d iv e rg e s  f ro m  t h a t  of th e  u n d i f f e r e n t i a te d  institution ( I ,rN- ' I ) f 
t h e  d isp u te s  t h a t  re a c h  i t  b eco m e  in c re a s in g ly  d i f f e re n t  from  
t h e  u n iv e r s e  of d isp u te s  in  th e  socie ty  (D1/'N-' D) and, most 
im p o r ta n t ly ,  th e  leve l  of d isp u t in g  w h ic h  th e  differentiated 
in s t i tu t io n  aair. ta in s  d iv e rg e s  f ro m  th e  lev e l  of d isp u t in g  which 
th e  society  m a in ta in s  H), T h e  I, t h a t  is responding to
a lev e l  of d isp u t in g  (H, + l ) ,  d i s tu r b e d  by se lec ted  disputes (Dt), 
so as to re s to re  it to H,, m a y  p e r fo rm  d i f f e re n t ly  from I. Let 
m e  i l lu s t r a te  th is  by se lec tin g  som e m isc e l lan e o u s  examples 
f ro m  th e  d e ta i le d  p re s e n ta t io n  of v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  fo llow s be­
low , I, m ay ,  as in  th e  e a r l i e r  anecdo te ,  f in d  t h a t  th e  dispute 
is n o t  p ro p e r ly  w i th in  th e  ca te g o ry  D lf t h a t  th e  in s t i tu t io n  
th e r e fo r e  lacks  ju r isd ic t io n ,  a n d  th u s  dec ide  to d ism iss  th e  case.
I, m a y  c o nc lude  th a t  one o r  m o re  of th e  p a r t ie s  o r  issues is 
n o t  p ro p e r ly  b e fo re  it, a n d  dec line  to a d d re s s  t h a t  p a r ty  o r  issue.
m a y  re fu s e  to  h e a r  p ro fe r re J  ev idence . A n d  I, m a y  d e n y  a 
r e m e d y  re q u e s te d .  E ach  of th ese  b e h a v io rs  is c o m p re h e n s ib le  
as a re sp o n se  to th e  d i s tu rb a n c e  in  th e  leve l  of d isp u t in g  w i th in  
th e  in s t i tu t io n ;  th is  re sp o n se  se rv e s  to  r e s to re  t h a t  level by 
dec id in g  th e  d ispu te ,  o r  th e  issues, b y  r e p ly in g  to th e  p a r t ie s ,  
o r  de a l in g  w ith  th e  ev idence , o r  b y  a n s w e r in g  a r e q u e s t  fo r  
relief . T he  resp o n se  m a y  a lso  r e d u c e  th e  leve l  of d isp u t in g  in  
th e  l a rg e r  socie ty ; b u t  as th e  in s t i tu t io n  is p ro g re s s iv e ly  d i f ­
f e r e n t ia te d ,  t h a t  co inc idence  of r e s u l t  becom es  less  l ike ly . I n ­
s tead , th e  in te rn a l  fu n c t io n a l  in te g ra t io n  of th e  in s t i tu t io n  
c re a te s  p a t t e r n s  of b e h a v io r  w h ic h  leave  th e  leve l  of d isp u t in g  
in  th e  l a rg e r  socie ty  (H + l)  u n to u c h e d ,  o r  e v e n  ad d  to that 
d isp u t in g ,  T h u s  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a te d  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  may be* 
«om e a~ c o m p le te  in v e rs io n  of i ts  u n d i f f e r e n t i a te d  c o u n t e r p a r t ^  
a g g ra v a t in g  d isp u te s  w h e r e  th e  l a t t e r  h a d  pac if ied  them .
c, Bureaucratization. W e b e r  assoc ia tes  c e r ta in  c h a r a c te r ­
is t ics  of p rocess  w i th  a  b u r e a u c r a t ic  s t r u c tu r e .  T hese  can be 
d iv id e d  in to  tw o  g e n e ra l  ca tego ries ,  e ff ic iency  a n d  c e r t a in ty . - "
T h e  e ff ic iency  o f  a d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  c an  be m e a s u re d  in terms 
of th e  t im e , e x p e n se ,  o r  e f f o r t - '2 e x p e n d e d  in  d ispos ing  of a 
d ispu te .  I t  is im p o r ta n t  to n o te  t h a t  on ly  costs in te r n a l  to the 
i n s t i tu t io n  a re  c o n se rv e d  — th e  t im e, etc., of  th e  intervener 
a n d  o th e r  spec ia lis ts ;  th e  p rocess  does n o t  m in im iz e  the ex­
p e n ses  of d i s p u ta n ts  o r  o th e r  uno ffic ia l  p a r t i c ip a n ts .213 Indeed , 
d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  m ay  be  fo u n d  w h ic h  represent the logical 
conc lus ion  of th is  ten d e n c y ,  p ro d u c in g  an operational surplus 
a f t e r  th e  costs  of t h e  specia lis ts  h a v e  b e e n  defrayed out of 
t h e  c o n tr ib u t io n s  of t h e  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts .2' 4 One source of 
eff ic iency  is  a n  e m p h a s is  on f in a l i ty :  econom y  is obviously 
a d v a n ce d  by r e fu s in g  to e n te r t a in  a d isp u te  beyond a certain 
p o in t .2' 5 H a r t ,  i t  is in te r e s t in g  to  obse rve ,  also c la im s  the virtue 
of e ff ic iency  fo r  h is  s e c o n d a ry  ru le s  of a d ju d ic a t io n  (1061: 94-95).
T h e  o th e r  c o n seq u e n c e  of b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n  — certainty — 
is a  c o m m o n p la c e  in  d iscuss ions  of m o d e rn  lega l  systems.21" 
W e b e r  a s se r ts  th a t  b u re a u c ra t ic  p rocesses  ra ise  to an  o p t im u m  
lev e l  such  q u a l i t ie s  as “p rec is ion  . . . u n a m b ig u i ty ,  k n o w le d g e  
of files, c o n t in u i ty  . . . s t r ic t  s u b o rd in a t io n ” and  p r e d ic ta b i l i ty  
(G e r th  a n d  Mills, 1946: 206-07). A g a in  f in a l i ty  m ak e s  a s ig ­
n i f ic a n t  c o n tr ib u t io n ,  in su r in g  th a t  a decision, once a n n o u n c ed ,  
w i l l  n o t  be  a l te red .  A n d  he re ,  too, th e r e  is a s t r ik in g  a g re e m e n t  
w i th  H a r t ’s a s s e r t io n  t h a t  seco n d a ry  ru le s  of reco g n i t io n  d ispe l  
th e  u n c e r t a in ty  as to  w h ic h  social n o rm s  w ill  be r e s t a te d  b y  
th e  d isp u te  process , an d  in w h a t  w a y  th e y  w ill  be  m o d if ied  
(1961: 92-93).
2. O p e ra t io n a l  ind ices  of processual change. T h e s e  g e n ­
e ra l  q u a l i t ie s  — ra t io n a l iz a t io n ,  logical o r  a e s th e t ic  c ohe rence ,  
fu n c t io n a l  a d a p ta t io n ,  in tro v e rs io n  o r  im p e rm e a b i l i ty ,  e ff ic iency , 
f in a t i ty ,  a n d  c e r t a in ty  — can  be r e d u c e d  to m o re  p rec ise  m e a s ­
u r e m e n ts  in  n u m e ro u s  w ays . T he  fo llow ing  is a t e n t a t i v e  an d  
v e ry  p a r t ia l  list. I h a v e  n o t  s ta te d  e x p lic i t ly  h o w  e a ch  specific 
m e a s u r e m e n t  i l lu s t r a te s  one  of th e  g e n e ra l  q u a l i t ie s  b e c a u se  I 
be lieve  th e  in te rc o n n e c t io n  w il l  be  r e a s o n a b ly  obv ious. O ften ,  
m o re o v e r ,  a s in g le  o p e ra t io n  lends  w e ig h t  to se v e ra l  of t h e  ab­
s tra c t io n s ,  w h ic h  o v e r la p  to  a  la rg e  e x te n t ;  i t  m a y  e v e n  b e  t h a t  
so m e  of  th e  qu a l i t ie s  a re  i n s e p a r a b l e — d iffe re n t  w a y s  of s t a t ­
in g  th e  sa m e  th ing . I h a v e  t r ie d ,  w h e n e v e r  possib le , to express 
each  v a r i a b le  as  a q u a l i ty  w h ic h  in c re a se s  w i th  specialization, 
d if f e re n t ia t io n  an d  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n .  W h e re  th is  is intolerably
a w k w a r d  I h a v e  in s te a d  d e f in e d  th e  p o la r  e x tr e m e s ,  po le  “ a ” 
b e in g  t h e  p rocess  assoc ia ted  w i th  a n  u n d i f f e re n t ia te d ,  n on -  
b u r e a u c r a t ic  s t ru c tu re ,  a n d  “b ” b e in g  i ts  o p pos ite ;  t h e r e  is, of 
course , a  c o n t in u u m  b e tw e e n  th e m . F o r  c la r i ty  of ex p o s i t io n  I 
h a v e  o rg an iz ed  th is  d iscuss ion  of t h e  d isp u te  p ro ce ss  in to  s tages  
w h ich  a r e  ro u g h ly  c h ro n o logical. ( P r o c e s s u a l  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
n u m b e r e d  P i ,  P 2 , e t c . ,  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  th e m  f r o m  t h e  
s t r u c t u r a l  v a r i a b l e s ,  n u m b e r e d  S I ,  S 2 , e t c . ,  w h ic h  
w e r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  P a r t  V .A .  s u p r a . )
a. Initiative and control in the dispute.
PI. Where the intervener was proactive, he becom es  re a c t iv e .217
a. T h e  in te r v e n e r  a c t iv e ly  seeks  out confl ic t  in  th e  soc ie ty  • 
a n d  c h a n n e ls  it in to  i d isp u te ;  h e  co llects  information a b o u t  d is ­
p u te s  a n d  in te r v e n e s  o n  h is  o w n  initiative.218
b. T h e  b u r d e n  r e s ts  on  th e  d i s p u ta n ts  to  t r a n s f o r m  con ­
f l ic t  in to  d isp u te  a n d  to p r e s e n t  t h a t  d isp u te  to  th e  i n te r v e n e r .21 H
T h is  contrast b e tw e e n  activity  a n d  p a s s iv i ty  c h a ra c te r iz e s  th e  
b e h a v io r  of t h e  in te r v e n e r  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  d i s p u te  p rocess  — 
in  t h e  d e f in i t io n  of issues, m o b il iz a t io n  of ev idence , etc. — as 
w i l l  b e  seen  be lo w .220
P2. A t  th e  sa m e  t im e, h o w e v e r ,  a good dea l  of c o n tro l  o v e r  t h e  
cOurse of th e  d isp u te  sh if ts  f ro m  th e  d i s p u ta n ts  to  th e  i n t e r ­
v e n e r — c o n tro l  n o t  o n ly  ove r  ou tcom e, b u t  o v e r  e v e ry  s te p  of
th e  p rocess .221
P3. T h e  c o n ju n c t io n  of th e s e  tw o  fa c to rs  d e te rm in e s  t h e  p e ­
c u l ia r  a t t i t u d e  of th e  in te r v e n e r  to w a rd s  a  s e t t l e m e n t  a r r i v e d
a t  b y  th e  p a r t ie s .
P 3.1. B ecause  th e  in te r v e n e r  seeks  c o n tro l  o v e r  b e h a v io r  w i th in  
t h e  d i s p u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  n e i th e r  o n e  p a r ty  a lone , n o r  th e  tw o  
p a r t ie s  in  c o n c e r t ,222 c an  w i t h d r a w  th e  d isp u te  f ro m  th e  in s t i ­
t u t io n  w i th o u t  h is  a p p ro v a l .
3.2. B u t  b e c a u s e  th e  in te r v e n e r  seeks  to  m in im iz e  h is  ac ­
t iv i ty ,  h e  e n c o u ra g e s  p a r t ie s  to  r e a c h  a  s e t t l e m e n t  be tw een  
th em se lv e s .
P3.3. T he  n e t  r e s u l t  is a  v a r i e ty  of dev ices  d e s ig n e d  to  fac i l i ­
t a t e  s e t t le m e n t  b e tw e e n  th e  p a r t ie s  a f t e r  t h e y  h a v e  in v o k e d  
th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,223 w h i le  a l lo w in g  th e  i n te r v e n e r  a r ig h t  
to  d isa p p ro v e  th e  s e t t le m e n t :  such  dev ices  as p le a  b a rg a in in g ,  
a n d  p re - t r ia l  co n fe rence .  W ith  in c re a s in g  d i f fe re n t ia t io n ,  th is  
r ig h t  becom s a m e re  fo rm a l i ty ,  a n d  is e x e rc is e d  less  o f te n .224
b. Concept of wrong.
P4. T h e  u n iv e r s e  of s u b s ta n t iv e  n o rm s  in v o lv e d  in  t h e  d isp u te  
p rocess  diverges- f ro m  t h a t  e m p lo y e d  b y  th e  soc ie ty  a t  la rg e ;  
la w  is d i s t in g u is h e d  f ro m  o th e r  n o rm s  — h a b it ,  cus tom , m o r ­
a l i ty .225
P4.1. N o t  a ll  social n o rm s  a re  reco g n ized  in  t h e  d i s p u te  p rocess  
a n d  th e  f ra c t io n  so reco g n ize d  c o n tin u o u s ly  dec reases .- - '1 A t  t h e  
s a m e  t im e, t h e  p rocess  in c re a s in g ly  deve lops  n o rm s  p e c u l ia r  to 
i tse lf ;  as a c o n seq u e n c e  th e  to ta l  co rp u s  of n o rm s  ex p a n d s .  
T hese  tw o  te n d e n c ie s  c o m b in e  to  p ro d u c e  a n  e so te r ic  b o d y  of 
no rm s, k n o w n  o n ly  to  in te r v e n e r s  a n d  o th e r  specia lis ts .
P.4.2, T h e  contend of e ach  n o rm , w h ic h  h a d  b e e n  f le x ib le  a n d  
a d a p ta b le  10  th e  peculiarities  of th e  case, b eco m es  f ix e d  in  t h e  
fo rm  of a g e n e ra l  ru le  ap p lic ab le  to  a il  “ l ik e ’7 cases. T h e  n u m ­
b e r  of C'-. ■ ■ w h ic h  <ro seen  to be  a like , a n d  th u s  g o v e rn e d  by  
th e  sa m e  n o rm , in c re ase s .227
P4.3. N o rm s  w h ic h  w e re  o ra l  a n d  v a g u e  a re  d e f in e d  in  w r i t in g  
w i th  g re a t  p rec is ion .2-8 W h e n  th e  u n d i f f e r e n t i a te d  in s t i tu t io n  
m u s t  h a n d le  prec ise , w r i t t e n  no rm s , it  t r e a t s  t h e m  as c u s tom , 
w ith o u t  m u c h  a t t e n t io n  to  t h e i r  e x a c t  w o rd in g ,2-" th e  d i f f e r e n ­
t ia te d  inst i tu t io n ,  on its  ow n , r e p h ra s e s  c u s to m  in  th e  la n g u a g e  
of s ta tu te s .23" T h e  c r im in a l  s t a tu te  o r  a d m in is t r a t iv e  r e g u la t io n  
d isp laces  th e  p ro v e rb  as a r c h e ty p e  fo r  all no rm s .  T h is  n o t  o n ly  
f u r th e r s  c e r ta in ty  an d  ease  of a d ju d ic a t io n ,  b u t  re l iev e s  th e  
in te rv e n e r  of h a v in g  to e x e rc ise  a d isc re t io n  w h ic h  m ig h t  l e a d  
to  a  rep r im a n d .-* 1
P4.4. U n c e r ta in ty  w h e th e r  a g iven  n o rm  w il l  be  rec o g n ize d  
also d ec reases  as  th e  body  of n o r m s  is m o re  c le a r ly  c i r c u m ­
sc r ib e d .21*2
P4.5. T h e  body  of n o rm s  is e la b o ra te d  so t h a t  it  becom es  e x ­
h a u s t iv e ,  a n d  o rg an iz ed  a c co rd in g  to som e log ica l  schem a. T he  
cod if ica t ion  o r  r e s t a t e m e n t  becom es  th e  p a ra d ig m  of a  n o r m a ­
t iv e  s y s te m .238
P5. T h e  a p p ro p r ia t e  c oncep ts  of w ro n g  h a d  e m e r g e d  p ie c e m e a l  
f ro m  a d iscuss ion  of th e  d isp u te  a m o n g  th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  to 
w h ic h  a ll  h a d  c o n tr ib u te d .  N ow  the  b u r d e n  is p laced  on e a ch  
p a r ty  to in v o k e  th e  n o rm s  on w h ic h  he  re l ies ,  o f fe n s iv e ly  or 
d e fens ive ly ,  a t  th e  o u tse t  of th e  d ispu te .  A n  e r r o r  in th e  se lec ­
t io n  of a  n o rm  w ill  h av e  in c re a s in g ly  se r io u s  c o n seq u e n c e s  —
r a n g in g  f ro m  a d d it io n a l  e x p e n se  u p  to  a n d  in c lu d in g  loss of 
t h e  d isp u te  — a n d  re c t if ic a t io n  of e r r o r  b ecom es  m o re  d iff icu lt ,  
e v e n  im p o ss ib le .234
c. D e f in i t io n  o f  issues*
P6. B ecause  th e  n o rm a t iv e  u n iv e r s e  has  ch an g ed ,  c e r ta in  of th e  
issues  on w h ic h  th e  o u tco m e  d e p e n d s  w ill  a lso be  u n iq u e  to 
t h e  in s t i tu t io n .  I t  h a s  b e e n  said, fo r  in s ta n c e ,  t h a t  th e  concep t  
of m ens rea on ly  a p p e a rs  in  m o re  d i f f e re n t ia te d  sy s te m s  (e.g., 
D rib e rg ,  1934: 235; H opk ins ,  1962: 2-3).
P7. T h e  n u m b e r  of s u b s ta n t iv e  issues  e n te r ta in e d  b y  the in­
t e r v e n e r  dec lines ;-35 on ly  th o se  issues  e s se n t ia l  to  a decision
a re  t r e a te d  (see generally  B ickel, 1962).
P8. In d iv id u a l  issues  a re  d e f in e d  m o re  n a r r o w ly  a n d  pre­
c ise ly .-30 T h e  c r im in a l  c h a rg e  e n u m e r a t in g  a c le a r ly  c i r c u m ­
s c r ib e d  lis t of e le "  crps  a n d  the  * e f in em en ts  of civil p lead in g ,  
a re  th e  m odels  (cf. P o u n d ,  1928 ),
P9. M u lt ip le  issues a re  jo in e d  on ly  if th e  p ro p o n e n t  can  d e m o n ­
s t r a te  a close r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th em .
P10. T h e  in te r v e n e r  re sp o n d s  on ly  to issues  p laced  b e fo re  h im  
b y  th e  p a r t ie s ,  e v e n  if th o se  a re  su p e rf ic ia l ;  h e  w il l  no t,  sua  
spon te ,  seek  to  u n c o v e r  m o re  fu n d am e n ta l  issues  w h ic h  m a y  
u n d e r l ie  th e  d isp u te .237
P i t .  P r o c e d u ra l  issues  te n d  to  re p la c e  s u b s ta n t iv e ;  in te r e s t  
sh if ts  f ro m  th e  o u ts id e  w o r ld  to th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  i tse lf .238 
P I2 .  T h e  r a n g e  of issues  is d e f in e d  e a r ly  in th e  d isp u te  p rocess  
a n d  c a n n o t  eas i ly  be e x p a n d e d  th e r e a f t e r ,  n o r  can  th e  p a r t ie s  
c o n t r a c t  t h e  issues  u n i la te r a l ly .
d. Participation of disputants.
P13. T h e  p a r t ie s  w il l  be  l im ite d  in  n u m b e r ,  u s u a l ly  to  two. 
A d d it io n a l  p a r t i e s  w i l l  on ly  be  a l lo w e d  to  p a r t ic ip a te  if t h e y  
a r e  c lose ly  r e l a t e d  to th o se  a l r e a d y  in v o lv e d .230 G ro u p s  c a n n o t  
d isp u te ;  th e y  m u s t  id e n t i fy  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  to ac t  fo r  t h e m .240 
P14. T h e  d i s p u ta n ts  no lo n g e r  p la y  in te r c h a n g e a b le  ro les. T h e  
ro les  of p la in t i f f  a n d  d e fe n d a n t  becom e  d e m a rc a te d ,  f ixed , a n d  
c le a r ly  de fined . A  d e fe n d a n t  w ill  n o t  b e  a l lo w e d  to  a s se r t  an
in d e p e n d e n t  c la im  a n d  th u s  r e v e r s e  th o se  ro le s .241 
P15. T he  d e f in i t io n  o f  w h o  is a p r o p e r  p a r t y  to  a  d isp u te  will 
change . P e r so n s  p e rc e iv e d  b y  socie ty  as a g g r ie v ed  w il l  n o t  be
p e r m i t t e d  to  a p p e a r  in  th e  d isp u te .242 A c tions  b r o u g h t  in  a 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  c a p ac i ty  a r e  d isc o u ra g ed ;  in  o r d e r  to  r e d u c e  the 
scope  of t h e  d ispu te ,  t h e  p e rs o n  w h o  h a s  b e e n  in ju r e d  b ecom es  
th e  sole p a r ty  in  in te r e s t .243 H o w e v e r ,  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  b y  a pro­
fess ional,  w h o  is an  offic ia l  o r  quas i-o ff ic ia l  m e m b e r  of th e  
in s t i tu t io n ,  in c re ase s  th e  c o n tro l  of th e  in s t i tu t io n  o v e r  t h e  dis­
p u te  a n d  is t h e r e fo r e  e n c o u ra g e d .244 T h e  m o s t  s t r ik in g  instance, 
of course , is t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  of a n o t io n  of crime out of a  
n o t io n  of civ il  w ro n g :245 t h e  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of a single injury 
in to  tw o  d is t in c t  in ju r ie s i  o n e  to  t h e  v ic t im , t h e  other to a  
l a r g e r  co llec t iv ity ,  each  of  w h ic h  m a y  be redressed in  different 
w ays . A t  ; h e  e ;trerr 3 , t h e  in s t i tu t io n  c re a te s  parties who h a v e  
n o  e x is te n c e  o u ts id e  i t .240
e. T e m p o ra l  l im ita t io n .
P16. D e la y  b  * a  r  p u t a n t  in  p r e s e n t in g  his grievance to t h e  
d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  com es to  a ffec t  t h e  o u tc o m e  regardless of 
w h e th e r  0 r n o t  t h e  .ielay h a s  h a d  c o n seq u e n c e s  o u ts id e  the in­
s t i tu t io n ,  e.g., in ju r io u s  r e l ia n c e  b y  a n  a d v e r s a ry  o r  b y  another 
p e rso n .
P17. W h a t  c o n s t i tu te s  a  s ig n if ic a n t  t im e  p e r io d  is calculated 
in  t e r m s  of s im p le  ch ro n o lo g y  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e te r m in e d  by  th e
c o u rse  of ev en ts .
P I8 .  T h e  p e r io d  b ecom es  sh o r te r .
Plf). T h e  p e r io d  loses i ts  f le x ib i l i ty  a n d  b ecom es  f ixed .
P20. D e lay  is no lo n g e r  m e r e ly  a d a tu m ,  f ro m  w h ic h  in fe re n c e s  
m a y  be d r a w n  a b o u t  th e  u n a v a i la b i l i ty  of ev idence , o r  th e  
in v a l id i ty  of th e  c la im  (A.L. E pste in ,  1954: 1 4 ) — a n d  w h ic h  
th e re fo re  m a y  b e  poss ib le  to  e x p la in  a w a y  — b u t  becom es  an  
u l t im a te  fac t  d e te rm in in g  ou tcom e.
P21. T h e  l im ita t io n  m a y  b a r  u n c o n t r o v e r t e d  as w e l l  as c o n t ro ­
v e r t e d  c la im s.
a. T he  in te r v e n e r  w i l l  r e fu s e  to c o n s id e r  s ta le  c la im s  o n ly  
w h e n  l iab il i ty  i tse lf  is in issue.
b. T h e  in te r v e n e r  w i l l  a lso r e j e c t  c la im s  in  w h ic h  l ia b i l i ty  
is a d m i t t e d  a n d  th e  on ly  issues  a re  t h e  m a g n i tu d e  of t h e  ac ­
k n o w le d g e d  o b l ig a tio n  a n d  t h e  e x te n t  to  w h ic h  i t  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  
fu lf il led .
P22. E ven  if a d i s p u ta n t  p r e s e n ts  a t im e ly  c la im  to  t h e  in ­
s t i tu t io n ,  th e  i n te r v e n e r  m ay  l a te r  d ism iss  i t  if t h e  d i s p u ta n t
cjoes not p re s s  th e  c la im  w i th  su ff ic ie n t  e n e rg y ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
h is  a d v e r s a r y  ra ise s  a n  o b jec t io n  of d i la to r in es s .247
f. A t t e n d a n c e  by  th e  d isp u ta n ts .
P23. a. T h e  in te r v e n e r  w i l l  n o t  p ro c e e d  in  t h e  a bsence  of any 
of t h e  d isp u ta n ts .
b . T h e  in te r v e n e r  w il l  s ti l l  t r y  to  r e a c h  th e  m e r i t s  of t h e  
d i s p u te  a l th o u g h  a p a r ty  is m iss in g  (A.L. E p s te in ,  ,1952: 7);  as ' 
t h e  s t r u c tu r e  is f u r t h e r  d i f f e re n t ia te d  h e  m a y  u l t im a te ly  dec ide  
a g a in s t  th e  a b s e n t  p a r t y  b y  re a so n  of his ab sen ce  a lone ,248 o r  
h a v e  h im  b r o u g h t  to th e  fo ru m  b y  fo rce .240 
P24. T h e  co n v e rse  of p ro p o s i t io n  P23 is also t ru e .
a. The in terye  n e r  w i l l  a lw a y s  h e a r  a d isp u te  if th e  d is ­
p u ta n t s  a r e  p re se n t .
b . T h e  in te r v e n e r  m a y  n o t  ac t  despite their p rese n c e ,  fo r  
r e a s o n s  of h is  o w r  ( th e  p re s s  of bus iness ,  the absence of k e y  
w i tn es se s ,  e tc .) ,
P25. In  o r d e r  to  se t  as ide  an  ex  parte  j u d g m e n t ,  a  disputant:
Will h a v e  to  e x p e n d  m o re  t im e  a n d  m oney , a n d  s u b s ta n t ia te
one  a m o n g  a l im ite d  n u m b e r  of w e ig h ty  ex cu ses .230
g. Reception of evidence*
P26. a. E v id e n c e  m a y  affec t  a d isp u te  w i th o u t  b e in g  fo rm a l ly  a d m i t t e d  
i.e., t h e  in te r v e n e r  m a y  ac t u p o n  p r io r  kno w led g e ,  o r  on in fo r ­
m a t io n  h e  o b ta in s  o u ts id e  h is  ro le  afc in te r v e n e r  in th e  d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n .  Indeed , th e  less d i f f e re n t ia te d  t h e  in s t i tu t io n ,  th e  
m o re  in fo r m a t io n  th e  in te r v e n e r  is l ik e ly  to have .
b. T h e  in te r v e n e r  m ay  o n ly  rece iv e  e v id e n c e  w h i le  oc­
c u p y in g  h is  ro le  w i th in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  a n d  m a y  n o t  
c o n s id e r  ev id e n c e  o b ta in e d  in  o th e r  capac i t ie s .25’ T h is  is in s u re d  
b y  in c re a s in g ly  fo rm a l  c o n s tr a in t s  u p o n  th e  r ec e p tio n  of ev i­
d en ce :  b y  n o t in g  th e  n a m e s  of w itnesses ,  r e c o rd in g  th e  c o n te n t  
of te s t im o n y ,  an d  re a d in g  i t  back  to th e m  fo r  ra t i f ic a t io n ;  by  
p r o h ib i t in g  one p a r ty  f ro m  a d d re s s in g  th e  in te r v e n e r  in th e  
a b sen c e  o f  t h e  o th e r ;  by  in su r in g  t h a t  th e  in te r v e n e r  is ig n o ra n t  
of t h e  d i s p u te  a t  th e  in ce p t io n  of th e  h e a r in g  a n d  t h e r e a f t e r  
c o n tro l l in g  th e  in fo rm a t io n  h e  rece iv es .252
P27. T h e  s ta n d a r d  of w h a t  is r e l e v a n t  to re so lv e  a c o n tro ­
v e r t e d  issue  becom es  in c re a s in g ly  n a r r o w .253 T h e  in te r v e n e r  
is le s s  r e c e p t iv e  to c i r c u m s ta n t ia l  ev id e n c e  w h ic h  can  on ly  be
co n n e c te d  to th e  p o in t  a t  i s su e  by  a l e n g th y  se t of in fe ren c e s ;254 
h e  p re fe rs  e y e -w itn es s  t e s t im o n y  a b o u t  t h e  u l t im a te  fact. W h e re  
c i r c u m s ta n t ia l  ev id e n c e  is a llow ed , t h e  c h a in  of r e a so n in g  is 
r ig id  an d  d iv o rc e d  f ro m  th e  th o u g h t  p a t t e r n s  of n o n -sp e ­
c ia lis ts .255
P28. T he  s ta n d a r d  of w h a t  is ad m iss ib le  a lso  becom es  in ­
c re a s in g ly  s t r in g e n t .
P28.1. C e r ta in  ev idence , o th e rw is e  m a te r i a l  a n d  re le v a n t ,  m a y  
b e  e x c lu d e d  p rec ise ly  b e c a u se  it  o ffe rs  a  f o u n d a t io n  fo r  i n f e r ­
ences  co m m o n  ou ts ide  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  b u t  w h ic h  th e  
in s t i tu t io n  has  fo rec lo sed  as im p e rm iss ib le ,250 o r  becau se  it  
le a d s  to  f a c tu a l  conc lus ions  w h ic h  th e  i n s t i tu t io n  h as  r e j e c te d  
as i r r e le v a n t .257
P28.2, C e r ta in  ev id e n c e  m a y  be  e x c lu d e d  u p o n  th e  r a t io n a le
th a t ,  by  d o ing  so, th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  a d v a n c e s  o th e r  s u b ­
s ta n t iv e  goals .258
P29, C e r ta in  u l t im a te  fac ts  com e t o  require  t h e  p ro o f  o f  c e r ­
ta in  p r o x im a te  fac ts ;  o th e r  ev idence , no m a t t e r  h o w  p e rsu a s iv e ,  
is s im p ly  in su f f ic ien t .250 T h u s  t re a s o n  r e q u i r e s  tw o  e y e -w i t ­
nesses; hom ic ide , a  c o rp u s  de lic ti ;  a n d  ra p e ,  c o r ro b o ra t io n  of
t h e  v ic t im ’s te s t im o n y .
P30. T h e  o r d e r  in w h ic h  ev id e n c e  is r e c e iv e d  g ro w s  in  im ­
p o r ta n c e ,200 to  t h e  p o in t  w h e r e  c e r ta in  e v id e n c e  w il l  n o t  be 
h e a rd  u n t i l  o th e r  ev id e n c e  has  b een  p re se n te d .
P31. L im its  a re  p lac e d  on th e  q u a n t i ty  of e v id e n c e  w h ic h  w il l
b e  rec e iv e d ;  r e p e t i t io n  is d iscou raged .
P32. P a r t ic ip a t io n  in  a d isp u te  be fo re  an  u n d i f f e r e n t i a te d  i n ­
s t i tu t io n  is g o v e rn e d  b y  th e  s a m e  c o n s tra in ts  as w o u ld  in f lu e n c e  
b e h a v io r  o c c u r r in g  o u ts id e  th e  in s t i tu t io n .  As th e  in s t i tu t io n  is 
d i f f e re n t ia te d ,  p a r t ic ip a t io n  is sh ie ld e d  f ro m  so m e  of th e se  
c o n s t r a in t s  a n d  s u b je c te d  to  o th e r s  p e c u l ia r  to  t h e  in s t i tu t io n .  
P32.1. a. P r e s e n t in g  e v id e n c e  to  th e  i n te r v e n e r  is a  v o lu n ta r y  
a c t  w h ich  a  p e rso n  p e r f o r m s  o u t  of s e l f - in te re s t  o r  a sense  of 
lo y a l ty  to t h e  p a r ty  h e  is s u p p o r t in g ;  e q u a l ly ,  a  w i tn e s s  m a y  
d ec line  to  te s t i fy  o u t  of a sense  of lo y a l ty  o r  fo r  o th e r  reasons . 
C o n se q u e n tly ,  a p a r ty  ca lls  w i tn e s se s  p a r t i a l  to  h im , a n d  does 
n o t  ca ll  a ho s ti le  w i tn e s s .201
b. P r e s e n t in g  e v id e n c e  becom es  a d u ty  o w e d  to  t h e  in s t i ­
tu t io n ;  it  c an  a n d  w il l  be  c o m p e l le d .202 P a r t i e s  do call h o s t i le
w itn esse s ;  on t h e  o th e r  h a n d ,  a w i tn e s s  m a y  be  b a r r e d  f ro m  
te s t i fy in g  b e c au se  of h is  b ias  in  f a v o r  of a  p a r t y  (see, e.g., 
F ish e r ,  1971: 737). ;
P32.2. a. B ecau se  of t h e  p u b l ic i ty  of t h e  p roceed ings ,  a  w i t ­
n e ss  w h o  te s t if ie s  b e fo re  t h e  i n te r v e n e r  w ill  su f fe r  t h e  sa m e  
social co n seq u en ces  as h e  w o u ld  h a d  he  d iscussed  th o se  issues  
o u ts id e  t h e  d isp u te  s t r u c tu r e :  n a m e ly ,  t h e  d if fu se  in fo r m a l  san c ­
t io n s  of p u b l ic  op in ion .
b. T h e  d i f f e r e n t i a te d  in s t i tu t io n  p ro te c ts  a  w i tn e s s  f ro m -  
th e  o rd in a ry  co n seq u en ces  of te s t ify in g , b y  a g r a n t  of p r iv i le g e  
a m o n g  o th e r  th in g s .203 Less p u b l ic i ty  a t t e n d s  th e  h e a r in g  w h ic h  
m ay ,  occasionally , be  h e ld  in camera.204
b . E v a lu a t io n  of ev id en ce ,  \  *
h.l. K in d s  of evidence.
P 33, A p re fe re n c e  fo r  r e a l  e v id e n c e 205 is s u p e rs e d e d  b y  a p r e f e r ­
en ce  fo r  te s t im on ia l .  In s te a d  of o b jec ts  f ro m  th e  o u ts id e  w o r ld  
e n te r in g  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  o r  be ing  v iew e d  b y  th e  in te r -  
y e n e r  in situ  (as in la n d  d isp u te s ) ,  p a r t i e s  a n d  w i tn e s se s  te l l  
t h e  in te r v e n e r  a b o u t  th e se  th in g s .200
P34. W r i t te n  ev id e n c e  becom es  m o re  p e rs u a s iv e  t h a n  t e s t i ­
m o n y .207
P35. T h e re  is in c re a s in g  re l ian c e  on e x p e r t  ev id e n c e  in  p lace  
of lay t e s t im o n y ; '0* u l t im a te ly ,  e x p e r t  t e s t im o n y  m a y  be  e s se n ­
tia l  to p ro v e  c e r ta in  issues. E x p e r ts  f r e q u e n t ly  becom e ass im i­
la te d  to th e  body  of offic ia ls  w i th in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n .-00 
PS*), a. A cts  a n d  s ta t e m e n ts  w h ic h  occu r  d u r in g  n o rm a l  
social in te rc o u rs e  ou ts id e  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  a r e  acco rded  
g r e a te r  W eight.-7" T e s t im o n y  b e fo re  th e  in te r v e n e r  is d isc o u n te d  
by  reason  of th e  s u b s ta n t ia l  t e m p ta t io n  to  p e r ju r y  in  th e  h e a t  
of co n tro v e rsy .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  in o r d e r  to  p ro v e  t h a t  C is th e  
th ie f ,  B says  to th e  in te rv e n e r :  “ A to ld  m e  y e s te r d a y  [i.e., 
ou ts ide  the  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ]  t h a t  h e  sa w  C h id e  th e  S to len  
goods.” T he  in te r v e n e r  w ill  t e n d  to  b e liev e  t h a t  he  has  c r i te r ia ,  
d r a w n  from  o rd in a ry  social in te rc o u rse ,  by  w h ic h  to e v a lu a te  
th e  t r u th  of A ’s a l le g ed  s ta te m e n t ;  b u t  th e s e  c r i t e r ia  do n o t  
ap p ly  to B ’s ac cu sa t io n  w i th in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  a b o u t  
w h ic h  h e  w ill  be  m o re  dub ious.
b* S ta te m e n ts  m a d e  w i th in  t h e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  a c q u ire
g r e a t e r  s ign if icance  b e c au se  of th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  fo r  th e  i n t e r ­
v e n e r  to  e v a lu a te  th e m  h im se lf .  B ecause  th e  in te r v e n e r  in  th e  
a b o v e  e x a m p le  h as  h e a rd  B ’s accusa tion  h im se lf ,  h e  be lieves  
h e  is ab le  to e v a lu a te  i ts  v e ra c i ty .  B u t  h e  h a s  no t  h e a rd  A ’s 
a l le g ed  asse r t ion , n o r  do th e  s ta n d a rd s  of th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  
g o v e rn  s ta t e m e n ts  m a d e  o u ts id e  it; t h e re fo re  h e  w ill  te n d  
to feel d isab led  f ro m  p a ss in g  u p o n  th e  c o n te n t  of t h a t  assertion . 
U l t im a te ly ,  th is  d isa b i l i ty  w i l l  lead  h im  to e x c lu d e  ev idence  
c o n c e rn in g  s ta t e m e n ts  m a d e  o u ts id e  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  w h e n  
th o se  s ta t e m e n ts  a re  o f fe red  to p ro v e  th e  t r u t h  of th e  m a t t e r  
a s s e r t e d — as r e q u i r e d  by  th e  h e a r s a y  ru le .271
h.2. S ta n d a r d  of v e rn c i ty .
P37, T h e  n o rm  i ts e lf  changes .
a. T he  o b l ig a tio n  to te l l  th e  t r u t h  d u r in g  th e  h e a r in g  of
th e  d isp u te  do s no t d r  fcr  s ig n if ic a n t ly  f rom  e x p e c ta t io n s  a b o u t  
v e ra c i ty  in  o th e r  social s i tu a t io n s  (A L. E pste in , 1954: 16). T he  
v a lu e  of t ru th fu ln e s s  r  o n ly  one  a m o n g  a n u m b e r  of co m p e t in g  
in fluences ,  a n d  m a y  bow  b e fo re  p e rso n a l  lo y a l ty  to  one  d is­
p u t a n t  o r  sp ite  to w a rd s  a n o th e r ,  th e  d es ire  to c u r r y  f a v o r  or 
r e p a y  a deb t.
b. T h e  d e m a n d  fo r  t r u t h f u l  te s t im o n y  becom es  m o re  e x ­
p l ic i t  and  m ore  ab so lu te ;  fa lsehood  w i th in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu ­
t io n  is t r a n s fo rm e d  f ro m  a m o ra l  in f ra c t io n  in to  a  c r im e  —
p e r ju r y .272
P38. T h e  m e a n s  of in s u r in g  v e ra c i ty  change.
a. P r im a r y  re l ia n c e  is u p o n  n o rm s  of t ru th fu ln e s s ,  i n t e r n a l ­
ized  d u r in g  socia liza tion  a n d  l a te r  re in fo rc e d  by  d if fu se  social 
sanctions. W ith  in c re as in g  d i f fe re n t ia t io n ,  s u p e r n a tu r a l  s a n c ­
t ions  m a y  be  su p e r im p o se d ,  th o u g h  on ly  in f re q u e n t ly ,  in im ­
p o r ta n t  an d  d if f icu l t  cases w h e r e  th e  ev id en ce  is inconc lu s ive ;  
t h e y  a re  in v o k ed  by  o a th  or a c tu a l ly  in f l ic ted  by  o rdea l ,  on ly  
on th e  pa: ties th em se lv es .  T h o u g h  th e y  m ay  be  a d m in is t e re d  
by th e  in te rv e n e r ,  th e  o u tco m e  is f r e q u e n t ly  b e y o n d  h is  co n ­
t ro l - 73 a n d  occurs  a f te r  th e  fo rm a l  h e a r in g  has  c o n c lu d e d  a n d  
th e  d i s p u ta n ts  h a v e  p assed  o u t  of h is  ju r isd ic tio n .
b. T h e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  develops its  o w n  d is t in c t iv e  
m e c h a n ism s  fo r  in s u r in g  v e ra c i ty .  E v e ry  p a r t ic ip a n t  —  w i tn e s se s  
as w e l l  as p a r t i e s 274 —  ta k e s  an  o a th  to te l l  th e  t r u t h  in  e v e ry  
case. B re a c h  of t h a t  o a th  is n o  lo n g e r  le f t  to  s u p e r n a tu r a l  p u n ­
i sh m e n t .  R a th e r ,  p e r j u r y  is d e te r r e d  b y  th e  sa m e  sa n c t io n s  w h ic h  
t h e  d is p u te  p ro ce s s  im p o se s  fo r  s u b s ta n t iv e  o ffenses .275 A t  f irs t ,  
t h e  i n t e r v e n e r  p u n i s h e s  p e r j u r y  as i t  occu rs  d u r in g  th e  h e a r in g ;  
b u t  as  t h e  in s t i tu t io n  is f u r t h e r  d i f f e re n t ia te d ,  th e  is su e  of 
p e r j u r y  b e c o m e s  a  s e p a r a te  d ispu te ,  to  be  h e a rd  a n d  d isposed  
o f  b y  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  in te r v e n e r .
h.3. Means of evaluation.
P39. T h e  b u r d e n  of p ro o f  becom es  in c re a s in g ly  r ig id .270 
P39.1. a. E v e r y  p a r t i c ip a n t  in  t h e  d isp u te ,  in c lu d in g  th e  in­
t e r v e n e r ,  s h a re s  a n  e q u a l  o b l ig a tio n  to  c o n t r ib u te  in fo rm a t io n  
r e l e v a n t  to  t h e  d isp u te .
b. T h is  o b l ig a t  m  is p lac e d  wholly on one of the disputants 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  e v e r y  m a te r i a l  issue.
P39.2. T h e  d e m a n d s  of th e  b u r d e n  a re  m o re  c le a r ly  defined. 
P39.3. T h e  a m o u m  of ev id e n c e  r e q u i r e d  to  sa tis fy  it  is g rea te r .  
P39.4. T h e  b u r d e n  of p ro o f  as  a s ta t e m e n t  of p ro b a b i l i t ie s  a b o u t  
w h a t  o c c u r r e d :
a. T h e  p a r t y  a rg u in g  th e  less p ro b a b le  cha in  of events —
i.e., t h e  on e  m o r e  c o n t r a r y  to o r d in a r y  e x p e c ta t io n s  — b e a rs  
t h e  o n u s  of c o n v in c in g  th e  in te r v e n e r  t h a t  h is  v e rs io n  is co r­
r e c t .
b. T h e  p ro b a b i l i s t i c  o r ig in  is p ro g re s s iv e ly  fo rg o t te n .  T h e  
p a  ty  a d v a n c in g  a c o n te n t io n ,  w h e t h e r  com m on-sens ica l  o r  e x ­
t r a o r d in a r y ,  m u s t  p ro v e  it. E x p e c ta t io n s  dev e lo p  w i th in  th e  
i n s t i tu t io n  c o n c e rn in g  w h o  w ill  a d v a n c e  evidence} th e se  becom e 
d e m a n d s  w h ic h  c a n n o t  be  sa tis f ied  s im p ly  by sh o w in g  t h a t  th e  
p r o p o n e n t  is  f a v o r e d  b y  p ro bab il i t ie s .
P39.5. T h e  b u r d e n  of p ro o f  as a s ta t e m e n t  of p ro b a b i l i t ie s  a b o u t
w h o  is m o re  l ik e ly  to  h a v e  th e  ev idence :
a. F a i lu r e  to  p r o d u c e  ev id e n c e  w h ic h  a d i s p u ta n t  is b e ­
l ie v e d  l ik e ly  to  possess m a y  be t h e  bas is  fo r  a  c i r c u m s ta n t ia l  
in fe re n c e  t h a t  t h e  e v id e n c e  is u n fa v o ra b le .
b. F a i lu r e  c a n  no  lo n g e r  be  e x c u se d  b y  sh o w in g  t h a t  th e  
d i s p u ta n t  lack s  t h e  e v id e n c e  fo r  good re a so n .277
P39.6. T h e  b u r d e n  of p ro o f  is m o re  f r e q u e n t ly  b a sed  on ease  
of access to  t h e  in fo rm a t io n  (^39.5, supra)  — a c o n s id e ra t io n  
w h o l ly  i n te r n a l  to  t h e  d i s p u te  in s t i tu t io n  — t h a n  on th e  p r o b a ­
b i l i ty  of e v e n ts  in  th e  o u ts id e  w o r ld  (P39.tt, s u p r a ) .278
P39.7. T h u s  th e  b u r d e n  of p roo f  is t r a n s fo r m e d  f ro m  a m o d e  
of in f e r e n t ia l  r e a s o n in g  w h ic h  i n te r p r e t s  th e  p re se n c e  o r  a b ­
sence  of ev id e n c e  as s u g g e s t in g  c e r ta in  o th e r  fac ts ,  in to  a  
m e c h a n is m  fo r  dec id ing  th e  e n t i r e  d ispu te .
P40. W h e n  th e  ev id e n c e  is in co n c lu s iv e  be c au se  w h o l ly  a b ­
s e n t  o r  e q u a l ly  p e rs u a s iv e  e i t h e r  w a y :
a. T h e  in te r v e n e r  r e f e r s  th e  d isp u te  to th e  s u p e rn a tu ra l ,  
a b a n d o n in g  c o n tro l  o v e r  th e  o u tco m e  (see, e.g., J. R o b e r ts ,  1965; 
M idd le ton , 1966).
b. T h e  d isp u te  is d e c id e d  b y  th e  b u r d e n  of p roof, a  r u le  
in te r n a l  to  th e  process.
P41. T h e re  is a sh if t  in  t h e  f r a m e  of r e fe re n c e  u se d  to  e v a lu a te  
te s t im o n y ,  f ro m  a r e f e r e n t  e x t e r n a l  to  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  
to  a n  in te rn a l  r e fe re n t .
a. T e s t im o n y  a b o u t  b e h a v io r  is c o m p a re d  w i th  c o m m o n ly  
h e ld  e x p e c ta t io n s  a b o u t  m o d a l  b e h a v io r  w h ic h  w o u ld  occu r  in  
s im i la r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  th e  o u ts id e  w o r ld .270
b. E x p e c ta t io n s  a re  s t i l l  u se d  to e v a lu a te  te s t im o n y ,  b u t  
n o w  th e y  a re  e x p e c ta t io n s  c o n c e rn in g  m o d a l  b e h a v io r  w ith in  
t h e  d isp u te  p ro c e s s :280 th e  d e m e a n o r  of a w i tn e s s  is c o m p a re d  
w i th  th a t  of th e  m o d a l  a f f ia n t  in  o r d e r  to d e te rm ine  v e ra c i ty .  
F u r th e r m o r e ,  th e  to ta l i ty  of s ta t e m e n ts  m a d e  to th e  i n te r v e n e r  
a b o u t  a g iven  issue  is c a re fu l ly  s c ru t in iz e d  fo r  in te r n a l  c o n ­
s is tency . W h e re  te s t im o n y  p re s e n te d  to th e  in te r v e n e r  co n ­
t ra d ic t s  s ta t e m e n ts  m a d e  o u ts id e  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  th e  
f o rm e r  rec e iv e  g r e a te r  c redence . U l t im a te ly ,  th e  in te r v e n e r  m a y  
d is r e g a rd  ev idence  from  a d i s p u ta n t  o r  h is  w i tn es s  w h ic h  co n ­
t ro v e r t s  te s t im o n y  p re s e n te d  e a r l ie r  to th e  s a m e  in te r v e n e r ,  
o r  e v e n  to  a n o th e r  w i th in  t h e  s a m e  sy s te m .281
P42. W h e n  e x p e c ta t io n s  a b o u t  b e h a v io r  o c c u r r in g  o u ts ide  th e  
in s t i tu t io n  a re  u se d  to  e v a lu a te  te s t im o n y ,  those  e x p e c ta t io n s  
a r e  p e c u lia r  to t h e  in s t i tu t io n :  th e  in fe re n c e s  a re  s u b s ta n t iv e ly  
d i f fe re n t ,  a n d  also m o re  r ig id .282
P43. a. T h e  i n te r v e n e r  ac t iv e ly  seeks  to assess t r u t h  an d  
fa ls i ty .
b . T h e  in te r v e n e r  is passive . H e  re l ie s  on  th e  d i s p u ta n ts  
to  a d d u c e  a ll  th e  ev idence , a n d  e v a lu a te s  th e i r  e ffor ts  (i.e., 
b e h a v io r  in s ide  th e  d isp u te  In s t i tu t io n ) ,  r a t h e r  th a n  th e  e v i­
den ce  itself, u s in g  c r i t e r ia  in te r n a l  to th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,
su c h  as b u r d e n  of proof, es toppe l,  an d  p re su m p tio n s .
P44. If  th e  in te r v e n e r  d e te rm in e s  t h a t  c e r ta in  ev id e n c e  is 
f a l s e ^ b y  a n y  of th e  m e th o d s  j u s t  d iscussed , t h e  co nsequences  
h e  im poses  a re  in c re a s in g ly  serious . T hese  d e v e lo p  in  th e  fo l­
lo w in g  sequence : th e  in te r v e n e r  seeks to p e r s u a d e  th e  p a r ty  
to a d m i t  h is  fa lsehood  a n d  c o n c u r  in  th e  t r u t h  (see, e.g., A.L. 
E ps te in ,  1954: 11); th e  ev id e n c e  is s im p ly  d i s re g a rd e d ;  an  in ­
fe re n c e  is d r a w n  t h a t  th e  w i tn e s s  (an d  p e rh a p s  th e  p a r ty  fo r  
w h o m  h e  te s t if ie s )  is g e n e ra l ly  u n t r u s tw o r th y ,  w h ic h  a ffec ts  
t h e  w e ig h t  of o th e r  e v id e n c e ;28'' a ju d g m e n t  is e x p re s s e d  a b o u t  
th e  a f f ia n t  w h ich , if h e  is a p a r ty ,  m ay  in f lu e n c e  th e  ou tcom e; 
sa n c t io n s  a re  im posed  on  th e  a f f ia n t  in a  s e p a r a te  p ro ce e d in g  
( p e r ju ry  o r  c o n te m p t) .
45. O ne  m ig h t  s u m m a r iz e  th e  c h a n g es  d esc r ib ed  in  th e  p r e ­
c e d in g  sec tion  (h.3.) in  th e  fo llow ing  a b s t r a c t  fo rm u la :
a. D a ta  e x te r n a l  to t h e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  a re  used  to m a k e  
ju d g m e n ts  w i th in  it.
b . D a ta  i n te r n a l  to  t h e  k d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  u se d  to 
m a k e  ju d g m e n ts  o u ts id e  it.
i. S ig n if ica n c e  of prior decisions of fact.
P46. A s  t h e  scope of each  d isp u te  n a r ro w s ,  so w il l  th e  b r e a d th  
o f  its  im p a c t  upon  f u tu r e  cases. T h u s  a d isp u te  b e tw e e n  tw o  
p a r t ie s  w i l l  n o t  a ffec t  a th i r d ;  t h e  re so lu t io n  of one  issu e  w ill
n o t  in f lu e n c e  th e  o u tco m e  of a n o th e r .
%
P47. H o w e v er ,  th e  d e m a n d  fo r  cons is tency , n a r r o w ly  co n s tru e d ,  
w i l l  in c rease ,  i.e., w h a t  h a p p e n s  w i th in  t h e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  
becom es  m o re  im p o r ta n t  t h a n  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  ou tside  it.
P47.1. I t  w i l l  b e  in c re a s in g ly  d if f ic u l t  to  p e r s u a d e  th e  sa m e  
in te r v e n e r  to re c o n s id e r  a  d isp u te  if th e  p a r t ie s  a n d  issues  a re  
id en tica l .
P47.2. O th e r  in te r v e n e r s  w i th in  a w id e n in g  a m b i t  w i l l  b e  
s im i la r ly  d is in c l in e d  to r e - h e a r  t h e  d isp u te .284
j .  A p p l ica t io n  of norms to facts.
P.48. A s  t h e  scope of t h e  d isp u te  n a r ro w s ,  th e  n u m b e r  o f  n o rm s  
in v o k e d  declines .
a. T h e  in te r v e n e r  b o ls te rs  h is  decis ion  w i th  a l a r g e  n u m ­
b e r  of n o rm s  b e a r in g  l i t t le  r e la t io n s h ip  to o n e  a n o th e r ,  a n d
o f te n  on ly  a p e r ip h e ra l  s ig n if ic a n ce  fo r  t h e  c o n tro v e rs y  i tse lf .285
b. T h e  in te r v e n e r  a f f i rm s  only those n o rm s  essential to 
r e a c h in g  a  decis ion; h e  m a y  e v e n  e x p lic i t ly  d isc la im  any posi­
t io n  w i th  r e g a r d  to  o th e r  n o rm s  c i te d  by  th e  d isp u ta n ts .
P49. T h e r e  is g r e a t e r  d e m a n d  fo r  c ons is tency  o f  n o rm s ,  j u s t  as 
t h e r e  w a s  fo r  co n s is ten cy  in  dec is ions  of fac t .280 
P49.1. C o n c o m ita n t ly ,  a n d  p e rh a p s  as a  n e c e s s a ry  p re re q u is i te ,  
t h e r e  is a  n a r r o w in g  in  th e  d e f in i t io n  of w h a t  m u s t  be  co n ­
s is te n t  w i th  w h a t .  N o t  on ly  is th e  o r ig in a l  i n te r v e n e r  presen ted  
w i th  f e w e r  p a r t ie s ,  issues, a n d  fac ts  to  be  a d ju d ic a te d ,  n o t  on ly  
does  h e  l im it  th e  b r e a d th  of w h a t  he  dec ides  h im se l f , b u t  s u b ­
s e q u e n t  in te r v e n e r s  u se  th e  d is t in c t io n  b e tw e e n  h o ld in g  a n d  
d ic tu m  to  c o n s tr ic t  Still f u r t h e r  w h a t  h e  could have  dec ided . 
P49.2. T h e  in te r v e n e r  re sp o n d s  less  to  th e  p e c u la r i t ie s  of t h e  
i n s ta n t  c a se287 a n d  m o re  to  th e  a t t a in m e n t  o f  h a r m o n y  w i th  
o th e r  cases. T h e  n o t io n  of w h a t  is n o rm a t iv e ly  h a rm o n io u s  d e ­
v e lo p s  a logic  p e c u l ia r  to  th e  in s t i tu t io n  a n d  d iv o rc e d  f ro m  
c o m m o n  sense  c a teg o rie s  — what, w e  call lega l  re a so n in g  (Levi, 
1948). T h e  p u rv ie w  of w h a t  is s im i la r  ex p a n d s .  T h e  fu n c t io n  
of  a c co m m o d a t in g  n o rm s  to  t h e  id io sy n c ra t ic  fac ts  of th e  case  
m a y  be  d e le g a te d  to a d is t in c t  in s t i tu t io n .288 
F49.3. In  o r d e r  to  a c h ie v e  th is  cons is tency , t h e  i n te r v e n e r  
m u s t  c o n s tru c t  leve ls  of n o rm s  in te r m e d ia t e  b e tw e e n  th e  g e n ­
e ra l  s ta n d a rd s  a d a p te d  f ro m  th e  soc ie ty  a n d  th e  spec if ic i ty  o f  
th e  d isp u te s  he  h a n d le s .280 As th e  in s t i tu t io n  is p ro g re s s iv e ly  
d if fe re n t ia te d ,  he  f i r s t  does th is  h im se lf ,  by  m e a n s  of p r e c e ­
d e n ts 200 B u t  w i th  in c re as in g  d i f fe re n t ia t io n ,  th is  fu n c t io n  m a y  
be  d e le g a te d  to o th e r  m o re  spec ia lized  in s t i tu t io n s  —  leg is la ­
t u r e s 201 (an d  sti l l  l a t e r  su b d iv id e d  b e tw e e n  th e m  a n d  a d m in ­
is t r a t iv e  bod ies)  a n d  lega l  sch o la rs .202
P49.4. N o rm s  a t  v a ry in g  leve ls  of g e n e ra l i ty  a re  o rg a n iz e d  in
h ie ra rc h ic a l  fa sh io n  (M oore, 1969).
P49.5. W h e re a s  th e  g e n e ra l  s ta n d a rd s  o v e r la p p e d  a n d  c o n t r a ­
d ic ted  each  o th e r ,  th e  m o re  r e s t r i c te d  n o rm s  t e n d  to be d i s t in c t  
a n d  co m p a tib le .
P50. T h e se  d e v e lo p m e n ts  a ffec t  t h e  w a y  in  w h ic h  n o r m s  a re  
changed .
P50.1. a. As long  as n o rm s  a re  a b s tra c t ,  v a g u e ly  d e f ined , u n ­
o rgan ized , o v e r la p p in g ,  a n d  m u tu a l ly  in co n s is te n t ,  th e  d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n  can  e n g a g e  in g ra d u a l ,  im p lic i t ,  l im ite d  n o r m a t iv e
c h a n g e  by  m e a n s  of cho ice  a n d  i n te r p r e ta t io n .202
b. A n o r m  w i th  a narrows a s c e r ta in a b le  co n te n t ,  u n q u a l i ­
f ie d  by  a n y  c o m p e t in g  n o rm , re s is ts  c hange . As a re su l t ,  t h e r e  
w i l l  be  a t e n d e n c y  to  d i s t in g u is h  t h e  t a s k s  of a r t i c u la t in g  n o r m s  
a n d  c h a n g in g  th e m .  T h e  l a t t e r  fu n c t io n  w ill  com e to  be  govr 
e r n e d  by  i ts  o w n  c le a r ly  d e f in e d  e x p l ic i t  ru le s .2’*4 A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  
t h e  d i s p u te  i n s t i tu t io n  m a y  e v en  lose  t h a t  fu n c t io n  a l to g e th e r  
—  as h a v e  th o s e  E n g l is h  courts  w h ic h  c la im  to  be  b o u n d  by  t h e i r  
o w n  p re c e d e n ts ,  o r  o u r  o w n  t r i a l  c o u r ts ;  in s tead , i t  w i l l  b e  
d e le g a te d  to a n o th e r  in s t i tu t io n  w h ic h  specia lizes  in  n o r m a t iv e  
c h a n g e  — a p p e l l a t e  c o u r ts ,  c o u r ts  of e q u i ty ,  o r  th e  le g is la tu re .  
T h e s e  i n s t i tu t io n s  w ill  p e r f o r m  t h a t  fu n c t io n  d i f fe re n t ly ,  o f te n  
d e c la r in g  ra d ic a l ,  a b ru p t ,  c o m p re h e n s iv e ,  e x p lic i t  c h a n g e .205 
P50.2. F le x ib le  n o r m s  fa c i l i ta te  c h a n g e  th ro u g h  r e a s o n in g  b y  
a n a lo g y ;  f ix e d  n o r m s  d e m a n d  th e  u s e  of  f ic t ions .200 
P51. A s  a  r e s u l t  of p ro p o s i t io n s  W9 andP50, th e  n o rm a t iv e  sy s ­
t e m  b e c o m e s  e so te r ic  (E p s te in ,  1954: 7).
P52. F o r  a ll th e s e  rea sons ,  th e  logic n e c es sa ry  to a p p ly  n o rm s  
to  fac ts  a n d  to  c h a n g e  n o rm s  — a logic w h ic h  h a d  b e e n  i m ­
p l ic i t  — m u s t  b e c o m e  e x p l ic i t .2"7
P53. A s a f u r t h e r  co n seq u e n c e ,  t h e  d isp u te  p rocess, w h ic h  h a d  
b een  e n t i r e ly  f a c t -m in d e d  (see e.g., F a l le rs ,  1969; N e k a m , 1967; 
A.L. E p s te in ,  1954: 6), d e v o te s  in c re a s in g  a t t e n t io n  to n o rm s ,- ilS 
a l th o u g h  li n e v e r  b eco m es  no rm -m inded .-""  In p a r t ,  th is  d e ­
v e lo p m e n t  o c c u rs  in  e m u la t io n  of o th e r  in s t i tu t io n s ,  as  d iscussed  
b e lo w .
k .  R e m e d ie s .
1*54. T h e r e  is in c re a s in g  use  of r e m e d ie s  th a t  a d v a n c e  th e  c e r ­
t a in ty  a n d  f in a l i ty  of a decis ion , e.g.:
P54.1. A n  act w h ic h  c an  be  p e r f o r m e d  w i th in  th e  in s t i tu t io n  
l a t h e r  th a n  o n e  w h ic h  m u s t  be p e r f o r m e d  ou ts id e ;20'*
P54.2. A s in g le  ac t  r a t h e r  th a n  a c o u rs e  of c o n d u c t ;101 
P54.3. T h e  t r a n s f e r  of p ro p e r ty  in  s u b s t i tu t io n  for th e  p e r ­
fo rm a n c e  of a n  act;
P54.4. F u n g ib le  p r o p e r t y  (i.e., m o n e y )  r a t h e r  th a n  u n iq u e  
p r o p e r ty .302
P55. W h e re  t h e  i n t e r v e n e r  w o u ld  p re v io u s ly  h a v e  so u g h t  to  
p e r s u a d e  th e  d i s p u ta n ts  th e m se lv e s  to a g re e  to accep t  t h e
r e m e d y ,  a n d  w o u ld  h a v e  m o d if ied  it  to  se cu re  th e i r  c o n c u r ­
ren c e ,  he  now  f ra m e s  it  to m e e t  c r i t e r ia  in te r n a l  to  th e  in s t i ­
tu t io n ,  w i th o u t  r e g a r d  fo r  th e  v iew s  of th e  d i sp u ta n ts .308
P56. T he  rem e d y ,  l ik e  th e  n o rm  it  subse rves ,is  p rec ise ly  d e ­
f in e d  a n d  f ix e d ;804 th e  r a n g e  of a v a i lab le  re m e d ie s  'n a rro w s ;  
c o n s is ten c y  of r e m e d y  is em phas ized .
P57. T h e  r e m e d y  is a re sp o n se  to  th e  d isp u te  as n a r r o w e d  b y  
th e  p rocess  d e sc r ib ed  above, n o t  to  th e  o r ig in a l  d isp u te  (G o ld ­
ing, 1969: 88 f f . ) .805
P58. T h e  r e m e d y  becom es  in c re a s in g ly  se v e re .300 O n e  re a s o n  
fo r  th is  is a  sh if t  f ro m  specia l  to  g e n e ra l  d e te r re n c e .
a. T h e  in s t i tu t io n  is p r im a r i ly  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  th e  i n s ta n t  
d ispu te .  T h e  r e m e d ie  it em p lo y s  a re  e ffec tiv e  on ly  b e tw e e n  
t h e  d i s p u ta n ts  invo lved . T h e y  a re  su ff ic ie n t ly  m ild  to  e n c o u ra g e  
d i s p u ta n ts  to  s u b m i t  to  th e  process.
b. T h e  in s t i tu t io n  is c o n c e rn e d  to  a n t ic ip a te  f u tu r e  d is ­
p u te s  o f  th e  s a m e  k in d .807 T h is  is poss ib le  o n ly  if  r e m e d ie s  a re  
cons is ten t ,  so th a t  th e y  s e rv e  as a w a r n in g  to  a ll th o se  w h o  
m a y  e n g a g e  in s im i la r  conduc t.  T h e  in f r e q u e n c y  w i th  w h ic h  
t h e  r e m e d y  is in f l ic ted  is c o m p e n sa te d  by  d ra c o n ia n  r ig o r .308 
P59. C oerc ion  r a t h e r  t h a n  p e rs u a s io n  se cu re s  co m p lia n c e  w i th  
t h e  decision. T he  m e a n s  of coerc ion  b ecom e in c re a s in g ly  e f fe c ­
t iv e  in  th e '  in d iv id u a l  case .300 U l t im a te ly  t h e  d isp u te  p rocess  
w i l l  n o t  o n ly  o v e rc o m e  re s is ta n c e  b u t  a lso  p u n i s h  i t .310
1. R ev iew .
P60. M a n y  of t h e  above  v a r ia b le s  c an  also se rv e  to  a n a ly z e  
s u b s e q u e n t  h e a r in g s  of t h e  s a m e  d isp u te  by  a n o th e r  in te rv e n e r .  
T h e  m e re  e x is te n ce  of in s t i tu t io n s  fo r  r e v ie w  d is t in c t  f ro m  th o se  
w h ic h  h a n d le  th e  d isp u te  in  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  is an  e x a m p le  
o f  in te rn a l  spec ia liza t ion  a n d  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  w i th in  th e  d i s p u te  
institutit-jx311 C o n s e q u e n t ly  I w o u ld  e x p e c t  t h e  d isp u te  p rocess  
c o n d u c te d  b y  a  r e v i e w e r  to  d i f fe r  f ro m  t h a t  of >the in i t ia l  in ­
t e r v e n e r  i n  t h e  sam e  w a y s ,  a n d  t o  t h e  sam e d e q r e e ,  a s  
t h a t  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n e r  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i n s t i t u t i o n  
d i f f e r e d  f ro m  t h a t  o f  h i s  c o u n t e r p a r t  i n  a n  u n d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t e d  i n s t i t u t i o n .
P61. a. R e v ie w  o c c u rre d  a t  th e  in s ta n c e  of one, a n d  o f te n  b o th  
p a r t ie s ,  w h o  w e r e  d issa t is f ie d  w i th  t h e  e a r l i e r  decision.
b. Review is f r e q u e n t ly  in i t ia te d  b y  a  s u p e r io r  of t h e
in te r v e n e r  ( re v is io n ) .812 ________
P62. T h e  r e v ie w  p rocess  is p ro g re s s iv e ly  d i f f e r e n t i a te d  f r o m  
a t r i a l .313
P62.1. P r e o c c u p a t io n  w i th  fac ts  is re p la c e d  b y  a  c o n c e rn  fo r  
th e  c o n te n t  of no rm s . A t  t h e  e x tre m e ,  th e  f i r s t  in t e r v e n e r  can  
on ly  d ec id e  t h e  facts , a n d  t h e  second  c a n  o n ly  i n te r p r e t  the 
law .
P62.2. In s te a d  of r e c o n s id e r in g  t h e  issues  decided b y  the trial, 
r e v ie w  c o n s id e rs  e r ro r s  in  th e  c o n d u c t  of the trial.314 
P62.3. T h e  r e v ie w e r  w il l  p ro g re s s iv e ly  narrow the scope of the 
e v id e n c e  he  w il l  e n te r ta in :
&. He w ill conduct a h e a r in g  denote (Fisher, 1971: 741-42).
b. H e  w ill  s c ru t in iz e  t h e  re c o rd  of t h e  e a r l i e r  hearing and 
re a c h  h is  ow n  conclusions, b u t  w il l  on ly  rec e iv e  additional evi­
den ce  fo r  good c a u se  (S m ith ,  1988;75).
c. H e  w ill  dec n e  to  r e - e v a lu a te  th e  e v id e n c e  be low , and 
w ill  e x a m in e  th e  re c o rd  to d e te c t  e g re g io u s  e r ro r .
PG2.4. a. No g r e a te r  w e ig h t  is a t t r ib u t e d  to  th e  o u tco m e  b e ­
low  t h a n  is acco rded  an y  o th e r  op in ion  on th e  d ispu te .
b. T h e  dec is ion  of th e  f ir s t  in te r v e n e r  is g r a n te d  in c re a s ­
ing  w e ig h t,  to  th e  po in t  w h e r e  it  m a y  be p ra c t ic a l ly  u n a l t e r a b le  
on  som e issues.
PG2.5. T he  resp o n se  of th e  r e v ie w e r  to  p e rc e iv e d  e r r o r  b e lo w  
deve lops  in th e  fo llow ing  se q u en c e :  he  a d ju d ic a te s  th e  d isp u te  
'on th e  m er i ts ;  he c o rre c ts  a n y  e r r o r ;  he  o rd e rs  a n e w  t r ia l  b y  
t h e  f i r s t  in te r v e n e r  o r  a n o th e r  of l ik e  r a n k ;  h e  p u n ish e s  th e  
f ir s t  i n te r v e n e r  (He m av , of course , do se v e ra l  of these .)
P63. T h e  o u tco m e  of th e  re v ie w  is c o m m u n ic a te d  m o re  w ide ly .  
W h e re a s  th e  in it ia l  dec is ion  is h e a rd  on ly  by  th e  d i s p u ta n ts  
a n d  o th e r  p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  th e  r e v ie w e r  c o m m u n ic a te s  to  i n t e r ­
v e n e rs :  in t ia l ly  to  th e  one  he  is rev ie w in g ,  t h e n  to  o th e r s  of 
s im i la r  r a n k  w i th in  h is  ju r isd ic t io n ,  a n d  u l t im a te ly  to  a ll .310 H e  
m a y  do so in s te a d  of c o m m u n ic a t in g  w i th  th e  pa r t ie s .
VI. D IS P U T E  INSTITUTIONS IN SOCIETY
T his  co m p le te s  m y  e la b o ra t io n  of one  p oss ib le  m ic rosoc ia l  
t h e o r y  of th e  d isp u te  p rocess , a th e o ry  w h ic h  a t t e m p ts  to e x ­
p la in  b e h a v io r  w i th in  a g iven  in s t i tu t io n  by  m e a n s  of c e r ta in  
a n te c e d e n t  b e h a v io r  w h ic h  I h a v e  d e m a r c a te d  as th e  s t r u c tu r e  
of th e  in s t i tu t io n .  B u t  t h a t  th e o ry  does n o t  te l l  us  w h ic h  in sti-
t u t io n s  w e  w il l  f in d  in  a society . I t  is to  th is  q u e s t io n  t h a t  
I now  tu rn .  M y d iscussion  w il l  be  s h o r te r ,  m o re  ge n e ra l ,  a n d  
m o re  sp e c u la t iv e ;  th e  fu l l  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a m ac ro so c ia l  th e o ry  
w o u ld  r e q u i r e  a n o th e r  essay .
I w o u ld  l ik e  to  c a u t io n  a t  th e  o u tse t  a g a in s t  con fu s in g  
m ic ro so c ia l  a n d  m acrosoc ia l  th e o ry .317 I h a v e  th u s  f a r  on ly  
o f fe red  a n  e x p la n a t io n  fo r  b e h a v io r  w i th in  a s ing le  d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n .  B u t  e v e ry  soc ie ty  w ill  h a v e  a n u m b e r  of d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n s ,  w h ic h  w ill  d isp la y  a ra n g e  of v a lu e s  w i th  resp e c t  
to  t h e  s t r u c tu r a l  a n d  p ro ce ssu a l  v a r ia b le s  o u t l in e d  above. Ay 
d i f f e re n t  k in d  of e x p la n a t io n  w ill  be  n e c essa ry  to  acco u n t  for 
t h e  d i s t r ib u t io n  of ■ ■ i tu t io n s  across th e s e  v a r ia b le s  w i th in  th e  
soc ie ty .
T o  b e g in  w ith ,  th e  social e n v i ro n m e n t  confines  th e se  v a r i ­
ab les  w i t h in  fair row  lim its . T h is  m a y  be seen  m o st  c le a r ly  
w i th  r e s p e c t  to th e  s t r u c tu r a l  v a r ia b le  of fu n c t io n a l  spec ia liza ­
tion , T h e r e  a re  few  b e h a v io ra l i te m s  which a re  p e r fo rm e d  w i t h ­
o u t  a n y  spec ia liza t ion  a t  all. T rue ,  in m ost  societies , th e r e  is 
so m e  b e h a v io r  w h ic h  a p p ro a c h e s  th is  e x t r e m e ;  t h e  e x c h a n g e  
of g re e t in g s  d e m a n d e d  by  o r d in a r y  c o u r te s y  m a y  be an  e x ­
am p le .  Y et even  he re ,  c h i ld re n  a re  o f te n  e x c e p te d  f ro m  social 
e x p e c ta t io n s ;  * f u r th e rm o re ,  som e socie ties  e x h ib i t  s u b s ta n t ia l  
v a r i a t io n  in  th e  d e g re e  of spec ia liza t ion  in e v en  such  c o m m o n ­
p lace  b e h a v io r ,  as e x e m p l if ie d  in th e  ro les  of re c lu se  and  po li­
t ic ian . A t  th e  o th e r  e x t r e m e  of th e  scale, co m p le te  spec ia liza t ion  
in  a g iv e n  fu n c t io n  is a lw a y s  l im ite d  by  c o m p e t in g  b iological 
a n d  socia l d e m a n d s ;  e v e n  th e  p o li t ic ian  m u s t  e a t  a n d  sleep, 
a n d  p e r f o r m  o th e r  social tasks .  H e n c e  in all socie ties  e v e ry  ta sk  
w il l  b e  p e r f o r m e d  w i th  v a ry in g  d e g re e s  of spec ia liza t ion , to an  
u p p e r  l im it  p e c u l ia r  to  th e  p a r t i c u la r  soc ie ty  b u t  less t h a n  
to ta l  spec ia liza t ion .
T h e s e  l im ita t io n s  obv iously  ap p ly  to ro les  w i th in  d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n s .  T h e re  is a lw a y s  som e v a r ia t io n  in th e  d e g re e  of 
spe c ia l iz a t io n  in  an y  of th o se  roles. F o r  in s tance ,  so m e  peop le  
d isp u te  m o re  th a n  o th e r s  — p e rh a p s  a d u l ts  m o re  th a n  c h i ld ren ,  
or m e n  m o re  t h a n  w o m e n ;  in  o u r  o w n  socie ty , th e  ro le  of d is ­
p u t a n t  r e a c h e s  e x t r e m e s  of sp ec ia liza t io n  — as in  t h e  p ro se ­
c u to r ,  o r  t h e  in su ra n c e  c o m p a n y .  T h e  sa m e  o b s e rv a t io n s  a re  
t r u e  f o r  th e  ro le  of in te rv e n e r .  In  a ll socie ties  m a n y  d isp u te s  
p ro ce e d  w i th o u t  th e  a id  of an  in te r v e n e r ;  n e v e r th e le s s ,  I be- 
l ive  t h a t  t h e  ro le  w il l  be  fo u n d  in som e d isp u te s  in e v e ry
soc ie ty .315' I t  m a y  b e  p e r f o r m e d  w i th  m in im a l  spec ia liza t ion :  
m o s t  peo p le  i n te r v e n e  in  d isp u te s  a t  lea s t  occas iona l ly  — in  
t h e i r  fam ilies ,  a m o n g  t h e i r  f r ie n d s ,  o r  in o th e r  social u n i ts ;  y e t  
e v e n  in th ese  s i tu a t io n s  som e in te r v e n e  m o re  t h a n  o th e rs ,  a n d  
so m e  n o t  a t  all. A t  t h e  o th e r  e x t r e m e ,  in te rv e n t io n  a p p e a rs  to  
be a ro le  w h ic h  p e rm i ts  of, in d e e d  e n co u rag es ,  a h ig h  d e g re e  of 
spec ia liza t ion ;  y e t  a g a in  t h e r e  a re  u p p e r  l im its .  S im i la r  co n ­
s t r a in t s  l im it  t h e  r a n g e  of o th e r  s t r u c tu r a l  an d  p ro ce ssu a l  v a r i ­
ab les , as a m o re  e x te n d e d  a n a ly s is  co u ld  d e m o n s t ra te .
T h e  s i tu a t io n  w e  h a v e  to  e x p la in ,  th en ,  can  be  p re s e n te d  
sc h e m a tic a l ly  l ike  th is  (I  r e p r e s e n t s  a  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ) :
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F IG U R E  5: D istr ibu tio n  of D ispu t e  In st it u t io n s  (I) in  D iffer­
ent  S ocieties
T h e  qu es tio n s  I w is h  to  a n s w e r  a re :
1. W h a t  social fac to rs  d e te r m in e  th e  u p p e r  a n d  lo w e r  l im its  
of v a r ia t io n  in  t h e  k in d  of in te r v e n e r  t h a t  w i l l  b e  fo u n d
in  a soc ie ty?
2. W ith in  th o se  l im its ,  w h a t  social fac to rs  in f lu e n c e  w h e r e  
th e  in te r v e n e r s  w i l l  be  g ro u p ed  a lo n g  those  v a r ia b le s?
T h e r e  is no  rea so n  to  a s su m e  t h a t  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  m e r e ly  
a pa ss iv e  re f le c t io n  of soc ie ty ;  r a th e r ,  t h e y  e x e r t  a  rec ip ro c a l  
in f lunce .  I th e r e fo r e  w a n t  to  k n o w :
3. W h a t  a r e  th e  c o n seq u e n c e s  fo r  soc ie ty  of h a v in g  c e r t a in  
k in d s  of d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s ?
f in a l ly ,  w e  muvtnotit lo re  th e  poss ib ili ty  of conscious a t t e m p t s  
to s h a p e  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of som e o r  a l l  of t h e  d isp u te  in s t i ­
tu t io n s  in  a  society :
4 If an a t t e m p t  is m a d e  to  c h a n g e  th e  q u a l i t ie s  of d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n s  by d e l ib e ra te  p lan n in g ,  w h a t  c an  w e  e x p e c t  
to h a p p e n ?
In a n s w e r in g  th e s e  ques tions ,  I w il l  b eg in  b y  c o n s id e r in g  d is ­
p u te  in s t i tu t io n s  a t  th e  u p p e r  r a n g e s  of specia liza tion , d i f f e r ­
e n t ia t io n  an d  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n ,  a n d  t h e r e a f t e r  t u r n  to e x a m in e
t h e  lo w e r  ranges .
A. D isp u n  In s t i tu t io n s  at the U p p e r  Ranges of S pec ia l iza tion , 
D i f fe r e r  t ia t io n  an d  Burcaucratizaton.
1. W h a t  s o c ia l  co n d it io n s  produce such institutions? I t  is
a b u n d a n t ly  c le a r  t h a t  social fac to rs  in f lu e n ce  b o th  th e  u p p e r  
b o u n d a r ie s  of th ese  v a r ia b le s ,  an d  th e  e x te n t  to w h ic h  in s t i tu ­
tions  w ill  be found  n e a r  th ese  bo u n d a r ie s .  I n s t i tu t io n s  w h ic h  
a p p e a r  to c o n tra d ic t  th e  g e n e ra l iz a t io n s  a d v a n c e d  be low  — for  
in s ta n c e ,  a E u ro p e a n  c o u r t  o p e ra t in g  in an  A fr ic a n  t r ib a l  s e t ­
t i n g — can  be e x p la in e d  as th e  p ro d u c t  of w h a t  is a c tu a l ly  a  
com pos i te  socie ty  — an a m a lg a m  of t r ib e s  u n d e r  E u ro p e a n  
Colonial ru le ;  th is  s i tu a t io n  w il l  be  d iscussed  as an  e x a m p le  of 
conscious p lan n in g .
D isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  co n n e c te d  to socie ty  in  tw o  d is­
t in c t  w ays. F irs t ,  as an  e le m e n t  of th a t  socie ty , th e  in s t i tu t io n  
is in f lu e n ce d  by th e  s t r u c tu r e  of socie ty , an d  of o th e r  social* 
in s t i tu t io n s ,  an d  by  th e  c u l tu r a l  v a lu e s  w h ic h  a c co m p a n y  th o se  
s t ru c tu re s .  Second, b e c a u se  a n y  g iven  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  r e p r e ­
sen ts  on ly  one  w a y  of  h a n d l in g  a d is p u te  a m o n g  n u m e r o u s
a l te rn a t iv e s ,  th e  sh ap e  of an  in s t i tu t io n ,  indeed , i ts  c o n t in u e d  
e x is tence ,  w ill  be  in f lu e n c e d  by  d i s p u ta n t  choice. A soc ie ty  w il l  
be c h a ra c te r iz e d  by  c e r ta in  k in d s  of social re la t io n s ,  w h ic h  
g e n e r a t e  c e r t a in  k in d s  of d isp u te s ;  as  a  r e s u l t ,  d i s p u ta n ts  w i l l  
p r e f e r  c e r ta in  so lu tions, a n d  choose th o se  in s t i tu t io n s  w h o se  
p rocesses  a re  m o st  des irab le .
a. Dispute institutions as a product of the social struc­
ture and culture of other institutions.
(1) Social dens ity .  T h e  c e n t r a l  th e o re m  of D u r k h e im ’s 
c lass ic  w o rk  is th a t  “ th e  d iv is ion  of lab o r  in an y  socie ty  is in 
d i re c t  r a t io  to th e  m o ra l  o r  d y n a m ic  d e n s i ty  of so c ie ty ” (1947:
257). I u n d e r s t a n d  Ur. a l t e r  concep t  (w hich  I ca ll  social d e n s i ty )  
to in c lu d e  such  fac to rs  as th e  b o u n d a r ie s  w i th in  w h ic h  p h y s ica l  
c o n ta c t  occurs, th e  ph y s ic a l  p ro x im i ty  of in d iv id u a ls ,  an d  th e  
l ike lihood  t h a t  p h y s ica l  c o n ta c t  w ill r e s u l t  in m e a n in g fu l  in ­
te ra c t io n .  A n  in c re ase  in  social d e n s i ty  w i l l  te n d  to p ro d u c e  an  
in c re ase  in social in te ra c t io n ,320 an d  h e n c e  an  in c rease  in th e  
n u m b e r  of d i s p u t e s . U n l e s s  th e  n u m b e r  of d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  
e x p a n d s  p ro p o r t io n a te ly ,  e a ch  w ill  h a v e  to h a n d le  m o re  d is­
p u te s ;  in c re as in g  case load  is an  im p o r ta n t  fa c to r  in b u r e a u ­
c ra t iz in g  an  in s t i tu t io n .
(2) F u n c t io n a l  specia liza tion . Th is  is a n o th e r  re sp o n se  to 
in c re a se d  case load ; cases, l ik e  w idge ts ,  can  be  p rocessed  m o re  
e ff ic ie n t ly  if they , o r  th e i r  e le m en ts ,  a re  t r e a te d  as be ing  id e n ­
tical. Spec ia l iza tion  in d i f fe re n t  fu n c t io n a l  ta sk s  is also m u ­
t u a l ly  re in fo rc in g :  to th e  e x te n t  th a t  A assu m es  m o re  of f u n c ­
t io n  x, he  f re e s  B f ro m  h a v in g  to p e r fo rm  it; m o re o v e r ,  A is 
now  less ab le  to p e r fo rm  fu n c t io n  y, t h e  b u rd e n  of w h ic h  is 
c a s t  upon  B ( th e  a c tu a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  of fu n c t io n a l  spec ia liza ­
t io n  is obv iously  m u c h  m o re  co m p lic a ted  th a n  th is ) .  As a r e ­
s u l t  of bo th  of these  tendenc ie s ,  spec ia liza t ion  is e n d o w e d  w ith  
p o s it ive  v a lu e ;  specia lis ts  a re  b e l ie v ed  to p e r fo rm  th e  ta sk  w i th  
g r e a te r  com pe tence ,  a n d  a re  c o rre sp o n d in g ly  r e w a rd e d  w i th  
h ig h e r  s ta tu s ,  m o re  m oney , etc. T h is  m o tiv a te s  e v e ry  f u n c t io n a ry  
to  specia lize  f u r t h e r . 12-
(3) Social d i f fe re n t ia t io n .  A n  in c re ase  in  th e  size of t h e  
s o c i a l  u n i t  w i l l  t e n d  t o  b e  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n
social d i f f e re n t ia t io n  (K a p la n ,  1965: 93). A n y  in c re ase  in  d if ­
f e r e n t ia t io n  w i th in  th e  socie ty  — w h e th e r  v e r t ic a l  socioeconom ic  
s tra t i f ic a t io n ,  o r  e th n ic  o r  re l ig ious  h e te ro g e n e i ty  —  w il l  t e n d
to in c re ase  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  of  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  a n d  w ith in  
th e  in s t i tu t io n .  T h e  in s t i tu t io n  w ill  be  d i f f e re n t ia te d  f ro m  th e  
socie ty  because  its  p e rso n n e l  w ill  t e n d  to  be d r a w n  d i s p ro p o r ­
t io n a te ly  f ro m  one se g m e n t  of th e  d if fe re n t ia te d  soc ie ty .323 T h e  
in te r v e n e r  w ill  be  d i f fe re n t ia te d ,  am o n g  o th e r  w ays , b y  a c q u i r ­
in g  g r e a te r  pow er;  p o w e r  is n o w  necessa ry  in  h a n d l in g  d isp u te s  
because  th e  in te r v e n e r  h a s  lost  som e  of th e  a u th o r i ty  he  p o s ­
sessed  in  th e  m o re  ho m o g en eo u s  socie ty  (N isbet, 1966: Ch. 4 );  
a t  th e  sam e  t im e, g r e a te r  social h e te ro g e n e i ty  makes power 
av a i lab le  to h im  (F ried ,  1967).
Social d i f f e re n t ia t io n  in c reases  th e  c o m p le x i ty  of behavioral 
p a t t e r n s  and  no rm s , s w ell  as th e  r a t e  of c h a n g e  in  each.
F u r th e r m o r e ,  social h e te ro g e n e i ty  com pels  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  of  
m o re  a b s tra c t ,  m o re  v e rsa l  n o rm s  cap ab le  of rec o n c il in g  th e  
v a lu e s  of d i f f e re n t  e g m e n ts  of th e  ‘p o p u la t io n .  T he  task of 
h a n d l in g  d_ p u r<-s ! m es  m o re  d iff icu l t ,  a n d  re q u i r e s  spec ia l  
t ra in in g .  T h ese  fac to rs  to g e th e r  — specia lization , social d i f f e r ­
e n t ia t io n ,  e n h a n c e d  p ow er ,  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  of u n iv e r s a l  n o rm s ,  
t r a in in g  — c o n tr ib u te  to th e  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n  of th e  i n s t i tu ­
tion. In  tu rn ,  b u r e a u c r a t ic  p a t t e rn s  of b e h a v io r  com e to be 
va lu e d ,  an d  a re  e v e n tu a l ly  id e n t i f ie d  w i th  ju s t ic e  itself.
b. D is p u te  in s t i tu t io n s  as a p ro d u c t  of d i s p u ta n t  choice.
E v e ry  socie ty  w ill  d isp lay  c e r ta in  c h a ra c te r is t ic  fo rm s  of socia l 
r e la t io n sh ip ,  a n d  w il l  g e n e ra te  c e r ta in  k in d s  of d isp u te ;  p e rso n s  
in v o lv e d  in  th ese  re la t io n s h ip s  w ill  h a v e  p re fe re n c e s  a b o u t  th e  
w a y  th e i r  d isp u te s  w il l  be  h a n d le d .  I w o u ld  e x p e c t  th e  fo l lo w ­
in g  k in d s  of social r e la t io n s h ip  to  p ro d u c e  th e  a c c o m p a n y n g  
p re fe re n c e  for a d isp u te  process .
(4) Social re la t io n s  w h ic h  fu lf i l l  a s ingle , n a r r o w ly  d e ­
f ined , pu rp o se ,  Jas opposed  to  th o se  w h ic h  a re  m u l t ip le x  a n d  
b ro a d ly  d e f in e d  (G lu c k m a n ,  1965b: Ch. 1): a d isp u te  p rocess  
in  w h ic h  fa c tu a l  i n q u i r y  is s e v e re ly  r e s t r i c te d  in  scope.
(5) Social r e la t io n s  w h ic h  a re  in s t r u m e n ta l ,  o r ie n te d  to ­
w a r d  o th e r  goals, as  opposed  to  th o se  w h ic h  a r e  a f fec tu a l ,  goa ls  
in  th em se lv e s :  a  d isp u te  p rocess  in  w h ic h  th e  o u tco m e  is c e r ­
t a in  a n d  p red ic ta b le .
(6) Social r e la t io n s  w h ic h  a re  t r a n s i to ry ,  d isp en sab le ,  a s  
opposed  to th o se  w h ic h  a re  e n d u r in g ,  i r r e p la c a b le :  a  dispute 
process  in w h ic h  th e  o u tc o m e  is final.
2. What are the consequences for society of having such 
dispute institutions?
a. For the structure and culture of other social insti­
tutions.
(1) T h e  social u n i t  in c reases  in size, becau se  th e  d i s p u te  
in s t i tu t io n  success fu l ly  h a n d le s  n e w  k inds,  a n d  la rg e r  n u m b e r s ,  
of d isp u te s ,  th e re b y  av o id in g  secession, f ission a n d  f ig h t in g  — 
a l t e r n a t iv e  re sponses  to conflic t  w h ic h  d im in ish  th e  size o f  t h e  
social u n i t .
(2) T h e  social u n i t  is f u r t h e r  d i f f e re n t ia te d ,  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  
of th e  in c re ase  in size, b u t  also d i re c t ly  as a r e s u l t  of t h e  d is ­
p u te  in s t i tu t io n  (E tzioni, 1963). By h a n d l in g  d isp u te s  b e tw e e n  
soc ia lly  d is ta n t ,  c u l tu ra l ly  d i f f e re n t ia te d  in d iv id u a ls ,  it p e rm i ts  
socia l c o n ta c t  to r ip e n  in to  social in te rac t io n .  In  th e  c o u rse  of 
h a n d l in g  th e s e  d ispu tes ,  i t  c re a te s  n ew , a b s t r a c t  n o rm s ,  th u s  
e n h a n c in g  overa l l  c u l tu ra l  d i f fe re n t ia t io n .
A t  th e  sa m e  t im e, th e  in s t i tu t io n  c o n tr ib u te s  to s t r a t i f i c a ­
tion. I t  becom es  m o re  costly: as it  is specia lized , d i f f e re n t ia te d ,  
a n d  b u re a u c ra t iz e d ;  as th e  n u m b e r  of in s t i tu t io n s  de c re a ses  a n d  
th e y  a rc  g eo g ra p h ica l ly  c e n tra l iz e d ;  as th e  possip le  leve ls  of 
a p p e a l  p ro l i fe ra te ,  etc. In  an  e co n o m ica l ly  s t r a t i f ie d  society , 
th e  r ich  h a v e  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  b e t t e r  access to th e  in s t i tu t io n  t h a n  
th e  poor. I t  is also socia lly  an d  c u l tu r a l ly  m o re  d i s ta n t  f ro m  
som e s e g m e n ts  of th e  p o p u la t io n  th a n  f ro m  o thers .  B ecause  the  
in s t i tu t io n  now  has m o re  p o w e r  a t  i ts  d isposal, a n d  g r e a t e r  
co n tro l  o v e r  econom ic  reso u rces ,  those  se g m e n ts  of th e  p o p u la ­
tion  w i th  g r e a te r  econom ic, social an d  c u l tu r a l  access a re  ab le  
to u se  th e  in s t i tu t io n  to  im p ro v e  f u r t h e r  th e i r  pos it ion  in  soc ie ty  
(G a la n te r ,  1972b).
(3) T h e  v a lu e  of specia liza tion , d i f f e re n t ia t io n  a n d  b u r e a u ­
c ra t iz a t io n  fo r  o th e r  social in s t i tu t io n s  is e lev a ted .  E v e ry  in s t i ­
tu t io n  e n g a g e s  in a p rocess  of se lf - ju s t i f ic a t io n ;  b u t  th e  con ­
se q u e n c e s  of t h a t  p rocess  a re  f a r  m o re  p ro fo u n d  w h e r e  th e  
i n s t i tu t io n  is seen  as e m b o d y in g  a  f u n d a m e n ta l  social v a lu e  —- 
in  th is  case ,  ju s t ice .
b. What are the consequences for the quality of social 
relations? T h e  im p a c t  of th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  h e re  is m u c h  
m o re  re s t r ic te d .  In  those  d isp u te s  w h ic h  it a c tu a l ly  h an d le s ,  it  
m a y  t r a n s fo r m  re la t io n s  b e tw e e n  d i s p u ta n ts  f ro m  m u lt ip le x ,
a ffe c tu a l  a n d  e n d u r in g  to  s ing le -pu rpose ,  i n s t r u m e n ta l  a n d  t r a n ­
s ito ry . B ey o n d  th is ,  th e  few  peop le  w h o  e x p e c t  to d isp u te  m ay  
s t r u c tu r e  th e i r  r e la t io n s h ip s  so as to m a k e  th e m  a m e n a b le  to 
th e  d isp u te  p rocess .324 O the rs ,  w h o  h a v e  no t  done  so, m a y  
n e v e r th e le s s  a n t ic ip a te  t h a t  o u tco m e  by  s im p ly  t e r m in a t in g  th e  
co n fl ic ted  r e la t io n s h ip  on th e  m ost  a d v a n ta g e o u s  te rm s  possible. 
B u t  no in s t i tu t io n  an d  n o d i s p u te  p rocess  h a s  a m onopo ly  o v e r  
d isp u te s ;  c o n s e q u e n t ly  m ost  d isp u te s  in v o lv in g  th e  v as t  m a ­
jo r i ty  of social re la t io n s h ip s  w ill  s im p ly  be  u n to u c h e d  by th e  
m o re  d i f f e re n t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n ;  th e  d i s p u ta n ts  w ill  n e v e r  a p ­
p ro ac h  it, e i th e r  b ecause  th e y  d is l ike  th e  p rocess  it offers ,  o r  
b e c au se  th e  in s t i tu t io n  is inaccess ib le  to th e m . :‘-’r'
3. i lannod  c h a n g e  n d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s .  T h e  p roposi t ions
a d v a n ce d  above  a s su m e  g ra d u a l ,  e v o lu t io n a ry  c h a n g e  in d is ­
p u te  in s t i tu t io n  a n d  society. A t lea s t  u n t i l  t h e  m id -e ig h te e n th  
century, and with the exception of colonial situations, such  
change m ay  h a v e  boon th e  rule.:,sn B u t in recent history it has  
certainly b ecom e the  exception. T his  is m ost  obv iously  d e m o n ­
s t r a te d  by  th e  co lonia l e x p e r ie n c e  of n o n -w e s te rn  na tions ,  a 
m a jo r  e le m e n t  of w h ic h  h as  been  th e  s u b s t i tu t io n  of w e s te rn  
d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  for in d ig e n o u s  in s t i tu t io n s ,  p ro d u c in g  r a d i ­
cal c h a n g e  in the  d ire c t io n s  s k e tc h e d  above. M oreover ,  po lit ica l  
in d ep e n d e n c e ,  r a t h e r  th a n  h a l t in g  th is  process , h as  a c c e le ra te d  
it.
T h eo r ie s  a b o u t  th e  in te r re la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  d isp u te  in s t i ­
tu t io n s  a n d  soc ie ty  m a y  th e r e fo r e  be less u se fu l  in p re d ic t in g  
w h a t  c h a n g es  w ill  occu r  w i th o u t  d e l ib e ra te  in te rv e n t io n ,  t h a n  
in r e v e a l in g  s t r u c tu r a l  l im ita t io n s  upon  p la n n e d  change . In  
a n a ly z in g  th ese  l im ita tions ,  it w ill  a g a in  be  u se fu l  to d i s t in ­
gu ish  b e tw e e n  ch an g es  in the  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  i tse lf  —  its  
s t r u c tu r e  and  c u l tu r e  — an d  c h a n g es  in t h e  social r e la t io n s h ip s  
a m o n g  p o te n t ia l  d isp u ta n ts .
T h e  th e o ry  d e v e lo p e d  above, c o n f i rm e d  b y  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  
of n u m e r o u s  societies, e x p la in s  w h y  p la n n e d  in s t i tu t io n a l  c h a n g e  
is no t  on ly  possib le  b u t  se lf -re in fo rc ing . In d eed ,  such  ch an g e ,  
by  its  v e ry  n a tu re ,  becom es p ro g re ss iv e ly  easie r :  spec ia liza t ion , 
d i f f e re n t ia t io n ,  a n d  b u r e a u c ra t iz a t io n  m e a n  a loosen ing  of th e  
in te rd e p e n d e n c y  b e tw e e n  th e  in s t i tu t io n  a n d  soc ie ty  (see M ay-  
h ew , 1971; G a la n te r ,  1972a: 66). F u r th e r m o r e ,  th e y  d ec rease  th e  
n u m b e r  of p ro fess iona l a c to rs  invo lved , a n d  hen ce  r e q u i r e  on ly
l im ite d  e x p e n d i tu re s  of resources ;  as m a n y  c o u n tr ie s  h a v e  d is­
covered , th e  r e fo rm  of lega l  in s t i tu t io n s  is r e la t iv e ly  cheap, 
so m e t im e s  e v e n  costless.
Y e t  such  re fo rm s  m a y  b e  se lf -d e fe a t in g  if  th e  l a r g e r  p u r ­
pose  is to  e ffec t  c h a n g e  in  th e  soc ie ty  as well. By th e  v e ry  fac t  
of t h e i r  d i f fe re n t ia t io n ,  such  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  h a n d le  r e l a ­
t iv e ly  few  d ispu tes ;  w h e re  th e y  a re  d e l ib e ra te ly  d i f f e re n t ia te d  
in  a d v a n c e  of o th e r  social changes , e v e n  f e w e r  p o te n t ia l  d i s ­
p u ta n t s  w i l l  be l in k e d  by  social re la t io n sh ip s  w h ich  p e rm i t  of 
i n t e r v e n t io n  b y  those  in s t i tu t io n s .  T h e  in s t i tu t io n a l  iso la tion  
w h ic h  is a n  in e v i ta b le  c o n c o m ita n t  of d i f f e re n t ia t io n  w il l  be 
c o m p o u n d e d  b y  th e  m e c h a n ism  of d i s p u ta n t  choice.
B. D is p u te  In s t i l  fions a t  th e  L o w e r  R anges  of Spec ia l iza tion ,
D if fe re n t ia t io n  a n d  B u re a u c ra t iz a t io n .
If  th e  ab o v e  an a ly s is  w e r e  a co m p le te  p ic tu re  of the social 
fo rces  in f lu e n c in g  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  of d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  we 
m ig h t  ex p ec t ,  in t im e, to  f ind  all such  in s t i tu t io n s  g ro u p e d  at 
t h e  u p p e r  l im its  of those  s t r u c tu r a l  v a r iab le s .  T hese  fo rces  are, 
a f t e r  all, p e rv a s iv e  in c o n te m p o ra ry  w e s te rn  socie ty ; e v en  in 
m a n y  of th e  d e v e lo p in g  n a t io n s ,  w h e r e  th e y  a re  s ti l l  weak, 
w e s te rn  in s t i tu t io n s  se rv e  as m odels  to be e m u la te d ;  an d  social 
an d  in s t i tu t io n a l  c h a n g es  a p p e a r  to be m u tu a l ly  re in fo rc in g .
C o n te m p o ra ry  th eo r ie s  of social c h a n g e  a re  in p a r t  r e s p o n ­
s ib le  fo r  th e  t e n d e n c y  to accep t  th is  a n a ly s is  as a d e q u a te  a n d  
co m p re h en s iv e .  M ore  th a n  a  c e n tu r y  a f t e r  D a rw in ,  sociological 
th o u g h t  still r e f lec ts  th e  e n o rm o u s  im p a c t  of e v o lu t io n a ry
b io lo g . a l th o u g h  ana log ies  b e tw e e n  o rg a n is m  a n d  soc ie ty  a re
n ow  m u c h  m o re  s o p h is t ic a te d .327 Social th e o r ie s  of l a w  a re  no  
ex cep tio n . If  few  a s se r t  t h a t  all lega l  sy s te m s  m u s t  pass t h r o u g h  
f ixed  id e n t i f ia b k s ta g e s ,  m a n y  s til l  r a n k  k n o w n  socie ties  a c c o rd ­
ing  to a chosen  va r ia b le ,  th e r e b y  s u g g e s t in g  a om d ire c t io n a l  a n d  
in e v i ta b le  p rogress ion  from  one end  of th e  c o n t in u u m  to  t h e
o t h e r . ,2S D u r k h c im  be lieved  th a t  th e  fo rm s  of social o rg a n iz a ­
t ion  he  id e n t if ie d  r e p r e s e n te d  p o in ts  in a historical p rog ress ion . 
A id a n  S o u th a l l ,  w r i t in g  re c e n t ly ,  a p p e a r s  to be no less c e r ta in  
w i th  re sp e c t  to on e  of th e  s t r u c tu r a l  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  I h a v e  
se lec ted  fo r  e m p h a s is .320
No doubt, em pirical instances could be found in w hich th e  ro le  
s tru c tu re  of a society changes th ro u g h  roles becom ing m ore 
generalized , diffuse, b road  in defin ition , and few er in num ber, 
such instances seem  som ew hat r a r e . . . .  none cf these instances 
exem plifies a process of role genera lization  w ith in  a society 
such as to con trast w ith  the opposite in te rn a l process of ro le  
d ifferen tia tion , w hich  has occurred  so  very  f re q u e n tly  in  tim e 
and sp a c e .. . .
This prom pts the  conclusion th a t societies w hich p ers is t th rough  
tim e w ith o u t v io len t in te rven tion  from  w ithou t e ith e r have been 
re la tiv e ly  stagnant, as in the case of num erous b u t v e ry  sm all 
and isolated non lite ra te  societies in m an y  p a rts  of th e  w orld, or 
else have exh ib ited  a continuous process of ro le d iffe ren tia tion  
(1959: 20-21).
Y e t  w e  k n o w  t h a t  e v e ry  society , no  m a t t e r  h o w  differ­
e n t ia te d  some, o r  even  m an y ,  of its  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  m a y  be, 
w ill s till  possess o th e r s  a t  t h e  opposite  end  of th e  sp e c tru m . 
T h e  th e o ry  m u s t  th e re fo re  be in co m p le te ;  th e  fo llow ing  are 
som e sugges t ions  a b o u t  social fo rces  w h ich  te n d  to p re se rv e ,  
o r  to p roduce , r e la t iv e ly  u n d i f f e r e n t i a te d  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s .
I. Dispute institutions as a product of social environment,
a. As a product of the social structure and culture of
o t h e r  institutions.
(1) F u n c t io n a l  g e n e ra liza tio n .  T h e re  a p p e a rs  to be  a d is ­
c e rn ib le  m o v e m e n t  to w a rd  fu n c t io n a l  g en e ra l iz a t io n ,  ev en  if 
i t  is no t  yet as p ro n o u n c e d  as th e  m o v e m e n t  to w a rd  sp ec ia liza ­
t io n  w h ic h  b eg an  m o re  th a n  a c e n tu ry  ago. In p a r t  th is  m a y  be  
a long  r a n g e  co n seq u e n c e  of econom ic  forces; w h e re ,  fo r  e x ­
am ple , th e  e a r ly  s tages  of in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n  d e m a n d e d  th a t  th e  
h u s b a n d  be  em p lo y e d  fu ll  t im e  o u ts ide  th e  house , an d  th e  w ife  
a s su m e  a ll  h o u se h o ld  ta s k s  in  o rd e r  to p e rm i t  th is ,  l a t e r  s tages  
m a y  in c re ase  t h e  le isu re  of bo th ,  p e rm i t t in g  a c o n v e rg e n c e  of 
spousa l  ro les  (in  o th e r  social classes, u n e m p lo y m e n t  m a y  h a v e  
th e  sa m e  c o n s e q u e n c e ) . In  p a r t ,  th e  t r e n d  m a y  be  a n  e x p re s s io n  
o f  c u l tu r a l  rev u ls io n  ag a in s t  specia liza tion , m ost  e x p lic i t ly  d is­
p la y e d  by c o n te m p o ra ry  in te n t io n a l  co m m u n it ie s ,  :,:m b u t  also 
v is ib le  in  m o re  e s ta b l ish e d  in s t i tu t io n s .  W h e re  th ese  d e v e lo p ­
m e n ts  a re  o ccu rr ing , w e  can e x p e c t  to f in d  th e  ro le  of i n t e r ­
v e n e r  re c o m b in e d  w i th  o th e r  functions .
(2) L e v e ll in g  of social a n d  c u l tu ra l  d iffe rences .  T h is  has, 
of course , been  a p e rs i s te n t  a n d  p o te n t  fo rce  in m a n y  societies, 
in c lu d in g  those  d isp la y in g  th e  g re a te s t  te n d e n c ie s  to w a rd  d if ­
fe re n t ia t io n ,  w h e re  it  h a s  p e rh a p s  b een  m ost  p ronounced . 
W h e th e r  one  v iew s  e g a l i ta r ia n  d e m a n d s  as an  ex p re s s io n  of 
class s tru g g le ,  o r  as an  ideo logy  d ivo rced  f ro m  social class, th e i r  
p o w e r  is u n d e n ia b le .  W e can  e x p e c t  such  d e m a n d s  to be  d i­
re c te d  w i th  specia l  force  a t  those  in s t i tu t io n s  w h ic h  a re  pos­
sessed  of s u b s ta n t ia l  a u th o r i ty ,  an d  e n d o w e d  w i th  sym bolic  
s ign if icance  by  th e  socie ty  — am o n g  w h ic h  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  
a re  a p r o m in e n t  ex am p le .  W h e re  th e  d e m a n d s  a re  n o t  sa tisfied , 
w e  can  e x p e c t  to f in d  th e m  t r a n s m u te d  in to  p re s s u re s  fo r  th e  
d i sm a n t l in g  of th e  in s t i tu t io n  — p e rh a p s  a l to g e th e r ,  p e rh a p s  in ­
to  a n u m b e r  of in s t i tu t io n s  fu n c t io n in g  w i th in  s u b -u n i ts  of th e  
society, f ro m  w h ich  each  is less d i f f e re n t ia te d .33-’
(3) R e d u c in g  b u r e a u c ra t ic  a u to n o m y . J u s t  as e g a l i t a r ia n ­
ism  opposes d if fe re n t ia t io n ,  so d e m o c rac y  opposes b u re a u c ra t ic  
ten d e n c ie s  (Fogelson , n .d .). A gain , w e  can  e x p e c t  th is  ideology 
to be d i re c te d  w ith  p a r t i c u la r  u rg e n c y  a g a in s t  d isp u te  in s t i ­
tu tions ,  w h e re  i t  w ill a ffec t  such  m a t te r s  as th e  choice an d  
t e n u r e  of pe rsonne l,  th e  s e p a ra t io n  of pow ers , m odes  of rev iew , 
e tc .333 F u r th e r m o r e ,  to th e  e x te n t  t h a t  p re s su re s  fo r  g r e a te r  
e q u a l i ty  lead  to a f ra g m e n ta t io n  of th e  h e te ro g e n e o u s  socie ty  
in to  su b -u n i ts  th a t  a re  in te rn a l ly  hom ogeneous ,  th e  d e m a n d  
fo r  u n iv e r s a l  n o rm s  ap p licab le  to th e  to ta l  socie ty  — one of th e  
raisons d 'etre  of b u re a u c ra c y  — loses it  cogency. T h u s  th e  
c lu s te r  of v a lues  e p ito m ized  by  th e  u n d i f f e re n t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n  
— fu n c t io n a l  g en e ra lism , e g a l i ta r ia n ism , d e m o c rac y  — a re  m u ­
tu a l ly  re in fo rc ing . A nd  ju s t  as h ig h ly  d i f f e re n t ia te d  d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n s  f ind  an  e x e m p la r  to im i ta te  (p e rh a p s  th e  U n i ted  
S ta te s  S u p re m e  C ourt ,  o r  th e  H igh  C o u r t  of E n g la n d  o r  of 
o th e r  co m m o n  law  co u n tr ie s )  so th e r e  a re  p o w e rfu l  m odels  for 
th e  u n d i f f e re n t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n  ( th e  f a m ily  c o u r t  idea  in A m e r ­
ica, p e rh a p s ,  or a n  idea l iza tion  of t r ib a l  in s t i tu tion^ .
b. P a t te r n s  of social relationship which affect disputant 
choice. D esp ite  the  te n d e n c ie s  d e sc r ib ed  above, m a n y  socie ties  
h a v e  b e e n  ab le  to c re a te  a n d  m a in ta in  h ig h ly  d i f f e re n t ia te d  
d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s .  B u t  th e r e  a re  ad d it io n a l  fac to rs  w h ic h  a f ­
fec t  t h e  e x te n t  to w h ic h  th o se  in s t i tu t io n s  w il l  be  used , an d  by 
th is  m e a n s  in f lu e n c e  w h ic h  w il l  s u rv iv e  a n d  f lou r ish ,  a n d  w h ic h  
w i l l  dec line  a n d  d isappea r .  T hese  fac to rs  a re  th e  k in d s  of r e l a ­
t io n s h ip s  p re v a i l in g  in th e  soc ie ty  — a v a r ia b le  f a r  m o re  re -  
s is te n t  to c h a n g e  t h a n  th e  sh a p e  of any  p a r t i c u la r  in s t i tu t io n .
I w o u ld  a rg u e  t h a t  in  e v e ry  socie ty  m a n y  social re la t io n s h ip s  
— indeed , th e  v a s t  m a jo r i ty  — te n d  to  be  m u lt ip le x ,  a f fe c tu a l  
a n d  e n d u r in g .  T h is  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  o b sc u re d  b y  n in e te e n th  c en ­
t u r y  social th eo r is ts  w h o  f ir s t  p e rc e iv e d  d e p a r tu re s  f ro m  t h a t  
m odel ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t ly  s t r e s se d  th e i r  im p o r ta n c e  o u t  o f  a ll 
p ro p o r t io n ;  M a in e ’s in f lu e n t ia l  d ic tu m  a b o u t  th e  m o v e m e n t  
f ro m  s ta tu s  to  c o n t r a c t  (1950: Ch. 5) is on ly  the  m o st  fam o u s  
e x a m p le  of a p e rv a s iv e  a t t i tu d e  (see N isbe t,  1966: Ch. 5). M ore  
re c e n t ly ,  h o w e v e r ,  o b se rv e rs  h a v e  c o rre c te d  th is  m is ta k e n  e m ­
phas is ,  reco g n iz in g  th a t  s ta tu s  re la t io n sh ip s  p e rs is t  a longs ide  
c o n tra c tu a l ,  t h a t  th e  l a t t e r  o f te n  becom e th e  fo rm e r ,  a n d  th a t  
th e r e  m a y  e v e n  be an  e q u iv a le n t ,  opposite  m o v e m e n t  f ro m  
c o n tr a c t  to  s ta tu s .334
W ha i 4 hen, r0 t h e  co nsequences  of th e  p e rs is te n c e  of 
s ta tu s  re la t io n sh ip s  fo r  d i s p u ta n t  choice?
(4) When relations se rv e  a  m u l t ip l ic i ty  of pur­
poses, b ro ad ly  defined , d i sp u ta n ts  eek  a n  a ir in g  of a wide 
r a n g e  of issues, in v o lv in g  n u m e r o u s  p a r t ic ip a n ts .335
(5) W h e re  social r e la t io n s  a re  a ffec tua l ,  d i sp u ta n ts  w ill  
seek  to m a in ta in  con tro l  of th e  d ispu te ,  a v o id in g  e x te r n a l  coe r­
cion, an d  s u b o rd in a t in g  a b s t r a c t  n o rm s  to th e  id io sy n c ra t ic  
s i tu a tio n .
(6) W h e re  social re la t io n s  a re  e n d u r in g  a n d  i r re p la c e a b le ,  
d isp u ta n ts  w il l  seek  to avo id  f ina l i ty ,  o r  a dec is ion  w h ic h  f a ­
v o rs  one  p a r ty  to  the  ex c lu s io n  of th e  o thers .
Y e t  e v en  w e re  th ese  l in k a g e s  to  be  s u b s ta n t ia te d ,  th e  con ­
sequences  of d i s p u ta n t  p r e fe re n c e  fo r  th e  s t r u c tu r e  of d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n s  w o u ld  r e m a in  h ig h ly  u n c e r ta in .  L e t  us  a ssu m e  t h a t  
d isp u ta n ts  w ill  seek  to avo id  an  in s t i tu t io n  w hose  p ro cessu a l  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  m ig h t  be d a m a g in g  to th e i r  p re -e x is t in g  r e l a ­
t ionsh ips. T h is  m ig h t  lead  to a dec line  in l i t ig a t io n  b e tw e e n  
p r iv a te  ■ put in in h ig h ly  d i f fe re n t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n s ;  indeed , 
t h e re  is c o n s id e rab le  ev id e n c e  of such  a dec line  in th e  c o u rts  
of m a n y  d i f f e re n t  societies, a l th o u g h  i t  is n o t  y e t  fu lly  d o c u ­
m e n t e d . ' ’" A re d u c e d  case load  cou ld  h a v e  c o n s id e rab le  s ig n if i ­
cance  for such  in s t i tu t io n s ;  a m o n g  o th e r  th ings ,  it w o u ld  d im in ­
ish one of th e  p re s s u re s  fo r  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n .  C o u r ts  m ig h t  a lso 
r e s p o n d  to th e  loss of fu n c t io n  — a n d  also of p re s t ig e  — b y  
s t r iv in g  to a l te r  th e i r  p rocessua l  c h a ra c te r i s t ic s :3:17 th e  r e p la c e ­
m e n t  of r ig id  ru le  by  m o re  f le x ib le  s ta n d a r d s  in  c o m m e rc ia l
law , o r  d ivo rce , m a y  b e  exam ples .  O n th e  o th e r  h a n d ,  d i s p u ta n t  
p r e f e re n c e  m a y  be a less p o te n t  fo rce  t h a n  I h a v e  suggested . 
H ig h ly  d i f f e r e n t i a te d  in s t i tu t io n s  te n d  to possess a m onopo ly  
of m a n y  p o w e rs :  fo r  in s tance ,  in m a n y  societies  i t  is n o t  pos­
s ib le  to  o b ta in  a d ivo rce ,  a n d  th e  c o n c o m ita n t  r ig h t  to  r e m a r r y ,  
e x c e p t  f ro m  an  offic ia l cou rt ;  d i sp u t in g  spouses  w ho  w a n t  th a t  
r e m e d y  canno t avo id  th e  cou rt ,  no  m a t t e r  h o w  r e p u g n a n t  its  
p ro cess .338 F u r th e r m o r e ,  co u r ts  h a v e  fo u n d  th a t  a n y  space  in 
t h e i r  do c k e ts  is m o re  t h a n  f il led  b y  a v a r i e ty  of q u a s i-a d m in -  
i s t r a t iv e  d u t ie s .330
A v o id a n c e  of h ig h ly  d i f f e re n t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n s  m ig h t  also 
lea d  to a p r: e re n c  • less d i f f e re n t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n s ,  o r  p r e s ­
s u re  to institutional h  d isp u te  processes: r e s o r t  to p r iv a te  
f a m i ly  co u n se l l in g ,  or the  d e v e lo p m e n t  of co m m e rc ia l  a r b i t r a ­
t io n  m a y  be  e x a m p le s .  B u t  th ese  ou tco m es  seem  e v e n  m o re  
problem! I  ion of any k in d  does n o t  e x h a u s t  th e
r a n g e  of re sp o n se s  a v a i la b le  to  p o ten t ia l  d isp u ta n ts .  If  e x is t in g  
in s t i tu t io n s  s e em  u n d e s ira b le ,  a d i s p u ta n t  m ay  choose to in ­
te rn a l iz e  th e  conflic t ,  an d  th u s  d e n y  th a t  it, or th e  d ispu te ,  
e x is ts ;  o r  lie m a y  choose  to “ lu m p  i t ,” t h e r e b y  t e r m in a t in g  th e  
r e l a t io n s h ip  in m u c h  th e  sam e  fa sh io n c s  the d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  
w o u ld  d o / 1,1 I t  m a y  be  t h a t  b o th  of th ese  re sponses  are , in th e  
lo n g  r u n  u n s a t i s fa c to ry ,  an d  lead  to an in c re ase  in “ a n o m ie ” 
a n d  pr< fo r  th e  c re a t io n  of in s t i tu t io n s  w h ic h  w i l l  h a n d le
th e  d isp u te  J i f f e r e n t ly ;  b u t  w e  c e r ta in ly  h a v e  no ev id en ce  th a t  
s u c h  is th e  case.
2. W h a t  a r e  th e  co n seq u en ces  for soc ie ty  of h av in g  such  
d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  O u r  e v o lu t io n a ry ,  e th n o c e n tr ic  b iases  lead  
u s  to t h in k  t h a t  such  institu tions m e re ly  c o n t r ib u te  to th e  m a in ­
te n a n c e  of th e  s ta tu s  quo , and  m ay  a c tu a l ly  in h ib i t  change. H e re  
I w i l l  t r y  to show  t h a t  th e y  can  be a fo rce  fo r  social c h a n g e  
a s  w ell .
a W h a t  a re  th e  co nsequences  for th e  s t r u c tu r e  and 
c u l t u r e  of o th e r  in s t i tu t io n s ?
(1) In c re a s e  th e  hom ogeneity  and  c o h e re n c e  of s m a l le r  
socia l  u n i ts ,  a n d  th u s  th e i r  social s ign if icance . T h e  r e la t iv e ly  
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  d i s p u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  b y  de fin i t ion ,  se rv es  a 
s m a l le r  soc ia1 u n it .  S m a l ln e s s  by  itse lf  in c re ase s  h o m o g e n e i ty  
a n d  colu >ce. T h e  s ign if icance  of a social u n i t  for its  m e m b e rs  
is a lw a y s  e n h a n c e d  w h e n  i t_ p e r fo rm s  c ru c ia l  social func t ions .
B u t  b e y o n d  this, d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  m a k e  a special c o n tr ib u t io n  
to  social so lida ri ty .  D sp u t in g  is i tse lf  an  im p o r ta n t  fo rm  of 
socia l in te r a c t io n . '" ’ M ore  peop le  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  u n d i f f e r e n ­
t ia te d  in s t i tu t io n ;  u l t im a te ly  e v e ry o n e  is invo lved . B ecause  th e  
n o r m a t iv e  sy s te m  of th e  in s t i tu t io n  com es to a p p ro x im a te  th a t  
of th e  sociey, “ju s t ic e  is no t  on ly  done, it  is seen  to be  d o n e ” 
—  a c a tc h p h ra s e  w h ic h  B r i t ish  co lonia l a d m in is t r a to r s  f r e q u e n t ­
ly  p ro c la im ed ,  b u t  cou ld  on ly  su b v e r t .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  th e  in s t i ­
tu t io n  se rv es  to fo s te r  a com m on  n o rm a t iv e  sy s te m  w i th in  th e  
socie ty . Econom ic  s tra t i f ic a t io n  is d im in ish e d  be c au se  e v e ry o n e  
h a s  equa l,  and  to ta l,  access to th e  in s t i tu t io n .  P o li t ica l  d i sp a r i ­
t ie s  t e n d  to be e lh  m u te d  in th e  sam e  w a y ;  f u r th e rm o re ,  th e  
in s t i tu t io n  doe no m a te  its ow n  inequ ities .  T h e  e g a l i ta r ia n ism  
of th e  d isp u te  inst tu ' io n  re in fo rc e s  th e  sw ay  of t h a t  v a lu e  in 
soc ie ty ,
(2) s<- . k d izn 'io n  and  bureaucratization. Because
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in th e  o n s t i tu t io n  becom es the duty of
e v e ry  c it izen  — a n d  an  in c re as in g ly  t im e-c o n su m in g  one— it 
in te r f e r e s  w i th  spec ia liza t ion  in o th e r  fu n c t io n a l  t a s k s , ^  M o re ­
over ,  po lit ica l  an d  social e n g a g e m e n t  becom e h ig h e r  v a lu e s  
t h a n  spec ia lized  tec h n ica l  p ro fic iency . B ecause  t h e  d isp u te  in ­
s t i tu t io n  is n o n -b u re a u c ra t ic ,  it  in h ib i ts  b u r e a u c ra t ic  te n d e n c ie s  
in  o th e r  a re a s  of social b eh av io r ;  t h e  u n c e r t a in ty  a n d  lack  of 
p re d ic ta b i l i ty  of o u tc o m e  rpake  r a t io n a l  p la n n in g  in c re a s in g ly  
d if f icu l t .  " T he  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  i ts e lf  sym bo lizes  o th e r  v a lu es :  
d e m o c ra t ic  c o n tro l  an d  th e  a c h ie v e m e n t  of s u b s ta n t iv e  goals  
r a t h e r  t h a n  b u re a u c ra t ic  r a t io n a l i ty .
b. W h a t  a re  t h e  consequences of such dispute institu­
t io n s  fo r  the  n a tu r e  of social re la tions?  W e k n o w  f ro m  n u m e r ­
ous  s tu d ie s  of t r ib a l  socie ties  th a t  u n d i f f e re n t ia te d  d isp u te  in ­
s t i tu t io n s  ten d  to p re s e rv e  a n d  s t r e n g th e n  m u lt ip le x ,  a ffec tu a l ,  
e n d u r in g  social re la t io n s .  Can  th e y  h a v e  s im i la r  co n seq u en ces  
w i t h in  t h e  s u b u n i ts  of a m o re  h e te ro g e n e o u s  soc ie ty?  O bv ious ly ,  
th e y  m u s t  f i r s t  h a n d le  d isp u te s  b e fo re  th e y  can  b r in g  to  l ig h t  
l a t e n t  m u l t ip l ic i ty  a n d  a ffec t  in social re la t ions ,  th u s  m a k in g  
th o se  r e la t io n s  m o re  e n d u r in g .  B u t  h e re  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of 
t h e  u n d i f f e r e n t i a te d  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  r e n d e r  i t  a m o re  p o te n t  
in f lu e n c e  t h a n  its  d i f f e re n t ia te d  c o u n te rp a r t .  I t  is accessib le  a n d  
n o n - th r e a te n in g ;  i t  is p ro ac t iv e ,  se ek in g  d isp u te s  in w h ic h  to  
in te rv e n e ;  i t  sym bolizes  v a lu e s  w h ich  com e to be s tro n g ly  h e ld
by  socie ty . F in a l ly ,  i t  c o n tr ib u te s  to t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  of a co­
hesive , h o m o g e n e o u s  soc ie ty  in  w h ic h  in d iv id u a ls  no lo n g e r  
possess  t h e  iso la t io n  a n d  p r iv a c y  n e c es sa ry  to concea l  t h e i r  
d ispu te s .
3. P l a n n e d  c h a n g e  in  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s .  P la n n e d  c h a n g e  
is f r e q u e n t ly  t h o u g h t  to  be s y n o n y m o u s  w i th  in c reases  in  s p e ­
c ia l iza tion , d i f f e re n t ia t io n  a n d  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n .  Y e t  conscious 
a t t e m p t s  to  d im in is h  such q u a l i t ie s  a re  no less in te r e s t in g  o r
im p o r ta n t ,  if t h e y  h a v e  been  re la t iv e ly  u n c o m m o n .344 In n o v a ­
t io n  has  o c c u r re d  u n d e r  t h r e e  d iv e rg e n t  h is to r ic a l  s i tu a tio n s .  
R a d ic a l  t r a n s fo r m a t io n s  h a v e  b een  d e d u c e d  f ro m  a r e v o lu t io n a ry
ideo logy  a n d  a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  th o ro u g h g o in g  social r e v o lu t io n :  
e x a m p le s  m ig h t  include th e  N apo leon ic  cod if ica tion  fo llow ing  
th e  F r e n c h  Revolution (M e r ry m a n ,  1969: Ch. 5);  th e  e s ta b l is h ­
m e n t  of p o p u la r  t r ib u n a ls  in  c o m m u n is t  c o u n tr ie s  such  as R u ss ia  
(B e rm a n  and Spin:-' \  T3), p a r  s of E a s te rn  E u ro p e  (P odgo -
reck i,  1969), an d  C h in a  (L u b m a n ,  1967); and  s im i la r  e x p e r i ­
m e n ts  u n d e r  an  u m b re l la  of socia lism  in  such m e m b e rs  of th e  
t h i r d  world as C uba  (B e rm a n ,  1969), C hile  (P re s id e n t ia l  M es­
sage, 1971), S ri  L a n k a  (G o o n e sek e re  a n d  M etzger, 1970), B u r m a  
(Tun, 1973), and  T a n z a n ia  (G eorges , 1967). C o n se rv a t iv e  ideo lo­
gies have been the in sp i ra t io n  for e q u a l ly  f a r - re a c h in g  c hanges :  
tie efforts to revive t ra d i t io n a l  in s t i tu t io n s  u n d e r  in d ire c t  r u le  
in colonial Africa, a n d  n o w  in c o n te m p o ra ry  R h odes ia ;345 th e  
aborted restoration of panchayats  in In d ia  (G a la n te r ,  1972a); 
r e c e n t  increases in the power of t r ib a l  a u th o r i t i e s  in M a law i.34'5 
In  most w e s te r n  nations, by contrast, th e  im p u lse  h a s  b een  r e ­
fo rm is t ,  a n d  th e  c h a n g es  m o re  l im ited . A m e r ic a n  lega l  h is to ry  
offers  numerous e x a m p les :  th e  F ie ld  C odes347 a n d  th e  m o v e m e n t  
fo r  e lec tion  a n d  reca ll  of ju d g e s  in th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry ;  
lega l  aid, smal1 claims, ju v e n i le  an d  fam ily  c o u rts  a t  th e  b e g in ­
ning of th e  twentieth c e n tu ry ;  a n d  m ost  re c e n t ly  th e  OEO 
lega l  se rv ices  progi on , an d  th e  advocacy  of “ d e - leg a l iza t io n .” 
T h is  in co m p le te  e n u m e r a t io n  a n s w e rs  th e  th re s h h o ld  q u e s ­
tion: it is c e r ta in ly  poss ib le  to e ffec t  such  s t r u c tu r a l  c h a n g es  
in d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s .  A d e ta i le d  e x a m in a t io n  of th e  h is to r ic a l  
ev idence , w h ich  w ou ld  be n e c essa ry  to d e te r m in e  th e  success 
an d  fa i lu re  of p a r t i c u la r  e x p e r im e n ts ,  is b e y o n d  tire scope of 
th is  paper. B u t  it  m a y  be  in s t ru c t iv e  to c o m p a re  th e  e n v i r o n ­
m e n t  in which such c h a n g es  a re  now  b e in g  a t t e m p te d  w i th  th e
e n v i r o n m e n t  in w h ic h  co lonia l a n d  pos t-co lon ia l  g o v e rn m e n ts  
h a v e  s o u g h t  to fo s te r  th e  “m o d e rn iz a t io n ” of th e i r  lega l  sy s ­
tem s, fo r  su ch  a c o m p ar iso n  m a y  p e rm i t  us to ge n e ra l iz e  a b o u t  
t h e  f a c to rs  t h a t  in h ib i t  change .
C o lon ia l  g o v e rn m e n ts  f r e q u e n t ly  h a d  to  ov e rco m e  th e  r e ­
s is ta n ce  of th e  p o p u la t io n  to c h a n g es  in th e i r  d isp u te  in s t i tu ­
t ions; b u t  th a t  res is tance ,  by  i ts  v e ry  n a tu re ,  te n d e d  to be u n ­
o rg an iz ed  a n d  in a r t ic u la te  — a n t ip a th y  cou ld  on ly  be  e x p re s se d  
b y  av o id in g  th e  n e w  in s t i tu t ions .  C o n te m p o ra ry  g o v e rn m e n ts  
a d v o c a t in g  ‘p o p u la r  t r i b u n a ls ” m ay  be ab le  to g e n e ra te  s u b ­
s ta n t ia l  e n th u s i a s m , '1* b u t  th is  is l ike ly  to be as in e f fec t iv e  in 
s u p p o r t  as in opposit ion ; peop le  m a y  use th e  in s t i tu t io n  once 
it is created) b u t  there is l it t le ,  s h o r t  of r ev o lu t io n ,  t h a t  th ey  
can  c o n t r ib tu e  to its  c rea tion .
T h e  a t t i tu d e  of e l i te s  seem s to be m u c h  m o re  s ign if ican t,  
e spec ia lly  th e  d ispos ition  of those  w h o  are , o r  m a y  becom e, 
p ro fess iona l o r  q u as i-p ro fe ss io n a l  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in th e  d isp u te  
in s t i tu t io n ,  In th e  colonial s i tua tion , tw o  k in d s  of e li te s  m u st  
be d is t in g u ish ed .  T ra d it io n a l  e l i te s  — those  w ith  an  econom ic  
o r  polit ical s ta k e  in e x is t in g  in s t i tu t io n s  — m a y  oppose g o v e rn ­
m e n ta l  in n o v a t io n ;  ho w e v e r ,  such  opposit ion  can  o f ten  be 
avo ided  by a policy  of in d ire c t  ru le  w h ic h  p re se rv e s  — indeed , 
m u m m i f i e s — tra d i t io n a l  in s t i tu t io n s  w h ile  c re a t in g  c o m p e t in g  
in s t i tu t io n s  a longs ide  them . M o d e rn iz in g  e l i t e s — those  w ho  
a d o p t  th e  m e tro p o l i ta n  c u l tu r e  a n d  o b ta in  w e s te rn  e d u c a t io n
— ten d  to be p red isposed  to w a rd  the  n e w  in s t i tu t io n s  ( indeed , 
th e y  a re  f r e q u e n t ly  m o re  v e h e m e n t  in th e i r  advocacy  th a n  th e  
colonial a u th o r i t i e s  th e m s e lv e s ) ;  an y  r e lu c ta n c e  can  g e n e ra l ly  
be  o v e rco m e  hy th e  o ffe r  of a position  w i th in  th e  n e w  in s t i tu ­
tion, o r  a n  e x p la n a t io n  of th e  a d v a n ta g e s  w h ic h  m a y  ac c ru e  
f rom  u s ing  the  n e w  in s t i tu t io n .  By co n tra s t ,  th e  c o n te m p o ra ry  
g o v e rn m e n t ,  w e s te rn  o r  w e s te rn iz e d ,  w h ich  seeks to im p le m e n t  
th e  re v e r s e  c h a n g es  w ill  f ind  th e  e l i te  u n a n im o u s ly ,  a n d  s tro n g -  
ly, opposed. T h is  e lite ,  e spec ia lly  th e  legal p ro fess iona ls ,  now  
possesses  s u b s ta n t ia l  po lit ica l,  econom ic, and  c u l tu r a l  p o w e r
—  all of w h ic h  is th r e a te n e d  by th e  p roposed  changes .  T he  n e w  
in s t i tu t io n s  o f fe r  lega l  p ro fe ss iona ls  n o th in g  w h ic h  m ig h t  c o m ­
p e n s a te  th e m  for  th a t  loss; th e  v e ry  q u a l i t ie s  of th e  n e w  
in s t i tu t io n s  e x c lu d e  th e m  f ro m  posit ions  of in f lu e n ce  an d  in ­
s u re  th a t  th ey  w ould  not, in an y  case, w a n t  such  positions.
W e  m ay  be a ided  in c o m p re h e n d in g  th e  s ig n if ican ce  of 
e l i te  opposit ion  by  a b r ie f  r e v ie w  of som e  of the  a b o r te d  r e ­
fo rm s :
(a) If  n e w  o r  r e fo rm e d  in s t i tu t io n s  a re  m e r e ly  a d d e d  to 
t h e  e s ta b l ish e d  in s t i tu t io n a l  s t ru c tu re ,  t h e  fo rm e r  a r e  l ik e ly  
to  c o m e  to  re se m b le  th e  la t te r .  E s ta b l is h e d  in s t i tu t io n s  c o n t in u e  
to  sy m b o l ize  th e  w a y  d isp u te s  o u g h t  to  be h a n d le d .  T h e y  r e ­
c e iv e  th e  m a jo r  a l loca t ion  of soc ie ta l  re so u rces ,350 O ffic ia ls  who 
s ta f f  th e m  r e m a in  a t  th e  to p  of th e  s ta tu s  h ie r a r c h y  within 
t h e  p rofession . J u v e n i le  c o u r ts  w e re  in te n d e d  to o f fe r  a  pro­
c e d u re  ra d ic a l ly  d i f fe re n t  f ro m  th e  c r im in a l  c o u r ts  in  which 
ju v e n i le s  h a d  been  t r ie d ;  b u t  th e  d i f fe ren ces  b e tw e e n  the two 
h a v e  lo n g  b een  d im in ish in g .351
0  V  d i / p ’i - in s t i tu t io n s  a re  re fo rm e d  w i th o u t  c o m ­
m e n s u r a te  c h a n g e  it: society , th e y  m a y  se rve  to p e r p e tu a t e  o r  
e v e n  agg; 1 conditions. R efo rm  of th e  s m a l l
c la im s  c o u r t  w as  d iv e r te d  n o t  so m u ch  by th e  a v e rs io n  of th e  
ju d g e s  as by th e  ac t iv i t ie s  of q u as i-p ro fe ss io n a l  d i s p u ta n ts :  
l a r g e  in s t i tu t io n a l  c red i to rs ,  co llec tion  agencies, e tc .352 F u r t h e r ­
m ore ,  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  w il l  o n ly  be ab le  to h a n d le  e x i s t ­
in g  in eq u i t ie s  in po l i t ica l  a n d  econom ic  p o w er  if it is e n d o w e d  
w i th  c o n s id e rab le  p o w e r  itself, an d  im b u e d  w i th  a s t ro n g  
re v o lu t io n a ry  ideology — bo th  of w h ic h  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  co n ­
t r i b u t e  to th e  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of th a t  in s t i tu t io n .
(c) If in n o v a t iv e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  do n o t  a s s im ila te  
to  m o re  e s tab l ish ed  s t ru c tu re s ,  a n d  if th e y  a re  n o t  c a p tu r e d  by  
th e i r  more powerful clien ts ,  I su sp ec t  t h a t  th e y  w il l  f r e q u e n t ly  
t u r n  o u t  to  be a n u l l i ty .  Social re la t io n s  m u s t  to som e  d e g re e  
a n te d a te  th e  in s t i tu t io n  if i t  is to h a v e  a n y  d isp u te s  to  h a n d le .  
W e re  a t r ib a l  m oo t  to be  t ra n s p o s e d  to an  u r b a n  A m e r ic a n  
n e ig h b o rh o o d ,  as h a s  occas iona lly  b e e n  p roposed , I w o u ld  n o t  
e x p e c t  m a n y  peop le  to use  it. E x t r e m e  social d i f f e re n t ia t io n  — 
esp ec ia l ly  of \ v  >rk an d  h o m e  —- d ra s t ic a l ly  s im p l iL ^ re la t io n s h ip s ;  
social h e te ro g e n e i ty  a n d  h o s t i l i ty  in h ib i t  a ffec t;  p h y s ic a l  i so la ­
t io n  a n d  f r e q u e n t  m oves  r e a d i ly  i n t e r r u p t  those  few , l im i te d  
r e la t io n s h ip s  t h a t  a r e  fo rm ed . T he  m a r g in a l i ty  of W o r k e r s ’ 
C o u r t s  in P o la n d  (Podgo reck i ,  1969), o r  th e  ju d ic ia l  p a n c h a y a t s  
in  In d ia  (G a la n te r ,  1972a), m a y  be  exp la ined  in  som e su c h  te rm s .
T h ese  l im ita t io n s  u p o n  g ra d u a l  c h a n g e  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  
a p p ly  to r e v o lu t io n a ry  s i tu a t io n s ;  indeed , th e y  m a y  c o n t r ib u te
to th e  c re a t io n  of r e v o lu t io n a ry  s itua tions .  T he re ,  th e  oppos it ion  
of t h e  e l i te  to  a n y  c h a n g e  m a y  fue l  p o p u la r  d isc o n te n t  w i th  
e s ta b l ish e d  in s t i tu t io n s .  P o p u la r  d isc o n te n t  m a y  in i t ia te  c hange ,
a n d  no t  s im p ly  a d a p t  to c h a n g e s m i t .a te d  above. C o m p e tin g  
m o d e ls  m ay  be e l im in a te d ,  in e q u a l i t ie s  leve lled ,  a n d  th e  social 
re la t io n s  w h ic h  d e m a n d  such  in s t i tu t io n s  m a y  be  bo rn .
C. An Overview of Dispute Institutions in Society.
T h e se  o b s e rv a t io n s  a l low  us to beg in  to c o n s tru c t  a n  e x ­
p la n a t io n  fo r  s ta b i l i ty  an d  c h a n g e  in th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  
of a society . I t h in k  w e  now  h a v e  som e in s ig h t  in to  th e  w a y  
in w h ic h  social f ac to rs  in f lu e n c e  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  of d isp u te
institutions long ,s< ructural variables I h a v e  iden tif ied ,  a n d  
consequently some und< f why this overall d is t r i ­
b u t io n  is fairi y has its characteristic, r a t h e r
in f le x ib le ,  limits for the values which those structural v a r ia b le s  
may ass f indeed for any i n s t i tu ­
t ion . A t  the si glol il changes s u b ­
s u m e d  under the notion of “modernization” are cau sin g  th e  
l im its  in every society to com e to resemble each  o th e r  m o re  
c lose ly ;  for instance, a supreme court has b ecom e as e sse n t ia l  
a  symbol of nationhood as a flag, or m e m b e rs h ip  in th e  U n i te d  
Nations. Y- t while every n a tio n  m a y  now  h a v e  th e  c a p a c i ty  
to  support a supreme court, th e  to ta l  d is t r ib u t io n  of d isp u te  
institute-. r will still reflect more fundamental qu a li t ie s  of th e  
society. The pinnacle of a judicial h ie ra rc h y ,  a f te r  all, is n u ­
merical y insignificant when compared with the base; and th e  
base of most such hierarchies will continue to be a wide v a r ie ty  
o f  undifferentiated in s t i tu t io n s  se rv in g  fam ilies , g ro u p s  w i th  a 
quasi-familial structure, a n d  o th e r  social su b u n its .  B ecause  of 
th e s e  in te r r e la t io n s h ip s  b e tw e e n  socie ty  and  in s t i tu t io n ,  e ffo r ts  
at purposive change in th e  l a t t e r  a re  l ike ly  to h a v e  l i t t le  im­
pact or the aggregate d is t r ib u t io n  of d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s  u n ­
less accompan ed by other, e q u a l ly  rad ica l  socal changes ,  such  
as have occiu red under the in f lu e n c e  of techno log ica l  d e v e lo p ­
ment, colonialism, or social rev o lu t io n .
B u t  s ta b i l i ty  in th e  to ta l  c o n f ig u ra t io n  of in s t i tu t io n s  sh o u ld  
no t  be construed as im p ly in g  th e  s ta b i l i ty  of each  c o n s t i tu e n t  
in s t i tu t io n .  Indeed , th e  c o n t r a ry  is, an d  m u s t  be, t ru e .  O v e ra l l  
s ta b i l i ty  is th e  r e s u l t  of a com pos i te  of those  forces  w h ic h  te n d  
to  produce high specialization, d iffe re n t ia t io n ,  and  b u r e a u c r a t i -
zation , a n d  th o se  w h ich  te n d  to p ro d u c e  low  v a lu e s  for these  
va r ia b le s .  B u t  th e s e  d isso n a n t  forces  do no t  ac t  d is ju n c t iv e ly  
u p o n  s e p a ra te  in s t i tu t io n s ;  th e y  act c o n ju n c t iv e ly  u p o n  each  and  
e v e ry  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  in th e  society. T he  p re c e d in g  d iscus­
s ion  has  id e n t i f ie d  m a n y  such  in fluences :  som e a re  c u l tu r a l  
va lues ,  o th e rs  in h e re  in  th e  social s t r u c tu r e ;  som e o p e ra te  d i ­
re c t ly  u p o n  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  o th e rs  e x e r t  in f lu e n ce  
t h ro u g h  d i s p u ta n t  choice a m o n g  a v a i lab le  p rocesses;  som e a re  
e v o lu t io n a ry  a n d  unconscious, o th e r s  th e  r e s u l t  of p u rp o s iv e  
p lan n in g .  I t  is in e v i ta b le  t h a t  th e r e  w ill  a lw a y s  be  c o n tra d ic ­
tions  a m o n g  th ese  fac to rs , b e tw e e n  each  and  th e  r e s u l ta n t  d is ­
p u t e  in s t i tu t io n ,  a n d  w i th in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n .  T h e se  con­
t ra d ic t io n s  cannot but lead  to c o n tin u o u s  p re s su re s  fo r  c h a n g e  
in  b o th  dispute institution a n d  soc ie ty .3*™ I can  b e s t  i l lu s t r a te  
th is  p e rs p e c t iv e  by m e a n s  of a d ia g ra m  w h ic h  consciously  
re if ie s  the el( of d : in s t i tu t io n  a n d  e n v iro n in g
socie ty .
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L e t  us look a t  th e  poss ib le  c o n seq u en ces  of in c o n g ru e n c e  
b e tw e e n  these  e le m e n ts  ( the  l e t t e r  in t r o d u c in g  each  p a ra g r a p h
refers to the arrow in d ic a t in g  th a t  s t r a in  in  t h e  m o d e l ) :
(1) C o n tra d ic t io n s  b e tw e e n  socie ty  an d  th e  d isp u te  in s t i ­
t u t io n  m a y  p ro d u ce  la rg e  scale  c h a n g es  in  th e  in s t i tu t io n .
(a) C u l tu r e /d i s p u te  process, e.g., c o n te m p o ra r y  w e s t ­
e r n  c u l tu r e  attache* g re a t  v a lu e  to th e  p r e s e r v a t io n  of th e  m a r ­
r ia g e  re la t io n sh ip ;  th is  v a lu e  m a y  lea d  to  a n  in s is te n c e  th a t  
a n y  in s t i tu t io n  w h ic h  h a n d le s  d isp u te s  in v o lv in g  th e  r e la t io n ­
sh ip  e n g a g e  in a th o ro u g h  in q u i ry  in to  th e  f u n d a m e n ta l  causes  
of t h e  d isp u te .1154
(b) C u l tu re  d i s p u t e  s t ru c tu re ,  e.g., a n  e m p h a s is  on  
th e  a u to n o m y  of th e  local u n i t  — espec ia l ly  a u n i t  t h a t  co n ta in s  
a h o m o g en e o u s  p o p u la t io n  w h ic h  d if fe rs  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  f rom  its  
s u r ro u n d in g s  -  m ay  e cd to p re s s u re  fo r  th e  d e c e n t ra l iz a t io n  
of d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n s ,  e.g., t h e  police  an d  th e  c o u r ts /153
(c) Social s t r u c tu r e / 'd i s p u te  process , e.g., th e  g ro w th  
of in s t r u m e n ta l  sociui r e la t io n s  m ay  lead  to  a  d e m a n d  for m o re  
p re d ic ta b le  ou tcom es,"50 on U > h a n d ,  th e  g r o w th  of e n ­
d u r in g  re la t io n sh ip s ,  e sp ec ia l ly  b e tw e e n  large  socia l u n i ts  l ike  
la b o r  un io n s  a n d  m a jo r  in d u s t r ie s ,  m ay  lead  to p re s s u re  fo r  
a m ode  of d isp u te  p ro ce ss in g  c loser  to a r b i t r a t i o n  th a n  a d ju d i -  
ca tion .HBT
(d) Social s t r u c tu r e  d isp u te  s t r u c tu re ,  e.g., in c re ase s  
in  social s t r a t i f ic a t io n  w ill  in e v i ta b ly  lead  to an  in c re ase  in  th e  
s tr a t i f ic a t io n  b e tw e e n  in te r v e n e r s  a n d  th e  p o p u la t io n  th e y  serve ;  
y e t  w h e n  coup led  w i th  a c u l tu r e  th a t  v a lu e s  socia l e q u a l i ty ,  
th is  in t u r n  m a lead  to  p re s s u re s  to se lec t  i n te r v e n e r s  f ro m  u n ­
re p re s e n te d  s t r a ta  of th e  soc ie ty .158
(2) T he  d i f fe re n t ia l  im p a c t  of social s t r u c tu r e  a n d  c u l tu r e  
on th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  w il l  p ro d u ce  c o n tra d ic t io n s  w i th in  t h a t  
in s t i tu t io n  w h ic h  g ive  r ise  to p re s s u re s  fo r  sm a l l  sca le  in s t i ­
tu t io n a l  a d ju s tm e n ts .
(e) D isp u te  s t r u c tu r e  d isp u te  process. P a r t  V  of th is  
essay  is an  e x h a u s t iv e  a n a ly s is  of th e  w ay  in  w h ic h  c h a n g es  in 
d isp u te  s t r u c tu r e  can  lead  to c h a n g es  in  d isp u te  p rocess.
(f) D isp u te  p rocess  d isp u te  s t ru c tu re .  T h is  rec ip ro c a l  
in f lu e n c e  c le a r ly  occurs, if i t  is less obv ious.151* T h e  d e m a n d  
fo r  a c h a n g e  in p rocess  m a y  lead  to p r e s s u re  fo r  a c h a n g e  in  
p e rso n n e l .11" D is p u ta n t  p r e s s u re s  fo r  a fu l le r  e x p lo ra t io n  of th e  
issues m a y  lead  to a d e c re a se  in th e  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  a n d  b u r e a u ­
c ra t iz a t io n  of th e  i n te r v e n e r . :uil P e r h a p s  m ost  d r a m a t ic a l ly ,  if 
th e  d isp u te  i tse lf  is e l im in a te d ,  as h a s  h a p p e n e d  in u n c o n te s te d
divorces, th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  m a y  be  t r a n s fo rm e d  in to  an  
a d m in is t r a t iv e  a g e n c y .11- A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  w h a t  h a d  b e e n  an  a d ­
m in is t r a t iv e  a g en cy  — th e  sm a ll  c la im s court ,  or th e  lo w e r  
c r im in a l  c o u r t  —  m a y  be t r a n s fo r m e d  in to  a d isp u te  i n s t i tu ­
t ion  w h e n  d e fe n d a n ts  a re  r e p r e s e n te d  by  counse l  w h o  p ro m o te  
t h e i r  in te r e s t s  ag g re ss iv e ly .103
(3) C h a n g e s  in th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n  w h ich  r e s u l t  f ro m  
th e  c o n tra d ic t io n s  ju s t  d iscussed  do not, of course , lead  to h a r ­
m o n y ,  b u t  to n e w  c o n tra d ic t io n s ,  w h ic h  e x e r t  p re s s u re  fo r  
c h a n g e  in th e  e n v iro n in g  c u l tu r e  an d  social s t ru c tu re .
(g) D isp u te  p rocess  c u l tu re ,  e.g., th e  in te r n a l  c o h e r ­
ence  w h ich  cl rizes th e  dec is ional p rocess  of som e h ig h e r  
a p p e l la te  courts ma; ievated in to  a n  ideology as th e  ru le  
of law h in  turn exer ipon o th e r  d isp u te  in s t i ­
tu t io n s  to conform  >neir b e h a v io r  to th e  c r i te r ia  of p ro c e d u ra l  
d u e  process. '114
(h )  D is p u te  s t r u c t u r e 'c u l t u r e ,  e.g., q u a l i t ie s  of ro les  
w i th in  th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  such  as specia liza tion , d i f f e re n ­
t ia t ion , a n d  b u re a u c ra t iz a t io n ,  b ecom e e le v a te d  in to  a v a lu e  of 
p ro fe ss io n a l ism ,305
(i) D isp u te  p rocess  social s t ru c tu re ,  e.g., th e  d isp u te  
p rocess  will in f lu en ce  the  n a tu r e  of r e la t io n sh ip s  w i th in  the  
society, r e in fo rc in g  e i th e r  those  th a t  a re  m u l t ip le x ,  e n d u r in g  
an d  a ffec tive , or those  th a t  a re  s ing le -pu rpose ,  t ra n s i to ry ,  an d  
in s t r u m e n ta l .30
(i) D isp u te  s t r u c tu r e  social s t r u c tu re ,  e.g., d isp u te  in ­
s t i tu t io n s  becom e m o re  e x p e n s iv e  as th ey  a re  specialized , d i f ­
f e re n t ia te d ,  b u re a u c ra t iz e d ,  th u s  r e n d e r in g  th e m  d i f fe re n t ia l ly  
accessible to a s : r a t i f ie d  p o p u la t io n ;  th is  d i f f e re n t ia l  access te n d s  
to in c rease  t h a t  s t r a t i f ic a t io n .307
(4) C u l tu re  a n d  social s t r u c tu r e  c h a n g e  in d i f fe re n t  w a y s  
in resp o n se  to  those p ressu res ,  c re a t in g  ten s io n s  b e tw e e n  th em .
(k) Social s t r u c tu r e  c u l tu re ,  e.g., as social r e la t io n s  
a re  t ra n s fo rm e d  f ro m  m u lt ip le x ,  e n d u r in g  and  a ffe c t iv e  to 
s ing le -purpose ,  t r a n s i to r y  a n d  in s t r u m e n ta l ,  t h e re  is p r e s s u re  
fo r  g r e a te r  c u l tu r a l  v a lu a t io n  of in d iv id u a l ism , se lf -su ff ic iency .308
(1) C u l tu re / s o c ia l  s t r u c tu re ,  e.g., v a lu e s  d e r iv e d  f ro m  
th e  d isp u te  in s t i tu t io n ,  such  as p ro fess iona l ism , o r  th e  r u le  of 
law , bee e ; r f th e  c u l tu re ,  a n d  a re  g e n e ra l iz e d  to o th e r
in s t i tu t io n s ;  m a n y  social re la t io n s h ip s  a p p ro a c h  th e  m ode l  of 
p ro fe s s io n a l - la y m a n ;  a l l  a u th o r i ty  t e n d s  to  c la im  leg i t im a t io n  
in  t e rm s  of g e n e ra l  ru le s .300
N o r  does th e  p rocess  s top  h e re .  H a v in g  a r r iv e d  a t  n e w  con ­
f ig u ra t io n s  fo r  each  of t h e  e le m e n ts  of th e  m odel,  w e  f in d  th e
a p p e a ra n c e  of n e w  co n tra d ic t io n s ,  w h ic h  c o n t in u e  th e  end le ss
p r e s s u r e  fo r  f u r t h e r  change .
VII. CONCLUSION
In  a sense , th en ,  m y  an a ly s is  h a s  b r o u g h t  us to  a c o n c lu ­
s ion  a n t ic ip a te d  by  b o th  sociology a n d  ju r i s p ru d e n c e .  W e b e r  
o b se rv e d  long  ago t h a t  “ all [ a u th o r i t ie s ]  a re  c o n f ro n te d  by  
th e  in e v i ta b le  conflict. b e tw e e n  an  a b s t r a c t  fo rm a lism  of lega l  
c e r t a in ty  a n d  th e i r  d e s ire  to rea l ize  s u b s ta n t iv e  g o a ls” (1954: 
226). A n d  P o u n d  p e rc e iv e d  t h a t  the  re su l t  of th is  ten s io n  w a s  
a  “c o n t in u a l  m o v e m e n t  in lega l  h is to ry  b a c k  an d  f o r th  b e tw e e n  
ju s t ic e  w i th o u t  lav/, a rtice  a cco rd ing  to l a w ”
(1922: 54). Y e 1 I hope  m y  an a ly s is  h as  n o t  been  e n t i r e ly  r e ­
d u n d a n t .  I h a v e  t r i e d  to sh o w  w h y  w e  c a n n o t  e l im in a te  e i th e r  
of th ese  poles, o r  en d  th e  f lu c tu a t io n  b e tw e e n  th em . M ore  im ­
p o r ta n t ly ,  I h a v e  t r i e d  to u n d e r s t a n d  w h y  o u r  d isp u te  in s t i ­
tu t io n s  h a v e  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  th e y  do, so t h a t  w e  m a y  sh ap e  
t h e m  a cco rd in g  to o u r  va lues ,  a n d  th u s  to so m e  d e g re e  in f lu e n c e  
t h e  soc ie ty  in  w h ic h  w e  live.
•  t  \
F O O T N O T E S
1 This bu rgeon ing  fie ld  can be sam pled  th rough  collections of essays, such 
as N ader (1965b); B ohannan  (1967a); and  N ader (1969a); as w ell as 
syn th e tic  w orks such as N ader (1 9 6 5 a); M oore (1970a); Pospisill (1971);
N ad er and  Y ngvesson(i3T  i»).M any of th e  above contain  ex tensive  b ilio - 
graphieS. In  addition , see N ader, Koch, an d  Cox (1966).
2 Tw o recen t sourcebooks su rvey ing  th e  l ite ra tu re  a re  F riedm an  and  
M acaulay (1969) and S ch w artz  and  S kolnick (1970).
3 T he anthropological eq u iv a len t of w h a t M ills criticized as ab strac ted  
em piricism  am ong sociologists (1959: Ch. 3 ).
* The task  th a t M erton  urges (1967a) and  accom plishes (1967b).
•’' T he im m a tu rity  of th e  social th eo ry  of law  is ev idenced  in  o th e r  w a y s . ,
O ne is its continued  su b o rd in a tio n  to  trad itio n a l legal scholarsh ip  -  
from  w hich  it  still derives its vocabulary . A nother is its preoccupation 
w ith  the  se l ection, defin ition , and  re fin em en t of concepts, of w hich th is 
a rtic le  is an  exam ple.
6 This p refe ren ce  inev itab ly  ra ises the problem s of cro sscu ltu ra l compo-ir' ^ ' ‘* ^ , t  
tro v ersy  m n ern ing  the possib ility  of such com parison, and th e  m ethod
by w hich it n d u c ted , is long and  passionate. T o  paraphrase
W inch - the  p roblem  of u n d ers tan d in g  an o th e r society seem s to m e no 
different., in eith* k ind  degree of d ifficulty , from  the problem  of u n ­
derstan d in g  an o th er person  (1958; 1904: 322-24). A rgum en ts over the 
m eans have  cen te red  aro u n d  the choice of a term ino logy  - w h e th e r to 
d ra w  i t f i i  '.'>>> being  stud ied  or from  he society of the  student,
o r to develop a logical m e ta -lan g u ag e  in d ep en d en t of both. This, I 
believe, is one roo t of th e  G iu ck m an -B o h an n an  con troversy  —  see no tes 
10, 21, infra. (J a n e  C ollier has suggested h i d ifferences betw een  
A m erican  cu ltu ra l and  B ritish  social an thropology  are an o th e r source.)
A n o th e r p ro b lem  of th is term inological s tra teg y  is the  tendency  of 
concepts to lose th e ir  con ten t as they  becom e m ore u n iversa l (G eertz ,
1965: 101). I a ttem p t to m eet som e of these problem s below.
7 In u rg ing  th a t we try  to co n stru c t v a riab les  th a t m ay  be scaled con­
tinuously , as against those th a t a lte rn a te  betw een  polar values, I do not 
w an t to be d octrina ire . D ichotom ies a re  o ften  a necessary p re lim in ary  
in th e  conceptualization of varia tion , and  m ay persist as a convenient 
S horthand th e re a f te r  (see P a r t  V .B .2 ).
3 T he d iscovery  th a t a s ign ifican t phenom enon, e.g., law , appears to be 
absen t from  a sc-nety could lead to  a search  for o th er phenom ena w hich 
se rv e  as functional equ ivalen ts. Im plicit in such  a search , how ever, is 
the  notion  of som eth ing  w hich th e  societies h a v e  in  com m on, if w ith  
su b stan tia l varia tions. I believe it is b e tte r  to  try  to fo rm ulate  th e  com ­
mon g round  at the  cu tse t and  then  look fo r the  range of variation.
!> The sam e d ifficu lty  confronts all concepts a t a sirryilar le*el of ab s trac ­
tion  - for instance, the fam ily , religion, language, justice.
10 S$ef for instance, the w orks cited in note 1. T h e  pub lication  of ev ery  
m a jo r essay and m onograph  has b een  m e t w ith  criticism  largely  d ire c t­
ed tow ard the choice of concepts, and p a rticu la rly  tow ard  the defin ition  
of law. See, e.g., G luckm an’s rep ly  to his critics (1967), o r B ohannan’s 
rep ly  to hi. (1968b). E very  m ajo r conference on legal an th ropology  
seem s to  get bogged dow n over th is issue. See e.g., N ader, 1969b (re p o rt 
of th e  B urg  W artcnste in  conference of 1966).
11 B ohannan  in tro d u c e  th is concep t into legal an thropology  (1957: 4 f f .) .
He has since argued  tha t n e ith er the  folk nor the  analy tic  m odels of a 
g iven society are app rop ria te  for cross-cu ltu ra l com parison an d  th a t a 
m eta-lan g u ag e  m u st be developed (1969). No one has yet done so.
12 T h ere  is scarcely an an th ropo log ist or law y e r (w ith  the  exception of 
M alinow ski, discussed below ) w ho has no t ad h ered  to the fundam en ta l 
th ru s t of th a t definition. See, e.g., Hoebe-1 (1954); Pospisil (1958); G luck  - 
m an  (1955); Elias (1956).
13 Such  a process of concept fo rm ation  has been  advocated  by bo th  philo­
sophers and  .sociologists, even  those from  opposite schools of thought.
See, e.g., W inch (1964: 317-18); M erton  (19674: 143-47); S tinchcom bo 
(1968: 33-40K
^ G lu c k m a n  has observed  th e  sam e developm ent am ong o ther w rite rs  
(1965a: 181).
1?> N ot e v e ry o n e  has accepted the  b ro ad er perspective . P .P . Howell, an 
a d m in is tra tiv e  officer w ith  anthropological tra in in g  w ork ing  am ong the 
N u er n ea rly  tw o decades la ter, could w rite :
T h e  te rm  “la w ” is som etim es used of all processes of social 
control, an d  by th is defin ition  any  of the obligations, custom ary  
actions, and  conven tions in h eren t in any  social system  m ight be 
described  as law . It is less confusing to  adep t the hypothesis th a t 
th e  e x te n t of th e  law  is lim ited  to social control w hich is m a in ­
ta in ed  by organized  legal sanctions applied by  some for ~“of o r­
g an ized  po litical m echanism . By this defin ition , the N uer had 
no  law  . . . (1954: 225).
H ow ever, H ow ell could take som e satisfaction in the  fact th a t since the 
tim e  of E v a n s -P r itc h a rd ’s fie ldw ork  the B ritish  had  successfully  i n 'r o -  
3* ced organ ized  g o v ern m en t to the N uer, thus con ferring  on them  the 
b en efit of law.
i3 A nthropologists a rc  fr 'qu en tly  sub jec t to the seducticm  r f  negative 
ethnocf difficult to su rv iv e  the  anthropological rite*
d e  ; of up to t in the field w ith o u t bee n ting p artia lly
converted  to th  ' outlook of the people one is study ing . H ow ever, in the 
in te rd isc ip lin a ry  fit d ci legal anthropology, an th ropo log ies have tended  
to borrow  the analy tic  fram ew o rk  of law yers w ith  p rac tica lly  no e x ­
change m th e  other direction (T w ining , lwo) For an example of a law­
y er rejecting tbtap nthropoloj Atlott (1953). T here  are
sev e ra l possible reasons for this: law  is a highly  technical subject 
possessed of high status in the aeadt mic m ark e tp lace  and a vocabulary  
incom prehensib le  to th e  u n in itia ted ; perhap  as a re su lt m any  of the 
an th ro p o lo g is ts  w ho v en tu red  upon such uncertain  g round  have had 
som e tra in in g  in law, or have collaborated  w ith  law yers (L lew ellyn  an"1 
H oebel, M alinow ski him self, G luckm an, E pstein, P rsp isii, S. Moore, D. 
M etzg er). L aw yers, u n lik e  anthropologists, a re  not so read ily  at racted 
to th e  c u ltu re  they a re  studying  since they do not genera lly  engage in 
ex ten s iv e  fie ld w o rk  and  have  no professional aversion  to e thnccen trism . 
17 F o r a thorough  discussion of M alinow ski’s theories of law, as w ell as a 
com prehensive  bibLiography, see  S chapera (1957a).
1 Indeed , the: positions of the  tw o an tagon ists a re  really  com plem entary . 
This c a r  be suggested by the follow ing list of d ichotom ous qualities
w hich ind ica te  the  opposing em phases.
Radcliffe-Brown Malinowski
1. nega tive  sanctions positive sanctions
2. sanctions subsequen t to  act sanctions an teceden t
3. em phasis on law  in the  breach  law as observed
4. m an d ato ry  law  fac ilita tive  law
5. m echan ical so lid a rity  organic so lidarity
6. ex te rn a lized  sanctions in ternalized  sanctions
A ll societies, of course, fall som ew here b etw een  the poles. H ow ever, it 
is u n fo rtu n a te  th a t M alinow ski's v iew poin t has gen era lly  been  sligh ted  
in fav o r of R ad cliffe -B ro w n ’s.
1H M alinow ski m ight leg itim ate ly  rep ly  th a t he w as o ffering  a defin ition  
o ip r im i t iv c law  w hich  obviously does not app ly  to A nglo-A m erican  
com m on law. (I arn g ra te fu l to R ichard  L em p ert for th is observation .) 
H ow ever even  .p r im itiv e  law contains torts, as C rim e  a n d  C v s tu m  in  
Savage S o c ie ty am ply  dem onstrates. M oreover, w e w ould  be left w ith  
a d efin itio n  of law  for all societies as a class of ru les w hich are  not en ­
fo rced  by re lig io u s sanctions, goodwill, c r  an  a b s trac t agency; I h ard ly  
th in k  th is is any  m o re  useful.
This o v e r-ren d in ess  to genera lize  all facets of T rob riand  
society co n stan tly  reap p ears  in his w riting : “I v e n tu re  to fo re te ll th a t 
w h e re v e r  ca re fu l in q u iry  be m ade, sy m m etry  of s tru c tu re  w ill be found 
in ev e ry  savage  society, as the  ind ispensable  basis of reciprocal obliga­
tio n ” (1926: 25).
2,1 A n o th e r is H ogb in  (1961), w ith  an_ in troduction  by  M alinow ski (1961).
- 1 O n G lu ck m an ’s fide, see 1955; 1962; 1965a: 1965c; 1967; 1969; and  A llott, 
Epstein  and G luckm an (1969). O p B ohannan’s side, sec 1957; 1965; 1967b; 
1968a; 1968b; 1969.
O thers have chim ed in (see, e.g., the b ib liography  in G luckm an, 
1967: 417). A ccording to L aura  N ader, the  B u rg  W artenste in  conference 
in 1966 reso lved  th is issue:
T he  question of anthropological use of ju risp ru d en tia l te rm in ­
ology basic to an earlie r d isagreem ent be tw een  M ax G luckm an 
and Paul B ohannan, was discussed and  sum m arized  at th is con­
ference. In te llec tua l ag reem en t betw een  B ohannan and  G lu ck ­
m an  w as a rriv ed  a t by Professor H oebel’s sk illfu l s ta tem en t of 
th e  question  . . . and the  group expressed th e  belief tha t the 
a rg u m en t had  now  been dissolved and need no longer occupy 
th e  a tten tion  and energies of scholars in te rested  in  law  (1969b:
4 >-
A read ing  of the exchanges betw een  the  principal adversaries, contained 
in  th e  sam e volum e, suggests th a t the  resolution  w as no t so successful.
— So have M air (1962: 19) and  G oldschm idt (1967: 2 -3 ) . Som e political 
scientists have recen tly  set a sa lu ta ry  exam ple by reso lv ing  to p u t a*ide, 
a t least fo r th e  m om ent, the ir equ ivalen t sh ibboleth , “the s ta te .” See, 
e.g., Fasten  (1953: 108 , S w artz , T u rn e r and T uden  (1966); bu t see 
F ried  (1967: 1, 227).
-3 A u b crt not- , th a t i' c f the  few m eeting  places betw een  th e  socio­
logy and  anthropology of law  (1969a: 12).
Im pact studio - which . Kplorc the  re la tionsh ip  betw een  norm s and b e ­
h av io r - have been  a in;.,:..hay of America] legal sociology. T hey have 
been  conspicuously absent n legal anthropology in  general, and in 
A frica  in  p a rticu la r. The reason  m ay  b« re la ted  to policies of ind irect 
ru le (see note 28 infra.) u n d er w hich som e colonial reg im es m ain ta ined  
trad itio n a l su b stan tiv e  rules. W here independent governm ents hove 
enacted leg isla tion  m an d a tin g  radical behavioral refo rm , the  reaction of 
m ost w este rn  scholars has been skepticism . A rth u r  Schiller qu ite  ea rly  
coined the phrase “fan tasy  law ” (1965), an d  m ost w rite rs  appear to 
agree w ith  h im  (V erhelst, 1963; F isher, 1971).
:’r> U nder th e  title  of “ju d ic ia l process” this has, of course, been a fav o rite  
sta rtin g  point for law yers specu lating  about th e  law . But these specula­
tions, though, d ressed  in social scientific  language, have only been su p ­
ported  by th eo ry  and em pirical research  in the  last decade. See, e.g., 
K a lven  and Zeisel (1966).
L ga1 rea li ;m appear: to have had considerab le  influence upon the d ev e l­
opm ent cf legal anthropology. K arl L lew ellyn, certa in ly  a leader of th a t 
m ovem ent, was also co -au th o r of one of the  first substan tia l m ono­
graphs devoted  en tire ly  to law  (L lew ellyn  and Hoebcl, 1941). B ut th e re  
w ore o th e r reasons as well. A nthropology in the 1950’s and  1960’s - w hen 
in te rest first tu rn ed  tow ards law  - w as ripe for such a focus. The atudy 
of social s tru c tu re  and  especially k insh ip  relations, w hich  derived  from  
R adcliffe-B row n  and  w hich m ight have led legal anthropologists to 
em phasize su b stan tive  rules, seem ed to h av e  reached a point of d i ­
m inishing re tu rn s . The w atchw ord  of th e  p a s t decade has been process, as 
ex p lo red  by the  ex tended -case  m ethod  (A.L. E pstein, 1967a; 1967b). 
G luckm an’s w ritings and  the w o rk  of his pupils - a force suffic ien tly  
p c ie n t to he te rm ed  the M anchester “School” - has carried  this approach 
to ■■uch d ispara te  sub jec ts  as r itu a l and  sym bolism , politices, and law .
ationship maj be even m ore direct. G luqkm an’s first m ajo r w ork  
in legal anthropology (1955) w as c learly  m odelled  upon Cardozo (1921).
It m ay be sign ifican t th a t the grow th  of legal anthropology coincided 
w ith  the rise of A m ericans to increasing  p rom inence  in  in ternational 
an th ropo logy  follow ing the  Second W orld W ar. A m erican  social scien­
tis ts  in te rested  in law  can hardW escape the  reach of legal realism . See, 
fo r instance, th e  su b stan tia l re liance  by L k y d  F a lle rs  (1969) on E d­
w ard  Levi (1948). E nglish and  con tin en ta l scholars, on the  o th er hand, 
m ay be p a rtia l to a m ore ru le -o rien ted  ju risp ru d en ce , as w ere  those 
ra re  A m erican an th rcp o k g is ts  w hose in te rest in law  an ted a ted  legal 
rea lism  (e.g.. B arton. 1919).
The legal realists w ere  fu lly  a w are  of th is ; and  offered th e ir ow n e x ­
p lanations (e.g., F rank . 1931; A rnold, 1935). A ubert has noted it recen tly  
(l°69a: 13); so m ust any  law y er o r social sc ien tist w ho seeks to engage 
:n in terd isc ip lin ary  w ork. W hatever the  reasons for the  sen tim en t, it 
h* Ij p lain  why, a f te r  m ore than  fifty  year?, legal realism  rem ains
0  p rogram , to be discovered and  proclaim ed anew  by every  generation 
cf s tuden ts, ra th e r  th an  an  accom plishm ent.
I t is in te res tin g  to note th a t scholars from  F rance and  Belgium , w hose 
colonial policies tended  m ere  to w ard  d irect rule, show ed considerab ly  
less in te rest in ind igenous societies generally , and in  indigenous judicial 
in stitu tions in particu lar. On the o th e r hand, th ey  w ere  m ore in te rested  
ir  the  su b stan tiv e  legal ru les of those societies, since colonial officials 
w ere  expected  to ad m in is te r them . See Salacuse (1969).
In n u m erab le  colonial ad m in is tra to rs  produced ad m irab le  studies of such 
institution? In A frica see. e.g L am b ert (1947), P h illips (1945); in Ind ia  
see, e.g., R ttigan  (1953). H enry  M oro»(1970: 16) suggests th a t the in ­
terest of colonial officials in trad itional jud ic ia l in s titu tio n ' was s tim u ­
lated  by a recognition th a t they  o ffe ied  the best source of in fo rm ation  
ab< -nutation \ those officials sought to control.
»n This st < a - 'l ie  coun terpart, perhaps even  a reflection , of the nostalg ia 
fo r a van isu in g  tecial >rder w hich a ttrac ted  the a tten tion , and sym pathies,
( f the  ’ h eo ris tf  (see N isbet, 1966).
•u M argare t Mead, in In; r- .en t au tob iography, indicates this was the  r e a ­
son w h y  she becam e an an th ropo log ist (1972: 291 ff .) ,
; T c - no ’ ' n w h\ 1 analy tic  • > n< I develop could not be applied
to  < I  shall
rpeak of the d isp u tan ts  as though  they  w ere  individuals.
:,:11 am h e n  tli angu ish ing  conflicts of in te rn ; from controversies over 
ascerta in ab le  fact and conflicts over values (see  A u b ert, 1963a).
8-4 i t  is thus su ffic ien t for a d ispu te  th a t th e  inconsistency be asserted . I am
th e re b y  including  bo th  w hat S im m el term ed rea lM ic  and w M t bp term ed  
unrealis tic  conflict (1955). I have  d e lib era te ly  chosen an obie 'd iv*  defi -  
nition in  te rm s of observab le  beh av io r so to a v c id  the n ec°ssih ' of 
hav ing  to p lum b th e  actual m en ta l s ta te s  of the c la im ants. The assertion  
of a claim  need not be verba l. O ne response to the disnute. of course, 
m ay be to persuade the c la im ants that the  inconsistency dcec nr* exist.
E ven  this defin ition  re ta ins a  grey area in w h 'ch  each c’a im en t com ­
m un ica tes his claim lo i n u (fo r instance, his w ife mid
no fu r th  t  confrontation  develops. H ence d ispu te  is a concept of w hich 
th ere  can be m ore  o r less,
3r* I am  follow ing G lu c k m a n s  helpful rem in d e r about the rm d ti-voealjty  of 
our m ore com m on concepts, and the d esirab ility  of developing  our 
ex is tin g  vocabu lary  of s im ilar w ords in order to stress certa in  elem ents 
of a conceot (1962: 19 ff.; 1965b).
"*fi The stage  of conflict as I have defined  it. appears tc  re q u ire  a sub jec tive  
m en ta l elem ent in th e  defin ition  of the phenom enon. It th ere fo re  ^ e e ^ s  
m ore  am enable to psychological inqu iry , w hereas d ispu te  lends itself to 
sociological analysis
T his te rm  was suggested to m e b y  W illiam  F elstiner.
These concepts have  been alm ost inescapable in the lite ra tu re  r ! le^al 
an thropology  and  sociology. T h e re  is, o f course, a Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. Rc-cert collections in these fields have used those concepts as 
organ izing  princip les .See A u b e rt (1969b: Ch. 4 ) :  N ad er (1969b): G ulli­
v e r (1969a). B ohannan, w ho eschew s the term  in his rolloction. L^w and 
Uorfare; studies in the a n th r o p o lo g y  of conflict (1967), offers a pos­
sible reason  for th is b ias in his preface:
In W estern  society — and  p erh ap s in m ost o thers bu t that, is 
beside our im m edia te  p o in t— conflict is unequ ivocally  “a bad 
th in g .’ I t is typ ical th a t W estern  society ten d s to m oralize 
ab o u t bad th ings — and. h av in g  salved  its collective conscience, 
do nothing else (Id. a t x i.) .
It m ay  be th a t w e a re  now  beg inn ing  to come to te rm s w ith  th is fear. 
See, e.g., D riberg  (1934); H ollem an (1950). L aw v ers  hove m ade the 
sam Elias (1956), as hav e  colonial adm in istra to rs, e.g.,
D undas (1915).
40 F o r a re c e n t criticism  of th is approach, see T an n e r (1970).
41 A nthropologists also ap p ear to  have  confused native rationaliza tions 
of b eh av io r w ith  o b jec tive  descrip tion . H ollem an quotes the H era  
p ro v e rb : ‘“ To d is tu rb  w a te r is to m ake  it calm  a<?a;n ’ . . . it is 
som etim es n ecessarv  to face troub le  in  o rder to get th ines stra igh tened  
o u t” (1952:36), B u t a read ing  cf the  d ism ite  in w hich th is n roverb  is 
invoked  leads m e to conclude th a t th e  troub le  was h v  no m eans s tra ig h t­
ened  out.. N ader, s im ila rly , has en titled  an essay: “Styles of C ourt P ro ­
cedure : To M ake the B alance” (1969c). tran s la tin g  th e  Zanote? value of 
“h ace r el ba lance .” Y et a close study  of the fiv e  cases she analyzes again 
leaves m e w ith  the felir.g th a t no balance was achieved in fact, and the 
d ispu tes co n tin u ed  to simmer on.
42 T his is obvious, in a c ru d e  form , to anyone w ho has practiced  in A m e r­
ican tria l courts. L aw ren ce  F ried m an  isi engaged in a carefu l s tu d y  to 
docum ent th e  e x te n t to w hich it is so, and  to explain  w hy.
4'J T his lends su p p o rt to M arc ( r’B im portan t suggestion th a t legal 
categories m ay not b tu sefu l s ta rtin g  points fo r o rganizing social research  
(1973: 16).
441 have re)i' d h eav ily  on Dahrendorf’.s analysis of th is  concept (1968a).
This is oi.e reation r y noliurso d islike  in te rv en in g  in m arita l d isputes 
— b eh av  ’ appear: to b u  random , and they  cannot know  w b 'h  to expect, 
T he tra in in g  of a (specialized Fam ily  C risis In te rv en tio n  Unit, ra n  be 
seen as an a ttem p t to lze the.se d ispu tes (Bnrd, 1970), An
ex am p le  c l  h igh ly  ul in stitu tio n a liza tio n  ir  the  d eve lopm en t of
machine- ;es d u rin g  the last cen tu ry
(D ahrendorf, 1959. Ch. 7).
4"M y  m odel h< alysis of t! w of d isputes (M ack and
S nyder, 1957).
47 Compare D ahrendorfs defin ition  (1959; 209).
tK M ichael S a ltm a n  has conducted  a ca re fu lly  controlled  com parison of the . 
co n ten t cf d isputes in  th ree  K ipsigis com m unities in K enya, w hich J.fVer 
r ily  in th e  e x te n t to w hich  th e ir econom ic organization  has been 
a ffec ted  b y  cont th  th e  larger soeietv. H e found th a t increasing
mod* n i *closely co rre la ted  w ith  a sh ift in the ob jects of d ispute
from  c a ttle  to land to m oney (1971).
•> ' See, e .g .  L eV ine (1960) (com parison of G usii of K enya and N u er of 
S udan  ) ; see generally Mead (1961). F o r exam ples of societies which ap­
p e a r to encoi ich rep ression , see, e.g., T h u b ten  and T u rn b u ll (1968)
shall (1961) (IK ung B ushm an of K alahari D esert, S ou th
A fr ic a ) .
50 See, e.g., G u lliver, 1955; for a general discussion of the  a lte rn a tiv es  to 
d ispute, s&e F tire r-H a im e n d o rf  (1967) (a com parison of severa l A sian 
so c ie tie s ) . Up to i point, th is a lte rn a tiv e  becom es less availab le  as 
popu la tio n  d ensity  increases. B u t w ith  the q u an tu m  ju m p  to an u rb a n  
se tting  m ig ra tion  — w h e th e r physical or sim ply social w ith d raw al — 
becom es an im p o rtan t, perhaps even  the m ost im portan t, solution to  con­
flict. C ollier c learly  delineates th e  consequences for Z inacanteco conflict 
of the  p ro x im ity  of th e  tow n of San C ristobal (1973).
•'1 T he eschatologicn! beliefs of m an y  versions of C h ristian ity  encourage 
th is approach.
: em phasized th e  fact th a t a p a r ty  in itia te s  the d ispute  
process by  a his claim ; he sees th is as one of th e  essen tia l fea tu res
of ad ju d ica tio n , w hich  d iffe ren tia tes  it from  o ther k inds of processes, 
such as econom ic nego tia tion  and political election  (n.d.: 54). I find 
th is  observation  v a lu ab le  in suggesting  the iden tity  of the  in itia to r of a 
d ispu te  as a variab le , and  in d raw in g  a tten tio n  to the  possibility  th a t a 
n o n -p a r ty  m ay  in itia te . H ow ever, I believe th e  effo rt to estab lish  ideal 
types of process tc be m isguided, and  the n o rm ativ e  overtones cf labe l­
ling one of th e se  “a d ju d ica tio n ” to be fu n d am en ta lly  antiscientific.
, i T he  n u m e ro u s  sociological s tud ies of the  legal profession point to  the 
im p o rtan ce  of this variable. See. e.g., those collected  in A u b ert (1969b), 
or Laiuyers in Developing Societies, w ith  p a rticu la r re fe rence  to Ind ia
54 This has been one of the  theo re tica l foci of the  B erkeley  C om parative 
V illage L aw  P ro jec t (see Y ngvesson, 1971: 4 ), as is am ply  d em onstra ted  
by  m an y  cf the  studies produced  by  m em bers of the p ro jec t (e.g., 
N ader, 1965c; S ta rr , 1969; Y ngvesson, 1970).
5G See also Y ngvesson (n .d .) . T his con trast b e tw een  styles can only be 
used w ith  th e  cau tion  th a t w e m ak e  exp lic it w h e th e r w e a re  using folk 
defin itions of w h a t i superfic ia l or fundam enta l, or analy tic  definitions. 
I suspect th a t it w ould  be very  d ifficu lt to co n stru c t the  latter.
S(t L on F u lle r  argues th a t b icen tric  and po lycentric  disputes are  d iffe ren t 
in kind, and th a t only the fo rm er is appropria te  fo r ad jud ication  (n.d.: 
74 ); see also H ow ard  (1969; 347).
8T A lthough  I be lieve  th a t A u b e rt’s perception  is w ell founded and useful, 
I am  not sure  th a t his use of the  ad jec tives “ legal” and “scientific" to 
describe the tw o approaches is justified . F rom  m y ow n experience  of th e  
process of fam ily  d isputes in A m erican  courts, I w ould argue th a t law yers 
and  o ther legal professionals (judges, clerks, social w o rk ers) ta k e  w h a t 
A u b ert calls a scien tific  approach, and  the  parties, and the ir n o n -p ro ­
fessional relatives, frien d s and  supporters , follow w hat he calls a legal 
approach.
8*Eckoff ’ ! -r" ) ; fh . • II (1 DG'Ja: 13-19). L loyd Falters devotes m uch of
the ana v 1 < in his book to the  p rob lem  of explic itness of no rm ative  a rg u ­
m en t (1969). Lon F u lle r  asserts  th a t explicit norm ative  a rg u m en t is 
an o th e r iden tify ing  ch a rac teris tic  of ad jud ica tion  .(n.d.: 69); see also 
H ow ard  (1969: 349).
08 S tu d en  g attitudes of
A frican and E nglish  tr ib u n a ls  tow ards the im portance  ( I finality , and  the  
tendency of th a t  va lue  to be em phasized w ith the E u ropean ization  of the  
court s tru c tu re . See, e.g., L a m b e rt (1947: 8 ); A. L. E pste in  (1952: 8 ); 
see also H ow ard  (1969: 354).
too A u b ert (1963a); Cohn (1967: 156); N ad er (1969c: 88). I believe N ader 
is in e rro r  in co n trastin g  a zero -sum  gam e w ith  th e  m in im ax  principle, 
T he la tte r applies equally  in zero -su m  games. I th ink the con trast she 
identifies is one betw een  dichotom ous e ith e r /o r  decisions, and  com pro­
m ise decisions. The fo rm i 4 * . * » » - £ . ra re  in an y  legal system .
,:t The grow ing sociological lite ra tu re  of “im pact s tud ies” deals w ith  this 
problem . See, e.g., Nagel (1971).
The p r b ie r n  w ith  using such analyses fo r sociological purposes is, of 
cour 1 both  F u lle r  and  W echsler a re  offering  n o rm ativ e  judgm ents, 
not descrip tive  sta tem ents,
*,8T h  n be due to  the fact th a t the “ru le  of law ” is a
cen tra l concept in the A m erican  legal and political folk system s. The 
w ork  of P h ilip  S elzn ick  and his tes at the C en ter fo r th e  S tudy  of
L aw  and Society, a t B erkeley , consists in p a rt of an a ttem p t to give 
th is folk system  a dt fin ite  analy tic  content. B u t the d ifficu lty  w ith  such 
borrow ings is th a t the folk concept can n ev e r be com pletely  freed  of 
th e  freigh t of em otional and ideological connotation w hich  is an essential 
a ttr ib u te  of ev ery d ay  language.
This approach also appears to be pred ica ted  on a causal sequence 
w hich is the reverse  of th a t com m only used  by the sociologists and 
anthropologists su rv ey ed  above (w ith  the possible exception  of B ohan­
nan) They, by and large , ex am in e  the  s tru c tu re  of a d e p u te  to u n d e r­
stand^ how  it determ ines process. The n eo -n a tu ra l law school stud ies the  
w ay in w hich  a concept of th e  d ispu te  process d e te rm in es  its structure. 
See the controversy  b etw een  Selznick and his critics reproduced in 
F ried m an  and M acaulay (1969; 1-34). F or a recen t exam ple of this 
n a tu ra l law approach, see Selznick (1969); and see Golding (1969).
1 This m ay explain  the vehem ent, and alm ost un iform , criticism  of jud icial 
behaviorism  by legal scholars, who d isparaged  it as “the b re a k -fa s t 
school of ju risp ru d en ce .”
0,1 The consequences cf th e  p a rad ig m  ex tend  beyond scholarship  to the 
w orld  of action. Legal scholars w ho em brace th e  notion of the ru le  of law  
urg e  th a t judicial in s titu tio n s  ab sta in  from  action w here  norm s, o r c e r ­
tain  k inds of norm s, do not decide the dispute. A nd judges, equally  
anx ious to  avoid  th e  ta in t of n o n -n o rm a tiv e  influence, o ften  follow 
th e ir  advice.
(,(J I am  h ere  concerned w ith  w hat it m eans for a no rm  to govern  a d ispute. 
L a te r I w ill consider the  conditions necessary  for a norm  to  govern  a 
dispute.
87 To ask th e  question — w hen do norm s d e te rm in e  the outcom e of a 
d ispute — is of course to choose a level of analysis at w hich norm s arc  
the sign ifican t variab le . R ecent political science and  legal h istory  have 
p re fe rred  to tre a t o th e r  variab les as d e te rm in a tiv e  of norm s and o u t­
comes, See e.g., H u rs t (1964); F ried m an  (1965); M acaulay (1966); 
T u sh n et (1972); H orw itz (1973).
^ W e c h s le r  w ould alm ost ce rta in ly  agree, and rep ly  th a t his s ta tem en t is 
m ean t to be critical and not descrip tive.
T his is, of course, the  criticism  offered  by Ja n  D eutsch.
A dequate  generality  in n jud ic ia l decision — neu trality , if you 
w ill —  is, there fo re , th a t deg ree  of genera lity  perceived  as 
a d e a u a te  by the very  society th a t Imposes th e  re q u ire m e n t 
of adequa te  genera lity  to begin w ith  . . . (1968: 195);
70 I t  w ould of course lx» possible, a f te r  the d ispute , to rev iew  events and 
find some norm s which appear to d esc rib e  w naf happened — e.g., p la in ­
tiffs  w earing  striped tie : should w in cases on N ovem ber 7, 1972 — and 
this is, to a U  : nt, w h a t logoi professionals (includ ing  scholars)
do. Hut th is is not w het they  m ean  by norm s govern ing  disputes,
71 A norm , it th is sense, may be sim ply the genera lization  of the  dem and 
beyond the fact situa te  < of t!u> in stan t d ispute to som e inclusive fact 
situation , to w hich positive value  is a ttr ib u te d . C hildren  below  a certa in  
age m ay no t be able to proceed beyond “1 w an t,"  Hut the capacity  to 
v e rb a liz e  a dem and  soon followed by the capacity to Justify it:
"I w an t because I like." And a lth o u g h  abso lu te  pow er m ny ioad a m an 
to reg ress to in fan tile  dem ands, as C am us suggests of Caligula, any th in g  
loss does not have th a t uesult; nations a re  constan tly  appealing  to norm s, 
and so a re  d ictators.
7- G luckm an had  an tic ipated  th is  by  in te rp re tin g  G u lliv e r’s A rusha cases 
as d isp lay ing  the  presence and  influence of p ow erfu l no rm s (1965c).
■sThjc d istinction  ha? boon criticized by others, e.g.. Raz (1972), and  
fu r th e r  refined  by  D w opkin (1972). F o r an  a ttem p t tc reconcile  th e  two, 
see Yale L aw  Journal I Note I (1972).
74 The m ost n o tew o rth y  instance i n  w hich a stan d ard  becam e a rule, and 
th en  a stan d ard  again, Is the  “s to p -lo o k -a n d -lis te n ” cases. T he com m on 
law norm  of behav io r a t level ra ilro ad  crossings had been reasonab le  
care. In  Baltimore & Ohio Rv. v. Goodman  (1927), Ju s tice  Holm es 
sought to “lay  dow n a stan d ard  I sic — a ru le  in th is  co n tex tl once for 
a ll” — a ru le  w hich w ould re q u ire  th e  d r iv e r  of a ca r to step, look and 
listen b rfo ro  proceeding th ro u g h  a level ra ilroad  crossing, and  if his 
v iew  wa? obstructed , to get ou t of the  car. This ru le  had o pera ted  for 
enlv seven  years w hen  Ju stice  Cardozo felt com pelled to overru le  it in 
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. (1934), w ritin g : “I llu stra tio n s such as these  bear 
w itness to the need fo r caution in fram ing  s tan d a rd s  of b eh av io r th a t 
am oun t to ru les  of law .”
R ecently  we have seen n um erous instances of standards b e in g  con­
stru ed  in an increasingly  ru le - lik e  m an n er, e.g., th e  E qual P ro tec tion  
Clause as applied  to school desegregation , to reapportionm en t, and, as 
in te rp re ted  by  sta te  courts, tc  school financing. A t th e  sam e tim e, th e re  
are  pro? al ly a g rea ter n u m b er of exam ples of ru les  becom ing s tandards: 
precise grounds for d ivorce in te rp re te d  as eq u iv a len t to m arriage  b re a k ­
dow n; ru les  govern ing  com m ercial transactions becom ing s tan d ard s of 
accepted business practice.
A m ore in teresting  question, therefo re , is w hy  a p a rtic u la r  n o rm a­
tive  idea is fo rm ulated  as a ru le, o r as a s tan d ard , an d  w h en  it w ill be 
tran sfo rm ed  from  one in to  the other.
7R A. L. Epstein observed  an increase  in th e  Ibvel of abstrac tion  of the  
norm s invoked  by  courts on th e  C opperbelt o v e r th e  course of tim e 
(1951: 34). K aw ash im a uses the P arson ian  p a tte rn  v ariab le  —  p a rtic ­
u la r ity /u n iv e rsa lity  — to describe  changing  p a tte rn s  in  legal reason ing  
in Jap an  (1963).
™ An increase in explicit a rg u m en t m ight, fo r instance, be co rre la ted  w ith  
rap id  social change, v Ith an increase in cu ltu ra l hetertfjen^ty or w ith  an 
Increasing  ra tional a u th o rity  ra th e r  than  trad itio n a l o r
charism atic.
77 B oth T an n er (1970) and C ollier (1973) em phasize th is v a riab le ; it m ay  
be sign ifican t th a t both  w orked  in societies th a t had  been  p lu ra lis t fo r 
a long tim e (In d o n esia ), and had a long h is to ry  of colonialism  (Indonesia 
and  M exico).
78 It m ay be. fo r instance, th a t ev e ry  d isp u te  process req u ire s  elements of 
both  flex ib ility  and fix ity , so th a t w h en  su b stan tiv e  norm s become 
fixed, p rocedures becom e * o re  flex ib le, and  vice versa. Eckhoff notes 
that flex ib ility  of norm s m ay in h ere  in po litical ideology in much the 
sam e way as formality of procedure is m an d a ted  by the western concept 
.of the ru le  of law. ‘ I C onfucius’ 1 teaching that the parties tend ing  to 
assert th e ir  r igh ts  m ust be dam pened , so th a t one could get them to 
com prom ise, has le ft deep m ark s in  the East-Asiatic ideology of con- 
flict-resolution” (1909: 173 n . l ) .
78 Sim on R oberts has g iven us un exce llen t analysis of the extent to which 
trad itiona l K gatla law  Is p resen tly  open to new  norm s, often drawn from 
w estern  legal system s (1971).
80N ader has m ade th is explic it (1909c: 88), as has M arc Gnianter (1972b). 
Eckhoff notes th a t the  influence of norm s cun derive  from  a wide variety 
of soun  pow er trad ition , ethics, etc, (1909: 170-77),
and  fu rth e r  t.hm the -n  ind iv idual may a lte rn a te  b e tw een  ad ju d ica ­
tion and  m ediation in coping w ith  «i dispute, even  th o u g h  his quantum 
of au th o rity  does not change (19011- 180-81). W cher, of course, has con­
ducted the  ma t ex tensive  inqu iry  into the re la tion  between the nature 
of au th o rity  and  the  n a tu re  or norm s (1954).
The tendency of the concepts I seek to correlate to merge into an
ind iv isib le  un ity  become: acu te  a t this point and th e  cn til d irection  of 
the ir re la tionsh ip  becom es obscure. Do au th o rity  or th e  re le v a n t norm s 
an ted a te  th e  d ispute; do they urine as a re su lt of the d ispu te? The p ro b ­
lem k lhut both sta tem ent#  a re  true, and  the a ttem p t to  ex p la in  one 
by th e  o th e r is n ecesw ily  a rb itra ry  to som e degree.
This m ay be considered a special case of W eber's  concept of charismatic 
au thority .
82 This is an instance of W eber’s concept of trad itio n a l au tho rity ,
88 Eckhoff gives th e  ex am p le  of chess-p layers (1969: 177); P iag e t finds 
sim ilar instances am ong ch ild ren  (1965: Ch. 1), and M alinow ski am ong 
the T ro b rian d  Islanders (1926:12 and  pass im ).  W e can all th in k  of 
exam ples from  o u r own experience. This m ay be genera lized  as W eb er’s 
concept of ra tional au tho rity .
84 M any au th o rita tiv e  decision-m akers function largely  w ith o u t re fe rence  
to norm s. W eb er’s id ea l-ty p e  of K adi justice  (1954: 63) and M aine’s 
p ic tu re  of the  p a te rfam ilia s  "ijvuing themistes  (1950: Ch. 1) m ay  be 
exam ples. E ven those d ec ision -m akers w hose behav io r can, in som e 
degree, be explained  by norm s engage in considerable ac tiv ity  w hich 
cannc-t be  so explained.
8a C om pare T an n er (1970) ,t and  C ollier's  use (1973) of B n rk u n ’s defin ition  
of law (1968- 92, 151). M arshall and  M ay pu t th is nicely  in th e ir  s tudy  
of th e  d ivorce court in Ohio:
The sub stan tiv e  law  of d ivorce is m ere ly  the  te rra in  on w hich 
the b a ttle  of the divorce court is w aged. As a m anual fo r the  
tra in ing  of A m erican in fa n try  officers says,
# The te rra in  exerc ises a contro lling  in fluence on all 
m ilita ry  opi rations. P ro p erly  u tilized  it is freq u en tly  
the  decisive factor. T he e lem en ts  of the  te ra in  a re  the 
concealm ent, cover, facilities for m ovem ent, and  oppor­
tu n itie s  for observation  and  fire  w hich it affords, and 
the obstacles it in terposes to fire  and  m ovem ent.
The procedural ru les in d ivorce actions are, th ere fo re , w h a t 
a m ilita ry  stra teg is t w ould call “the  u tilization  of the te r ra in ”
j , (1933; 211).
M T his is, of course, a com m onplace am ong p ractic ing  law yers. Indeed, 
th e re  a re  m anuals which in struc t the  p rac titio n er in  how to contro l fo r 
jury pre ju d ice  (Q arry , 1969). B ut if the legal system  does not actively 
seek to conceal th e  irra tio n a lity  of th e  jury, it is sufficiently ambivalent 
about that factor to resist academ ic investiga tion  and  pub lic ity . See  
S tro d tb eck  (J902: 151 n. 8 ).
87 See, e.g., R. D aw son (1969); H ood (1962); F ran k e l (1973); Seym our 
(1973). M ost e rim ina l dispositional system s, in  addition, m ake explicit 
provision fo r th e  ex erc ise  of execu tive  clem ency, w hich is in ten tionally  
a d ev ia tio n  from  th e  norm s. T here  is considerab le u n certa in ty  over 
th e  ex ten t to w hich  norm s do, and  should, govern  th is behavior, as 
th e  recen t W ate rg a te  scandal indicates.
88 T he d iscretion allow ed p riv a te  ind iv iduals in in itia tin g  civil litigation 
is so obvous th a t, u n fo rtu n a te ly , it has n ev er been  studied; von Jh e rin g  
is alm ost u n iq u e  in h is speculations (1915). See also B lack (1973). This 
has, how ever, fo rm ed  a p rin c ip a l concern of the  so c io lo g y  of crim inal 
law. See, e.g., J . G oldstein  (I960 ); Skolnick (1966); L aF ave (1965); 
B lack (1971).
88 See  M iller (1969). C om pare th e  criticism  of A dam  W alinsky, then 
cand idate  fo r N ew  Y ork  S ta te  A tto rn ey  G eneral, w hen  he announced 
th a t if e lected  ho w ould  no t devo te  h is p rim a ry  e f fo r t ' to th e  prosecution 
of flag b u rn e rs  (New York Times, A ugust 15, 1970; A ugust 21. 1970), 
w ith  the claim  by  the  th en  A tto rn ey  G eneral Louis L efkow itz  (w ho was 
seeking  re -e lec tio n ) that he prosecuted  all o ffenses b ro u g h t to his 
a tten tion . W henever such discretion  is m ade exp lic it th ere  are cries of 
outrage, See the attem pt by y-rV endum  in B erke ley  to regu la te  the 
d iscretion  of  the  noiic to m ake a rrests  for the  possession cf m arijuana . 
A lthough th e  re fe ren d u m  was successful, It has since been declared 
unconstitutional by a court, T he W atergate scandal is in p a rt a, con tro ­
versy  over the  factors that should affect the decision to prosecute.
u" Newman (1966); Hmv ;r*d (1969); Jones (1909); Ross (1970). M y own 
experienci In prad New Waven c these observations. Not
on ly  doc" the judge accept uncritically almost any ag reem en t between 
counsel, but ho will frequently refuse to hour counsel argue w hen they  
wish to do so, and  instead ncnd them  out of th e  courtroom  to nego tia te  
n settlement.
"' T he con troversy  s tim u la ted  by  P resid en t Nixorf* recen t successful and 
unsuccessful n om ina tions to the  Suprem e Court, and by the change in 
jud ic ia l ideology an d  decision w hich those appoin tm ents have produced, 
is co n tem p o ra ry  ev idence of th e  im portance of these factors. 
O ’G orm an  (1963: 21), follow ing M erton (1967b: 126 ff .) , has a rgued  
th a t such d isp arities  b e tw een  norm  and behavior should provide a 
stim ulus for social analysis, n e t ju s t m oral rep robation : “N orm s, legal 
o r  o therw ise, a re  no t evaded w ith o u t reason. W hen evasion becom es 
common practice  am ong large n u m b ers  of law -ab id ing  citizens, the 
d e te rm in an ts  of such evasion a re  to be found . . .  in in stitu tio n a l incon­
sistencies ra th e r  than  in  ind iv idual m orality . . . . p a tte rn s  of evasive 
b ehav io r have  developed  by w hich th e  law  is obeyed in theory  and 
denied  in fact. To paraph rase  M erto n ’s analysis  of political m achines, 
th e  functional deficiencies of th e  law  gen era te  an a lte rn a tiv e  m ethod  
to fu lfill social dem ands som ew hat m ore effectively .”
n:,F.q., the  scandal concerning Ju stice  M itchell S chw eitzer (N ew  York  
Times, A ugust 3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 1971).
"* The O.E.O. Legal Serv ices p rog ram  was developed la rg e ly  in response 
to a recognition  of these  d isparities, and tho lite ra tu re  w hich led to its  
creation , an d  w h ich  evaluates its success, is rep le te  w ith  data. See, e.g., 
Harvard Im w  R ev iew  I Note 1 (1967); G alan le r (1972b).
{,R G usfield deal., a t som e leng th  w ith  the problem  of ex p la in in g  behavior, 
w hich is explicitly justified in  no rm ative  term s, by  m eans of o ther 
social fac to rs (1963: 57-60).
tMl A u b e rt has noted th a t “a touchiness often arises because of a ce rta in  
am bivalence  in  th e  foundation  of the  relationship . L aw yers a re  the 
su b jec t of sociologists, b u t they  a re  sim ultaneously  collaborators . . 
(1969a: 13-14).
1,7 O ’G o rm an ’s stu d y  (1963) of law yers w ho hand le  m a trim o n ia l cases 
o ffers exce llen t in sigh ts in to  the com plem entary  influence of official 
ru les, and of o th e r  s tru c tu ra l and  cu ltu ra l factors, upon th e  behav io r of 
each of the actors in these cases. T h ro u g h o u t the book he  p resen ts  
instances of b eh av io r w hich cannot be exp la ined  by official n o rm s alone. 
F o r instance, th e  decision by a residen t of N ew  Y ork to seek  his d ivorce 
in ano ther ju r is d ic t l  n, is best exp la ined  by th e  socio-econom ic .status of 
th e  pe titio n e r, and  by the  n a tu re  of his law y er’s practice (1963: 77-80).
08 See Stinchcom be’s analysis of th e  use of type  concepts (1968: 43-47). 
M alinow ski, of course, is the e x trem e  ex am p le  of this. B ut m an y  a n th ro ­
pologists h av e  d ifficu lty  b reak ing  ou t of the  fram ew ork  of the  firs t 
society they  s tudy  —  w hich  is often the last.
100 I t  is s tr ik in g  th a t anthropologists w ho engage in  ex tensive  fie ldw ork  in 
tr ib a l societies o ften  fail to ca rry  ou t com parab le  research  in th e ir  ow n. 
In stead , th ey  re ly  on popu lar lite ra tu re , or even  th e  anecdotal e x p e r­
iences of them selves or th e ir  friends. See, e.g., B ohannan  (1970). On 
the  o th er hand, p rac tic ing  law yers — certa in ly  p a rtic ip an t observers of 
th e ir  own legal system  —  m ake the opposite m istake.
101 Y et even it reveals the  dangers of th is  m e th o d  Ja n e  C ollier’s a tte m p t 
to apply th e  Zapotec m odel to h er Z inacantan  m ateria l seem s to m e to 
d is to rt the la tte r, no t to illum inate  it (1973: 105-6).
102 A n in te restin g  exam ple  of a zero -sum  gam e w hich  included some of the  
fea tu res  of N ader’s m odel, but not others, w a s je x p e rim e n t cf a h isto ry  
d ep artm en t in an A m erican  u n iv e rs ity  in allocating  by vote the total 
sum  of m oney availab le  fo r facu lty  ra ises for th e  en tire  d e p a rtm e n t 
am ong each or its m em bers. The focus of in q u iry  tended  to be prospective 
ra th e r  than re trospective , b u t discussion w as lim ited  to superficial issues.
108 On th e  o th e r hand, th e  B akongo exp lo re  all th e  issues, and  y e t have no 
belief in th e  value  of com prom ise, o r the  im possib ility  of an  u n am b ig ­
uous a ttr ib u tio n  of prai.se or b lam e (M acG arfey, 1970: 183).
104 A m erican  cou rts  im pose com prom ise all th e  tim e  (see Coons, 1964). 
E very ju ry  verd ic t in a neg ligence case is a com prom ise betw een  the 
v ic tim ’s claim s and the d e fen d an t's  contentions.
lon I w ould suggest, us a hypothesis, th a t such a d ep a rtu re  m ight be found 
w here  the Zapotec court w as confronted  w ith  a d ispu te  w hich contained 
a suspicion of w itchcraft; I w ou ld  be very  su rp rised  if such a suspicion 
was m ade public, und openly  and fu lly  explored.
mo W eber, him self, w ould choose an o th e r course. He w ould seek  fu rth e r  
insight from  the d e p a rtu re  of da ta  from  ideul type (1968: 506). B rodbeck 
has criticized this approach  as c ircu la r (1968: 459-60).
107 This is ano ther reason  w h y  I re jec t th e  a tte m p t to d iv ide d isputes into 
n o rm ativ e  and  non-n o rm ativ e , a  d ivision w hicn crea tes tw o ideal types.
108 O ne reason w hy  an thropology  has no t proceeded m uch beyond the  
classification of tra its  m ay be the insidious in fluence of functionalism . 
If, as M alinow ski in  p a rtic u la r  proclaim ed, ev e ry th in g  in a society is 
re la ted  to  ev e ry th in g  else, the  only possible exp lana tion  is a holistic 
description. T his w as u n d o u b ted ly  a fru itfu l doc trin e  in th e  ea rly  study 
of tr ib a l society, and  a va luab le  cau tion  for those who w ould b lind ly  
s tu d y  single tra its  in isolation. B u t taken  to its logical ex trem e, it leads 
to a m indless ga thering  of da ta  in th e  vain  hope of u n d erstan d in g  th e  
society as a whole.
’">» Nade] (1951:407). M uch of th e  w ork  of th e  cu ltu re  an d  personality  
school of A m erican  an thropology  is v itia ted  by the fa ilu re  to use sep a r­
ate  indices for cu ltu re  and p e rso n a lity . Jam es G ibbs com m its the  sam e 
erro r in his recen t study  of th e  d ispu te  process am ong the  K pelle, b u t 
he is clearly  conscious of th e  problem  and has conducted , though  no t y e t 
analyzed, a  sep ara te  in q u iry  into p erso n a lity  tra its  (1969: 185).
110 This has also been  called the  “Z an z ib a r sy n d ro m e” in  a probab ly  apocry­
phal sto ry  about a Z anz ibari s tu d en t at Yale w ho confounded his pro­
fessor by d em u rrin g  to ev e ry  generalization  offered  on the g round  th a t 
it did not apply  to Z anzibar. Of course, he w as r ig h t — Z anzibar is 
special - but so is ev e ry  o th e r concrete instance.
rn  F or critica l discussions of th e  defin itional p rob lem s, see D ahrendorf 
(1968a); Sou thall (1959).
112 T he S uprem e C o u rt’s decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (1954) m ay 
no t have been “effec tiv e” to in teg ra te  the schools, b u t it co n trib u ted  in 
some degree to la te r legislation w hich  asserted  th» princip le of n a ­
tion in o ther social activ ities.
118 A t least th is  was the  hope of th e  nu m ero u s colonial ad m in is tra to rs  w ho 
recc nm ended  th a t rem edy . See P hillips (1945: 168).
1,4 K enya has consciously adopted a  policy of sta tio n in g  judges outside 
th e ir localities in o id e r to p ro m o te  the developm ent of national norm s.
11 r)A n ex ce llen t ex am p le  of sophisticated  analysis of this m ore  com plex  
re la tio n sh ip  is A u b e rt (1966).
n «  E v en  in th is som ew hat m ore sophisticated  form , m y essay is still an  
“im pac t s tu d y .” A m ong  the m any  reasons w h y  th a t fo rm a t is so p e rv a ­
sive in  th e  "sociology of law, "two predom inate . F irst, con tem p o rary  
w este rn  politics is b u ilt on an  assum ption  th a t law  should  be effective. 
Second, all scholars a re  sw ayed  by  th e ir  v a lu e  p references in  choosing 
p rob lem s for study . B ecause th ese  a re  o ften  unstated , they  a re  ra re ly  
su b jec ted  to  analysis. In those circum stances, official s ta tem en ts of 
v a lu e — em bodied in law  — offer a conven ien t and acceptab le s ta rtin g  
point. I have d iscussed th is  p o in t a t g rea te r len g th  in  a 
rev iew  essay  (1973).
" " I  hav e  dene so to a lim ited  e x te n t e lsew here  (1970), and  am  in  the 
p ro cess of ex p an d in g  that analysis.
118 Each of these  defin ing  c r ite r ia  allow s of varia tio n , so th a t the d ispute  
w ith  an  in te rv en e r m erges im p ercep tib ly  w ith  the d ippute w h ’ch lacks 
one. T hus th e  in te rv e n e r  need not be addressed d irec tlv  bv  the narijps 
b u t  m ay h ea r of th e ir  claim s th rough  in te rm ed ia rie s . A nd he need not
issue a u n ila te ra l decision; indeed, inaction  m ay  be a form  of in te r ­
v en tion  if ac tion  is custom ary .
It appeal ; to be a norm  of alm ost u n iv ersa l p rovenance th a t someone,
at least, shou ld  in te rv e n e  in ev e ry  d ispu te . T his m ay exnlain  the w id e­
spread  rep u g n an ce  exp ressed  w hen  no one docs so, w h e th e r in New 
Y ork C i ty —  as in th e  K itty  Genovesv? in c id e n t— or in U ganda, am ong 
th e  Ik, as described  by Colin T u rn b u ll (1972). N ew  Y orkers have 
recen tly  token  h e a r t  from  the ren ew ed  w illingness of the ir fellow  citizens 
to  in te rv en e . See, e.g.. N tvYork Timti J u ly  23, 1973, p. 1.
iso T he re la tiv e  capacity  to do som eth ing  about th e  ro le  m av explain  w hv 
so m uch sociological a tten tion  has focussed on the legal professional, 
w h e th e r  law y e r or ju d g e , and  so little  on th e  litigan t, w h eth er actual 
o r po ten tia l.
121 A m ong  th e  num erous exam ples a re : K enya —  Abel (1969a; n .d .b ); 
U ganda — R ussell (1971); Zam bia —  Spalding, H oovcr and P ip e r (1970), 
and th e  ex ten s iv e  re fe re n ce s  cited  therein .
122 T h e re  a re  severa l p rob lem s w ith  this definition, ow do w e know  v« kether 
a d isp u tan t is follow ing the  decision of an in te rv en e r?  I f  we use an 
ob jec tive  crite rio n  — conduct w hich  appears to an  ex te rn a l o bserver to 
be in conform ity  w ith  the decision —  we include conduct w hich is m ere lv  
fo rtu ito u sly  conform able . See W eb er (1947: Ch. 1). On the  o th e r hand, 
a su b jec tiv e  defin ition  in troduces all th e  problem s of m easu rem en t and 
proof. F u r th e rm o re  it crea tes a c ircu la rity  of defin ition: au th o rity  is 
m easu red  by conform ity , and con fo rm ity  by subm ission  to au th o rity .
128 P ospisil’s pu rpose  h e re  is to d is tingu ish  law  from  custom . He does not 
ex p la in  w hy  he  chooses these  tw o qualities, n o r  how they  are  re la ted  
to each other, if th c v  are.
124 See D u r h a m  v . United States  (1954). I t  is possible tha t psych ia tris ts , 
h a b itu a te d  tc  the exercise  of absolute au tho rity , come to behave in a 
m ore  legalistic  fashion, e.g., in d e te rm in in g  com m itm ent to or release
from  large s ta te  m ental institu tions, or in deciding to g ran t or deny oarcle. 
Cf. A. G oldstein  (1967). A u b ert m akes a s im ila r point (1936b: 19).
128 The en th u siasm  w ith  w hich A m erican foundations poured m o n e v  into 
h ig h e r educa tion  in general, and  legal education in p articu la r, in A frica 
and Lat in' A m erica , is testim ony to the  p ervasive  belief in the  capacity  
of tra in in g , even  a t a re la tiv e ly  late stage of a person’s in te llec tual career, 
to  effect change in him  and in society. T he resu lts  have no t m et the 
expec ta tions.
,2,? By in c lu d in g  a u th o rity  and tra in in g  u n d er th is  um brella . I do no t m ean 
to suggest th a t ro le  d iffe ren tia tio n  cap tu res all th a t is sign ifican t about 
those tw o  concepts; ra th e r , it ab strac ts  th e ir  b a re  bones. I am here con­
cerned whether the intervener possesses more au­
thority or training than other interveners, not 
w i t h  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  that authority or traininq.
The la t te r  will u n d o u b ted ly  also in fluence the in te rv e n e r  to act in 
c e r ta in  wav*, ___________ ____________________
f’-’7 See, e.g., Toennies (1957); Sorojein (1937-41). H ere, as in m y  analysis 
cf process, I re je c t th e  typological approach  b u t use th e  ty p es posited 
to  fu rn ish  variables.
128 In  anthropology, e,g., W hite (1959); S tew ard  (1955); Sahlins and  Service 
(1960); F ried  (1967). In  sociology, e.g., P arsons (1966): E isenstad t 
(1964) . F or additional refe rences, see m y b ib liography  on “E vo lu tionary  
Theories of Law  in S ocie ty” (n .d .a: -11 ).
120 See also S chw artz  and  M iller (1964); N agel (1902). L ubm an  has used 
the sam e v ariab le  to exp la in  th e  d ifferences in  function ing  am ong  u rb an , 
industrial^and ru ra l m ed ia to rs  in contem porary  C hina (1967: 1330, 1337).
1801 am com pelled to accept R obert N isbet’s conten tion  th a t m uch of 
tw en tie th  c e n tu ry  sociology is a rew o rk in g  of th e  ideas of n in e teen th  
cen tu ry  ancesto rs (1966: p a s s im ) .
181 T he  task  itself is som ew hat dauting . T he availab le  m ateria l c n  K enya, 
published  and  unpublished , is considerable. See  A bel (1969b). In  add i­
tion, I collected cases, d ispu tes processed ou t of court, descrip tions of 
and prescrip tions fo r  courts  by  ad m in is tra tiv e  officers, an d  statistics 
abou t litigation .
Yet m y purpose he not been an ex h au stiv e  su rvey  an d  sy n thesis  of th e  
grow ing lite ra tu re  ( tlem ent. I am  seeking , ra th e r, to  e la b o ­
ra te  sonu general tr .> in such a w ay th a t th ey  can be tested . I th in k  
th e  r< at ' - w ho continues w ith  'h is essay  w ill agree th a t I h av e  derived  
m ore tijan  enough concre te  conclusions for th is  p u rpose ; fu r th e r  p ro lif­
e ra tion  of e x a m p u ; w ould be u n p ro d u ctiv e  at th is stage, since th ey  
w ould  not o ffer evidence fo r o r against th e  theo ry . The one bias th a t 
m ay p ro v e  seriou- . • ■ y fam iliarity  w ith  A nglo -A m erican  legal system s, 
a n a  m y ignorance of th e ir  C ontinen ta l counterparts.
139 I t m ay well be th a t  ou r ow n society is th e  best p lace  to- test m any  of 
the  hypotheses fo rm ula ted  b y  m eans of re search  in th e  developing 
countries. Not only; a re  some of th e  eth ical p roblem s of research  an a  
ex p erim en ta tio n  m itigated , b u t contro lled  re fo rm  m ay be m ore  p rac tic ­
ab le  than  in  societies w h ere  rap id  social change is a p a ram o u n t objective.
194 F unctional specialization, in the  sense ofn*ole independence, S i
infra has s trong  norm ative overtones as w ell. The separa tion  of pow ers 
is an axiom  of th e  political ideology of w este rn  E urope and  A m erica. 
E uropean  observers in v a riab ly  noted th e  com m ingling  of pow ers in 
A frican  polities, and g en era lly  criticize^*. Colonial govern m en ts  often  
m ade an  a ttem p t to  restructure. A frican  g jw ern m en K  along E uropean  
lines. See, e.g., th e  “B ushe” R eport (1934) jS p a ld in g , H oover and P ip e r 
',1970: 59-69) B ut these  a ttem p ts  have been  of on ly  lim ited  success, 
even  today. F a lle rs  w rites  th a t  Soga chiefs, w ho p a rtic ip a ted  in p ro ­
m ulgating  legislation and adm in is te rin g  th e  affa irs  of governm ent, w ere  
also the courts un til 1941, and  continued  to dom inate  the  ju d ic ia ry  at the 
tim e  of bis fie ld w o rk  in ,1950 (1969: 59). Indeed , in a case h e a rd  in 1950, 
the defen d an t seem ed w holly  ig n o ran t cf the  d istinc tion  betw een  a 
subcoun ty  ch ie f ac ting  in  his ad m in is tra tiv e  capacity an d  th e  sam e 
ind iv idual p erfo rm in g  the  role of jud g e  (1969: 165). (I found  instances 
of sim ilar confusion about th e  h ead m an ’s k o r ti in K enya in 1907-6JD 
B ut no t only did the judges perfo rm  o th e r gov ern m en ta l functions, th ey  
freq u en tly  Owed allegiance to  persons and  groups as a re su lt of th e ir  
positions in the  trad itio n a l s ta te  stru c tu re . F allers has devoted  a w hole 
book to  describing the  “s t r a in ” to w hich  an ind iv idual is sub jec ted  
w hen he is the  focal point of such poorly  in teg ra ted  in stitu tio n s asserting  
inconsisten t expectations abou t his behav io r (1965).
185 T h e  krfinition of w h a t it m eans to p erfo rm  a function  will c learly  cause 
serious difficulties w hen  w e com e to m easure  this variab le , and  I am  
g ra te fu l to Robi rto  U nger for po in ting  them  out. W hat is in te rv en tio n ?
Is it s itting  in the p resence  of th e  d isputan ts?  even if the in te rv e n e r is 
th in k in g  ab o u t som eth ing  else? W hat if, despite his efforts, th e  d ispu te  
is stiuem ated? A n in te rv e n e r m ay be. specialized in  the  sense th a t he is 
physically  in  has office, b u t n ev erth e less  be d iversified  in  th e  functions 
he perform s.
139S ee  B iddle and  Thom as (1966: 34). C om pare, for instance, th e  C on­
tinen ta l trad itio n  of a ca ree r ju d ic ia ry  (M errym an , 1969: 34 ff.) w ith  
the  A m erican  p rac tice  of appo in ting  m en  to th e  bench late in life, som e 
c f w hom  (e.g., S u p rem e  C ourt ap p o in tees), w hile qualified as law yers, 
m ay have had little  contact w ith  th e  law  for m an y  years. C on trast w ith  
bo th  of these  the s itua tion  in  som e trad itio n a l A frican societies, w here  
m en m ay qualify  to ad ju d ica te  by  atta in ing  a senior age-g rade, p rio r to 
w hich point th ey  h av e  perfo rm ed  th a t function  only  w ith in  th e ir  fam ­
ilies, if  a t all. Sec, e.g., L a m b e rt (1956: 107 f f .) .  G iven the lim ited  life 
expectancy, m ost w ill function  as judges fo r a  v e ry  sho rt period, both 
abso lu te and  re la tive .
137 B iddle and  Thom as (1966: 59) (concept of rep e rto ire  ex ten s iv en ess).
188 The com bination  of ro les m ay  be as  m uch th e  p roduct of conscious 
decision as the  division of roles. In  N ew  Y ork’s ex p e rim en t w ith  th e  
F am ily  Crisis In te rv en tio n  U nit it w as decided th a t  those p a tro lm en  
w ho received  special tra in ing , and  responded  to all fam ily  q u arre ls , 
w ould  con tinue th e ir reg u la r p a tro l w ork (B ard , 1970). O ne reason  m ay  
have been  the low er s ta tu s  associated w ith  specialization in th a t role. 
A sim ilar reason m ay exp lain  the un ifo rm  opposition of the  C onnecticu t 
bench to a specialized dom estic re la tions section in  olace of the p resen t 
practice of ro ta ting  m ost ju d g es th ro u g h  th e  dom estic  re la tions calendar 
fo r a lim ited  period of tim e.
,31» Again, societies m ay  consciously m ak e  th e  opposite decision, re q u ir in g  
in te rv en e rs  to p erfo rm  o th e r roles, and the occupants of o ther ro les to 
in te rvene . C hinese m ed ia tion  is an exam ple  (L ubm an , 1967: 307-08 n. 
94).
ik ’ This can go fa r  beyond provisions designed to p rev en t a conflict of 
m a te ria l in te rests  — p.g , th a t a  judge d ivest him self of stocks, or recuse 
h im self in a p a r tic u la r  cn.se. O ne response to the  W arren  C om m ission’s 
investigation  w as a dem and  th a t judges be p recluded  from  acting  in such 
a capacity  in the fu tu re . Iron ically , the v e ry s^ c  **dization of judges in 
th e  U nited  S tates co n trib u te s  to th e ir status, w hich leads to p ressures 
UDon them  to accept o ther roles.
141 See. e.g., Sm elser (1964: 261): “S im ply  defined, d iffe ren tia tio n  re fe rs  
to the evo lu tion  from  a m u lti-fu n c tio n a l ro le s tru c tu re  to sev era l m o re  
specialized s tru c tu re s .”
142 M erton has dem onstra ted  this convincingly  w ith  reg ard  to in te rm arriag e  
»n A m erica (1941).
>4:t O n 'p a r e  for instance, th e  High C ourt cf E ngland (w hcse justices con- 
.s thu 'e  OOC12*# of the  popu la tion ) w ith  the lay  m agistracy  (w hich  
constitu tes a percen tage  300 tim es larger) or w ith the m ediation  com ­
m ittees  oil C h ina  w hich, even  w ith in  tha t m uch la rg e r  population, con­
s titu te  a percen tage  200 tim es as g re a t  See  A b el-S m ith  and  S tevens 
(1969: 459 f f .) ;  Cohen (1966: 12Q2).
144 It should not be th o ugh t th a t A frican  dispute in stitu tio n s  lack th is form  
c>f In te rn a l specialization. A kan courts possessed spokesm en, m essengers, 
and criers, as well as chiefly  judges (M cnsah-B row n, 1970: 128). B u t 
th e  fact th a t society recognizes, such roles does no t m ean  th a t they are  
alw ays perfo rm ed . E thiopian  litigan ts  tended to shun th e  am a teu r 
law yers w ho w ere  ava ilab le  (F isher, 1971: 733).
J ,n Spalding, Hoover and  P ip er see th is as an im po rtan t them e in ju d ic ia l 
develoom ent in A frica (1970: 52-59).
1444 T ribal courts gen era lly  had un lim ited  subject m a tte r  ju risd iction . The 
change u n d e r colonial ru le  was ab ru p t. T hese th a t w ere  recognized w ere 
hedged in on ev e ry  side: fo rb idden  to h ea r cases involv ing  m arriages 
ce leb ra ted  u n d er c e rta in  ord inances, denied s ta tu to ry  ju risd iction , 
restric ted  in cases w h ere  death  had  occurred, c r  w here  sev ere  penalties 
m ight be req u ired . W ith  independence these restric tions have been 
re lax ed . B u t there  is reason to expect an increase in specialization along 
the lines of recen t w estern  jud ic ia l h istory . See  A b e l-S m ith  and S tevens
(1969).
147 T he A m erican doctrines of e x h au stio n  cf ad m in is tra tiv e  rem edies and  
absten tion  by  the  federa l courts are ex trem e  refinem ents of this. B ut 
C h inese judges, too, scrupulously  observe  th e  re q u ire m e n t tha t a couple 
su b m it to m ediation before the h ea rin g  cf a contested d ivorce (L ubm an , 
1967: 1327-28). -
148 C onversely , social revo lu tion  m ay  constitu te a conscious a tte m p t to 
dim in ish  social d istance  and cu ltu ra l d ifferen tia tion , especially  as these 
v ariab les ch aracterize  jud icia l institu tions. Sae L u b m a n ’s discussion of 
M aoist s tra teg y  as early  as 1946 (1967: 1306-09).
*40 I w ish to d istinguish  h e re  betw een  tw o k inds of perip a te tic  disputing. 
In  the  first, m odelled upon som e A frican  societies, the  in te rv e n e r  accom ­
m odates to the  d ispute , ho ld ing  the hearing  w here  th e  d isputan ts, the<r 
w itnesses, or the ob jects of+he d ispu te  a re  located. I w ould  view  th is as 
re la tiv e ly  u n d iffe ren tia ted . However, D uncan K ennedy has suggested  
to m e th a t a cen tra l g overnm en t m ay  send  out in te rv e n e rs  to hear 
d isputes locally in o rd er to enforoe its ru le  m ore effectively . I w ould 
tre a t th is as a situation  of high d ifferen tia tion  because th e  in te rv e n e r 
com es from  the capital and p resu m ab ly  is endow ed w ith  som e of the 
o ther qualities discussed below . A ppeal cou rts  in K enya trav e lled  on 
circu it; so did those of T anzan ia  (K aplan , 1965: 85).
150 L ubm an  notes th a t Chinese m ed ia to rs v isited  th e  d ispu tan ts ind iv idually  
in th e ir  hom es (1967: 1298, 1307).
A frican  d ispu te  in stitu tions accom m odated to d isp u tan ts  here , too. M a r -  
j e r y  P e rh am  no tes of E thiopia: “P arties  in civil and even  m ino r c rim ina l
disputes w ould  call upon a passerby  to decide th e  issue b e tw een  them  
u n aer a tree . T hese in fo rm al roadside co u rts  m igh t last for hours, to the 
deep intf - est of the spectators. . . . Ju d g es thus conscripted w ere  
expected to accept the r d u ties” (1948: 144-45, quoted  in F isher, 1971: 
729). C ollier reports instances of th e  Z inacanteco p resid en te  being 
aw akened  at night, or co rnered  a t his hom e e a r ly  in th e  m orn ing  (1973: 
30). Ev ng had  been begun, it m ay  be ad jo u rn ed  to
perm it p a n  fitnesses (A. L. Epstein, 1954: 18;
Ifollem ar:. 195? 30 • !;y contrast, the  s ta tu s  f legal sp ec ia lis t— w h e th e r 
law yer or judge — lik e  th a t of the m edical specialist, is o ften  defined 
by how m any  people he h a s  w aiting  fcr him , and  how  long each of 
them  has to w ait. An exce llen t em pirica l s tu d y  of th e  M agistra tes’ 
C ourts in E ngland observes: “It is certa in  tha t the convenience and  
feelings cf litigan ts have h a rd ly  ev er been  considered in the adm in is­
tration. cf this b ranch  of su m m ary  justice. Such deta ils  as the  opening 
hours of collecting offices or th e  w illingness cf co u rt staff to save a 
w om an  the loss of a half d ay ’s earn ings by  giv ing h e r  in fo rm ation  over 
the  te lephone seem  too triv ia l to be considered in legal discussion of 
ju risd ic tion . But these a re  the so rt of tr iv ia  th a t m ean  fo r th e  
m ostly  very poor and  u n h ap p y  citizen's w ho m eet fam ily  lawT in  the 
m ag istra tes’ courts, the  d ifference  betw een  d ig n ity  and hum iliation , 
betw een  decency and sq u a lo r.” M cG regor, B lom -C ooper and G ibson 
(1971: 122).
A ttem pts to re fo rm  m odern  legal system s o ften  a ttack  this p h e ­
nom enon; Chinese m ed ia to rs and  th e  firs t A m erican  ju v e n ile  cou rt both  
m et d u rin g  le isu te  hours so th a t p arties  w ould no t have to mis# w o rk  
(L ubm an, 1967: 1318; Jev en ile  C ourt of th e  C ity  and  C o un ty  of D enver, 
1904: 85).
] 52 This fac to r has been u n d u ly  neglected, and  only a few  studies give us 
any  data  on. m uch less analysis of, ju d ic ia l a rch itec tu re . See, e.g., H azard  
(1962); B edford  (1961); Moley (1932); C ollier (1973); Spalding, H oover 
and  P ip e r (1970. 161 f f .) ;  V irtu e  (1956).
1B" An Ibo p ro v erb  perfec tly  expresses one e x tre m e  of this variab le : “A 
care forbids no one” (Elias, 1956: 239, quoted  in F isher, 1971: 731). A 
public se tting  may perm it o th e r m em bers of the  co m m unity  to p a rtic i­
pate, as lin E thiopia (F isher, 1971: 732) or T anzania  (K aplan, 1965: 84).
15+ w h en  Ju d g e  B en jam in  L indsey, m oving sp irit beh ind  th e  h ighly  inno ­
vative D enver Ju v e n ile  and  F am ily  R elations C ourt, w as rep laced  by a 
m uch  m ore trad itio n a l judge, h e  w rote  of h is successor: “The bench  
itself he finds too low  to m eet the  re q u ire m e n ts  cf jud icial d ign ity  — 
according to th e  press he w ill ‘ra ise  it  18 in d ie s ’ } A nd in an expansive  
m o m en t he confides: ‘I w ill say  . . . th a t  m y idea cf the  co u rt is to 
m ake it as n ea rly  like o th e r co u rts  of record  in  th e  sta te  as it is possible 
_  u n d er th e  lhw ” (L indsey  and  Borough, 1931:, 296). ___  ___
W e h a v e  recen tly  w itn essed  o ther developm ents in the physical 
env iro n m en t of A m erican  courts w hich, though in troduced  for d iffe ren t 
reasons, ap p ear to have th e  consequence of fu r th e r  increasing  th e  social 
d istance b e tw een  in tervener and  d ispu tan ts. D ism ayed by  the am ount 
—  and k in d  —  of d e fen d an t partic ipa tion  in recen t crim inal tria ls , judges 
h ave  re so rted  to a v a rie ty  of devices, one of w h ic h  — approved  by the  
S uprem e C ourt —  h as been  to rem ove the d e fen d an t from  the courtroom  
and  allow h im  to w atch  thfcproceedings b y  closed c ircu it television. The 
sam e technology  has been  used  in rev erse : in o rd e r to p ro tec t the  ju ry  
from  hearing  inadm issib le evidence, the tria l has been  v ideotaped, cut, 
and th en  p resen ted  to  th e  ju ry  on television . See New Y ork  Times,  
Ju n e  23, 1973, p. 32,
186 The d iffe ren ce  bew een  tra d itio n a l A frican  in stitu tions and  those estab ­
lished b y  colonial ru le  w as im m ense. F u r th e r  change has occurred  m ore 
g radua lly  as a resu lt of ad m in is tra tiv e  consolidation an d  population 
grow th. K ap lan  notes an  increase in  the size of Chagga ch iefta incies 
betw een  c. 1900 and  1952 from  5,000-15,000 to 10,000-30,000 (1965: 82-83). 
P r io r  to th e  judicial reo rg an iza tio n  of 1930 th e re  w ere  app rox im ate ly  
400 p rim a ry  courts in K enya  serv ing  a  popu lation  of 4,000,000; in 1970 
ab o u t 100 such  courts se rv in g  a population of m ore th a n
10,000,000, roughly  n u fo ld  increase  in th e  population  p er court.
18<J M aine stressed  the im portance of a  tran sfo rm atio n  of th e  concept of 
ju risd ic tio n  from  one based on k in sh ip  (p erso n a l) to one based on 
te rr ito ry  (g eo g rap h y ) (1950: C h  5 ). 3 a r to n  found  em p irica l con firm ­
ation of this hypothesis in the P h ilipp ines (1949).
157 T he n  tion and defin ition  of lim its  m ay also be v iew ed  as a con­
com itant of bu reaucratiza tion  (see P art 7 ,A , L u b m an  describes
th e  ju risd ic tio n  of m ed ia to rs in  in d u stria l se ttings in  C hina as being 
v ery  flex ib le  and  indefin ite  (1967: 1333),
H en ry  M orris describes the g rad u a l expansion  of the personal ju risd ic tion  
of p rim a ry  courts in  A frica  — from  A fricans of th e  local area, to  A fricans 
of th e  tribe , to A fricans of th e  te rr ito ry , to all A fricans (1970: 14). Since 
independence th e re  has been  a general re jec tio n  of the  concept of p e r ­
sonal ju risd ic tion , w hich is seen as re p u g n a n t to con tem porary  ideals 
of eq u a lity  and  nationalism .
159 T he increase in the  size of the  geographic u n it served  b y  th e  p rim ary  
courts in K enya has been m ore  th an  m atched  by an  im provem en t in 
roads and bus tran sp o rt. See B arn e tt (1965; 44). T his is tru e  for m uch, 
though n o t all, of A frica, 
ion T b 's  consequence  of the colonial system  of c rim in a l ju s tic e  was often 
the subject cf concern. See, e.g., the “B ushe” R eport (1934: 13-16, 23).
1,11 T h at this is o ften  done from  v e ry  d iffe re n t m otives —  e.g , to prom ote 
a sp irit of national un ity , o r to lim it co rrup tion  —  does no t a lte r the
consequences*. __• . . . /
' ' ‘-M arc  G a la n te r  tells m e th a t a civil se rv an t in In d ia  was expected  to 
resign from  his club w hen appointed  a judge. C elibacy m ay have s im ila r 
consequences for an o th e r profession, 
l is  T he in flex ib ility  of the  costs m ay  also be an index  of b u reaucratiza tion . 
H ollem an indicates th a t custom ary  gifts m ade in  H era cou rts  w ere h ighly  
flex ib le: goods could su b s titu te  for cash, p a rtia l p aym en t w ould be 
accepted as a token  of good fa ith  in ten t to pay the  rest, and full pay ­
m en t was often n e ith e r dem anded  no r m ade (1952: 31).
104 As F isher describes t.he c rim in a l investigation  in E thiopia, it was an 
occasion for feasting  by th e  local officials, and an econom ic d isaste r to 
th e  in h ab itan ts  (1971: 719). 
i«5 i would expect rem u n era tio n  from  ano ther source to resu lt in g rea te r 
d iffe ren tia tio n  of the  in te rv e n e r  for tw o reasons: th e  econom ic nex u s is 
e lim inated , th u s  p e rm itting  the  in te rv en er to rem ain  m ore  aloof from  
th e  d ispu tan ts, w ho no longer pay  him  for his serv ices: th e  am ount cf the 
re m u n e ra tio n  can be g rea te r since it need  not come from  the d isp u tan ts  
alone. W ith  respect to the fo rm er d ifference, com pare the legal or m ed­
ical professional, w ho avoids discussing paym ent w ith  his c lien t and 
sends a bill a f te r  the service is rendered , w ith  the  sto rekeeper, w ho 
shows no such em b arrassm en t.
ion E ven  in the  m ost eg a lita rian  societies, w om en are  com m only excluded  
from  partic ipation  in disputes, or re legated  to a la rge ly  passive ro le as 
audience. They a re  th ereb y  dep rived  of th e  tra in in g  req u ired  to perfo rm  
th tro le  of in te rv en er.
1,,7The opposite m ay also be tru e ; C h inese m ediator? w ere  freq u en tly  
illite ra te  — c e rta in ly  not by chance (L ubm an, 1967: 1323).
J(l8 I am  using  th is  in W eb er’s sense of “the  p ro b ab ility  Ih a t a com m and w ith  
a g iven specific conten t w ill be obeyed by a given group  o f 'p e rso n s” 
(1947: 152). A lthough a u th o rity  ce rta in ly  can serv e  to d iffe ren tia te  the 
in stitu tion  c r  in te rv en er, I am  not clear in m y ow n m ind  w h e th e r its 
effect, is com m ensura te  w ith  th a t of the  o th e r variab les, or w h e th e r it  
has consequences th a t d iffer in kind.
ini* At th e  sam e tim e th a t  colonial governm ents recognized ce rta in  tra d i­
tional A frican  d ispu te  in s titu tio n s ,'th ey  genera lly  g ran ted  them  a m o ­
nopoly of au th o rity  to ie e id e  d isputes, and im posed crim inal penalties on 
o ther trad itio n a l in stitu tions w hich con tinued  to perform  the sam e fu n c ­
tion. See, e.g , N ative  T ribunal- Ord., No. 39 of 1930, s. 26 (K e n v a ); 
and the descrip tion  of prosecutions in M eru D istric t in P h illips (1945: 
82 f f .) .
170 S ta te  m onopoly of the  pow er to change sto tus is a tfery recen t p h e ­
nom enon, and  still ...com plete even  in w es te rn  countries; consider the
history  of such sta tu ses  as adoption, m arriage, and divorce, w here 
“com m on law ” (i.e.. p riv a te ) practices persist. For the  change in A frica, 
see A L, E pstein  (1952: 7). ,
171 T he lite ra tu re  on - 1 d ispu te  settlem ent is rep le te  w ith  instances in 
w hich a u th o r :y i v, v w idely  d is trib u ted  am ong partic ipants. This 
v a riab le  m ay  be  e.s;. 'd a lly  usefu l for com paring dispute in stitu tions in 
ch iefly  and acephalous societies.
JT  ^D ahrendorf sees “the  unequal d istribu tion  of political au tho rity  over 
persons as incum bent, of p o s i'ien s” as th e  critical e lem en t in a m ean ­
ingful concept of social s tra tifica tion  (1959: 292, and Ch. 8 passim; see 
also 1968b: 1968c).
173 E ffo rts a re  o ften  m ade  to reduce  the social distance b etw een  in te rv en e rs  
and the  e.g., th e  req u irem en t that races be rep re sen ted
on a iu rv  in proportion  to th e ir  rep resen ta tio n  in the  population, o r the 
recent C alifornia e x p e rim en t of hav ing  juven iles act as a ,iury in  the  
juvenii. fitly one of the m ost ex trem e  instances of social
distance bet and in te rv e n e r.m ea su re d  in te rm s of age. A l­
though in te rv en e rs  in A frican  d isp u te  in stitu tio n s genera lly  w ere  socially 
p rox im ate  to the  d isp u tan ts  alcng m ost of these  variables, they  w ere  
often socially distant in te rm s of age and sex, being staffed  exclusively  
by m ale elders. Yet w om en and  youths m ight have th e ir  own institu tions 
fo r in te rn a l d isputes, and  sem e trib es  (e.g., the  M eru of K enva) in s titu ­
tional} ;.*d th e  repre ; n ta tio n  cf several age grades am ong the  in terveners.
174 D ahrendorf has show n hew  this can con tribu te  to a d istinct social s tra tu m  
even  w hen  the m em b ers  are  o rig inally  d raw n  from  q u ite  d iverse  s tra ta  
(1964).
775 Such m eetings are  b eg inn ing  to occur am ong p r im a ry  court judges in 
A frica. See K ap lan  (1905: 85); G eorges (1968). English  H igh  C ourt 
ju dges h av e  opposed decen tra liza tion  of th e  ju d ic ia ry  on the g round  
th a t judges s itu a ted  outside L ondon w ould be "cut off . . . from  the 
in te llectual s tim u la tion  of the inns of C ourt.” (A b e l-S m ith  and S tevens, 
1969: 289).
17,1 The reporting  cf ju d ic ia l decisions can serve th is function, w h e re  th e re  
is an  effective m echanism  for c ircu la ting  those reports. T his is n o t tru e  
in moot A frican nations. In  K enya, for instance, each High C ourt ju d g e  
de te rm ines w h e th e r h is decisions shall be m ade availab le, and  some are  
ap p aren tly  re lu c tan t to  su bm it them  to the sc ru tiny  of th e ir  peers.
177 Such issues can d iv ide  as w ell as u n ite  th e  jud ic ia l corps (M oriondo, 
1969).
178 T he norm s regard ing  p ro p er appearance  in  a ju d ic ia l setting  ap p ear to 
be w idely d issem ina ted  in A m erican  society, an d  f in e ly  graded. Y ouths 
appearing  before  th e  ju v en ile  co u rt are  aw are  th a t its proceedings a re  
supposed to be  in form al, and  th a t th ey  can w e a r  s tree t dress for the  
in itia l hearing . B u t th ey  also know  that, as they  re tu rn  as m u ltip le  
offenders, th ey  are tre a te d  m ere  harsh ly  and jud ic ia lly  and m ay  be sen t 
to reform  school. A t th is po in t they  cut th e ir  h a ir  and  put cn  ties.________
no T h e  a ttem p t to a lte r  th is h ig h ly  im practical d ress  in N igeria m e t w ith  
fu rio u s  resistance, and w as defeated  (C ottrell, n .d .). On the o th e r hand, 
th e  Z inacanteco p residen te , who o rd inarily  w ore L adino  a ttire , pu t on 
Ind ian  d ress  w hen he heard  cases at th e  Tow n H all (Collier, 1973: 81). 
780 Ja n e  C ollier has u sed  an  idiom d raw n  from  G offm an to illum inate  the  
behav io r occuring d u ring  a d isp u te  (1973: Ch. 3 ). In  doing so, she 
rev ea ls  th e  im portance of developing  concepts fo r analyzing  the  s tru c tu re  
u n d e rly in g  such behavior. In the  absence of such concepts, th e re  is a 
real d an g er th a t th e  social th e o ry  of law  w ill reduce  to m ere ideographic 
descrip tion  as our in te rest m oves from  the  analysis of s tru c tu re  to th e  
analysis of process.
181 A t th e  e x tre m e  of n o n -d iffe ren tia tio n , th e re  m ay  be no behav io r th a t 
is d is tinc tive  cf the d ispute institu tion . See H ollem an (1952: 33). 
lfl2W e a re  accustom ed to th in k in g  of jud icial deliberations as solem n p ro ­
ceedings. B u t th is is no t a lw ays tru e  in ou r ow n courts (see Moley, 1932), 
and  o th e r  societies m ay  in stitu tiona lize  d iffe ren t k inds of behavior, as in 
th e  E sk im o song duel (H oebel, 1954: Ch. 5; compare F isher 1971: 733). 
188 F o r instance, contrast the  b eh av io r of c u r  m ore  notorious tr ia l law yers 
in  f ro n t of a ju ry  w ith  a rg u m e n t before  th e  Suprem e Court. 
t ^ S e e ,  e.g., Messenger (1.959). P au l B ohannan, a h igh ly  sk illed  fie ldw orker, 
w ro te  of his ow n d ifficulties:
W he I firs t w en t to TivLand in  1949, I w as inv ited  by  chiefs 
and r id e rs  to a tten d  co u rt sessions. I scon gave them  up. I knew  
th e ir  im portance, and  knew  th a t they  form ed a la te  stage in 
fieldv/orfc, w hen iv know ledge of language and  cu ltu re  was 
fu ller. Most of rry case m ateria l, then , comes from  m y th ird  
to u r in  T iv land , in 1952-53. My ow n know ledge of tire language 
w as such at th a t tim e th a t I cculd u n d erstan d  m ost co u rt cases 
easily  as they  proceeded. I was n ev e r ab le  to u n d erstan d  all 
of th em  easily  or p robab ly  any of them  hilly , for the T iv  la n ­
g u a g e — like all A frican  languages —  is h igh ly  a llu sive  and its 
p e rfec t u n d e rs tan d in g  d em apds n o t only a thorough  know ledge 
cf its  idiom and  its m y th s and  stock  m etaphors, b u t also of 
th e  incidents w hich  have  occurred  in the specific ne ighborhood 
in th e  last fo rty  or fifty  years. (1957: x ii) .
185 T his m ode of d iffe ren tia tio n  has recen tly  becom e a source of tension in 
the A m erican  jud ic ia l process. See the ex ten siv e  l i te ra tu re  on the 
Chicago conspiracy tria l, e.g., D ellinger (n .d .) ; L ukas (1970); J. E pstein
(1970); see also R osenblum  (1971).
180 The s tru c tu re  of the A m erican  courtroom  typ ica lly  insures this. Not 
only is th e  ju d g e  e levated  on a bench , and  segregated  from  law y ers  by 
the  bar, b u t he en te rs  and  leaves th e  courtroom  from  cham bers by  
m eans of a door re s tr ic ted  to h im  alone.
,87H cllem an  describes ihe  w ay  in  w hich  H era  litig an ts  m u st “clim b u p ” 
to the  judge, who is physically  situa ted  at a h igher level, by  m eans of 
to k en  gifts w hose v e rn acu la r  nam e m eans “to clim b u p ” (1952: 28, 30). 
L u b m an  quotes a revealing  inc iden t in w hich  a C hinese ju d g e  and  an  
A m er'can  diplomat, clashed  o v er w h e th e r  a  C hinese em ployee of the 
U.S. C onsulate, w ho had been  sum m oned to testify , w ould  kneel in  
trn d itio n a l Chinese fashion. N eedless to say, the  A m erican  w on (1967: 
1?96 n. 42). Y e t A m erican  courts are  h a rd ly  th a t d iffe ren t. T he S u p erio r 
C o u rt fo r  N ew  H aven  C ounty  em ploys a sh e riff  for each courtroom  
w hose functions appear to be p rac tica lly  lim ited  to o rdering  all p resen t 
to rise  a t each en try  and d e p a rtu re  of the  judge, an d  adm onishing w it­
nesses no t to chew  gum , or p u t th e ir  hands in th e ir  pockets, o r w a lk  in 
f ro n t c f th e  (em p ty ) ju ry  box. A nd 1 find  it in te resting  th a t th is m an ­
d a ted  deference  ex ten d s outside the courtroom . An A m erican ju d g e  is 
alm ost ahvays re fe rred  to as “Ju d g e ” in social re la tions outside the court, 
even  a f te r  h :s re tirem en t, som etim es evfcnby his m ost in tim a te  friends. 
This is only tru e  of a few  o th e r  honorific  titles, e.g., Senator, G eneral. 
18S A m ong th e  B arotse, the  king or m em b er of the  ru lin g  fam ily  is ex  
officio the  head  of the  kuta. H ow ever, G luckm an  w rites:
U su ally  the  ru le r  does not a tten d  the hearin g s of cases, though 
th e  k u ta ’s ju d g m e n t is re fe rred  to  h im  for confirm ation. Even 
if th e  ru le r  chooses to s it  in  the  k u ta  w hile  a case is being 
tried , it p roceeds as if he  w ere  no t there . H e tak es  no p a rt 
in  th e  hearing , an d  th e  facts and ju d g m en ts  in  the case are  
r e fe rre d  to h im  as if he  h ad  not h ea rd  them  (1955: 9 ).
See  also M en sah -B ro w n  (1970: 128) (A k a n ) .
O b se rv e rs  c f  trad itio n a l A frican  dispute in stitu tio n s have o ften  rem ark ed  
on  th e  e loquence  of m an y  partic ipan ts, w hich  s^em s to be scarcely less 
th a n  th a t of th e  e ld ers  w ho are  h earin g  th e  dispute. In  A m erican court­
room s, by co n tra s t, th e  d ifference  b e tw een  the fluency of th e k g a l p ro ­
fessionals and  th e  in a rticu la ten ess  of parties and w itnesses could no t be 
m o re  p ronounced . I f  the  records of local co u rt cases in K enya are  a fa ir  
re n d e r in g  of th e  ac tua l in terchange, litig an ts  have becom e m ore tongue- 
tied  as these  courts have evolved  to w a rd  a  E uropean  m odel. W hen 
o ffe red  an  o p p o rtu n ity  to c ro ss-ex am in e  an  ad v e rsa ry  or hostile  witness, 
p artie s  o ften  exp ress an inab ility  to do so* T he ju d g e  then  takes ov er 
th e  ta sk — usually  w ith  considerab le skill.
T h is is in p a r t  an  academ ic euphem ism  for the  concept of “pro fessional­
iza tion .” T he la tte r  is freq u en tly  dem anded  today  as a solution to alm ost
any  imagine.b e- m .sb o h av io r—com pare the  schem es for p ro fessionaliza­
tion  cf th e  police w ith  those  fo r  the  professionalization of various fo rm s 
of p sv eh o th erap h y . P ro fessionaliza tion  has also been  a constan t them e  
e lsew h e re  (Spald ing , H oover & P iper, 1970: 36-52).
I®1 As no ted  above, a q u a lity  th a t is a p p a ren tly  achieved m ay in fac t be 
r e s tr ic t '- ;  to an  ascr bed  g roup  if th e  educational o r exp erlen ta l p re re ­
q u isites a re  n o t gen era lly  available.
*•* T h e  no tion  of the com plete  “au tonom y” of th e  ju d ic ia ry  w as successfully  
c h a m p io n e d ’b y  th e  Italian  Associzione N r > cr.Rle M agistrati (M oriondo, 
1969: 311).
W8 T his w as com m only  th e  case in trad itio n a l A frican d ispute  institu tions. 
Sec, e .g ., F ish e r  (1971: 732); G u lliv e r (1963: passim ).
ie4B oth  innovations w e re  in troduced  in K enya: a reg u la r panel of judges, 
fro m  w hom  the  bench  fo r a p a rticu la r  case w as chosen a t random  
(P h illios, 1945: 182).
195 In  societies w h ere  th e  in te rv e n e r is paid  on ly  fo r services ren d ered , he 
w ill n a tu ra lly  seek custom ers. If  ju risd ic tio n a l boundaries are  unclear, 
or  overlap , h e  w ill in  effec t be selling the  service of in te rv en tio n  in a 
buye.-’s m a r k e t  T he  h is to ry  of d ispu te  institu tions is rep le te  w ith  in te r ­
v en er?  w ho hav e  ta ilo red  th e ir  ac tiv ities w ith  th is in m ind (C ollier. 1973: 
73-74). Som e h av e  gone so fa r  as to s tir  up d isputes to  handle (Cohen, 
1966: 1221). This k ind  of com petition  is an tip a th e tic  to bu reau cracy , 
and is abolished  as ju risd ic tio n  is ra tionalized , and  certa in  in stitu tions 
o b ta in  a m onopoly  ov er d isputes.
in*1 W eber him self is not clear w h e th e r it is m ore bu reau cra tic  to p rom ote  
on th e  basi* of th e  q u a lity  of task  perform ance, or cn th e  basis cf leng th  
of service. The fo rm e r is the d istinc tive ly  b u reau cra tic  crite rion  fo r 
ap p o in tm en t; the la tte r  m ig h t be v iew ed  as the ro u tin iza tion  of b u re a u ­
cracy. A ccordingly, th e  tw o m ay  be com bined w ith in  a single institu tion : 
sk ill, m easu red  b y  exam ina tion  or perform ance, being  th e  crite rio n  fo r 
ap p o in tm en t and  m a jo r p rom otions b e tw een  ran k s; sen io rity  be ing  the 
c rite r io n  fo r sa la ry  increases and  o th er p erq u is ites  w ith in  the ra n k — as 
in the  fed e ra l c iv il service.
187 In te re s tin g ly , th is c rite rio n  does not d istingu ish  sh a rp ly  b e tw een  tra d i­
tional A frican  e ld e rs  and  ocn tem porary  C on tinen tal career judges, ex cep t 
for the  fac t th a t on ly  the la tte r  a re  re s tric ted  from  o ther activ ities by  
b eing  a ju d g e . See. <j.g., such K enya trib es  as th e  M eru  (L am bert, 1947; 
B ernarcu. 1959), th e  K ikuyu  (L am bert, 1956; K enyatta , 1953), or the 
E m b u  (S ab erw al, 1970). Of course, th is does no t m ean  th a t those in s ti­
tu tio n s  a re  iden tical in  o th e r  respects, n o r th a t the  concept of b u re a u ­
cracy  is useless in d istingu ish in g  them .
198 A kan  judges could be  rem oved  by a h ig h e r chief, or by  the  people— 
and  o ften  w ere  (M ensah-B row n, 1970; 128).
1®° M any in dustrious colonial ad m in is tra to rs  fe lt com pelled to produce a 
handbook of ru les  for local court p rocedure. See, e.g., the  ‘‘.Guide and 
In s tru c tio n  to N ative T rib u n als ,” p rep a red  b y  W yn H arris , D istric t 
C om m issione’* of N yeri, in  1943, ana  described by P h illip s  as “a c lo th - 
bound vo lum e of 41 foolscap pages of typescrip t (w ith  space for ad d i­
tions an d  am en d m en ts) . I t  is in  English  and  each tr ib u n a l has been  
supplied  w ith  a copy of it.” A nd see th e  s im ila r “G uide  to N ative
T r ib u n a l s — K ia m b u  D is t r ic t” p r e p a r e d  b y  H. E. L a m b e r t  a t  t h e  s a m e  t im e  
(P h i l l ip s ,  1945: 43-44, 05).
200 T h e  c o n fu s io n  o f  p u b lic  a n d  p r i v a t e  f in a n c e s  b e c o m e s  a  m a t t e r  o f  c o n ­
c e rn  to  a b u re a u c r a c y ,  a n d  is g iv e n  th e  n a m e  c o r r u p t io n .  J u d ic ia l  a d m in ­
i s t r a to r s  h i  c o lo n ia l so c ie tie s  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  p r e o c c u p ie d  w i th  th i s  s u b ­
je c t .  See, e.g., P h i l l ip s  (1945: C h. 13).
201 T h is  is  in  p a r t  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  b u r e a u c r a t i z a t io n  o f th e  
roLe h a s  o f te n  o c c u r r e d  u n d e r  c o lo n ia l r u le .  W h e re  th e s e  n o rm s  a r e  n e w , 
a n d  d e r iv e d  f ro m  a n  a l i e n  c u l tu r e ,  i t  is h a r d ly  s u r p r i s in g  th a t  th e  
s u p e r io r s  w h o  r e p r e s e n t  th i s  c u l tu r e  u se  e x te r n a l  
s a n c t io n s  to  o b ta in  c o m p lia n c e . I t  is n o t c l e a r  to  m e  th a t  th e s e  s a n c t io n s  
c a n n o t  b e  la r g e ly  in te r n a l iz e d .  H e re , a s  e ls e w h e r e  in  th i s  p a p e r ,  it  is  h a r d  
To d v o id  m is ta k in g  th e  c o n c re te  h is to r ic a l  s i tu a t io n  In  w h ic h  th e s e  
c h a n g e s  to o k  p la c e  fo r  v a l id  c r o s s - c u l tu r a l  g e n e ra l iz a t io n ,  I t  s e e m s  to  
m e  tn a t  o th e r  a u th o r s  h a v e  fa l le n  in to  th is  e r r o r ,  e.g., T a n n e r  (1970) 
a n d  C o ll ie r  (1973), m is t a k in g  th e  c u l tu r a l  p lu r a l i s m  a n d  so c ia l s t r a t i f i ­
c a t io n  w h ic h  c h a r a c t e r i z e  c o n te m p o r a r y  I n d o n e s ia  a n d  M e x ic o  fo r  u n i ­
v e r s a l  c o n d it io n s , a n d  th e r e f o r e  u n d u ly  g e n e ra l iz in g  f r o m  th& je le g a l  
s y s te m s . Y e t in  d o in g  o, th e y  a r e  a ls o  c o r r e c t in g  th e  e r r o r s  o f  e a r l ie r  
w r i t e r s ,  w h o  te n d e d  to  g e n e ra l iz e  f r o m  th e  le g a l  s y s te m s  o f  s m a ll ,  
h o m o g e n e o u s  t r ib a l  so c ie tie s ,
202 I t  is in t e r e s t in g  th a t  th i s  p r e c is e ly  p a r a l le l s  th e  d is t in c t io n  b e tw e e n  la w  
a n d  c o n v e n t io n  err e r e d  b y  W e b e r .
A system  of o rd e r will be called convention so fa r  as its va - 
lid ity  is ex te rn a lly  g u aran teed  by  the  p ro b ab ility  th a t dev ia tion  
fro m  it w ith in  a g iven  social group w ill re su lt in a  re la tive ly  
general and  p rac tica lly  significant reaction  of d isapproval. Such 
an o rd e r w ill be called Law w hen  conform ity  w ith  it is upheld 
by the probab ility  th a t d ev ian t action w ill be m et by  physical 
or psychic sanctions aim ed to com pel conform ity  o r to p un ish  
disobedience, and applied by a group of m en especially em ­
pow ered  tc  carry out this function  (th is  last em phasis added)
(1947: 127).* ................................
2«3 F o r explications of W ebed; notions of ra tionaliza tion  in law  see  T ru b ek  
(1972a); F ried m an  (1966); C. M orris (1958); R heinste in  (1954). O ne 
of the p rob lem s w ith  und erstan d in g  W eber is th a t th e  English te rm in ­
ology in to  w hich he has been  ren d ered  carries s trong  connotations of 
value: ra tio n a lity  is a “good” k in d  of ordering, p erh ap s even the only 
p ro p er k ind; ra tionaliza tion  is a  false, or hypocritica l ordering. This is 
not e n tire ly  the  fau lt of transla tion ; W eb er’s orig inal conceptual schem e 
u n d oub ted ly  expressed  his ow n values.
Indeed , W eber’s purpose  w as to se t fo rth  all th e  possible m odes of 
ra tio n a l .'t*xt*on. F o r illu s tra tio n s  of legal ra tionaliza tion  u n d er a v a rie ty  
of social conditions, see  L lew ellyn  and  H oebel (1941) (C heyenne In ­
d ians) ; H ollem an (1950) (Shona of R h o d e s ia ) ; F u lle r (n.d.: 86) (A m er­
ican ju d ic ia ry ) ;  R iesm an (1951: 133-34) (A m erican  legal p ro fessio n ); 
M ayhew  *(1968: 146) (M assachusetts Com m ission A g ain st D iscrim ­
in a tio n ).
* *  T h e  no tion  of the  au tonom y of a d iffe ren tia ted  sphere  of activ ity  receives 
excep tionally  clear expression  in a m ost u n lik e ly  source:
S o c ie ty  g iv e s  r i s e  to  c e r t a in  c o m m o n  features w h ic h  i t  c a n n o t  
d is p e n s e  w i th .  T h e  p e r s o n s ! e l e c te d  fo r  these f u n c t io n s  form 
a  n e w  b r a n c h  o f th e  d iv is io n  o f  l a b o u r  w ithin  society. This 
g iv e s  th e m  p a r t i c u l a r  in te r e s t s ,  d is t in c t  too from the interests 
of th o s e  w h o  g a v e  th e m  th e i r  office; th e y  make themselves 
in d e p e n d e n t  o f th e  l a t t e r  a n d — th e  s ta te  is  in  b e in g . . . .
I t  is s im ila r w ith  law . As soon as th e  new  d iv ision  of labour 
w hich creates professional law yers becom es necesary , ano ther 
new  and in dependen t sphere  is opened up w hich, for all its
general dependence on p roduction  and  trade, s till has its ow n 
capacity  fo r reacting  upon these spheres as w ell. In a m odern  
state, law  m u st not only  co rresp o n d  to the  general economic 
position  and  be its expression , b u t m u st also be an expression  
w hich  is consistent in itse lf , and  w hich does not, ow ing ta  
inner contradictions, look g laring ly  inconsistent. A nd in o rd er 
to achieve this, th e  fa ith fu l reflection  of economic conditions 
is m ore  and  m ere  in frin g ed  upon. All th e  m ore so the  m ore 
ra re ly  it happens th a t a code of law  is the b lunt, unm itigated , 
u n ad u lte ra ted  expression  of the  dom ination  of a class— this 
in  itse lf w ould a lready  offend “th e  conception of ju stice .”
This ex trao rd in a r W eberian  form ulation  is in fact from  F ried rich  
Engels, in  a  le tte r  to C onrad Schm idt, w ritte n  in  1890. See M arx  and  
E ngels (1947: 48Q-81). I am  g ra te fu l to  B ru n -O tto  B ryde fop vth is  
references , ^
K aplan describes the decrease  in  c o m m u n ic a t io n  b e tw e e n  d is p u te  i n s t i t u ­
tion  and  society w hich follow s an  in c r e a s e  in  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  (1005: 93).
W7 F u lle r (n.d.: 80) and G olding (1909: 85-80) note t h a t  th e  in s t i tu t io n  
redefines sc cm! p roblem s for its ow n purposes, a n d  w ill ig n o r e  p ro b le m s  
th a t cannot be so r o . re d . Barii B ernste in  m okes a sim ilar o b s e r v a t io n  
abo u t the power of language to shape a social s itua tion  in  o r d e r  to  
fac ilita te  a p a rticu la r k in d  of com m unication ( q u o te d  in  M . D o u g la s , 
1970: 150-57).
ao* Mayhew h a s  A n a ly zed  at so m e  le n g th  t h e  w a y  in  w h ic h  in s t i tu t io n a l  
so lu tio n s  o r e  n o t so c ia l s o lu t io n s  (1971 ) T h is  in e v l tu b le  c o n s e q u e n c e  
o f ff Mice o f c o n c e rn  to  leg a l
sc h o la r s , w h o  deplore the “ g a p "  between law in th e  b o o k s  a n d  law in  
a c tio n . I d is c u s s  th is  -s a- f u r th e r  in  an  e * te » > d td  re v ie w  e ssa y  (1073).
aun The d h p u te  institu tion  in society can be v iew ed  as m ain ta in ing  a varie ty  
of hom eostatic  v ariab les: the n u m b er cf ongoing disputes, conceptualized 
in d iscrete  units; the overall in tensity  of d ispu ting , etc. I t  w ould  b e  
possible, and f ru itfu l  to conduct a functional analysis using each of 
these variab les; in the discussion th a t follows, how ever, I hav e  concen­
tra ted  on the aggregate n u m b e r of d isputes w hich th e  institu tion  o r the  
society is hand ling  a t  a p o in t in tim e. This level is often one of the 
principal concerns of the in stitu tion  itse lf ( s e e  Sykes, 1969).
110 The form ulation  of functionalism  p resen ted  h ere  lends w eigh t to th e  
com m on criticism  th a t it  is a th eo ry  of the s ta tu s  quo w hich offers no 
insigh t into, indeed  o b sjeu res  th e  perception of, change. I th erefo re  
hasten  to add tha t the d ispute  in stitu tio n s of a society may, over tim e, 
fail to m ain tain  the level of d ispu ting ; th a t level m ay  increase— as has 
p e rh ap s  happened  in  co n tem porary  u rban  society— c r the  society m ay, 
as a re su lt of increased disputing, d iv ide in to  a n u m b er of fragm en ts— 
w hich again m ig h t be a he lp fu l im age for u n d erstan d in g  the con tem ­
porary  situation.
2,1 It is often argued that b u reau cra tic  institu tions apply norm s w hich a re  
un iversa lis tic  ra th e r  th an  particu la ris tic . This ij one w ay of transfo rm ing  
th e  ideology of th e  ru le  of law  into a social scientific variab le . I w ill 
consider w ays to operationalize  this concept below.
2 i2 E ffort, u n lik e  tim e  or expense, is a su b jec tive  index of th e  quality  of an  
act. I t  is an  a ttem pt to m easure  in tensity ; fo r exam ple, I w ould  expect 
a rep e titiv e  act to be less e ffo rt than  an idiosyncratic  one, even  though  
both m ig h t tak e  th e  sam e tim e and cost the system  th e  sam e am o u n t 
of m oney.
- i : lT he E thiopian “a ffe rsa ta” and  the official C hinese court system  are  
ex trem e  exam ples of d ispu te  in s titu tio n ^  w hich m axim ize  official e f f i­
ciency at g rea t expense to th e  non-offic ia l p artic ip an ts  (F isher, 1971: 720; 
van  der S p ren k e l, 1962). In  th e  language of economics, these institu tions 
px ternalize  the  la tte r  costs.
- 14 These con tribu tions m ay  take  th e  form  of court costs in civil cases, or 
fines and bail fo rfe itu res in  c rim in a l prosecutions. I t  is com m on fo r the 
la tte r  to produce a ne t su rp lus, w h e th e r in  Ind ia  (N icholas and M ukho- 
padhyay . 1962: 17, 24, q u o ted  in G alan ter, 1972: 60) or the  U nited  S tates 
(Sanri, 1967 297), a lth o u g h  the  p ractice has recen tly  been  , sub jec t to
criticism  on constitu tional g rounds in the  U n ited  S tates. B u t it is not
u n u s u a l  f o r  c iv i l  l i t ig a t io n  to  p ro d u c e  a  s u r p lu s  a s  w e ll.  A la n  G le d h il l  
h a s  n o te d  th a t  th e  In d ia n  ju d ic ia r y  “ is  th e  m o s t  s u c c e s s fu l  o f  th e  n a t io n ­
a liz e d  in d u s t r i e s ” (1964: 8, q u o te d  in  G a la n te r ,  n .d . ) .  A n d  th e  s a m e  
m ig h t  h a v e  b e e n  s a id  o f c o lo n ia l K e n y a  (seie P a t te r s o n .  1 9 69 ). T h is  m a y  
b e  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  g e n e r a l  B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l p o lic y  o f s e e in g  th a t  th e  
c o lo n ie s  p a id  th e i r  w a y .  I t  m a y  b e  c o n tr a s te d  w i th  B e n th a im ’s b e l ie f  
th a t  ju d ic ia l  in s t i tu t io n s  o u g h t  to  b e  f r e e .
2’« T h e  in t e r e s t  o f b u r e a u c r a t i c  in s t i tu t io n s  in  f i n a l i ty  h a s  b e e n  r e p o r te d  
m a n y  t im e s . S k o ln ic k  (1 9 6 6 ) d e s c r ib e s  th e  w a y  in  w h ic h  p o lic e  b a r g a in  
w i th  s u s p e c ts  f o r  “c lo s in g s ,”  o f f e r in g  a  lesse** plee< in  r e t u r n  fo r  a n  a d ­
m is s io n  o f o th e r  c r im e s  w h ic h  w i l l  c lo se  f i le s , o u t  f o r  w h ic h  th e  s u s p e c t 
w il l  n o t  b e  p ro s e c u te d ,  C o n n e c t ic u t  c o u r t s  r a r e l y  t a k e  t h e  in i t i a t iv e  in  
l i t ig a t io n ;  a  n o ta b le  e x c e p t io n  is t h e i r  d i l ig e n c e  in  d is m is s in g  c a se s  s u a  
s p o n te  a f t e r  th e y  h a v e  r e a c h e d  a c e r t a in  ag e . T h e  c a ll in g  o f  th e  d o r m a n t  
lis t is c n e  c f  t h e  f e w  o c c a s io n s  on w h ic h  t h a t  b u r e a u c r a c y  sh o w s  re a l  
e n e r g y .  B y  c o n tr a s t ,  t r ib a l  in s t i tu t io n s  o f te n  r e f u s e  to  c o n c lu d e  a  d is p u te  
e v e n  a f t e r  th e  p a r t ie s  h a v e  lo s t  in te r e s t ,  fo r  f e a r  th a t  so m e  h id d e n  
g r ie v a n c e  l in g e r s .  See  R ollem an (1952; 34).
See  T ru b e k ’s discussion of the  “core conception” of m o d ern  law  (1 9 2 7 b ) .
2 171  h a v e  t a k e n  th i s  d is t in c t io n  f r o m  B la c k  (1 9 7 3 ) .
818 B o th  t r a d i t io n a l  C h in e s e  m e d ia t io n  (C o h e n , 1066: 1217) a n d  c o n te m p o r ­
a r y  C h in e s e  m e d ia t io n  (L u b m a n , 1967: 1331) h a d  th ia  c h a r a c t e r .  S o  d id  
t r a d i t io n a l  A f r ic a n  d is p u te  in s t i tu t io n s — e.g., the  A k a n  o f  Ghana (M e n -  
r a h - B r o w n ,  1970: 143) and  E thiopia (F i s h e r .  1071: 726, 7 2 8 ). E v e n  c o n ­
tem porary  A m e r ic a n  c u l t u r e  re ta in s  som ething of th is  id e o lo g y , as w i t ­
n e ss  th e  s e n s e  o f  o u tr a g e  e x p re s s e d  a t  th e  f a i l u r e  of b y s ta n d e r *  to  i n t e r ­
v e n e  in  t h e  m u r d e r  of K it ty  G e n o v c .1* .
a ioT h is w as ap p aren tly  tru e  of the  trad itio n a l C hinese official c o u r t  s t r u c ­
ture, as d istinguished  from  non-governm enta i m ediation . In d e e d ,  t h e  
inertia  of th a t 3vstem w as so ex trem e  th a t m any  cases w ere  e n d e d  
sim ply because th e  d isp u tan ts  could n o t m obilize su ffic ien t e n e r g y  to  
m ove the m ag istra te s  to action (B u x b au m , 1971: 2 7 4 ). T h e  A m e r ic a n
ju d ic ia l system  is, o f c o u rs e , h igh ly  r e a c t iv e  Indeed, F u lle r m a k e s  th is  a n  
essen tia l e lem en t in  his defin ition  o f  a d ju d ic a t io n  (n.d .: 5 4 ) . O n e  c o u ld  
a rg u e  th a t  th e  A m e r ic a n  le g a l system  as a  w hole is s till p ro a c t iv e ,  b u t  
t h a t  th e  l a t t e r  fu n c t io n  h a s  b e e n  ta k e n  aw ay  from  th e  j  udicial b r a n c h  
a n d  g iv e n  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e ,  in  the f o r m  of police and  prosecutors. Y e t 
e v e n  th e s e  in s t i tu t io n s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  u rb an  areas, have  ten d ed  to b e c o m e  
reactive police di n o t  p a t r o l  a beat on  foot b u t respond to calls in  p a tr o l  
cars* p ro s e c u to r s  p u r s u e  m a n y  c r im in a l  in frac tions o n ly  upon th e  in ­
sistence o f a  c o m p la in a n t .
220 See A u b ert (1969c: 289). T h is ch a rac teris tic  of m odern  c o u r t s  m a y  
ex p la in  w h y  they  f a i l  to achieve ce rta in  goals w hich  re q u ire  a m o r e  
active ro le— f o r  in s ta n c e , the  p rese rv a tio n  of m arriag e  in  actions fo r  
divorce. C o u r ts  in  th e  U n ited  S ta tes (G oldstein  an d  K atz, 1965: 1 4 0 -61 ; 
R h e in s te in ,  1972: 09-60), in  E ngland  (R heinstein , 1972: 6 0 -6 2 ) , in  
F ran ce  (Id.: 219-20), and  in Po land  (G orecki, 1970) have all found t h a t  
the  req u irem en t th a t an action for d ivorce be investiga ted  by th e  c o u r t  
soon tu rn s  ou t to  be a n u llity . (Com pare, th e  success of C anon low in  
th is  regard , R heinstein , 1972: 57-5^) T h is  suggests, a t the v e r y  least, a  
certa in  c a u tio n  in  giving the  court re sponsib ility  fo r fu rth e rin g  im p o r t a n t  
values— for instance, fo r securing “th e  best in terests  of the c h i ld ” in  
c u s to d y  d is p u te s  T he one exception  to  th is g enera lized  p a s s iv i ty  is  
b e h a v io r  w h ic h  serves to te rm in a te  the  d ispu te  expeditiously , o r  sim ­
p lify  it; thus th e  cou rt w ill n o t h e s ita te  to raise, sua sponte, such con­
clusive obstacles to  fu r th e r  litiga tion  as lack of ju risd iction , res jud ica ta , 
lack o f standing , etc. ■> J y( ‘
221 T hus o n e  of the f i r s t  a c ts  of a  colonial g o v ern m en t is to outlaw  c e r ta in  
m odes of d ispu ting  w hich  lie beyond  th e  contro l o f the  new ly  in t r o d u c e d  
courts—feuding, revenge, se lf-help— and to reg u la te  indigenous d is p u te  
institutions. S im ila rly , d isp u tan ts  engaged in litiga tion  in  w este rn  c o u r t s  
com m only hav e  to ob ta in  leave  of the  cou rt for m any  actions w h i l e  th e  
dispute is p end ing ; in addition , the court has au th o rity  to f r e e z e  th e  
s ta tu s quo  m eans of a tem p o rary  restra in in g  o rd e r o r  an  in ju n c t io n  
penden te  lite. •' v f
22*.For the  v ictim  of a crim e to com pound  th e  feiony is itself a crim e; the  
activ ities of th e  police a re  su b jec t to e labo ra te  sc ru tin y  to in su re  th a t any 
crim es d iscovered  are  p ro p e rly  investiga ted ; th e  p rosecu to r cannot drop  
' the  charges, or nolle a prosecution w ith o u t th e  app roval of th e  judge.
2?3 The dispute in stitu tion  m ay  urge, or require , th e  d ispu tan ts to ta k e  th e ir  
■' i d ispu te  to an o th e r institu tion  firs t. T h u s the local courts  in  K enya com ­
m only re q u ire  d isp u tan ts  to consult w ith  ind igenous e lders in  a t least 
some d isputes (Abel, 1970: 50-59), Official C h inese courts sim ilarly  
encouraged m ediation (Cohen, 1966: 1210). A nd  at least one appella te  
court in K e n y a , held  by  a d is tric t officer, u rged  litigan ts to  accept m ed i­
ation  by  elders in  place of a  h ea rin g  befo re  n im  (P h illip s, 1945: 53-55).
This p rac tice  is no t u n k n o w n  in  E u ro p ean  or A m erican  courts. The N ew  
Y ork C ity  sm all claim s c o u rt o ffers litigan ts  the  choice of hav ing  th e ir  
dispute m ediated  by  a law yer— w ith  the  incen tive  of a  speedier hearing .
In  Poland, J a n  G oreqki observed  judges p ressu rin g  litigan ts to accept 
an uncontested  divorce (1970). And I saw  the sam e th ing  in  th e  Fam ily  
Relations D ivision of the S u p erio r C ourt for N ew  H aven  C ounty . G ell- 
h o rn  has docum ented  the w a y  in  w hich  defendan ts are  persuaded  to  
agree in p a te rn ity  suits, p roceedings for non-support, m arita l fights, and  
m atrim o n ia l actions in th e  courts of N ew  Y ork C ity  (1954: C h ap te rs  
7 ,8 ,9 ,1 3 ) .
224 A m erican  udges ra re ly  re jec t a bargained  p lea in a crim inal prosecution, 
or, a nego tia ted  p ro p e rty  se ttlem en t in a divorce action.
■■-r' T he A kan of G hana use sim ple, e v e ry d ay  language fo r a ll norm a, ev en  
those th a t a r t  consciously legislated  (M ensah-B row n, 1970: 132). W here 
these  nqrm s fa il to cover th e  d: 'tu s tio n , m ax im s a re  cited from
o th er areas of behav io r (Id. 135). A. L. E pstein  found  thaji genera l 
\ e th ical notions p e rv ad e  discueaicn in  th e  local cou rts  of Zambia (1952: 
j e 4 7 j .
22* T his is consonant w ith  B o h an n an ’s notion of th e  re in stitu tio n a liza tio n  of 
legal n o rm s (1968a). M ayhew  and  Reiss have docum ented  the  fac t th a t 
in our own society only those no rm s w hich concern the  problem s of the  
upper classes are  re institu tionalized  in the  legal system  (1969).
227 T hus w e find  increasing em phasis on such ideas as n eu tra lity , generality , 
un iversa lity , logically form al ra tionality .
226 E v ery w h ere  in A frica cu s to m ary  crim inal offences have  been replaced 
by a com prehensive w ritte n  P en a l Code (M cClain, 1964: 196).
228See, e.g., F allers (1969: 68-69) (Soga of U g an d a): N ekam  (1967: 47) 
(K aram ojong  of U g an d a). This is tru e  in ncn -cc lo n ia l situations as w ell.
L ocal'E th iop ian  in stitu tio n s tre a te d  th e  Fetha N agast as custom  (F isher,
1971: 712) and  dispute in stitu tio n s on the E ast A frican  coast, in  th e  
Sudan, and  N orthern  Nigeria^ gave a s im ila r trea tm en t to the Sharia .
^ 0  T w in in g  has com pared the  re s ta tem en ts  of A frican  custom ary  law  p re ­
pared  by C otran. a law yer, and Cory, a sociologist; and  he has noted th a t  
local courts te n a  to tre a t even  the la tte r  re s ta tem en t as though  it w ere 
a s ta tu te  (1963: 33, 37-51). M ore recen tly , S altm an has observed the 
use m ade of C o tran ’s re s ta tem en ts  in the local courts of K enya, and 
noted  th a t th ey  a re  given alm ost s ta tu to ry  force desp ite  th e  fact th a t 
they  contain  exp lic it cautions aga in st such ^ n  in ten t (1971).
231 Indeed, S a ltm an  (1971) exp lains the  use of the  K enya t-e.statements as a 
p ro tec tion  ag a in st rev e rsa l on appeal. D istric t M agistra tes increasing ly  
reel th e  neea for such a  gu id e  because th ey  a re  often from  an o th er p a r t 
of K enya, and  u n fam ilia r w ith  th e  custom ary  law  they  m ust apply.
S om e e v e n  s e e k  t o  a v o i d  a p p l y i n g  c u s t o m a r y  l a w  a l ­
t o g e t h e r .  I n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s ,  t h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  
f e l t  c o m p e l le d  t o  i s s u e  a  m e m o ra n d u m  r e m i n d i n g  D i s t r i c t  
M a g i s t r a t e s  o f  t h e i r  d u t y  t o  a p p l y  c u s t o m a r y  l a w ,  
a n d  t o  t a k e  e v i d e n c e  w h e r e  t h e y  w e r e  i g n o r a n t  o f  
i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  ( C i r c u l a r  N o .  1 o f  1 9 6 8 ,  N o v e m b e r  
5 ,  1 9 6 8 ) .
?32 W rite rs  on u n d iffe ren tia ted  d ispu te  in stitu tio n s f re q u e n tly  com m ent an  
the high degree  of ag reem en t upon, and know ledge cf, custom ary  norm s. 
True, th is con trasts  sh a rp ly  w ith  the ' d isag reem en t in ou r ow n society 
concern ing  legal norm s, and  th e  w idesp read  ignorance abou t those 
norm s. B u t th e  m ore  app rop ria te  com parison is w ith  th e  degree of 
consenus and know ledge d isplayed by  the  legal professionals w ho staff 
o u r ow n m ore  d iffe ren tia ted  institu tions.
fc*3 Codifications and resta tem en ts  of custom ary  law  can be found  v e ry  
early  in colonial h istory . See, e.g., N atal Code of N ative  Law  (1943) 
(S o u th  A frica; 1891); H aar (1948) (Indonesia; n in e teen th  c e n tu ry ) ; 
S chapera (1938) (B e c h u a n a lan d ); see generally  A bel (1969a). M ore 
recently , th e  R esta tem ent of A frican  Law  P ro jec t has devo ted  consid­
e rab le  en e rg y  tow ard th is end (see A llott. 1968-72), and a n u m b er of 
A frican  nations have begun to codify th e ir  law, m ost no tab ly  Ethiopia.
234 In  A k an  law . an  oath  m ay  be sw orn  to in itia te  proceedings, b u t th e re  is 
no p re lim in a ry  in q u iry  in to  th e  con ten t of the  substan tive  grievance 
(M ensah-B rcw n, 1970: 139 f f .) .  The con trast w ith  the la te r h isto ry  of 
E ng lish  law  is ex trem e  ( see  M aitland, 1962: 4 -5 ). B ux b au m  (1971: 263) 
and  C o h n  (1966: 1211) d isagree  over w h e th e r Chinese m agistra tes 
m ade such an  inqu iry . I t  w ould  be reasonable to expect a  m ore s tr in ­
gen t screen ing  of disputes as the sta te  becam e m ore  involved  in th e ir  
handling .
233 A n exam ple  of this m ay be th e  d ram atic  cu rta ilm en t in the  chain of 
causation w hich  will be investiga ted  by th e  in te rv en e r. T rad itional d is­
p u te  in stitu tions in Africa, investiga ting  a d ea th ,w e ll rev iew  all the 
an teceden t events, h ow ever rem ote ly  they  m ay  b e  connected  (H opkins,
1962: 8). W here the u ltim a te  o u tc o m e e ,  course of conduct is s till in  
d cu b t, th e  hearing  of the  d ispu te  w ill be postponed to aw ait it (A. L. 
E pstein, 1952: 9 ). C on trast this w ith  the lim itation  of liab ility  in A nglo- 
A m erican  to r t and  con trac t law  to “fo reseeab le” consequences.
23C H ollem an notes cf the  H era  th a t du ring  a h ea rin g  of a dispute, pa rtic i­
pants e x e rt p ressure  fo r th e  b r o a d e s t  defin ition  cf th e  issues (1952:
38). A. L. Epstein has o b se rv ed  a g radua lnu rrow ing  of the issues in the  
u rb a n  courts of th e  Z am bian copperbelt. w h ere  th e  in q u iry  in m a tr i­
m onial proceedings now  concerns w h e th e r grounds fo r d ivcrce  exist, 
ra the i' th an  w h e th e r th e  m arriag e  has b roken  dow n  (1952: 4-5, 9 -10).
Hc-pkins observed  th a t A nkole co u rts  ju d g e  th e  w hole person, no t ju s t  
the act, in a c rim ina l p roceeding  (1962: 11). A nd our ju v en ile  co u rts  
tend  m ere  in  th a t d irec tion  th an  do our reg u la r crim inal courts.
ajr C om pare con tem porary  C hinese m ediators (L ubm an , 1967: 1308) o r 
H era d ispute  institu tions (H ollem an, 1952).
233 A fasc inating  instance of th is is the E thiopian p rac tice  of p lacing  w agers 
upon the outcom e of an in te rv en e r; because tn e  size of the  w ager fre q u e n tly  
exceeds th e  am ount in controversy , th e  actions of th i in te rv e n e r becom e 
m ore im p o rtan t th an  th e  orig inal d ispute  (F ish er, 1971: 734-37).
- !19 In  th e  u n d iffe ren tia ted  stru c tu re , the  only  re la tionsh ip  necessary  for 
partic ipa tion  w as some k in sh ip  or lik e  connection w ith  a d ispu tan t. In  
th e  d iffe ren tia ted  s tru c tu re , i t  is necessary  to d em o n stra te  a personal 
in te re s t identical to th a t of th e  d isputan t.
240 I t is a valid, if m uch  abused , g enera liza tion  th a t re la tions betw een  
groups a re  ex trem e ly  im p o rtan t in tr ib a l society. H ence a dispute th a t 
began w ith  th e  conflicting claim s of ind iv iduals  m ay  q u ick ly  be tra n s ­
form ed into d ispu te  b e tw een  the  la rg est groups w hich  do not y e t
include both (H ollem an, 1952; 30). M any o b se rv e rs  have noted th a t 
as sue) societies re w estern ized , an  ind iv idual w ho had acted as re p re ­
sen ta tiv e  of a g roup  in a d isp u te  now  seeks to arrogate  to him self p e r­
sonally  the  in te rests  he is seek ing  to v indicate. T his is especially v isib le  
in  th e  a rea  of land  ow nersh ip . In  K enya, K ik u y u  fa th e rs  suing for the 
im pregnation  of th e ir  u n m arried  d au g h ters  claim  fc r  them selves th e  
goats th a t p rev iously  w en t to th e ir  k insh ip  group. T hus d isputes b e tw een  
groups a re  transfo rm ed  in to  d isp u tes  betw een  individuals. In  h igh ly  
d iffe ren tia ted  legal system s, such as our own, th e re  are  sub stan tia l 
re s tra in ts  upon litigation by a group, as in the technical p roblem s of 
class actions, and  perhaps also the doctrine of political questions.
241 T his is c learest in crim inal prosecutions R ecently , c rim inal accused have 
sought to tu rn  th e  tab les on th e  sta te , and  accuse it of crim es in  tu rn : 
those w ho hav e  p ro tested  against the  w a r in  V ietnam  a re  an ou tstand ing  
exam ple. W ith o u t exception , A m erican  courts hav e  re jec ted  such  a t­
tem pts. In  an action  fo r divorce, th e  defendan t has the option to file  a 
counterclaim . I f  he  does so, how ever, he in n s  th e  risk th a t d ivorce w ill 
b e  denied  to  b o th  p a rtie s  u n d e r  the  doctrine  of recrim in a tio n  (a t least 
u n til re c e n tly ) . If he fa ils to  do so, and  appears at the  hearing, th e  cou rt 
is like ly  to deny  him  an opportun ity  to speak.
242 T h e  w hole concep t of s tan d in g  ,is a developm ent of the d iffe ren tia ted  
d ispu te  in stitu tion , w here  it  is na rro w ly  view ed: a person who, in th e  
la rg e r  society, is seen as hav ing  a rea l grievance, w ill be found  to have 
no stand ing  in  court (e.g., su its b y  tax p ay ers , conservation ists). T he 
victim  is no t p a r ty  to a  crim inal prosecution in A m erican  law, a lthough  
in te restin g ly  h e  is In Soviet law  (see, e.g., Feifer, 1964). By 1966 at least 
one of th e  p rim a ry  courts in K enya (th e  K iam b u  D istric t A frican  C ourt) 
h ad  begun to deny the v ic tim  a c iv il rem ed y  in  a prosecution. On th e  
o ther hand, con tem porary  E th iop ian  efforts to e lim inate , o r at least to 
control, th e  partic ipa tion  of the v ictim  in a crim inal p rosecution, have  
n o t been v e ry  successful (F isher, 1973). I t  seem s to m e th a t th e ir  lack  
of succ rib u ted  la rg e ly  to the re la tiv e  lack of d iffe ren tia tio n
of the in stitu tio n a l appara tus fo r c rim ina l prosecutions in E thiopia.
243 A. L. E pstein  fo u r d tn a t in L unda (Z am bia) customary law, the husband 
had  cctne to su b stitu te  for th e  w ife’s f a th e r  in  actions for adultery 
(1952 8) A nd  S im on Robert* found  th a t Kgatla (B otsw ana) women, 
r a th e r  th a n  nation (1971: 72). In  K enya,
th e  sam e re su lt occurred fo r th e  ten  year period  1959-69 w h en  th e  
A ffilia tion  A ct w as in effect.
244 Obvious exam ples are th e  prosecu to r in A m erican  law , an d  the p rocu ra­
to r in  Soviet ±aw. B u t th e re  a re  m anyc-thers: the w elfa re  d e p a rtm en t 
w hich rep resen ts  the in te re s t of a  child in a n eg le tt h t h e  fam ily  
re la tions officer w ho does the sam e in  a custody  figh t d u rin g  divorce. 
E ven  th e  professional a tto rn e y  m ay be seen in th is  ligh t—an officer of 
th e  court, w ho rep re sen ts  the  p a rty  and  y e t is su b jec t to contro l by  th e  
court. B lum berg  has g iv en  a strik in g  p o rtray a l of “defense law y er as 
double agen t” (1967). P erhaps fo r th is  reason, A m erican  co u rts  a re  
e x tre m e ly  re lu c ta n t to allow  a crim inal accused to conduct his ow n 
d e fe rs  , as the  Chicago tr ia l of Bobby S eale  show ed. I t  is in te restin g  
th a t A frican  courts in itia lly  allow ed a d isp u tan t to be rep resen ted  by  
a n y o n e—a frien d  oi re la tiv e— b u t have recen tly  m oved  in  the  d irec tion  
of g ran ting  a m onopoly  of rep resen ta tio n  to  legal professionals.
243 M aine em phasized  th is  no tion  (1950: Ch. 5 ) , and  m an y  o thers h av e  
since tak en  it up.
246 T he  E thiopian  practice  of p lacing w agers on th e  outcom e of a d ispu te  
effec tively  m ak es  th e  b e tte rs  add itional p a rtie s  (F isher, 1971: 737). The 
re q u ire m e n t th a t a  p a r ty  have  a su re ty  has a s im ila r effect; see F isher 
(1971: 731) (E th io p ia ) ; B rockm an (1972: passim ) (C h in a ) . E ven  C on­
nection* has th e  re s id u e  of a s im ila r practice; every  p a rty  w ho in itia tes 
a civil action m u st have a su re ty  fo r th e  p ay m en t of co u rt costs. In  
con tem porary  A m erican  law , th e  am icus cu riae , o r the  stockholder in  
a  d eriv a tiv e  ac tion  m ay be exam ples of p a rtie s  c rea ted  by  the institution.
247 As the dispute in stitu tio n  becom es less to le ran t of d ispu tan t delay  (sec 
notes 2 su p ra ) , it  creates delay  of its ow n. A n  overcrow ded  ca l­
endar is one of the id en tify in g ^a rk s  of the co n tem p o rary  w estern  court; 
it m ay take as long as seven years to have  a negligence case tried  to a 
ju ry  in New Y ork City. This is not ju s t  one of those incom prehensib le 
hassle:; of m odem  life, bu t an  inev itab le  consequence of s tru c tu ra l d ev e l­
opm ents (see  Sykes, 1969k An increase  in  d iffe ren tia tion  m eans a 
decrease in. th e  n u m b e r  of in te rv en ers  w h o je rv e  a giw« population ; an  
increase in b u reau cra tiza tio n  m eans an  increase in th e  fo rm ality  of the 
procedure, w ith  th e  associated delays. The convergence of these two 
tendencies is tru ly  K afka-esaufe: the d isp u tan t m ay  be required to wait
his tu rn  w ith  a legion o f fellow  petitioners, and  to w end  his w ay slowly 
th rough  the bu reau cra tic  m aze, only  to d iscover th a t h is claim  is b a rred  
because h e  did not prosecute  i t  w ith  su ffic ien t diligence.
A c o m p a r a b l e  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  r e c e n t l v  a r i s e n  i n  a n  
I t a l i a n  c r i m i n a l  t r i a l ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  
h a s  f o u n d  i t s e l f  u n a b l e  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  a p p e a l s  
p r o c e s s  b e f o r e  t h e  s t a t u t e  o f  l i m i t a t i o n s  r u n s  o n  
t h e  c r i m e  ( s e e  New Y o r k  T i m e s ,  F e b r u a r y  2 7 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  
p .  5) .
248 It is one of th e  ironies of jud icia l r e f o r m  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  t h a t  th e  
sm all claim s court, w hich w as in tended  to b e  a  re la tiv e ly  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
forum , has becom e la rg e ly  a m ill f o r  adm in istering  d e f a u l t  ju d g m e n ts .  
A lthough non-appearance  of a p a r ty  is penalized  in  th is  w a y , n o n -  
appearance  b y  a law yer is com m only excused.
s ^ T h is  is obviously th e  case in crim inal p rosecutions w here, in a d d it io n ,  
the  defendan t is fu rth e r  penalized  for his non-appearance . A n  e v e n  m o r e  
e x trem e  situation  is one w h e re  the court keeps one c f the  p a r t i e s  a w a y  
from the hearing , and th e reb y  defeats tlw claim ants petition . See Leonard  
v. Mitchell (1973) (C ourt in fuses to com pel the A tto rn ey  G eneral to 
disclose the w hereabou ts of p e titio n e r’s cx -w ife , who had absconded 
w ith the ch ildren  ol’ w hom  he had been  g ran ted  legal custody, s in c e  s h e  
had rem arried  a g o v ern m en t in fo rm er w hose iden tity  was sec re t) .
-3,lT he defau lting  p a rty  is in effect pun ished  for w asting  the co u rt’s tim e 
by m aking  it h ea r tno m a tte r  tw ice. The pun ishm en t m ay ta k e  the form  
of additional costs paid to the court. The o th e r p a rty  is not com pensated , 
although  he also hud to  ap p ea r in co u rt tw ice, possibly a t considerab le 
personal cost and inconvenience.
2 3 1 F u lle r (n.d .: 50) m akes this an essen tia l e lem en t in th e  defin ition  of 
ad judication .
23- The first is sought by v o ir d ire  of th e  ju ry , by m oving tha t a judge 
recuse him self, or by re q u irin g  th a t the hearing  judge be d iffe ren t from  
the  judge w ho conducted the a rra ig n m en t. T he  second is sough t by 
secluding the  ju ry  and contro lling  access of the m ass m edia to the  case. 
But because the judge is m ore  d iffe ren tia ted  from  p riv a te  .disputants 
than  he is from  o ther professional quasi-o ffic ia l m em bers of the d ispute 
institu tion , his isolation from  them  is su b stan tia lly  less com plete; a jud g e  
who w ould n ev er be caught hob -n o b b in g  w ith  a crim inal defendan t, or 
a civil p la in tiff, w ill nonetheless socialize w ith  p rosecu tors and  law yer*.
cvt A nyone who has practiced in an  A m ercian court is fam ilia r w ith  the 
re luctance  of m any ju d g es to h ear evidence. W hatever the la tte r  m ay 
protest, th is is often not a function  of caseload. M any stud ies have  show n 
th a t judges spend onlv a sm all p a rt of th e  day  on the  bench. S e e . e.g., 
M ileski (1971: 509). C asual observation  confirm s this. A t the  hearing  of 
uncontested  divorces in th e  S u p erio r C ourt for N ew  H aven  County, for 
instance, judges often  refuse  to listen  to any th ing  su b stan tiv e  by the 
d e fau ltin g  husband; w h en  custody  is contested  ,thc judges p re fe r  to 
send the case for investigation  by a fam ily  rela tions officer, and  decline 
to h ear any evidence beyond  w h a t is contained  in  th e  re p o rt of th a t 
officer.
- <T’4 A. L. E pstein  finds p resum ptions com m onTplace in an A frican  u rb an  
court (1954: 13), ,and H opkins describes the  use of in ferences from  
m otive, from  th e  fa ilu re  to answ er an a la rm , and  from  the  sud d en  
accession of su b s tan tia l w ealth , in crim inal prosecutions in U ganda 
(1962: 2 -4 ).
233 G luck m an ’s concept of th e  reasonab le  m an— the parad igm  for inference 
in triba l cou rts—is ac tually  a  dev ice  for in troducing  into th e  d ispu te  
institu tion  all th e  com m on sense expectations ab o u t b eh av io r in the 
cutside w orld  (1955: Ch. 3 ). C om pare the m uch m ore techn ica l chains 
of in ference  em ployed by  A m erican  courts, e.g., those w hich  m u st be 
follow ed in au th en tica ting  docum ents.
23K E.g., evidence of p rio r crim es in th e  course of a crim inal p rosecution.
257 E.g., ev idence w hich w ould disclose th a t th e  defen d an t w as in su red  in 
a to r t action.
258 E.g., the  ru le  th a t excludes a w ife’s testim ony  a g a in s t  h e r  h u s b a n d  on th e  
g ro u n d  that such testim ony w ould  d estroy  the  m arita l r e la t io n s h ip .  See 
Hawkins v. United S tates  (1958). I t is characteristic  of the  sense o f s e l f -  
im portance  acquired  by  in te rv en ers  in d iffe ren tia ted  d ispu te  in s t i tu t io n s  
th a t they  com e to believe th a t ev e ry th in g  th ey  do in th tro le  o f  intfef-vener 
has an im pact outside the in stitu tion , and  an im portan t one a t th a t. T h e y  
thus come to ra tionalize  th e ir  actions on th a t basis, n e v e r in q u i r in g  
w h eth er th o se  actions m ak e  any d ifference  in fact A good exam ple  is  
Pashko v.Pashko (1951), quoted  by  G oldstein  and  K atz (1965: 131). 
T here  a judge in an  ac tio n -fo r separa te  m ain tenance  o rd e r e d  th e  “o th e r  
w om an” to stay  aw ay  from  th e  e rrin g  h u s b a n d  d u r in g  th e  p e n d e n c y  o f 
the  proceedings, say ing:
D ivorces a re  a t a  scandalously  h igh  level in  th e  U n i te d  S ta te s  
today. C purts  should use w h a te v e r p o w e r s  th e y  h a v e  to  s te m  
th e  tide. A restra in in g  o rd e r against th e  th i r d  p a r ty  in  th is  
case will be notice to o th ers  d e lib e ra te ly  in ten t u p o n  b r e a k in g  
up a fam ily  to ta k e  heed  and  desist from  t h e i r  c o u rse . T h e  
court is convinced th a t it w ill d e te r o thers f r o m  s im i la r  a c tio n  
an d  becom e a shield  in p ro tec tin g  th e  in te g rity  a n d  th e  sanctity 
of fam ily  life  in o u r com m unity .
L aw  schools foster such th in k in g  by  tra in in g  s tu d e n ts  to  analyze the 
“policies’ u n d erly in g  ju d ic ia l decisions, an d  to  c r i t ic iz e  those decisions 
in  te rm s of th e ir  ow n policy objectives.
230 A n exam ple of this can  be found even  In K e n y a  c u s to m a r y  la w : ' in  a n  
action fo r cattle  trespass, th e  com plainant m u s t  s u m m o n  e ld e r  to  v ie w  
the  cattle on the  dam aged  land, a t least if t h e  t r e s p a s s  h a s  o c o u r r e d  
during  th e  day. Without the testimony of such an  e lder, th e  c o m p la in a n t  
is unlikely  to succeed, un less h e  has a v e ry  good e x p la n a t io n  for i ts  
unavailab ility .
wo I t  is the  ra re  a ir in g  of a  d ispute  in  w hich the  p resen ta tion  of e v id e n c e  
is no t o rd ered  to som e degree. A t th e  v e ry  least, th e re  will b e  r e g u l a r i ty  
concern ing  w hich  p a r ty  speaks first, and w hen  w itnesses a re  h e a r d  (sec, 
e.g., F isher, 1971: 734).
2 3 1 1 w as im pressed by  the  freq u en cy  w ith  w hich pa rtie s  in  litigation  befo re  
the  p rim ary  courts of K enya s ta ted  in  co u rt th a t they  did not call a w it­
ness because he w as hostile  and  w ould  th e re fo re  lie, or refuse to come. 
T hey w ere  e ith e r  u n aw are  of, o r  u n im pressed  by, the capacity  of the  
cou rt to com pel th e  appearance  of w itnesses, and  to punish  p e rju ry . 
These expectations ab o u t p e r ju ry , how ever, p e rm it th e  in fe rence  th a t 
any  w itness w hom  the p a r ty  fa ils to call does have  hostile evidence, and 
th a t ev e ry  p a rty  he does call is biased. See  H opkins (1962: 10) (A nkole 
of U ganda); S. R oberts (1971: 72) (K gatla  of B o tsw an a); A. L. E pstein  
(1954: 16) (u rb a n  courts of Z am b ia ).
202 A s trik in g  A m erican  ex am p le  w as th e  con tem pt c ita tions im posed on 
w itnesses, s«u»»moned befo re  th e  num erous inq u iries  into loyalty  in  the 
1950's, who refused  to nam e fr ie n d s  and  political associates. T he reasons 
they  gave—p riv acy  and  the  bonds of friendsh ip— are  certa in ly  im p o rtan t 
values in A m erican  society, b u t th ey  carried  no  w eight w ith  the C on­
gressional com m ittees o r courts. The c u rre n t d eba te  over th e  new s 
re p o rte r’s p riv ileg e  raises th e  sam e issues. I t  is in te restin g  th a t the  
im perial courts of E th iopia  also p un ished  th e  fa ilu re  to disclose the 
nam es of o ffenders (F isher, 1971: 717).
208 T hat th is notion is alien to tr ib a l d ispu te  in s t i tu t io n s  is s h o w n  b y  th e  
num erous actions in itia ted  in  the p rim a ry  courts of K enya c o m p la in in g  
of testim ony  g iv en  in p rev io u s actions in th e  sam e courts.
2W4 T he  w idespread  pub lic ity  w hich  a ttends the  occasional sensational t r i a l  
should  not m islead ; alm ost a ll A m erican  tria ls  receive far less p u b l ic  
atten tion  th an  do d ispu tes h e a rd  in  tr ib a l settings. Y et th e  m isp e rc e p tio n , 
is v e ry  common; in p rep arin g  p a rtie s  for the  h ea rin g  of th e ir  u n c o n ­
tested divorces. I w as fre q u e n tly  asked  w h e th e r th e re  w o u ld  b e  p re s s  
coverage; in  fact, th e  press could no t be less in terested .
20!» See, e.g., H ollem an (1952: 40) (th e  w idespread  u se  of tokens as m a te ria l 
sym bols in H era  p ro ced u re ).
260 C ontinental p rocedure  m ay re p re se n t a  fu rth e r  developm ent along these 
lines. T here, an  exam in ing  m ag istra te  accum ulates and digests the 
evidence before p resen tin g  it  to  th e  jud g e  (M erry m an , 1969: 37). 
a*7 Parties m ay be encouraged  to su bm it affidavits ra th e r  th a n  p resen t te s ti­
m ony; u ltim a te ly , th e  a ff id av it m ay becam e th e  only vehicle for o ffe r­
ing evidence, as in  hearings upon  a lim ony  in th e  New Y ork S uprem e 
C ourt (see  G ellhom , 1954: 340-42). A lte rna tive ly , p a rtie s  m ay  be 
aJUowedj indeed  encouraged, to file  cross-m otions for su m m ary  ju d g m en t.
A m cng some K enya tribes, a trad itio n a l m ode o f estab lish ing  the  p a t e r ­
nity of a child born  to an  u n m arried  giiil w as fo r th e  elders to c o m p a re  th e  
child w ith  the  p u ta tiv e  fa th er. Today, bo th  p a rtie s  and  c o u r t  a r e  m o r e  
likely  to req u es t a  blood test. S im on R oberts no tes the  sa m e  d e v e lo p m e n t
in  B otsw ana (1971: 73).
E.g., in A m erican  courts, th e  assessor in m ortgage foreclosures, the p sy ­
ch ia tris t in insan ity  hearin g s in c rim ina l trials, th e  social w o rk er in th e  
ju v en ile  o r fam ily  court.
270 Thus H opkins no tes th a t A nko le  judges give considerab le  w e ig h t  to  
th re a ts  m ade b y  th e  accused p rio r to th e  alleged crim e, and o v e r h e a r d  
. by  o th e rs  (1962: 1).
* ti j '  re fe r here  to  the genera l contours of, and  ra tio n a le  for, the ru le ; of
course, th ere  a re  num erous exceptions.
272 T h is observation  can be g enera lized  fo r a w ide ran g e  of behav io r: in 
th e  und iffe ren tia te .: in stitu tion  the norm s an d  sanctions a re  those of the 
la rg e r society ; in the  d iffe ren tia ted  in stitu tio n  the  no rm s d iv e rse  an d  
the in stitu tio n  m p . \ .. s own sanctions. * o rs ld e r  such b eh av io ra l item s 
as: dress, dem eanor, speech, posture.
A defense law ye: in  a recen t crim inr. tr ia l in the New' Je rsey  
S uperio r C ourt re m a rk e d  a t th e  end of the ju d g e  s c h irg e  to th e  ju ry  
th a t it w?as ‘one of th e  best s ta te  sum m ations I’ve h ea rd  in the  last five 
y ea rs .” H e was im m edia te ly  held  in  contem pt and  sen tenced  to four 
days in ja il fo r a “sarcastic” rem ark  w hich  tended  to “degrade  and 
hu m ilia te  th e  court” (N ew  Y o rk  Times,  Ju ly  27, 1973: p. 33). O utside 
th e  courtroom , few  people consider sarcasm , h o w ev er effective, a c r im ­
inal offense, n o r  w ould  they  expec t it to deserve  a ja il sentence.
278 See, e.g., :he  th ief seeker, or the use of oath ing  in  E th iopia  (F isher, 1971: 
721 ,737).
274 A t firs t only witnesses take  the  oath ; parties a re  still expected to give 
self-serv  ng testim ony. T h e  n a tu re  of th e  ca th  also changes: th e  m ore
us tribal oaths freq u en tly  en d an g er the  liv es  of th e  e n tire  fam ily  
c f the affiant; judicial oaths o n ly  b ind and  affeqt the a ffian t him self.
275 A. L. E pstein  found no concept of p e r ju ry  in th e  u rb an  A frican  courts 
he investigated  (1954: 16).
273 In K ik u y u  custom ary  law, th e  p a te rn ity  of an illegitim ate child  m ay  be 
proved in a w ide  nu m b er of ways, including the testim ony  of th e  chilcfe 
m other. U nder th e  A ffilia tion  Act, w h ich  w as applied  to  the  K ikuyu  in 
1959, the m o th e r’s testim ony  req u ired  co rrobora tion  by  a t least one 
independen t w itness. P r im a ry  cou rts  a lte rn a ted  betw een  ignoring  th is 
req u irem en t and  apply ing  it  w ith  the  u tm ost rig id ity .
277 T he  intervene r is no longer d raw in g  an  in ference  from  the fa ilu re  to  
produce th e  evidence, b u t pun ish ing  th e  p a rty  w ith  the  sanction  of loss 
of the  law suit.
278 An exam ple  of th e  tension betw een  these  tw o conceptions m ay  be found 
in th e  doctrine of res ipsa lo q itu r in  A m erican  to r t law.
270 This allow s a w ide v a rie ty  of beh av io ra l s tan d a rd s  to be voiced during  
th e  airing  of the  d ispute, and  th u s  the p en e tra tion  of m any  non-legal 
n c rm s wrfthin the d ispu te  institu tion . See G lu ck m an  (1955: Ch. 3 ) ;  A. L. 
E pstein  (1954:! 7-8, 12, 17). 1 
-•so Such  expectations m ay b e  used to su b s tan tia te  as w'ell a s  to in v a lid a te  
testim ony. A n adm ission of ad u lte ry  is so u n lik e ly  in Z am bia th a t  it is 
generally  given, credence ( A. L. E pstein , 1954: 14). S im ilarly , an  u n ­
m arried  girl in K enya is so un like ly  to divulge h e r  love affairs th a t  she 
is genera? .7  believed w hen  she nam es th e  fa th e r of h e r illeg itim ate  child , 
a lthough tnis is now changing.
281 In  K enya, th is developm ent has tak en  th e  form  of m isconstruction  cf 
th e  doc trin e  of estoppel. In A nglo -A m erican  law, a p a rty  m ay  be estop ­
ped  fro m  denying  the tru th  of a s ta tem en t m ade outside the  court w h ere  
he has induced  his opponent to re ly  on th a t s ta tem en t to  th e  la t te r ’s 
d e trim en t. In  K enya, ju dges w ill not allow  a p a r ty  to contrad ict te s ti­
m ony g iven  earlie r in the  proceeding, o r in  an  ea rlie r h earing . T h ere  is 
no in ju rious re liance  by  a p a r ty  here; th e  only  re liance  is by  the  court. 
In effect, w h a t th e  co u rt has done is to tak e  a ru le  orig inally  devised  to 
achieve sub stan tiv e  ju stice  and  em ploy it  to  fac ilita te  th e  ta sk  of the 
co u rt in ju dg ing . T he court is saying, in effect: th e  inconsistencies in 
your testim ony show  th a t you a re  ly ing ; because  you have  sought to 
deceive the  court, w e w ill pun ish  you; in stead  of try in g  to d e te rm in e  
the  tru th , w e w ill now  a rb itra r ily  choose to ta k e  your firs t s ta tem en t 
as correct.
282 P re s u m p to n s  in  A m erican  law  often have  n o th in g  to do w ith  probable 
behav io r in the  rea l w orld. R ather, th ey  a re  ex trem e  exam ples of ru les 
devised  by *:he d ispu te  in stitu tion  ro r convenience in deciding, w hich  th * i 
com e to assum e the form , and  p e rfo rm  th e  function , of p rim ary  su b ­
s tan tiv e  ru les about behavior. The p resum ption  of th e  leg itim acy  of the 
offspring of a m arriag e  m ay be an  exam ple: th e  p resum ption  is ce rta in ly  
no t an  em pirical s ta tem en t ab o u t sexual m ores; nor, toaay, is th e re  any  
su b stan tiv e  legal ru le  th a t ch ildren  should  be legitim ate; y e t the  p re ­
sum ption  -eems to h av e  becom e ju s t such a ru l* .
w  A. L. E pstein  oxpv> ;tiy notes th a t this in ference is not  genera lly  d raw n  
(1954: 9) Comp: ■ the Roman legal m ax im  som etim es invoked  in 
Anglo-American law: fa.lsus in uno, Jalsus in omnibus.
284 N otions of fu ll ai : and oredit, and  even  m ore  of com ity, a re  la te  deve l­
opm ents in th e  b u reau c ra tiza tio n  of d ispu te  institu tions.
283 See, e.g., $ ch ap era  (1957) (T sw an a). A. L. E pste in  describes d isputes in 
Zam bia as hom ilies on good b eh av io r (1854: 18).
288 Y et th e re  is n ev e r com plete d isreg a rd  fo r no rm ative  consistency; M aine's 
themistes and W eb e r’s kadi ju stice  rem a in  ideal types. T an n er describes 
tendencies tow ard  consistency in  an  e x tre m ly  u n d iffe ren tia ted  d ispu te  
in stitu tion  (1970: 384).
2S> T rad itiona l Chinese law w as also suspicious of p receden ts; c iting  a 
p reced en t w as like “m ak ing  a m a rk  on a m oving sh ip  to show w h ere  to 
recover a sw erd  w hich has been  dropped over its side in to  th e  river. . . . 
H um an  n a tu re  is in fin ite ly  varied  and  th e re  n e v e r  is a case w hich is 
exactly  the sam e as the  one th a t has been decidedbafore” (W ang H u i-tsu , 
“Pr-uqTv f r Local A dm in is tra tiv e  Officials,” quo ted  in Lubm an, 1967: 
1291 n. 18). N ekam  a ttr ib u te s  strik in g ly  sim ila r ideas to m ag istra tes  in  
U ganda: “ ’Each case is d iffe re n t’ th ey  w ill tell you: 'how  could you 
use p reced en t if you find th a t th e  facts a re  not exactly  the  sam e.’ ’ (1967: 
53). T he opposite ex trem e  m ig h t be rep resen ted  by  the “slippery  slope” 
a rg u m en t freq u en tly  found  in  A nglo-A m erican  jud ic ia l opinions—if  w e 
decide this here, we will be forced  to decide th a t la ter.
As in th e  distinction b e tw een  la w  and  equ ity , and  th e ir  separate  courts; 
at a m uch low er level of in te rn a l  d ifferen tia tion---the  sep ara tio n  b e ­
tw een  ad jud ica ting  guilt in a crim inal tr ia l and  sentencing, or b e tw een  
de te rm in in g  liab ility  in to r t and  assessing dam ages.
280 F a lle rs  (.19691 deals w ith  this a t  g rea t length , re ly ing  h eav ily  on L evi 
(1948).
200 R elatively  u n d ifA ren tia ted  d ispu te  in stitu tio n s re fe r  to p rio r d isputes, 
b u t  only  as exem plify ing  a g enera l s tan d a rd  (A. L. Epstein, 1954: 27); 
increasing d iffe ren tia tion  is necessary  before the  doc trine  cf starejrtecisis 
is follow ed— in th e  sense of th e  b ind ing  force of a p rio r ru ling  upon 
sim ilar facts. C om pare M ay h ew ’s d escrip tion  of the M assachusetts Com ­
m ission A gainst D iscrim ination  (1968: 223). A system  of p reced en t 
requ ires, a t a m in im um , th e  effective com m unication  of decisions, and 
this is som ething w hich is fo u n d  only in h ighly  b u reau c ra tized  institution*
21)1 Societies vary  grea tly  in  th e  d eg ree  of d iffe ren tia tio n  w ith in  th e ir  po lit­
ical institu tions. A t a fa irly  low  level of d ifferen tia tion , the  sam e in sti­
tu tion  d- clares norm s ahd  hand les disputes. W ith  increasing  different*  -  
ation, these processes m ay be distinguished, though  still p erfo rm ed  by  
the  sam e institu tion . See, e-.g,, M ensah-B row n (1970: 132) (A k a n ).
Specialized leg is la tu res  in  co n tem p o ra ry  E uropean  societies a re  o ften  
an  o u tg ro w th  of d isp u te  institu tions. E ven  in the U nited  S tates, w ith  its 
insistence upon th e  separation  of pow ers, in stitu tio n s ten d ed  to perfo rm  
bo th  functions ra th e r  late. See, e.g., th e  legislative ju risd ic tio n  in d ivorce
in the m id -n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  (B lake, 1962: Ch. 5 ).
2 9 2  T h e  w r i - t i n a s  o f  A m e r i c a n  l a w y e r s ,  la w  p r o f e s s o r s ,  
a n d  t h e  r e s t a t e m e n t s  o f  t h e  A m e r ic a n  Law I n s t i t u t e  
a r e  o u t s t a n d i n g  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .
203 T hus M ensah -B ro w n  w rite s  th a t A kan  judges have  no consciousness 
th a t change in cu sto m ary  law  has occurred  (1970: 131). A nd Kaplan, 
app ly ing  th e  term ino logy  developed by L lew ellyn  and H oebel (1941), 
fm ds tha t change in  Chagga law  follow s a p a tte rn  of d rif t— filling  in  gaps 
— ra th e r  th a n  d riv e  (1965: 90). See generally M air (1962: 103).
214 These a re  H a r t’s secondary  ru les of change. O ne of th e  cen tra l problems 
of ju risp ru d en ce  has been  the  e x te n t to w hich these ru les  and  the rules 
of recognition  and  ad ju d ica tio n  a re  sim ilar.
*f''* Indeed, th is  v e ry  d iffe ren tia tio n  m ay  be p a r t  of the  exp lanation  fo r the  
rtp rtlin g  fact th a t in cu r ow n c en tu ry —ap p aren tly  fo r the  f irs t tim e—  
tpw  ha een as an in s tru m en t fo r rad ica l social change.
See, e.g., F rie d m a n  (1973).
M aine - ay be the origin of this idea (1950: Ch. 2 ). B eidelm an  has 
fcupd  it app licab le  in  th e  A frican  con tex t (1961).
21,7 A p u m b er o f  w rite rs  have  found im plicitness to be an  ou tstand ing— even 
ebe o u t/..:  •dir.'c * ’ristk : of th e  A frican d isp u te  process, €.g,t F i l ­
le rs  (1969); A. L. E pstein  (1954: 6). The ch a rac teris tic  is ce rta in ly  no t 
lim ited  / )  A frica; M";yhew found  it durin  rc  e a rly  years cf an A m er­
ican reg u la to ry  agency: “ru les on th e  s f d isc rim in a­
tion have  no t been  fo rm ulated . Issues have  been  resolved im plicitly  
on a co m p la in t-b y -co m p la in t basis” (1968: 117).
Vox One ex am p le  of th is  developing  in te rest m ay  be the fact th a t the in te r ­
v en er begins to ask: W hich norm s o re  applicable? T hat is, he becom es 
conscious of conflicts of law' p roblem s. This aw areness is alm ost en tire ly  
absen t in  u n d iffe re n tia te d  institu tions, w hich tend  to apply  th e  lex 
fori unquestion ingly . See, e.g., N ekam  (1967); T w ining  (1963: 25).
21,0 It w ould obviously  be im possible for a d ispute  institu tion  charged  w ith  
th e  day processing of d ispu tes to  becom e preoccupied w ith  th e
defin ition  and  change cf the  n o rm s w hich a re  to goven those disputes. 
D ibble 1 m en ted  this fo r  A m erican  triq l courts (1973 ). B ut ju r is ts
have alw ays know n  this, if th ey  have been unhappy  w ith the know ledge. 
Cardozo w rite s : “T hose cases [w here  the con troversy  tu rn s  n o t upon 
the r : of law, b u t upon its application  to the  facts], a fte r all, m ak e  up 
the b u lk  of th e  business of the  courts. T hey  a re  im portan t for th e  
litigan ts concerned in  them . T hey call fcr in telligence and  patience and  
reasonab le  d isce rn m en t on th e  p a r t  of the  ju d g es  w ho m ust decide them . 
B u t th ey  leave  ju risp ru d en ce  w here it  stood b efo re” (1921: 163).
^ 'H e r a  d ispu te  in stitu tio n s used  concrete tokens, w hich  w ere  tra n sfe rre d  
betw een  th e  d ispu tan ts, to sym bolize acts w hich w ould  la te r be p e r­
form ed ou tside  the  in stitu tio n  (H ollem an, 1952: 36).
301 L ubm an  notes th a t con tem porary  C hinese m ediators a re  unusual in 
th e ir  ab ility  to su p erv ise  fu tu re  conduct (1967: 1308 n. 95). American 
courts  are  no to rio u sly  in effec tual in th is regard , as I llu s tra ted  by their 
incapacity  to en fo rce  reg u la r p aym en ts of a lim ony  and  support, following 
a divorce decree.
2102 I t  is rtrijk ing th a t d ispu tes in  trad itio n a l Af rican  custom ary  law  over 
b rid e -p rice  or ca ttle  loan agreem ents, w hich  re q u ire d  the r e tu rn  of the 
iden tical catttle g iven  or loaned, can now  be se ttled  by  the p aym en t of
lponey.
303 I th in k  th is  la t te r  s ta tem en t is a fa ir ch a rac teriza tio n  of the A m erican 
ju d ic ia l system , w ith  one sign ifican t exception: w here very  large o rg an ­
izations a re  invo lved  in h igh ly  com plex litigation, the  cou rt o ften  seeks 
a consent decree. I th in k  th is is p a rtly  exp la ined  by the necessity  for 
re g u la tin g  a course of fu tu re  conduct, an d  p a r tly  by the low er degree 
of d iffe ren tia tio n  b e tw een  th e  co u rt and p arties . T hat the  cou rt often
asks the  successful p a r ty  in o th e r  cases to d ra ft a ju d g m en t is not an 
excep tion ; th e  court, by  th is device, sim ply  saves itse lf effort, while 
re ta in in g  full control.
804 W ith  respect to crim inal law , th is har. becom e an  e lem ent of p ro ced u ra l 
due  process in  m ost coun tries w ith  A ng le-A m arican  legal system s. T he 
A frican  C onference on Local C ourts and C ustom ary  Law unan im ously  
reso lved  th a t u n w ritten  cu sto m ary  crim inal pen a lties  should  be abolished 
(1963: 24 ); this has since been  inco rpo ra ted  in  the constitu tions of 
m c jt  A frican  states, and  such penalties have in  fac t been  elim inated .
son T he re la tiv e ly  u n d iffe ren tia ted  H era  dispute institutions involve all 
tho se  w ho  pa rtic ip a ted  at the h ea rin g  in administering the remedy 
(H ollem an, 1952: 38). O ne exam ple  of the way in which the differen­
tia ted  in s titu tio n  fashions a rem ed y  in  terms of its own actions is the 
division b e tw een  civil and c rim ina l sanctions; where these were both 
im posed in  a sing le  hearing , th ey  now  req u ire  two separate actions.
mm This m ay seem  to be con trad ic ted  by m any of the ea rly  tabulations of 
harsh  p en a lties  u n d e r custom ary  lawj B u t th e re  is o ther evidence indi­
cating  th a t  those schedules rep re sen t ideal punishments at most, and 
q u ite  possibly d isto rtions of those ideals. E thnographers w ho have studied 
the  p u n ish m en ts  in flic ted  in v a riab ly  fin d  th a t the ideals becom e a basis 
fo r m a k in g  th rea ts , estab lish ing  bargain ing  positions, and th a t the actual 
p u n ish m en ts  a re  fa r m ilder. See, e.g., M acG affoy (1970: 105-06, 127, 
131); H ollem an  (1952).
807 By th is  1 m ean  th a t the  in s titu tio n  expresses such a concern, and pro­
ceeds to rationalize its actions in  te rm s  of th a t  goal. T hus we find a 
harsh penalty justified n o t by the in stan t crim e, b u t by  th e  increase in 
crim es of that scrt in the com m unity  (H opkins, 1962: 11). A legal logic 
thus links the differentiated dispute  in stitu tio n  to b eh av io r in th e  outside 
w orld . It is a m easure  of the d iffe ren tia tio n  of the  in stitu tio n  th a t, while 
the  little  em pirical ev idence w e have strong ly  suggests th a t th e  penalties 
in flic ted  by  th e  in stitu tio n  a re  laFgely ineffective to achieve the goal 
sought, y e t th a t  logic is not abandoned  or altered .
308 T he logic of g enera l d e te rren ce  thus p e rm its  the d iffe ren tia ted  institution 
to gain (d p p a ren t) efficiency, increasing  the s e v e r ity  cf its sanctions so 
as to  d ecrease  the n u m b er of instances in  w hich it m u st act.
309 T h e  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  d i s p u t e  i n s t i t u t i o n  l e a v e s  t h e  
t a s k  o f  e n f o r c e m e n t  t o  t h e  d i s p u t a n t  ( s e e ,  e . g . ,  
F i s h e r ,  1 9 7 1 :  7 4 2 ) .  B e c a u s e  t h i s  e n d a n g e r s  f i n a l i t y  
a n d  c e r t a i n t y ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i n s t i t u t i o n  a f f o r d s  
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  e n f o r c e m e n t  t o  c i v i l  l i t i g a n t s ,  a n d  
e n f o r c e s  t h e  d e c r e e  i t s e l f  i n  c r i m i n a l  c a s e s .
8,0 R ichard  C antor, w ho has done fie ld w o rk  in the  local courts of Zam bia, 
has re m a rk e d  on th e  frequency  w ith  w hich th ey  p u n ish  as crim inal 
contem pt, th e  fa ilu re  by civil defendan ts to sa tisfy  a ju d g m en t. In  New  
H aven , fo rm e r husbands, w ho had  fa llen  in a r re a rs  in th e  p ay m e n t of 
a lim ony and  support, w ere  tre a te d  w ith  som e sev e rity  by the  S uperio r 
C ourt; b u t  w h en  they  violated  a second o rd e r of th a t  court, th ey  w ere  
in v a riab ly  th rea ten ed  w ith  j a i l , and  o ften  ac tua lly  ja iled .
311 R eview  should  th u s  b e  d istinguished  from  the av a ilab ility  of a lte rn a tiv e  
in stitu tio n s  to  w h ich  a d isp u te  m ay be b rought. M ost societies offer 
som e a lte rn a tiv es  to  the d isp u tan t; few er societies o ffer rev iew  in the 
sense described below. F ailu re  to  appreciate th e  distinction m ay help  to 
ex p la in  th e  ir r ita tio n  w hich  E u ro p ean  colonial a d m in is tra to rs  fe lt a t the 
p ro p en sity  of A frican  litigan ts to seek  rep ea ted  rev iew  of. the  decisions 
of .lower courts. T he  A frican litigan ts, dissatisfied  by  the outcom e, m ay  
sim ply  h av e  b een  seek ing  another, a irin g  of the  d ispute; E uropean  ad - 
m ir i  tra to rs  cou ld  on ly  co n ce iv e  of th e se  su b seq u en t hearings in hier­
arch ical te rm s  as reviewing  the earlier decision. T he European preference 
for th is  la tte r  re la tionsh ip  between institutions m a y  be seen in the 
Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and Registration in Kenya, 
1965-06 (1960: 38).
An in te rm e d ia te  stage b e tw een  rep ea ted  h ea rin g s  b y  institu tions 
w hich a re  d iffe ren t in k in d  b u t  equal in  au th o rity , an d  h ie r a r c h ic a l  
rev iew  in the  sense described below , m ay be appeal to an  in s titu tio n  or 
in d iv id u a l w hich  is seen as possessing charism atic  a u th o rity  to  correct 
injustice. H e n ry  M orris describes A frican  litig an ts  w ho sough t th e  
in te rv en tio n  of the D istrict O fficer in  this m an n er (1970: 17) , and  I h ea rd  
sim ilar stories of pe titions to th e  G overno r of K enya w hich  by -passed  
th e  co rrec t appella te  p rocedu re  to req u es t d irec t in terv en tio n . This 
approach seem s to d e riv e  from  an  a ttitu d e  tow ard  m onarch ic^  ru le  w hich 
sees th e  k ing  (or h is rep resen ta tiv e) as the  fo u n t of ju stice— a  ju s t i c e  
fre q u e n tly  p e rv e rte d  b y  h is officials, though  w ith o u t his k n o w le d g e  
(H obsbaw n, 1959: 119-21). T his a ttitu d e  to w ard  th e  E m p e r o r  still p r e ­
vails in E th iopia  (F isher, 1971: 740-41).
h 2 E.g., th e  Inspecto ra te  of N ative C ourts of N o rth e rn  N igeria  d e s c r ib e d  b y  
S m ith  (1968: 67). In a sense th e  w hole concept of r e v ie w  r u n s  c o n t r a r y  
to m any  of th e  developm ents a lread y  noted : it  u n d e rm in es  c e r t a in ty ,  
prolongs th e  ach iev em en t of fina lity , and  dim in ishes e f f ic ie n c y . W e  m a y  
be able to  harm onize  th e  d eve lopm en t of rev iew  w ith  th e  th e o r y  p r e - ,  
sen ted  h ere  if w e see the institution- as responding  no t to the  d e m a n d s  of 
th e  disputants, b u t to  an  in te rn a l in te re s t in  co rrec ting  its o w n  e r r o r s .
hi« w h e re  th e  sam e institu tion  engages in  bo th  in itia l hearings and th e  
rev iew  ot in itia l hearings held  e lsew here, those  tw o processes w ill re ta in  
som e sim ilarities. This w as tru e  in m uch of A frica. See, e.g., F isher 
(1971: 715) (E th io p ia ); M ensah -B row n  (1970: 125) (A k an  of G h a n a ) ; 
S m ith  (1968: 61) (N orthern  N ig e ria ). As the in stitu tio n  comes to 
specialize exclusively  in rev iew —w hich  is the case of alm ost all A m er­
ican appe lla te  courts— th e  process w ill develop d iv e rg en t characteristics.
3,4 T his developm ent para lle ls  th e  shift in focus at the in itia l h ea rin g  from  
su b stan tiv e  to p rocedura l issues, discussed earlie r.
313 F ille rs  notes th a t in Busoga, th e  appeal is tre a te d  as a new  action 
d ispu tan t aggrieved  by the orig inal outcom e, and  the orig inal in te rv en er; 
th e  o ther d isp u tan t is no t even  fo rm ally  a p a r ty  (1909: A ppend ix  B ) . In 
the ex trem e, th e  rev iew  com es to resem ble  a prosecution  of the o rig ina l 
in te rv en e r by  th$ rev iew er.
* " ’ K aplan rep o rts  th a t the  decisions of C hagga appeal courts w ere  com ­
m unicated  only to the in te rv e n e r  w hose decision -was rev iew ed  (1965: 
85). I found a d ivergence of p rac tice  in K enya: some decisions w ere  not 
ev en  com m unicated  to the  cou rt w hose ju d g m e n t-w a c being m odified; 
w here  this was done, o ther p rim ary  courts in the ju risd ic tio n  w ere  not 
notified; y e t decisions of the C ourt of R eview  w ere  c ircu la ted  (see Abel, 
1969a: 612-26; B arnett, 1965: 117).
817 T his is no t to deny  th a t the  d istinction  is w holly  a rb itra ry . I have lim ited  
m y m icrosocial theory  to arv exp lanation  of d isp u te  process in te rm s of 
the characteristics of th e  in te rv en er. I th e re fo re  discuss the influence of c 
d isp u tan t re la tionsh ips via the  m echanism  of d isp u tan t choice u n d er 
the heading of m acrosocial th eo ry ; it  could ju s t  as read ily  have been 
included w ith in  the fo rm er category.
sis T he sam e exam ple  can be used  to suggest som e lim iting  v a ^ e s  for rc le  
d ifferen tia tion  I canno t im agine a society in w hich ev e ry  person  greets 
every  c h e r  person in the  sam e w ay.
313 C erta in ly  in te rv en e rs  han d le  a la rg e r p roportion  of d isputes in our ow n 
society than in, fo r instance, th a t of the  IKung B ushm an (M arshall. 1960; 
Thom as, 1959), or B am buti pygm ies (T u rn b u ll, 1961; T u rn b u ll, 1965). 
W hy this is so, though an im p o rtan t question, is beyond the  scope of 
th is  paper.
3-° K luckhohn  (1960: 394), citing Dodds (1957). B u t m ere  physical density  
does not p roduce  in terac tion . C on tem porary  w este rn  city  dw elle rs  have 
learned  how  to m in im ize th e ir  sign ifican t contacts u nder conditions of 
v e ry  h igh physical density .
821 Even social in terac tion  m ay  not p roduce disputes if a society endow s its 
m em bers w ith  a personality  disposed to in te rn a lize  conflict and  avoid 
dispute, as has been  claim ed fo r m any  cu ltu res of th e  F a r East, especia lly  
those u n d er th e  influence of C onfucianism .
This seem s to m e one posible r e f in e m e n t  of L a w r e n c e  F r i e d m a n ’s n o tio n  
of legal c u ltu re  (1969): legal institu tions o pera te  in  ce rta in  w a y s  because 
of societal p ressu res, and  th en  com e to value that; m ode of o p e r a t ic n .
823 T his assum es n o  conscious m an ipu la tion  o f th e  in s titu tio n  to a v o id  tha t 
resu lt. R ecently  w e have seen a varie ty  of devices used to redyce d i f f e r ­
en tia tion : quotas in th e  selection of personnel from  each subgroup; f r a g ­
m enta tio n  of society in to  sm aller units, each w ith  its ow n  in stitu tio n .
*-4 M acaulay  notes th a t though som e la rg e r business organ iza tions in  the 
U nited  S ta tes do this, m ost do n e t (1963).
8- r> M ayhew  and Reiss (1969) have  show n th a t the  A m erican  legal system  
is inaccessib le to m any  poor people because i t  does n o t recognize th e ir  
p ro b lem s as legal problem s.
3-(J A n exce llen t h is to ry  of g rad u a l ju d i c ia l  d e v e lo p m e n t  i n  re s p o n s e  to  
evo lu tio n ary  social change is  th a t  of J .  D a w s o n  (1 9 6 0 ) .
*-7 N isbet (1989) gives a  com prehensive  s ta tem en t an d  p ersu asiv e  c ritiq u e
• of the organic analogy in history,
^  See  D iam ond (1935) and la te r  w ritings; H obhouse (1914) a n d  l a t e r  
w ritings; C arlston (1968). T his notion  a p p e a r s  to  b e  o n e  e le m e n t  o f 
w h a t D avid T rubek  has characterized  as tne “core c o n c e p t io n ” o f  m uch
cf co n tem porary  scholarship  on lav/ and developm en t ( lO 'ttb ) .
320 S o u th a lA  dichotom y strik ing ly  resem bles Maine’s distinction between
. static  and dynam ic societies (1950),
A m ong the proliferating lite ra tu re  on th is  sub jec t, the following offer 
usefu l descrip tions or ana ly tic  insigh t: Kanter (1972); H ourie t (1971); 
F airfie ld  972): Z ab h ck i  ^1971) K a n te r  and Zablocki also  contain 
excellen t b ib liographies.
sai a  g rea t deal of political, especially r%jpal, u r  'c-st in  A m erica has focussed 
upon the police. M any of th e  dem ands arc  specifically  d irec ted  toward 
reduc ing  social d iffe ren tia tio n : m inorities should  be rep resen ted  on the 
force; police should live in the  com m unity  w hich  th ey  serve. But these 
dem ands have also been  m ade of ju d ic ia l institu tions, e.g., th a t minorities 
be rep resen ted  cn  ju ries, th a t a t least to k en  ap po in tm en ts of black judges 
be  m ade, th a t b lacks be ad m itted  to  law  schools.
w - M ayhew  (1971: 167) no tes th a t black dem ands h av e  sh ifted  f r o m  i n t e ­
gration  to separatism , b u t h e  fa ils  to see th a t  both, sire dem ands fo r  
reduced  d ifferen tia tion , though w ith in  d iffe ren t fram es of r e f e r e n c e .
88 A gain, con troversy  over th e  police offers th e  b es t exam ple. Civilian 
Review  B oards have  been  a consistent dem and, v io len tly  resisted . N u ­
m erous o th e r m e th o d s h av e  been  suggested tc increuepopular control. See, 
e.g., C hevigny (I9 6 0 ): S k o ln ick  (1966); Virginia Law  R e v ie w  [Note]
(1969). The B erkeley , C alifornia, re fe ren d u m  to decen tra lize  th e  police 
force— tw ice defeated— is an o th e r exam ple.
884 See Isaacs (1917); see generally G raveson  (1953); F ried m an n  (1959: 
Ch. 4 ). Thi^ phenom enon has b een  observed  m ast o ften  w ith respect to 
em p lo y er/em p lo y ee  re la tions. B u t M acaulay  has also repo rted  it  for 
re la tions am ong  businessm en  (1963).
335 F u lle r  (n .d .: 74) acknow ledges th a t ad ju d ica tio n  is poorly  su ited  to 
po lycen tric  disputes.
8381 have found th is in  K enya; L aw rence  F ried m an  is in the  process of 
docum enting  it fo r A m erica; M arc G a lan te r observes it in  In d ia  (1972a: 
59 n. 38), And Adam  Podgoreoki in form s m e th a t sociologists h av e  no ted  
it in  Ita ly  and  F in land .
337 L egal h isto ry  is rep le te  w ith  com petition  fo r  business am ong jud icia l 
institu tions; A b e l-S m ith  and  S tev en s  (1969) p resen t num erous con­
tem porary  instances from  E ngland .
838 T his m onopoly w as recen tly  no ted  in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971). I 
th in k  it is accu ra te  to  observe  an  increase in  s ta te  m onopolization of the 
p ow er to a lte r  s ign ifican t sta tus: even contro l o v e r m arriage  and  d ivorce 
is on ly  a phenom enon of the  last h u n d re d  years.
383 L aw rence  F ried m an  in th e  U nited  S tates, and  I in  K enya, have both 
found th a t cou rt dockets h av e  sh ifted  from  d isp u tes  betw een  private 
litig an ts  to q u a s i-a d m in is tra tiv e  m atters.
340 W illiam  F elstiner ha/ no ted  th e  p o p u la rity  of th a t so lu tion  in c o n tem p o - 
r a r^ ^ A m  erica, and is c u rre n tly  analyzing w h y  A m ericans “lu m p  it”
341 This is epitom ized in an  ep ig ram  w hich, in its  v a r ia n t .forms in d iffe ren t 
p arts  of A frica, is com m only  tran s la ted  as “w e m a rry  those w e fig h t.”
342 T he only obligation of the  A m erican  citizen to  his d ispu te  in s t i tu t io n s  is  
ju ry  du ty . It is ind ica tive  of o u r  o rdering  of the  im portance  of c o n f l ic t in g  
duties tha t citizens a re  excused  from  serv in g  on a ju ry  fo r n u m e r o u s  
reasons; it ranks low er th an  the d u ty  to keep  house, to p erfo rm  p r o ­
fessional activ ities, etc. By contrast, political ac tiv ity  has a v e ry  n ig h  
p rio rity  in  tr ib a l socities, and  in co n tem porary  A m erican  c o m m u n e s . 
E lia K atz  gives an  am using, if p ro b ab ly  exaggera ted , account of th e  
energy  devo ted  to h and ling  d isputes am ong th e  Fam ily, a g r o u p  in  T ao s, 
N ew  M exico (1971: 116-58). -
343 Thiii is th e  inverse  o f W eb er’s perception  of th e  linkage betw een  legal 
ra tio n a lity  and the rise of capitalism . See T ru b ek  (1972ql
344 See generally  the  b ib liog raphy  p re p a re d  by Ie tsw aa rt and  T ir u c h e lv a m  
(n .d .)
See the  A frican L aw  and  T rib a l C ourts B id  (1969), a n d  th e  accom pany- 
iiWj legislative debate. ,, _______ _
343 See  the  Local C o m 1 (A m endm en t) Bill (1969) and  the C rim inal Law
(A m end - n t)  B ;i: (1 89) and the accom panying legislative debates.
#47 See  th e  discussion in tenB roek  (1971: Ch. 3 ).
343E ven thi. is not cU vr. a ttem p ts  to assert s tro n g er controls over the  
police, by m eans «»f d e-cen tra liza tio n , w ere  opposed b y  a  m a jo r i ty  o f 
th e  black population  of B erkeley .
343 M arc G alan tei has am ply  docuiru © opposition of Ind ian  la w y e r s
to th e  rev ival of traditional punchayats (197A . 56-57 and passim). T h e  
d efeat of Chilean legislation w hich w ould hve  c rea ted  neighborhood 
trib u n a ls  may be a con tem porary  exam ple.
wo O ne illu stra tio n  of th is is the h isto ry  of m arita l counselling  schem es 
a ttached  to d ivorce courts. O ften  in itia ted  w ith  considerable e n th u ­
siasm, they have fre q u e n tly  been abolished shortly  th e re a fte r  because 
they  w ere  thought to be too .p., B odenheim er (1961)
(U ta h ) ;  G oldstein and K atz (1965: 150-161) (N ew Je rsey ); N ew  York  
Times, Ju n e  2, 1973; p. 1 (N ew  Y o rk ).
334 See In re Gault, (1967), and th e  discussion of a lte rn a tiv e  m odels of 
c rim ina l p rocedure in G riffith s  (1970).
55- T here  is a len g th y  lite ra tu re  on the “fa ilu re” of the  sm all claim s * 
court See, e.g., Sm all C laim s S tu d y  G roup (1972), and  its  b ib liography .
u s tA  strik ing  instance of such p ressu re  is the  recen t recom m endation  
by the Canon Law Society of A m erica th a t C atholic m arriag e  trib u n a ls  
be elim inated, and th a t in th e ir stead som e radically  d iffe ren t in s ti­
tu tio n  be established, w hich m ight include psychologists and  social 
scien tists as well as p riests, and seek to  counsel ra th e r  th an  to a d ­
jud ica te . See N ew  York  Times, O ctobr 19, 1973: p. 11, col. 1.
354 T he fam ily  cou rt m ovem ent in th e  U nited  S tates during  the  p resen t 
cen tu ry  is an excellen t exam ple  of continuous p ressu re  in this d irec ­
tion. A t th e  sam e tim e, its repeated  failu re to achieve th e  s ta ted  goal 
o f a thorough  in q u iry  in to  the underly ing  causes of the  d ispu te  is 
evidence of s trong  cou n terp ressu res  d e riv in g  from  the s tru c tu re  of 
d ispu te  institu tions. See, e.g., G ellho rn  (1954: 163-65) (superficial 
in q u iry  into financial p roblem s cf a dissolving fam ily  u n i t ).
355 T he call for decentra liza tion  as a social panacea, for a re tu r n to  sm all 
tow n v irtues, can read ily  be illu s tra ted  from  recen t h istory .
;,lw T his is, of course, a p a rap h rase  of W eber’s notions ab cu t th e  re la tio n ­
ship  b e tw een  law  and capitalism  (see T riibek , 1972a). W eber saw  the  
causal connection proceeding  in  the opposite d irection ; bu t to m e th is  
sim ply  ind icates th a t contrad ictions b etw een  social s tru c tu re  an d  dis­
p u te  process genera te  p ressu re  for changes in  both phenom ena.
357 T his general developm ent has freq u en tly  been  observed du ring  th b  
last half c en tu ry  from  a w ide  v a rie ty  cf view points, (see, e.g., D an ren - 
dorf, 1959: Ch. 7; A. Douglas, 1957).
3B8 S tra tifica tion  is so m uch  a p a rt of c o n te m p o r a r y  w estern  le g a l s y s ­
tem s th a t p artic ip an ts  in those s y s te m s  a r e  n o  lo n g e r  a b le  to  r e c o g n iz e  
th e  fact th a t it ex is ts  and  is increasing. P r o f e s s o r  M aurice R o s e n b e rg  o f  
C olum bia L aw  School, the  c u rre n t p re s id en t of the A s s o c ia tio n  o f
A m erican  Law  Schools, recen tly  w rote  a le tte r  to  th e  N ew  York  Times  
condem ning  the “n ig g a rd ly ” com pensation paid to federa l ju d g e s , a n d  
arg u in g  th a t unless th ey  w ere  paid “ju s t” com pensation, g o o d  law yers 
could no t “in fa irness to th e ir  fam ilies and them selves” a f f o r d  to  
becom e judges. T he p resen t “n ig g ard ly ” sa lary  is $40,000-$42,500 a  y e a r .  
(N ew  Y ork  Times, O ctober 10, 1973: p . 46.) A s  th i s  e x a m p le  sh o w s, 
there  are  no p ressu res to reduce  econom ic stra tifica tion . R a th e r ,  th e  
d em an d  is fo r g rea te r  rep resen ta tio n  of groups d e f in e d  b y  e th n ic i ty ,  
religion, or sex  —  by the appo in tm ent o f  ind iv iduals w h o  a r e  im m e ­
d ia te ly  p laced in  the  h igher econom ic stra ta .
An in s tru c tiv e  exam ple  m ay be d raw n  from  an o th er legal i n s t i tu ­
tion. the leg isla ture . D uring  the past c en tu ry , sta te  l e g i s l a tu r e s  h a v e  
gradua lly  been  tran sfo rm ed  from  a  collection of poorly  paid  a m a te u r s ,  
holding o ther fu ll tim e  jobs, and m eeting  only  ra re ly , to p ro fe s s io n a ls ;  
acting  n ea rly  full tim e, w ho are  dem anding , and in c r e a s in g ly  ob- 
taiivng. ad eq u a te  pay . Y et the  s tru c tu ra l changes req u ire d  to m e e t  
the  dem ands of t r .r  con tem porary  leg isla tive, process m ay  no t stop 
there , as th e  fo llow ing a rtic le  indicates:
Congress, caught between m ultip ly in g  p roblem s and  d e ­
clining efficiency, m ay  have reached a  legislative absolute 
— the unpassable bill,
A ttem p tin g  v  rew rite  the e n tire  F ed era l c rim inal code 
in  one package, the  law m ak ers  now face th e  possib ility  th a t 
a b ill can be so long, so com plex and so co n troversia l, th a t 
it cannot b e  processed w ith  [sic] th e  tw o -y e a r life span 
to w hich each Congress is lim ited .
S om e stru c tu ra l change m ay  be req u ired  by  the size of the  bill (538 
p ag es), its con troversia l n a tu re  (issues such as capital pun ishm en t, 
abortion, th e  in san ity  defense, obscen ity ), and  political sensitiv ity . B ut 
ironically , one such s tru c tu ra l change —  g re a te r  professionalization  —  
m ay  in fac t b e  an < bstacle to passage of the  bill, for, as th e  artic le  notes, 
“L aw y ers  m ak e  up  to [sic] 54 p er cent of the  c u rre n t C ongress and  100 
per cent of the  tw o Ju d ic ia ry  C om m ittees th a t have ju risd ic tio n  over 
th e  crim inal .code, and  they  ta k e  p a rticu la r in te re s t in care fu lly  sc ru ­
tin iz ing  changes in the ru les of th e ir  profession” (ATe w  Y o rk  Times, Ju ly  
16, 1973: p. 15 .^
3flcThe suggestion th a t laym en, especially  social scientists, be  included  in 
C atholic m atrim on ia l tr ib u n a ls , is an ex am p le  (see no te  354 s u p r a ) ’, -so 
is th e  dem and  fo r professional judges to preside  over a d ispu te  process 
tran sfo rm ed  by  the in troduction  of a w ritte n  code, o r  by th e  partic ipa tion  
of professional counsel, 
s l u d g e s  o ften  becom e personally  invo lved  in contested  m atrim o n ia l ac­
tions, especially d isputes ov er custody ; ev idence  of this m ay  be found 
in th e  deg ree  of affect they exh ib it from  the  bench, and in th e ir  f r e ­
qu en t references to personal experience  in passing jud g m en t. See, e.g.. 
th e  ex tensive  M ateria ls concerning the  “L esser” case in G oldstein and 
Katz. (1965: 19-58, and especially 113-22). M ore recently , judges con­
fron ted  w ith a rg u m en ta tiv e  defen d an ts  in  c rim in a l tria ls  have  lost th e ir  
self-con r r l  and th e reb y  dim in ished  th e  d istance b e tw een  ju d g e  and 
accused — w hich, of course, w as p recisely  the  in te n t of th e  d e fen d an t in  
th e  firs t place.
832 The C onciliation B u reau  of th e  N ew  Y ork S u p rem e  C ourt, w hose p u r­
pose w as a fu ll ex p lo ra tio n  of the  problem s u n d e rly in g  the  d ivorce  ac­
tion, w as recently  abolished because few  d ivorc ing  couples w an ted  such 
an  exp lo ra tion  (L aw s of N ew  Y ork 1973. Ch. 1034); cn  the reasons fo r 
th e  r e p  al, see S ubcom m ittee  on L egal R epresen tation  c f  Ind igen ts  and 
L im ited  Incpm e G roups (1973: 10-12); and  N ew  York  Times, J u n e  2, 
1973: p. 1.
808 T h e  m ost no tab le  recen t exam ple has been the  legal serv ices l a w y e r s  
w ho refuse to barga in  pleas, o r w ho r a i s e  a ffirm a tiv e  defenses to e v ic ­
tion  proceedings, thus p lacing in to le r a b le  burdens on in stitu tio n s a c ­
custom ed, to rou tine  b u reau c ra tic  p ro c e s s in g .
864 T he cham pions of the  ru le  of law  a re  a lm ost exclusively  legal p ro fes­
sionals (law yers or ju d g e s) , usually  those who operate  a t th e  h ig h e r 
levels of legal institu tions (ap p e lla te  courts, th e  national legislature, th e  
larger law  firm s, th e  professional associations). The ideology m ay  be 
seen as an  idealization  cf th e  process occurring w ith in  those  institu tions, 
w hich is th en  generalized  as a va lue  fo r a w ide v a rie ty  of o ther in s titu ­
tions w hich hand le  disputes, e.g., prisons, schools, un iversities, etc.
305 Of th e  fo u r trad itio n a l professions, the  clergy  and  th e  military have 
little  salience as con tem porary  role m odels; law  and m edicine have in­
creased in im portance com m ensura te ly .
33,1 A w ea lth  of da ta  on the w ay d ispu te  p rocessing  p rese rv es  intimate re ­
lationsh ips can be found  in th e  genre  k n o w n  as the  American Jewish 
novel, e g  , Roth, M alam ud, B ellow ; th is p henom enon  may be general: 
certa in  k inds of d ispu ting  m ay  be n p rinc ipa l m ode of in teg ration  for all 
fam ilies. See E isenste in  (1956).
G aluntei has m ade th is a rg u m en t for the  U nited  S tates (1972b); D uncan  
K ennedy, following F u rn iv a ll (1956), has analyzed  th e  colonial s itua tion  
in  sim ilar term s.
3,18 H ere, again, I am  tu rn in g  W eber upside dow n (1958).
ww This ii Weber's tl hat, in th e  modern era, authority tends to  claim
legitim * n upon th. basis of rationality, r a th e r  than  by  invocation of
tradition or charisma (1947),
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C h a p t e r  4 .  A Bibliography of the Customary Lavs 
o f  K e n y a  ( w i t h  special reference to 
the laws of wrongs)
T h is  b ib liog raphy  was developed in the course of research in the 
custom ary  laws o f  w rongs in Kenya,* and is therefore most thorough 
w ith  respect to  th a t sub jec t. However, the nature of customary law is 
such th a t w rongs do  no t fo rm  a sharply differentiated substantive area,
M oreover, o th e r bodies o f  law— e.g ., tho se  pertaining to the family, to 
p ro p erty  • ights, to  p rocedura l m a tte rs— clearly bear on the treatment of 
wrongs C onsequen tly , m ost sources cover a broad subject matter, and 
in seeking to inc lude  all those  having any bearing on the laws of wrongs, I 
believe I have been  reasonably  com prehensive. Two areas were deliberately 
excluded  N o n -cu sto m arv  u m —received  English law, adopted Indian 
A cts, M oslem  or H in d u  law— w here it has no  bearing  on customary 
practices, is not re fe rred  to. W ith in  custom ary  law itself, the rules of 
and law have only been  dealt w ith  inciden ta lly , for th e  area is sufficiently 
specialized to  co n stitu te  a separab le  sub jec t m a tte r, w ith  an extensive 
bib liography  o f  its ow n. (See especially  S o rrcnson , M. P. K. Land Reform  
in the Kikuyu Country: a study in Government Policy , pp. 253-56 . New 
Y ork: O xford  U niv . P. for E. A fr. In st. Soc. R es., 1967).
Tw'o o th e r invaluable resources for s tu d y  shou ld  be mentioned here . 
The Kenya N ational A rchives con ta in  an  ex tensive collection of th e  
records o f colonial a d m in is tra tio n : D is tr ic t and Provincial Political 
R ecord  Books, A nnual R eports , and  H an d in g -o v er R eports . (See Govern­
m en t o f  K enya, Archives Microfilming Programme, Section I: Provincial  
and District Annual Reports3 75 pp . and  m ap. C yclostyled .) T h e se  fre ­
quen tly  inc lude  s ta tem en ts  o f  substan tive  ru les and  p ro ced u res , as well as
*This research was supported by a Marshall Scholarship in London and by a 
Foreign Area Fellowship in Kenya. I am extremely grateful to Professor A. N. 
Allott and Mr. Eugene Cotran, both of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, for their help, and for allowing me access to the files of 
the Restatement of African Law project. I am also grateful to Mr. T. A. Watts, 
Administrative Secretary, High Court of Kenya, for his generous assistance in 
Nairobi. Editor's N o te: The results of some of this research appeared earlier in 
the East African Law Journal: “Case Method Research in the Customary Laws 
E. A . L. J. of Wrongs in Kenya”— Part I, “Individual Case Analysis”, 5 247 
(Dec., 1969) and Part II: “Statistical Analysis”, 6 E. A . L . J . 20 (March, 1970).
discussions of problems in administering customary law (e.g., whether or 
not to impose a statute of limitations) M u ch  of this material has been 
microfilmed and stored in the Syracuse University Library, from which 
it may be borrowed. (See Fedha, Nathan and John B. Webster. A Cata­
logue of the Kenya National Archives Collection on Microfilm at Syracuse 
University;  Syracuse: Programme of Eastern African Studies, 1967; 
Gregory, Robert G ., Leon Spencer and Robert Maxon. A Guide to the 
Kenya National Archives. Syracuse: Programme of Eastern African 
Studies, forthcoming 1969.)
Second, the proceedings o f the African Courts and of Appeals Magis-
t, t agj t rate’s Courts) have been recorded for about a
decade, generally  in E ng lish  but sometimes in Swahili. These reports
include >ti:noay of parties and witnesses, a reasoned judgment, and 
the step taken  to execute it. They are filed in the highest court to have
L c tn  sc', a -J f  he case. In  ad d itio n , M r. T , A. W atts, while African 
C o u rts  O facer (1963-67), collected  ab o u t 5,000 copies of the judgments 
o f  A ppeals Magistrates, which can now  be consulted in the Law Courts,
N airob i.
F inally , several o th e r b ib liograph ies m ay assist the investigator:
D uP re , C arole E . The Luo of Kenya: an annotated bibliography. (Institute 
for C ro ss-C u ltu ra l R esearch  S tud ies No. 3) Washington, D .C .: Inst.
for C ro ss-C u ltu ra l R es., 1968.
M olnos, A ngela. Sources for the Study of East African Cultures and Develop­
ment. (E. Afr. Res. Info. C en tre  Circular No. 1). Nairobi: E. Afr. Res. 
In fo . C en tre , 1968.
R ead , James S. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. (Bibliographical Introduction 
to Legal History and Ethnology, E/26). Brussels: Universite Libre, 1968.
R esta tem en t of African Law Project. Draft Bibliography: East Africa. 
1961) 83 \- iii pp. C yclostyled . (T o  be published by Sweet & Maxwell
in  a revised  ed ition).
W alker, A u d rey  A. Official Publications of British East Africa, Part III:  
Kenya and Zanzibar. W ashington, D .C .: Library of Congress, 1962.
W ebster, John B., Shirin G. F. Kassam, Robert S. Peckham, and Barbara
A. Skapa. A Bibliography on Kenya. (Syracuse University Eastern 
A frican Bibliographical Series No. 2, Kenya). Syracuse: Programme of
E astcrii African Studies, 1967.
I have organized the bibliography as follows:
I. General Background
II. Judicial and Legal System— General
A. Legislation
B. Cases
C. Official Reports
D. Published Sources
E. Unpublished Sources
III. Substantive Law— General
A. Contracts and Commercial Law
B. Criminal Law
C. Family Law
D. Inheritance and Succession
E. Land Law
IV. Substantive Law—by Tribe
Bantu C. Nilo-Hamitic
1. Embu 1. General
2. Gusii 2. Elgeyo
3. Kamba 3. El Molo
4. Kikuyu 4. Iteso
5. Kuria 5. Kipsigis
6. Luyia 6. Kony
7. M eru 7. Masai
8. Mijikenda 8. Nandi
9. Pokomo 9. Pok
10. Sarnia 10. Pokot
11. Taita 11. Rendille
12. Taveta 12. Samburu
Nilotic—Luo 13. Tugen
14. Turkana
D. Hamitic—Galla
E. Aboriginal
1. Dorobo
2. Sanye
F. Swahili
The only significant omission of a tribe is the Somali, the reason being 
that practically no one has studied the Somali of Kenya, whereas those of 
the Somali Republic [q.v.) have been extensively described. In organizing 
the data by tribal categories, I have included some brief information to
help iden tify  the trib e :
Name (with alternate spellings, and constituent groups) (Population
according to the most recent census). Principal home districts.
Following usual practice, I have dropped prefixes from the tribal names, 
e.g., Bantu: wa-, a-, aba-; Nilotic: jo-; Nilo-Hamitic: el-.
In the references which follow I have used a number of abbreviations.
A.L.S./S.O.A.S.: African Law Section, School of Oriental and African
Studies, Univ. of London.
Afr. S tud .: African Studies (formerly Bantu Studies)
Amer. A nthrop.: American Anthropologist
Beh. Sci,: Behavioural Science
Can. J. Afr. Stud.: Canadian Journal of African Studies
E. Afr. A nn.: East African Annual
E A I.S .R .: East African Institute of Social Research (now Makcrcrc
Institute of Social Research)
E.A.L.J.: East African Law Journal
E. Afr. Med. J ,: East African Medical Journal
E. Afr. Prot. L, R ep.: East Africa Protectorate Law Reports
E. Afr. Q .: East African Quarterly
Geog. J.: Geographical Journal
H .M .S.O .: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
Hum. O rg .: Human Organization
I.A .I.: International African Institute (formerly International Institute 
for African Languages and Cultures, I.I.A .L.C.)
I.I.A .L .C .: see I.A .I., supra.
J. Afr. Admin.: Journal of African Administration (later Journal of Local
Administration Overseas)
J. Afr. H ist.: Journal of African History
J. Afr. Soc.: Journal of the African Society (later Journal of the Royal 
African Society, J. Roy. Afr. Soc.)
J. Anthrop. Inst.: Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great 
Britain and Ireland (later Journal of the Royal Anthropological Insti­
tute of Great Britain and Ireland, J. Roy. Anthrop. Inst.) 
J.E .A .U .N .H .S .: Journal of the East Africa and Uganda Natural History 
Society (sometimes Journal of the East Africa Natural History Society, 
J.E.A.N.H.S.)
J. Mod. Afr. Stud.: Journal of Modern African Studies 
J. Roy, Anthrop. Inst.: see J. Anthrop. Inst., supra.
K.I.A .: Kenya Institute of Administration 
R -L .I.: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute
R-L.J : Rhodes-Livingstone Journal (also known as Human Problems in
Cential Africa)
5 .0 .A .S .: School of Oriental and African Studies, Univ. of London
Tang. Notes & Records: Tanganyika Notes and Records (later Tanzania
Notes)
Ug. J.: Uganda Journal 
Because the unpublished materials can only be consulted by persons 
able to travel to London or Kenya, I have listed them separately. All 
unpublished materials (except theses, which are filed at the degree-
granting institution) are in the form of microfilm, and are at the A.L.S./
5 .0 .A .S ., unless otherwise noted.
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V. Addendum: 1969-1974
Research and publication on Africa generally, and on Kenya
in particular, has enormously accelerated In the last decade.
This addendum attempts to bring the preceding bibliography up to
date by adding materials published In the last five years, and
also those items published earlier but only discovered recently. .
Because it has been compiled in the United States, it will be
more comprehensive for items published there, and less so for
Items published in England or Africa. Entries are arranged in
the sane order as above, and under the same topic headings, so
as to facilitate cross-reference.
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s a m p l e  f r o m  Kenya," in W.M. O ’Barr, et al eds. Survey 
R e s e a r c h  i n  Africa 1 2 2 - 3 4 .  Evanston: Northwestern
U n i v .  P . , 1 9 7 3 .
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VI. Kenya Case Materials
A. Statutes
1. All statutes governing the work of the local courts,
1897 - date.
2, All statutes defining the place of customary law,
1897 - date.
This includes, among other thing3, the following:
Native Courts Regulations, 1897
Courts Ord. , 1907
Native Tribunal Rules, 1913
Native Tribunals Ord., 1930, and parliamentary debates, 
Native Authority Ord., 1937.
African Courts O r d , ,  1951, and debates
African Courts (Amend.) Ord., 1962, and debates
Magistrate’s Courts Act, 1967, and debates
Kadhi's Courts Act, 1967
Judicature Act, 1967
Jurisdiction of Courts Act, 1967
Abolition of Customary Crimes - Parliamentary Question, 
3/10/67.
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1969, and debates 
Law of Succession Bill, 1970, and debates
B. Rules - all subsidiary legislation relating to the above,
i n c l u d i n g :
Native Tribunals (later African Courts) (Fees and Fines) 
Rules - amended periodically 
African Courts (Interrogation of Judgment Debtors)
Rules, 1952, GN 987/52 
African Courts (Lapsed Deposits) Rules, 1959, LN 38/59 
African Courts (Dismissal of Land Suits) Rules, 1957,
LN 181/57
African Courts (Corporal Punishment) Rules, 1956, LN 
170/56
C. Reports
Native Affairs Department. Annual Reports, 1925-47 
African Affairs Department. Annual Reports, 1948-57 
Judicial Department. Annual Reports, 1955-70
1 n o  
> o u
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administra­
tion of Justice in Kenya, Uganda and the Tanganyika 
Territory in Criminal Matters, May 1933.
East African Royal Commission Report, 1953-55.
Kenya Land Commission Report.
Phillips, Arthur. Report on Native Tribunals (1945) 
Barnett, T.E. A Report on Local Courts in East Africa 
(1965)
D. Administrative regulations for local courts
Standing Orders for African Courts (1956) (80 pp)
Tennent, J.R.M. (D.O. (Courts) Kakamega). Notes and 
Instructions for the Cuidance of African Courts
(1959) (51 pp.)
Office of the D.C., Machakos. Notes and Instructions 
for the Guidance of African Courts (1959) (38 pp.) 
Criminal Procedure Rules for African Courts (c. 1962-63) 
(23 pp. with three later amendments)
African Courts Civil Procedure Rules (c, 1962-63) (18 
pp. with three later amendments)
Framing of Charges for Offences Hearable by African 
Courts (with amendments) (15 pp.) (From African 
Courts Handbook - ACH)
Waller, II. de Warrenne (African Courts Officer). A Guide 
to Evidence for African Courts (1961) (9 pp. with a 
later circular on the same subject) (from ACII)
(Chief Accountant and African Courts Officer). Notes 
for the Assistance of Checking Officers. (1962)
(4 pp.)
African Courts Officer. Guide to Hearing of Civil 
Appeals by District Officers. (1951) (5 pp.) from 
ACH)
Thompson, W.H. (Acting African Courts Officer). African 
Courts Administrative Instructions (1963) (4 pp.)
Courts Empowered to Make Probation Orders 
Courts Empowered to Administer Corporal Punishment 
Statutory Law for African Courts (1960) (from ACH)
Offences Which Can be Heard by African Courts, with
the Courts listed for each offence (1963) (from ACH)
A Guide to Following the Law in Adjudication, Land
Consolidation and Enclosure for Registration. (35 pp.)
African Courts Officer. Circulars to African Courts
(1962-63)
1/62: Confirmations; right of appeal; revision; in­
spection
3/62; Confirmations of sentences of imprisonment or 
detention
4/62: Sale of property after attachment or distraint;
lnter-clan land disputes; model criminal case files. 
6/62: Proforma for a bond under ACO s. 18 (lc)
7/62: Fingerprinting for previous convictions
1/63: Disposal of case files; suits in forma pauperis
2/63: Amendments to Guide for Evidence; advice in appeal
judgments; suits in forma pauperis 
3/63: Trespass Ordinance
4/63: African Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962
5/63: Confirmation and revision of African Court cases
6/63: Repeal of Circular 1/62
7/63: Monthly returns
8/63: Service of process in Uganda and Tanganyika
9/63: Trespass Ordinance
Magistrate’s Courts - Forms (post-1967)
Chamber summons
Decision in Appeal
Application for execution
Order to attach salary of public office
Notification of sale of immovable property
Warrant of conmltal of judgment debtor to jail
Civil complaint (1967)
Civil complaint (1970)
Administrative records
Political record books of the DO, DC, and PC, from the 
Kenya Archives. Very incomplete.
Kenya Restatement Project and Law Panel Minutes
1. Structure and administration of the restatement 
project
a. composition of law panels
b. purpose of project
c. means of achieving unification
2. Complete law panel minutes for every tribe on the 
subjects of:
a. marriage and divorce )
b. succession and inheritance ) (several hundred pages)
c. customary crimes )
Cases
1. High Court (Supreme Court) and East African Court of 
Appeal - all reported cases relating to customary law 
and the primary courts. Several hundred cases alto­
gether.
2. Court of Review
a. Law Reports, vols. I-X (1953-62) (all published 
reports)
b. Unpublished cases, 1963-66 (twenty-four).
3. Local court3 - African Courts and Appeals Magistrates. 
All African Court cases are for 1966: most Appeals
Magistrates decisions are from that year, but some are 
from 1963-67. The following is a list, by province, 
district and court, of the number of cases I have for 
each court. All cases are civil cases, unless desig­
nated as criminal. Most civil cases deal with wrongs, 
broadly conceived, and comprise about 4Q-5Q% of the 
total caseload for the year.
Western province total 858
Kakemega District
Lurambi AC (Kakamega township) 131
Kakamega DAC Criminal cases 89
Kamisi AC 114
Emuhaya 50
Khvisero AC 39
Mutt i as AC 92
Kakamega Appeals Mag 129
Bungoma/Busia District
Bungoma DAC 46
Bungoma DAC Criminal cases 28
Nambale AC 73
Bungoma Appeals Mag. 67
Eastern Province total 751
Machakos District
Iveti (Machakos DAC) 143
Machakos DAC Criminal cases 96
Machakos Appeals Mag. 178
Kitui District
Kitui Appeals Magistrate 36
Embu District
Embu Appeals Magistrate 18
Meru District
Meru Appeals Magistrate 280
3 '  V 4 *
N y a n z a  P r o v i n c e  t o t a l  917
C e n t r a l  N y a n z a  D i s t r i c t
VJinam (K is rau )  DAC 102
K i s u m u  DAC C r i m i n a l  c a s e s  67
M a s e n o  AC 79
M a s e n o  AC C r i m i n a l  c a s e s  57
K i s u m u  A p p e a l s  M a g i s t r a t e  109
S o u t h  N y a n z a  D i s t r i c t
Doho K o s e l e  AC 37
Doho K o s e l e  AC C r i m i n a l  cases 21
B u r a  R ongo  AC 42
Iloma Bay A p p e a l s  Mag. 57
K i s i i  D i s t r i c t
K i s i i  DAC 129
K i s i i  DAC C r i m i n a l  c a s e s  112
K i s i i  A p p e a l s  Mag.  105
C e n t r a l  P r o v i n c e  total 953
K ia m b u  D i s t r i c t
K ia m b u  DAC 183
K ia m b u  DAC C r i m i n a l  c a s e s  142
K ia m bu  A p p e a l s  Mag.  229
T h i k a  D i s t r i c t
T h i k a  A p p e a l s  Mag. 2
M u r a n g ' a  D i s t r i c t  ( F o r t  H a l l )
M u r a n g ’ a  A p p e a l s  Mag. 224
N y e r i  D i s t r i c t
N y e r i  A p p e a l s  Mag.  134
K e r u g o v a  D i s t r i c t
K e r u g o v a  A p p e a l s  Mag. 37
R i f t  V a l l e y  P r o v i n c e  t o t a l  2 9 6
K i p s i g i s  D i s t r i c t
K e r i c h o  DAC 129
K e r i c h o  DAC C r i m i n a l  c a s e s  37
S o t i k  AC 41
K e r i c h o  A p p e a l s  M a g i s t r a t e  32
N a n d i  D i s t r i c t
K a p s a b e t  AC 40
E l d o r e t  A p p e a l s  M a g i s t r a t e  17
C o a s t  P r o v i n c e  t o t a l  236
K w a le  D i s t r i c t
O w i r n n l  ( C a z i )  AC 33
K l n a n g o  ( K w a l e )  AC 96
K w a le  A p p e a l s  Mag. 10
K i l i f i  D i s t r i c t  
K i l i f i  AC 
K a l o l e n i  AC
K i l i f i  A p p e a l s  M a g i s t r a t e
55
23
9
U r b a n  C o u r t s t o t a l 116
N a i r o b i
M a k a d a r a  AC 28
Mombasa
T o n o n o k a  AC 
Mombasa A p p e a l s  Mag.
87
1
C r a n d  T o t a l  4 2 2 9
Informal, extra-judicial dispute processes - data from
r e s e a r c h  a s s i s t a n t s ,
1. D o n a l d  W. K a n i a r u  -  S o u t h  T e t u  location, Nyeri District,
A p p r o x i m a t e l y  two  h u n d r e d  c a s e s :
a .  M u k u r w e i n i  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e ' s  Court ( 1 9 6 8 )  -  
c i v i l  c a s e s .  V e r y  d e t a i l e d  accounts of testimony,
r e c o r d e d  b y  K a n i a r u ,  s u p p l e m e n t e d  b y  interviews 
w i t h  t h e  p a r t i e s  o r  t h e i r  w i t n e s s e s .
b .  C a s e s  h e a r d  by  e l d e r s  ( k i a m a )
2.  Duke W asam bo-W ere  -  E a s t  Gem l o c a t i o n ,  C e n t r a l  N y a n z a
A p p r o x i m a t e l y  f i f t y  c a s e s :
a .  Land  A d j u d i c a t i o n  C o m m i t t e e ,  M va w a ra  s u b l o c a t i o n .
b .  S u b - c h i e f ' s  b a r a z a
c .  M a se n o  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e ' s  C o u r t  -  m o s t l y  c r i m i n a l  
c a s e s .  ( 1 9 6 8 )
3. R o b e r t  A g u f a - E n d u s a  -  N o r t h  M a r a g o l i  l o c a t i o n ,  K a k a m e g a
D i s t r i c t
A p p r o x i m a t e l y  o n e  h u n d r e d  c a s e s :
a .  M b a le  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e ' s  C o u r t  ( 1 9 6 8 )  -  c r i m i n a l
b .  l l a m i s i  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e ' s  C o u r t  ( 1 9 6 8 )  - civil
c .  C a s e s  h e a r d  b y  e l d e r s  ( m a g u t u )
d .  C a s e s  h e a r d  b y  t h e  s u b - c h i e f
4 .  Tom M b a l u t o  -  I v e t i  l o c a t i o n ,  M a c h a k o s  D i s t r i c t
1 .  I n f o r m a l  d i s p u t e  p r o c e s s e s
2 .  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  k i t h i t u  o a t h
3. R e s i d e n t  M a g i s t r a t e ' s  C o u r t ,  M a c h a k o s
5. John C.N. Otula - East Karachuonyo location, South 
Nyanza Dist.
Approximately one hundred cases
a. Doho Kosele District Magistrate's Court - (1968) - 
civil and criminal cases supplemented by discussions 
with litigants and witnesses
b. Cases heard by clan elders
c. Cases heard by sub-chief
Statistical Data
A. National Statistics
1. Cases filed, all of Kenya, 1927-69, broken down by 
civil and criminal
a. National total
b. By district and province
2 . Average population served by a primary court
a. by tribal district (all districts)
b. by year, for the two years 1943, 1967
3. Cost of Litigation
a. Schedule of fees for courts
(1) by the service rendered
(2) by year, 1931-61 span, with some intervening 
years missing. (fees remained relatively 
constant after 1961)
b. Actual cost of litigation in one court, for im­
pregnating an unmarried girl, and for damaging 
crops and trees, for 1948 and 1966
(1) average fee
(2) total fees paid for this type of case
(3) average claim
(4) total of claims made for this type of case
(5) fee/claim ratio
4. Duration of Litigation
a. Average length of time from filing to judgment - 
civil cases - Kiambu, 1948 and 1966; Machakos 1966, 
for nine different kinds of cases.
b .  A v e r a g e  l e n g t h  o f  t i m e  f r o m  o f f e n c e  t o  a r r e s t ,  a n d  
f r o m  a r r e s t  t o  j u d g m e n t ,  f o r  two  c o u r t s ,  f o r  e a c h  o f
f o u r  o f f e n c e s ,  1 9 6 6 .
5.  R a t i o  o f  c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n s  t o  c i v i l  c a s e s ,  f o r  s i x  
c o u r t s ,  1 9 6 6 ,  t o t a l ,  a s s a u l t ,  a n d  t h e f t .
6 .  K i n d s  o f  c a s e s  f i l e d
a .  C o m p r e h e n s i v e  t a b u l a t i o n  o f  a l l  c a s e s  f i l e d  i n  t h e  
p r i m a r y  c o u r t s  a n d  f i r s t  l e v e l  o f  a p p e l l a t e  c o u r t s  
o f  K e n y a  f o r  1 9 6 6 ,  b y  c o u r t ,  b r o k e n  down by  t h e
f o l l o w i n g  t y p e  o f  c a s e :
( 1 )  c u s t o m a r y  c r i m e s
( 2 )  c r i m e s  u n d e r  t h e  P e n a l  Code
t h e f t  a n d  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  t a k i n g
a s s a u l t  a n d  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  i n t e n t i o n a l  i n j u r y
s e x u a l  o f f e n c e s
( 3 )  O f f e n c e s  u n d e r  t h e  W i t c h c r a f t  A c t
(A) T o t a l  c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n s  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e
u n d e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n s )
(5) Total civil, broken down by:
land
a c t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  A f f i l i a t i o n  A c t  
o t h e r  c i v i l
( 6 )  T o t a l  c a s e s  f i l e d
b .  C o m p r e h e n s i v e  t a b u l a t i o n  o f  a l l  c a s e s  f i l e d  i n  a l l  
c o u r t s  o f  K e n y a ,  1 9 6 7 - 6 9  i n c l u s i v e ,  b r o k e n  down b y  
c o u r t ,  a n d  b y  t y p e :  c r i m i n a l ,  t r a f f i c ,  c i v i l ,  a n d
land.
B. S t a t i s t i c s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u r t s
1.  C i v i l  w r o n g s
a .  C o m p r e h e n s i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  a l l  c a s e s  o f  c i v i J  w r o n g s  
f i l e d  i n  t h e  p r i m a r y  c o u r t s  i n  1 9 6 6 ,  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
c o u r t s  ( w i t h  t r i b e )  ( a n d  n u m b e r  o f  c a s e s  a n a l y z e d )  :
r
Gwirani (Digo) (33)
Iveti (Kamba) (192)
Kinango (Duruma)
Kaloleni (Giriama)
Kilifi (Ciriama)
Wundanyi (Taita)
Kericho (Kipsigis) (152)
Sotik (Kipsigis) (62)
Kakamega (Luyia) (157)
Mumins (Luyia Wanga) (152)
Maseno (Luo) (143)
Doho Kosele (Luo) (62) 
llamisi (Luyia Tiriki) (119)
Kisii (Gusli) (216)
Kiambu (Kikuyu) (239)
Kilungu (Kamba)
Analysis of civil wrongs filed in primary court in 
1943, for the following court (with tribe): Kiambu
(Kikuyu)
For the above, I have most, if not all, of the follow­
ing information for civil cases:
(1) Characteristics of the parties:
sex
residence - by village, sublocation, location
religion
literacy
occupation
(2) Cause of action
(3) Relief claimed: amount, if in money; or other 
remedy
(4) Relief awarded
(5) Whether judgment by default; whether or not set 
aside
(6) Court costs: total, sometimes broken down by
purpose, party
(7) Chronology
date of the incident 
filing date 
judgment date
date of motions in furtherance of execution 
dates of payments made in satisfaction of jud&iueftt
Criminal Prosecutions
a. Analysis of criminal prosecutions involving 
wrongs filed in the primary courts in 1966, for 
the following courts (with tribe)I
(1) Kiambu (Kikuyu) (complete)
(2) Machakos (Kamba) (partial)
b. For criminal cases, I have most, if not all, of 
t h e  following information:
( 1 )  S t a t u t e  u n d e r  which the c a s e  is prosecuted
( 2 )  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the parties (complainant,
a c c u s e d )
W h e t h e r  child or adult 
sex
c o - r c s i d e n c e
( 3 )  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  offence
d a t e
t i m e
p l a c e
( 4 )  C h r o n o l o g y
n u m b e r  o f  days from offence to arrest 
" " 11 !1 arrest to trial (and
j u d g m e n t  - always the same day)
(5) Whether accused held in custody
( 6 )  P l e a
( 7 )  D i s p o s i t i o n
(8) Statements in mitigation or aggravation
by accused 
by prosecution
(9) Prior record
( 1 0 )  S e n t e n c e
fine - amount
detention camp or EMPE in default of fine 
number of days 
detention camp - number of days 
prison - number of days 
conditional discharge 
corporal punishment - number of strokes
For theft cases, I have in addition:
(11) characteristics of article stolen
(12) value of article stolen
(13) whether article returned to complainant
(14) Whether accused intoxicated at the time
(15) Weapon used:
fists
stick or rungu (heavy walking stick)
knife or scissors 
panga (machete) 
iron bar 
other
Appendix. Published Articles and Reviews
BOOKS
Reviewed
Law Books and Books About Law*
Richard L. Abelf
M arriage S t a b il it y , D ivorce, a n d  t h e  L a w . By Max Rheinstein. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1972. xi +  482 pages. $17.50.
What is the difference between a law book and a book about law ? Does 
the insertion of a preposition change the nature of the intellectual enter­
prise in a significant way? I believe it docs, and that the latter endeavor 
demands a radical shift in our thinking. Books about law are increasing 
in number; indeed, it has almost become dc rigucur to claim allegiance to 
this new style in scholarship. Unfortunately, there appears to be consider­
able confusion about the nature of the distinction and the consequences of 
choosing to write a book about law rather than a law book. This essay is 
one of many similar efforts to clarify the path of studies about law in order 
to advance them.1
A law book, as I use the term, is a work of legal doctrine. It is a study 
of the rules which legal institutions apply, or which regulate the behavior 
of those institutions. The study identifies, defines, organizes, and criticizes 
the rules by means of criteria proper to the legal system—it rationalizes 
them in Weber’s sense.2 The mode of rationalization need not be wholly 
internal to the legal system—it may, for instance, connect the rule with 
some social goal—but the relationship between that goal and the legal rule 
is the product of a mental operation peculiar to law.8 Legal rationalization 
is thus another form of professional activity within the legal system—like
* I am grateful fo r the criticism  of John Griffiths, John M odell, the m em bers o f the sem inar in 
Com parative Legal Sociology, held a t Yale L aw  School in  the fall of 1972, and  D avid T rubek , w ho 
taugh t that sem inar w ith  me.
t B.A. 1962, H arvard  College; J.D . 1965, C olum bia L aw  School. Associate Professor o f L aw ,
Yale University.
t .  See, e.g., M. G alanter, Notes on the F u tu re  of Social Research on L aw , April 1973 (paper 
presented to the Conference on Developm ents in L aw  and Social Science Research, held at the U n i­
versity of N orth  C aro lina); Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 Y a l e  L.J. 1086 (1 9 7 2 ); 
Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 Y a l b  
L.J. 1 (1972). Such program m atic  efforts are hard ly  new ; indeed, they largely reiterate sim ilar sta te­
m ents by the legal realists in the 1930's. See, e.g., L lew ellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence— the Next 
Step, 30 C o lu m .  L. R e v .  431 (1 9 3 0 ).
2. See M a x  W e b e r  o n  L a w  in  E c o n o m y  a n d  S o c i e t y  61 (M . R heinstein ed. 1954).
3. T here  are excellent exam ples of such purposive ra tionalization  in Pashko  v. Pashko, 45 O hio
O p. 498, 101 N .E .2d 804 (C .P . 1951), and H aw k in s v. U nited States, 358 U.S. 74 (1 9 5 8 ). These
cases are reproduced in J. G o l d s t e i n  & J. K a t z ,  T h e  F a m i l y  a n d  t h e  L a w  131, 354 (1 9 6 5 ).
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adjudication, or advocacy, or counseling.* All professional activity is shaped 
by external pressures—by the demands of the legal system, or of the larger 
society in which it is situated. This hardly needs to be stated of the work 
of the practicing lawyer, or of the legislator, administrator, or judge, each 
of whom is an active participant in a functioning legal system. We may have 
to be reminded, however, that legal educators, though now operating within 
a university environment, are similarly directed; law schools invariably 
characterize their mission as one of teaching each student to “think like a 
lawyer”;* success and failure arc phrased in such terms as “lawyerly” and 
“unlawycrlike” behavior. Most important for my argument, the legal 
scholarship which produces law books is also a response to the demands 
of a functioning legal system.
By contrast, a book about law is a mode of reflection upon the legal 
system. Neither legal training nor professional competence is adequate 
qualification to write about the legal system, any more than an Olympic 
swimmer or leading opera singer is qualified to explain the hydrodynamics 
of swimming or the physiology of singing, This is not to deny that practice 
of a professional skill permits unique insight into the skill, but under­
standing is a different matter. For this reason, efforts to understand legal 
action have borrowed the perspectives of other intellectual disciplines; 
the social sciences and the humanities have all been used to illuminate 
legal phenomena. Within the social sciences, and particularly within so­
ciology, we have recently seen the tentative development of a social theory of 
law.6 Although these several studies diverge in method, they share among 
themselves a common difference from law books: their objectives lie out­
side the legal system. The central question thus becomes: what is the nature 
of the understanding they seek, and how do we acquire it ?
Max Rheinstein explicitly proclaims that his important book, Marriage 
Stability, Divorce, and the Law , reaches beyond narrow professionalism 
toward a different kind of understanding: “This book is not a ‘law book’ but 
a book about law, about law, that is, in its impact on life. It is meant as an 
inquiry into the facts of life and an attempt to pave the way to an informed 
discussion of what, if anything, might or ought to be done.”7 The title 
Rheinstein has chosen links a social fact—marriage stability—to a legal 
process—divorce—and a set of behavioral standards—the law. The study 
was executed by methods appropriate to its interdisciplinary nature: schol­
4. T h is characterization of legal rationalization has been developed w ith  great clarity  and force 
by V ilhelm  A ubert in  his Introduction to S o c io lo g y  o f  L a w  9 - 1 4  (V . A ubert cd. 1 9 6 9 ) .
5. See, e.g., S t a n f o r d  L a w  S c h o o l ,  P r o o r a m s  o f  S tu d y , 1 9 7 2 -7 3 , a t 6 (S tanford  U niversity 
Bulletin, Ser. 26, N o. 7 , 1 9 7 2 ) :  “ T he courses, m aterials, and teaching approach in the first year 
arc designed to develop in each studen t a beginning grasp of som e o f the  basic intellectual attributes 
w hich characterize the  first-class, well-educated law yer.”
6. See note 1 supra.
7. P. 7.
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ars from a variety of disciplines collaborated over two decades to bring 
together data concerning legal and social phenomena in many countries 
during different historical periods.
This Review is a critical examination of the extent to which Rheinstein 
has written a book about law. Since interdisciplinary studies have not yet 
agreed upon the criteria by which they should be judged, I have drawn 
upon the standards of more established disciplines. I organize my critique 
in terms of several distinct intellectual operations which, whether explicitly 
recognized or not, are necessarily involved in any social analysis. Although 
the operations shade into one another, they can be roughly demarcated as 
die selection of values, the development of theory, the application of a 
method to test propositions drawn from that theory, and the advocacy of 
policy. By the values of a study I mean those assumptions, factual or 
normative, generally unstated, that establish the most basic general bound­
aries for the study. Values may become theories when these assumptions 
arc stated explicitly and subjected to analysis and reconsideration. The 
more general statements of theory are in turn translated into more concrete 
propositions according to notions of what constitutes an adequate explana­
tion, which dictate the choice of methodology. Finally, the study may be 
used as die basis for policy recommendations which cither express the 
author’s values, or derive from his empirical investigation and are framed 
as testable propositions about change. In what follows I have tried to assess 
Rheinstein’s study according to the criteria appropriate to each of these 
operations.
I. V a l u e s
It is not necessary to enter the interminable wrangle over the possibility, 
or desirability, of value-free social science in order to maintain that an 
author’s values influence his inquiry at many points, including his decisions 
about what is worth studying, how to study it—the definition of the prob­
lem, the kind of explanation or understanding to seek, the concepts to use, 
the facts to examine for potential explanations—and what policy recom­
mendations to make. Because I believe in the subjectivity of values, I do 
not presume to criticize those that guide another; the exposition of Rhein­
stein’s values which follows should not be read as an attempt to denigrate 
them, although my own do differ significantly. At the same time, however, 
the influence of values upon any inquiry may render its conclusions un­
interesting to those whose values differ, even though the findings satisfy 
accepted criteria for verification.8 It is this characteristic of social science
8. D ah rendorf m akes a very sim ilar com m ent w ith  respect to w h a t he  calls "m eta-theoretical” 
decisions: “I t is difficult to exam ine 'basic attitudes’ of scientific analysis w ith  respect to  their useful*
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that moves me to analyze Rheinstein’s values, which, while not made ex­
plicit, are also not concealed beneath a facade of value-ncutrality.'
A. The American Family
Rheinstein elaborates the concepts in his title in a clear statement about 
the focus of his interest:
Some marriages collapse; in fact a great many do. And when a marriage collapses, 
problems arise, for the spouses, their children, and the community. Hopes are 
dashed, a home is destroyed, and with it the economic basis of a family. Readjust­
ments must be made, children have to be taken care of, wounds should be pre­
vented from festering.10
My interest in the relationship between marriage stability and the law of di­
vorce grew out of my membership in the Interprofessional Commission on Mar­
riage and Divorce . . . [which] was expected to draft the model law that would 
protect the American family from threatened ruin.11
Although Rheinstein later came to doubt the capacity of law to accomplish 
that goal, he never abandoned the goal itself: “Marriages, at least most of 
them, are still intended to be for life. ‘We take each other to love and to 
cherish, in sickness and health, for better, for worse, until death do us part/ 
Even where this time-honored formula of the Christian marriage ritual 
is not used, the parties expect, or hope, that their marriage will last.'*18 The 
family which this matrimonial bond unites is an idealization1* of the white, 
religious, middle class family of an earlier era,li consisting of two parents,
ness. T h e  question of em pirical rightness or w rongness does not apply to them . . . . W c are dealing  
here w ith 'm eta-theoretical’ decisions w hich determ ine the direction o f analysis w ith  respect to specific 
problem s w ithout being  part of this analysis themselves. T h eir test is their analytical fruitfulness and 
no t their em pirical correctness or logical soundness." R. D a h r e n d o r f ,  Class a n d  C la s s  C o n f l i c t  i n  
I n d u s t r i a l  S o c i e t y  112-13 (1 9 5 9 ).
9. Cf. W. Goode, Women in Divorce at ix (1 9 6 5 ); "G ood research procedures prevent any 
personal bias of the  researcher from  'm ak in g  the  data  conform  to one’s prejudices.’ Since, never­
theless, the subject is em otionally loaded, it m ay be useful to the reader if the au thor gives w hat m ay 
be his ow n m ost pertinen t laym an's prejudice, relative to divorce."
My ow n values can be stated briefly. T hey grow  out of the experience of practicing family law  
fo r a year w ith the N ew  H aven Legal Assistance Association. I w ould prefer that the state interfere 
as little as possible w ith the decision of one or both m arried partners to obtain  a divorce. Once th at 
decision is m ade, how ever, I believe that the state should perform  tw o functions. First, it should p a r­
ticipate in the decision about the fu ture  of any ch ild ren  of the m arriage, although existing m echanism s 
for determ in ing  the "best interests of the child" do  no th ing  of the  sort. Second, it should help  to 
correct the economic im balance present in alm ost every m arriage, caused by the disadvantaged position 
of wom en in ou r society, and  the failure of the society or the state to provide adequate assistance in  
childrearing .
10. P. 3.
11. P. viii.
12. P. 3. T here  is considerable am biguity  here as to whose views are being expressed— is it  a 
consensus of contem porary  m orality, or the  doctrines o f C hristianity , or a view o f the  past? N o  em ­
pirical evidence is offered to connect these values w ith  any of those sources; the speaker can only be 
Rheinstein himself.
13. See R odm an, The Textbook, World of Family Sociologyt 12 Social Prob. 449 (1 9 6 5 ).
14. I t is clearly not the  black A m erican fam ily, o r the  poor w hite  fam ily: " [A m o n g  A m erican
Negroes, u n d er conditions of slavery] a feeling for the sanctity o r  indissolubility o f m arriage could
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legally bound in lifelong monogamy, obeying a mandate of strict sexual 
fidelity, economically self-sufficient, raising their children in their own 
home.
Such notions of family stability and marriage stability pervade and 
shape the book. But it is critically important to recognize that the aura of 
value-neutrality which surrounds them is deceptive: marriage and family 
are not benchmarks with an agreed content—like absolute zero, or a circle 
—from which departures can be observed with scientific objectivity. Rhein- 
stein’s personal values have influenced his choice and definition of con­
cepts. Only those values can explain why American Negro marriage is 
measured against the criteria of the white middle class but the inverse judg­
ment is never made. Clarity would be served by substituting “white middle 
class ideals” wherever the concept of marriage or family appears.
For the same reasons that these ideals arc valued, sexual relationships 
unconsecratcd by formal marriage are condemned. Irregular unions not 
celebrated according to the forms of church or state, and irregular dissolu­
tions, are disfavored.10 Rheinstein believes that adult sexual relationships 
are too important to be left to the parties. The Soviet Union, in its early 
revolutionary zeal, expected the state to wither away and cease regulating 
family relations; but with greater “maturity” this dream has been dis­
carded, and Rheinstein cannot quite hide his glee at the embourgeoisment 
of communist marriage,10 Contemporary Swedish experiments with a radi­
cal legal reform which would tend to equalize alternative family structures 
are treated with a skepticism which seems to me to be grounded in disap­
proval.17
Rheinstein’s criticism also extends to concubinage, prostitution, polyga­
my—whether simultaneous or serial—infidelity, abandonment, and sepa­
ration. Consistent with the class attitudes discussed earlier, he sees these 
vices as traits of either the brutalized proletariat or the degenerate aris­
tocracy :
F a m ily  in s ta b i l i ty  h a s  b e e n  c h a ra c te r is tic  o f  th e  lo w e s t s ta tu s  g ro u p s  o f  so c ie ty : 
A m e r ic a n  Negroes, L o n d o n  E a s t-E n d e rs , P a r is  clochards, th e  “ L u m p e n p r o lc ta r ia t”  
o f  B c r lin -W e d d in g . . . , T h e  b o n d  o f  m a r r ia g e  is ta k e n  th e  le a s t s e r io u s ly  b y  
t h o s e  g ro u p s  w h ic h  a re  so lo w  o n  th e  social la d d e r  th a t  th e i r  b e h a v io r  p a t te rn s  
a rc  ir re le v a n t to  th e  g u a rd ia n s  o f  re sp e c ta b ility . T h e  b o tto m  g ro u p s  a rc  th o s e  
a m o n g  w h o m  th e  i r r e g u la r  u n io n  is a  r e g u la r  p h e n o m e n o n .18
not develop. It rem ained com paratively weak after the abolition o f slavery, ju st as it has been w eak
am ong w hite proletarians the world over.” P. 411.
15.  P p .  2 7 5 .  3 1 3 -
16. “ Inform al m arriage is no longer possible. M ore and m ore m arriages are concluded not in the 
perfunctory way and the dingy rooms of the registrar of civil status, but in an impressive, a lthough  
sim ple, cerem ony conducted in the cheerful atm osphere of a ‘m arriage palace.’ ” P . 239.
17. Pp. 156-57.
18. P. 422.
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At the opposite end of the social spectrum, the French nobility of the ancien 
regime had equally little respect for the ideal of the family:
[ F jo l lo w in g  th e  m o d e l se t b y  th e  k in g s ,  e sp ec ia lly  L o u is  XV, th e  u s u f ru c tu a r ie s  
o f  th e  m a jo r  p a r t  o f  th e  n a t io n ’s w e a lth  e n g a g e d  in  c o n sp ic u o u s  o rg ie s  o f  c o n ­
s u m p tiv e  lu x u r y  a n d  o f  sex . T h e  C h r is t ia n  c o m m a n d  a g a in s t  s e e k in g  c a rn a l  
p le a s u re s  o u ts id e  th e  la w fu l  w e d lo c k  w a s  d is re g a rd e d  by th e  m e n , u n m a r r ie d  a n d  
m a r r ie d ,  a n d  w id e ly  lo o se n e d  fo r  th e  w o m e n . M a r r ia g e  m ig h t  b e  in d is so lu b le , 
b u t  i t  w as  f a r  f ro m  b e in g  th e  remedium concupiscentiae.1B
The “average” man, Vhommc moyen sensucl, is contrasted favorably with 
these two extremes. “Christian marriage certainly was a living reality in 
the bourgeois middle class that was steadily increasing in number, wealth, 
and national importance.”80
Rheinstein is able to discover his ideals embodied as a “living reality” 
in the i8tlvccntury French bourgeois family only by limiting his view to 
the outward forms of family structure. Here, as throughout the book, he 
makes it clear that he is not interested.in the content of human relation­
ships. On the rare occasions when the issue arises he carefully skirts it. 
Writing of  institutionalized day care in the Soviet Union, he observes: "By 
freeing the mother for gainful outside work it decreases the financial de­
pendency of wives upon their husbands and may thus remove an inhibi­
tion against the breaking up of a marriage which might otherwise be 
endured.” He then adds cautiously: “Whether such endurance would be 
socially desirable is, of course, a different question.”81 It is a question which 
many would think more important, but it is a question which is never 
discussed.
B. T h e  N'ature o f M an
Complementing Rhcinstein’s ideal of the family is his belief that pow­
erful psychological forces inherent in human nature tend to undermine 
that ideal: “Infidelity, abandonment, and separation have never been fully 
eliminated nor is there a chance that they ever will be.”22 Male family 
behavior is dominated by limitless sexuality; female sexual desires appear 
to be less threatening to the family, though it is not clear whether Rhein- 
stcin sees them as physiologically less compelling or as subject to greater 
social and cultural restraint. Men inevitably seek a variety of sexual objects 
in addition to their spouses; women to some extent sublimate sexual pas­
sion in pi atonic attachments and religion.28
Compounding this sexual drive is a fundamental aversion to any social
19. p. 199.
20. pp. 198-99.
21. p . 425.
22. p. 408.
23. See text accom panying note 73 infra. See also p. 160.
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restraint upon its free expression. Rheinstein finds evidence for this ten­
dency under the most diverse circumstances. “Even in ancient Babylonia 
we are told of the custom of simply walking out on a distasteful marriage 
so as to avoid the high fee of a formal divorce, a custom which Urukagina, 
ruler of Lagash, tried to abolish in 2 4 7 0 B.C.” 24 He offers a similar expla­
na t ion  for the consequences of the Russian revolution: “[T]he anarchist 
element of Marxism was attractive. If it was no longer necessary, in order 
to get married, to go before and pay the priest, why should one go to and 
pay the registrar?”2' Because of this essential lawlessness, any loosening of 
the reins is viewed as dangerous, partly because it is almost impossible to 
reverse the trend and rcimpose limits once they are removed. For example, 
conservative reaction to the excesses of the French Revolution was unable 
to withdraw from the people the right to divorce:
Portalis, the most influential of the four principal draftsmen [of the Napoleonic 
Code], openly expressed his aversion against the institution of divorce; he recog­
nized, however, that it was too late to deprive Frenchm en of it, since they had 
had it for ten years. Bonaparte was convinced that divorce could not be completely
abolished-*6
F u r th e rm o re ,  even the most cautious liberalization will generate pressure 
for easier divorce,*7
A l t h o u g h  Rheinstein’s outlook is thus extremely pessimistic, he secs 
m a n  as endow ed  with another characteristic which has, until now, offered 
reason for hope :  the capaci ty to see himself as evil, to be conscious of his 
essential sinfulness, and  thus accept the need  for external controls to re­
inforce his own self-restraint. For several millenia this consciousness has 
been main ta ined  by the great world religions, but Rheinstein fears that it 
is dissolving u n d e r  the onslaughts of popular hedonism. The intensity of 
these fears is revealed in the most explicit statements of value to be found 
in the b o o k :
That Western society is undergoing profound change is generally recognized 
today, with or without approval, with or without misgivings. A  conspicuous feature 
of this change in cultural climate is the greater permissiveness of society toward 
once proscribed lines of individual conduct. . . . [T  ]he apprehension of social 
collapse through pluralism has been waning in the democratic nations. Freedom 
from restraints is postulated for every kind of conduct .... open expression of
2 4 . Pp. 4 0 7 - 0 8 .
25. P. 224.
26. P. 209.
27. Rheinstein believes that the premonitions of Italian conservatives and the strategy of liberals 
were both based on an accurate perception of social phenomena: “The forces of tradition rightly un­
derstood that divorce on the large scale would follow inevitably once the door was opened to the 
tabooed institution. . . .
it
. . The ‘little divorce’ (piccolo divorzio) had been meant to constitute the wedge to open  
the door for divorce on a more generous scale." Pp. 188-89, ! 9 i .
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social dissent, homosexuality, pornography, abortion, etc., freedom of remar- 
riage . . . .
. . . The new rise of the divorce rates coincides with the emergence of other 
elements of the new social climate, such as the N ew  Left, youth culture, social 
protest, women’s liberation, the new attitudes toward sex, hippiedom, drug use, 
and crime in the streets.28
Dissatisfied people are the most dangerous to peace, political and domestic. 
Both revolution and marital disharmony thrive on dissatisfaction. More human 
needs are fulfilled in our time than ever before. Yet dissatisfaction seems also to 
be more general and more intense. The very fulfillment of once pressing needs 
has made expectations run ahead of reality. A utopian society free from war and 
authority, is sincerely believed to be achievable by sinful men. . . .  So the vic­
tim s of progressive education take to flight into the escapist realms of drugs, sex, 
flower power, pacifism, extraparliamentary opposition, romanticism—realms in 
w hich  lu t in g  satisfaction is not to be found. The hard ways of discipline, self- 
restraint, acceptance o f fate immutable by man, these solely effective ways to find 
satisfaction here on earth, are disdained. If marital breakdown has indeed come 
to be m ore frequent than in the past, here seems to lie the principal cause.80
Th is erosion of man’s sense of sin disables religion from instilling and sup­
porting individual self-restraint. If man’s evil nature is not to reign su­
preme, it is necessary to look to other methods of control.
C. State Control
Upon the default of religion, Rheinstein turns to the state. Perhaps the 
most fundamental assumption underlying the entire study is his belief that 
the state should intervene in family relations. Such intervention Rheinstein 
thinks proper not only to alter the choices a person might make in pursuit 
of his values by adjusting the social or economic costs of the alternatives 
through some legal or administrative apparatus, but also to alter those 
values themselves through education at an early age and counseling later. 
Given this assumption, which is never questioned, the inquiry is narrowed 
to the appropriateness of various modes of state intervention in different 
circumstances.
II. T h e o r y  
A. Rheinstein's Definition of the Problem
Rheinstein defines the central problem of his study as how “to eliminate 
or reduce the temptation toward marriage breakup which exists in certain 
specific situations. What are these situations? How might the injurious 
elements be removed from them?”80 Although we should never pretend
28. p . 311.
29. p . 428.
30. p. 412.
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to know another’s motives with anything like certainty, the congruence 
between Rheinstein’s values and his definition of the problem is surely 
remarkable. He chooses to explore the causes of breakdown in a particular 
configuration of marriage and the family—namely, lifelong monogamy— 
rather than investigate the social variables associated with each of the ob­
servable family structures—such as serial polygamy, cohabitation without 
marriage, marriage without cohabitation, etc.81
His values are also consistent with the way he goes about solving the 
problem. The number of conceivable solutions to any problem, of course, 
is very large; no scholar can explore them all simultaneously. Among the 
numerous possible explanations for marriage stability, Rheinstein decides 
to look at the law: “[T]he changes that the law of divorce is undergoing 
are indeed sensational. . . . How has all this change come about? What 
does it signify? How will it affect the stability of marriage, the family, 
and the home ? These arc the problems which are treated in this book.”88 
Rheinstein seems to have been drawn to this formulation by a rather naive 
faith in the efficacy of law to control behavior: “Repression through deter­
rence worked fairly well, although never completely, in the comparatively 
static world of pre-industrial society.”88 But as he explored the historical 
and contemporary sociological evidence, he was forced to conclude that 
law has often been violated, consciously and successfully:
Experienced observers hnve long known what we have laboriously tried in this 
book to prove, namely, that a strict statute law of divorce is not an effective means 
to prevent or even to reduce the incidence of marriage breakdown. In spite of the 
facts the old belief is still held widely among the public as well as among lawyers.8*
One would expect to find such a radical change in basic approach at 
the beginning of the book, not at the end, a foundation for the study, not 
an afterthought which nullifies much of its significance. Once Rheinstein 
had found his assumptions to be in error, why did he not turn to a syste­
matic exploration of other factors that might affect marriage stability? 
I would suggest that legal professionals, with their strong and obvious 
commitment to the importance of law, are clearly the last people likely 
to accept its irrelevance, Instead of doing so, they will make that irrelevance 
the central problem.
This is precisely what Rheinstein does. Having recognized that law 
no longer deters marriage breakdown, he nevertheless writes: “This book
31, A number of writers have recently commented on the unfortunate consequences for the 
development of theory of this single-minded focus upon the family established by lifelong monogamy. 
See, e.g., Adqms, An Inquiry into the Nature of the Family, In F am ily  in T h a n s i t i o n  73 (A, f»kol*
nick fc J. Skolnick eds. >971); Skolniek k  Skolniek, Rethinking the Family, in id. at 1,
33. Pp. vii-viii.
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is . . . about law, about law, that is, in its impact on life . . . .  Among 
the facts of life, the law is one of importance even when it is flouted.”85 
Laws that are flouted can have an “impact on life” in a number of ways: 
they can create deviance and give it shape;86 they can express values and 
thus offer an arena for status competition.87 But Rheinstein is not primarily 
interested in either of these phenomena; rather, he is preoccupied with 
the difference between law and behavior, which he characterizes as a form 
of hypocrisy. He writes with obvious admiration of “Scandinavia, where 
literature, theology, and philosophy united in calling for truthfulness and 
sincerity in all walks of life.”88 He cannot conceal his irritation at the 
pervasive divergences between law and practice found elsewhere; twice, 
in three pages, he is drawn to characterize such laws as inane—a word 
not commonly found in the vocabulary of either the legal scholar or the 
social scientist.89 Throughout he contrasts favorably those countries where 
the deviation is small—Japan, Sweden, and now England, Germany, and 
certain American states—with others where it is large—Italy and France, 
other American states, and the Soviet Union. Among the latter, he looks 
hopefully for signs of change which “may succeed in eliminating or at 
least reducing the conflict between the law of the books and the law in 
action/'49
B. Legal Thought and the "Gap Problem*1
Although Rheinstein's personal constellation of values may be seen as 
contributing to his definition of the problem as the dissonance between 
law and behavior—what he, in a chapter heading, calls “Our Dual Law of 
Divorce: The Law of the Books and the Law in Action”41—still his choice 
is not unexpected. I think it fair to say that this dissonance, which I will 
call the “gap problem,” has become the  problem for books about law.42 
Some approach it as an issue of the effectiveness of a legal system (as in 
studies of “penetration” in developing countries) ;4S others as a question of 
the degree of conformity with Supreme Court decisions or legislation (so- 
called “impact” studies) ;44 others as threatening the wholesale nullification
35 . p . 7 .
36. T his is the foundation  of one school o f deviance studies; an  ou tstand ing  exam ple o f  the 
school is K. E r i k s o n ,  W a y w a r d  P u r i t a n s  (1 9 6 6 ).
37. T he  concept of status com petition as an  explanation for the passage of law s w hich are never 
enforced has been developed m ost extensively in  J. G u s f i e l d ,  S y m b o l ic  C r u s a d e  (1 9 6 3 ).
3 8 . P. 1 34-
3 9 . P p . 3 51 , 3 5 3 -
40. P. 352.
4 1 . P. 5 1 .
42. D onald Black has m ade this po in t cogently. See Black, supra note 1,
43. For critical discussions of the  literatu re  concerning penetration, see F riedm an, On Legal 
Development, 24 R u t g e r s  L. R e v .  i i  (1 9 6 9 ); T rubek , supra note 1.
44. See, e.g., T . B e c k e r  & M. F e e l e y ,  T h e  I m p a c t  o f  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  D e c i s io n s  (2d  cd. 1973);
Becker, On Science, Political Science and Law, 7 Am. B e h a v i o r a l  S c i e n t i s t ,  Dec. 1963, at 11; N agel, 
Some N ew  Concerns of Legal Process Research Within Political Science, 6 L. fit S o c ’y  R e v .  9 (1 9 7 1 ).
N o v e m b e r 1973] B O O K S  A B O U T  L A W 185
of law (as in the recommendations by liberal lawyers and other policy­
makers for reform of sumptuary laws) ;45 and still others as a jurisprudential 
issue (legal realism and sociological jurisprudence) . 40 I think it is impor­
tant to ask why the gap is seen as a problem, both because that perception 
is so pervasive in books about law, and also because it directs their focus 
in such a significant way.
W e  must begin by recognizing that to characterize the difference be­
tween law and behavior as a gap, and to see that gap as a problem, is to 
make a choice, even if not a conscious one. W h y  should we expect har­
mony between law and behavior rather than some other relationship—  
dissonance, for instance, or a purely accidental conjunction ? I believe that 
the expectation of harmony is an element of the dominant mode of legal 
rationalization. By “rationalization” I refer to two distinct but related phe­
nomena .47 Any system of thought must have its own internal organization 
and coherence; when its practitioners— in this case legal professionals— are 
specialized and undergo lengthy training, we can anticipate a high degree  
of organization. If, in addition, the system of thought constitutes a justi­
fication for social action involving the exercise of power— a preeminent 
characteristic of legal thought— the rationalization will grow in impor­
tance and therefore in complexity.
Other modes of rationalizing legal thought and action did not lead to 
1 perception of the gap as a problem. When, for instance, law was seen as 
the disconnected pronouncements of a lawgiver justified by his charis­
matic authority or by tradition (i.e., formally or substantively irrational),4* 
the expectation, if any, was that the relationship between law and behavior 
would be purely accidental. When law was seen as the application of a 
seamless, comprehensive body of abstract legal propositions by means of 
a uniquely legal logic (formally rational) , 40 the expectation, if any, was 
diat law and behavior would be inconsistent. But contemporary Western 
legal thought and action rest upon an ideology of purposive rationality—  
they are organized in terms of the purposes they serve, and justified by 
their ability to serve those purposes. The full implication of these differ­
ences is far too complex to analyze here; nevertheless, I hope that a neces­
sarily superficial investigation of the implications of these ideal types of 
legal rationalization may help to illuminate the genesis of the gap problem.
The last hundred years of Western legal thought can crudely be sum­
marized as a shift from some variant of formal rationality to some mode of
45. This has been a common argument in movements to reform divorce law. See, e .g ., N . Blake, 
The Road t o  Reno 212 (1962); cf. J. Kaplan, Marijuana: The New Prohibition (1970).
46. See, e .g ., Llewellyn, supra  note 1.
47. See  notes 2-4 supra  and accompanying text.
48. See  H.S. Maine, Ancient Law 1-20 (1861); M. Rheinstein ed., supra  note 2, at 61-64.
49. See  M. Rheinstein ed., supra  note 2, at 61-64.
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purposive rationality.”0 The earlier rationalization held a set of values to be 
objectively true. Society was seen as essentially static. The task of guiding 
society, in  which law played a part, was directed toward realizing and 
preserving traditional values. This was assured by selecting state officials 
f ro m  an elite imbued with those values. Legislation expressed and clarified 
values already immanent in the society; adjudication merely reasserted the 
values enunciated by previous judges.
The contemporary rationalization, by contrast, is less concerned with 
the expression of values than with the realization of practical goals con­
ceived in utilitarian terms and pursued according to canons of scientific 
reasoning.81 Because it sees these goals, and also the underlying values, as 
idiosyncratic and subjective,8'* it is forced to develop some method of choos­
ing among them. 1 Because the size of the social unit within which choices 
are made and pursued has grown enormously, its members can no longer 
• irtit * direct ’y in ?heir own governance, This has the important con­
venience that the actions of those who do govern must be seen as making 
a difference,  a difference phrased in terms of the realization of goals, not 
ju t the expression of values. Hence those officials who act by formulating 
and 'vm p  behavioral  standards— legislators, judges, and executives— 
v .ust v that  their  actions ire rationally related to some goal. The pres­
sures for such explicit justification are intensified by the tension between 
the  preva i l ing ideology of democracy, and popular mistrust of historical 
or  potent ia l  elites coupled with the increasing differentiation of the official 
class.
W e  can see examples  of the p redom inanc e  of this m ode  of ra t iona l iza­
tion th ro u g h o u t  our  legal system. Const i tut ions are t rad i t ional ly  repositories 
for expressions of t imeless value, bu t  ours is reinterpreted as a do c u m e n t  
w i th in  w h ic h  n u m e r o u s  interest  groups  can locate the part isan goals they 
strive to attain.  Legisla t ion is preceded by extensive research in tended  to 
elicit opinion  about  goals as well  as i n fo rm a t ion  concern in g  the w a y  in 
w h ic h  behavior  deviates f rom  those goals. T h e  reasoning w h ic h  a judge  
offers to justify his decision increasingly relates tha t  decision to the achieve­
m e n t  of some goal.  W h e n  he construes  legislation he does so in te rms  of 
legislative intent,  f u r the r ing  goals chosen by the legislature. Legal  scholar­
ship seeks to o rgan ize  and ,  if necessary, r e fo rm  legal rules in o rder  to
50. T he types developed infra do not pretend to he a faithful reproduction of Weber’s ideas.
■51. I w ish  to reem phasize that I am w riting of the w ay in which legal professionals describe 
the legal system . Others have looked behind the rationalization to portray the legal system differently. 
See, c.v., J. G u s f i f ld ,  supra note 37.
52, T he subjectivity o f values cannot be com plete, however. In order to gain acceptance, even 
this m ode of rationalization demands minimal agreement upon the method of choosing among goals. 
T his explains w hy dem ocracy and the rule of law are unquestioned in the West, as are the rule of 
the proletariat and peop le’s justice in communist societies.
53. This necessity for choice, and the impermanence of any actual compromise, throws society into 
constant change in an effort to achieve the always elusive goal; change itself comes to be valued in 
the nam e o f progress.
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further substantive goals; indeed, a subdiscipline devoted to this has devel­
oped— the policy sciences. Legal education at the elite law schools claims 
to train students in this form of policy analysis. The identification of social 
problems invariably produces an outcry from the most diverse sources for 
legislative or judicial action to solve them.54 And American lawyers c o m ­
mitted to social change in other nations urge the exportation of our legal 
system because of its capacity to further substantive goals.
C. Sociology and the G ap Problem
The gap problem, however, is not just the preoccupation of legal pro­
fessionals; it has also been the primary focus for books about law written 
by social scientists. Its attraction for the latter has a different origin. Sociolo­
gists do not ordinarily begin with the expectation that law can mold be­
havior; this assumption inheres in the rationalization peculiar to legal 
thought < i p:;* n c and is therefore alien to nonprofessionals. Rheinstein 
clearly recognizes this:
W hii lawyers and lawmakers have concentrated their attention upon divorce
and r d fact ! marriage breakdown, behavioral scientists have looked upon
;• riai 1 y d ■.integration as a unitar phenomenon paying scant attention or no at­
tention at all to the law in gener. 1 and the law of divorce in particular,""
1 think his observation can be generalized beyond the area of divorce: social 
scientists in the first half of this century consistently ignored law, whether as 
a social phenomenon worthy of study in its own right, or as a significant 
variable for the explanation of other realms of behavior. The reasons for 
this again are very complex. Law, with its technical vocabulary and pro­
fessional carapace, has long seemed impenetrable to other disciplines. More 
im por tan t ,  the prevailing legal rationalization has claimed to be a sufficient 
explanation for the legal system, thus rendering superfluous other efforts 
at understanding.
Sociology, in its infancy, was unprepared to challenge this boast. As it 
gained in stature, however, some reply became vitally important: acceptance 
of the rationalization would not only make a sociology of law impossible, it 
would also jeopardize the pretensions of sociology to offer an independent 
explanation for social action. Lienee the early efforts of the sociology of 
law were devoted to establishing the existence of a gap between legal rules 
and the behavior to which those rules spoke.50 These efforts demonstrated
54. As Rhcinsu-in has observed of the rising divorce rate: "Every year usually produces legisla­
tion in quite a number of American states and foreign countries.” P. 5.
55. P. 265. See also p. 292. This observation is confirmed by William Goode’s inclusion of only 
.1 couple of propositions about law  in his inventory of some 3,000 propositions concerning the family. 
See W. Goode, E. H opkins & H. McClure, Social Systems and Family Patterns: A Propositional 
Inventory (1971).
56. See. e.g. , the extensive literature reproduced or cited in L. Friedman & S. M acaulay, Law
and the R e h a v io r a i  S c i e n c e s  197-505 (1969).
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that legal rules could not explain behavior within legal institutions and, a 
fortiori, could not explain the behavior those institutions sought to control. 
Once this was demonstrated, sociology could, and did, offer alternative, 
more adequate explanations. However, because social scientists shared the 
dominant political ideology, and because many, through long collaboration 
with legal professionals, came to accept their rationalizations, these studies 
were frequently directed by the belief that the gap, once revealed, could 
and should be eliminated.67
If sociologists were drawn to the gap problem when they studied law 
as control, they also arrived at that formulation when they viewed law as 
norm. This latter approach was slow in developing; Sumner’s dismissal of 
law-ways long dominated the ideology of social scientists.08 But the con­
spicuous activities of legislators, judges, and administrators declaring norms 
in the form of statutes, judgments, and regulations could not be overlooked 
f or vcr in a serious sociology. In explaining such behavior, sociologists made 
use of the concept of norm constructed by the prevailing social theory, 
which saw society as the individual writ large— the “organic fallacy” which 
has so str-ngly influenced all social thought.00 That theory extrapolated 
from an oversimplified psychology which expected the normal person to 
exhibit , harmony between thought and action, Any departure from this 
pattern would be aberrant: if unintentional, it would suggest mental disease 
or arrested development; if deliberate,it would be innocent joking or,worse, 
deceit, hypocrisy, or make-believe. If social action is viewed as individual 
behavior, and social norms as personal norms, these expectations can be 
extended by analogy. The expectations appeared to be confirmed by early 
studies of social norms— expressed in literature or the mass media, in con­
versation or in response to interviews and questionnaires. Norms were gen­
erally in harmony with conduct and any departure could be explained as 
merely temporary. With the model thus reinforced by selected data, law 
which diverged from behavior could only be seen as either an irrelevant 
excrescence upon the social organism— the older view which was no longer 
maintained— or a pathological instance of social norms.00 This latter attitude 
can be seen most clearly in sociological studies of the criminal law, the
57 Sec, e .g ., E. Schu r, Crim es W ith o u t V ictim s (1965). I offer, with some hesitation, the 
su ggests : that the desire to eliminate the pap is one of the underpinnings of the natural-Iaw school of 
legal sociology that has come to be associated with Philip Selznick and the Center for the Study o f  
Law a n d  Society at Rerkeley, See, e.g., P. Sei.znick , Law, S o c iety , and In d u str ia l Ju stice  (P. N onet 
& H. Vollmer collabs. 1969); Selznick, T h e Socio logy of L a w , in Socio logy  Today: P roblem s and 
P rospects 115 (R Merton, L. Broom & L. Cottrell eds, 1959).
58. See W.G. Sum ner , Folkways (1 9 0 6 ).
59. See gen era lly  R. N isbet, Social Chance and H istory (1 9 6 9 ).
60 There are, however, very few empirical studies of the divergence between positive law and 
normative attitudes. The only two of which I know arc K nowledge and Opinion A bout Law (C. 
Campbell, W. Carson & P. Wiles eds. 1973) and J. Cohen, R. Robson & A. Rates, Parental Author­
ity : Tiie Community  and the Law (19 5 8 ).
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substantive area in which law most closely resembles social norm in form 
and subject matter.61 Such studies were commonly preoccupied with the gap 
problem, selecting for examination precisely those laws which deviate most 
markedly from behavior: statutes proscribing prostitution, homosexuality, 
and other sexual activities; prohibition and drug laws; white-collar criminal 
laws. The deviance found was viewed, at best, as a misunderstanding, or, at 
worst, as hypocrisy; in either case it could be solved, generally by conform­
ing law to behavior. Thus, social scientists have ended up where lawyers 
began, perceiving the gap as the central issue for studies about law.
This continuing preoccupation with the gap problem has had unfortu­
nate consequences for the development of a social theory of law. Scholar­
ship is confined to a single question, seen from two perspectives: why does 
behavior deviate from law; why does law mandate a conformity which is 
not forthcoming? W e  are thus directed to particular gaps between law and 
behavior; and how we may close them. But we cannot question the expecta­
tion of harmony itself; we cannot entertain the possibility of another rela­
tionship between law and behavior, or begin the construction of a more 
complex model in which law and behavior interact without a one-to-one
espt ndcnce.** As long as wc continue to define the gap as our problem, 
books about law, whatever thei • claims, will be little more than law books."9
III. M e t h o d :  T h e  N a t u r e  o f  t h e  E x p l a n a t i o n
H o w  does Rheinstein seek to understand the problem of marriage in­
stability and the gap between such behavior and the law? Although he 
offers no explicit statement,64 some view of what constitutes a satisfactory 
explanation must underlie any relational statement. It is important to be
61. S ee , e.g ., E. Schur, supra  note 57.
62  This is intended as a criticism of an approach to books about law. Although Rheinstein is 
strongly influenced by this approach, he does go beyond it. In Part IV of this essay I extrapolate from 
his discussion of other issues and seek to develop a more complex model.
6 , Single minded concentration on the gap is similar to sociological inquiry devoted solely to 
manifest functions. Merton wrote many years ago: "The distinction between manifest and latent 
func ions serves further to direct the attention of the sociologist to precisely those realms of behavior, 
attitude anti belief where he can most fruitfully apply his special skills. For what is his task if he 
confines himself to the study of manifest functions? He is then concerned very largely with determining 
whether a practice instituted for a particular purpose does, in fact, achieve this purpose. . . . [S ]o  
long as ociologists confine  themselves to the study of manifest functions, their inquiry is set for them 
by practical men of affairs (whether a captain of industry, a trade union leader, or, conceivably, a 
Naval o chieftain, is for the moment immaterial), rather than by the theoretic problems which are at 
the core of the discipline. By dealing primarily with the realm of manifest functions, with the key 
problem of whether deliberately instituted practices or organizations succeed in achieving their ob­
jectives, the sociologist becomes converted into an industrious and skilled recorder of the altogether 
familiar pattern of behavior. T h e term s of appraisal are fixed  and l im ite d  by  the qu estion  p u t to  him  
b y  th e  n on -th eoretic  m en  o f affairs R. Merton, M anifest an d  L a ten t Functions, in On T heo­
retical Sociology 73, 119 (1 9 6 7 ) .
64 . He does begin  to do so in the op en in g  paragraphs o f  chapter 12: *‘[ H ]o w  can on e inquire  
whether there exists a cause and effect relationship betw een a society’s law  of divorce and its state o f  
marriage stability? Before presenting the fragm entary em pirical data w c shall try theoretically to 
determ ine w hat kinds o f relationship m ay conceivably exist."  P. 277 .
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aware of the kind of explanation sought: even if the choice is simply a 
reflection of individual values and thus is not open to criticism by others, 
it still constitutes the source of criteria by which to assess the success of the 
explanation offered. One of my difficulties with Rheinstein’s book is the 
number of radically different modes of explanation found in close juxta­
position. A  good example is his explanation for the fact that several coun­
tries do not grant alimony following divorce. “The Japanese system is a 
relic from the time of complete male domination. The socialist scheme is 
a technique to push women into the labor force. In the nonsocialist coun­
tries the same process is going on simply as an incident of industrializa­
tion ’ ’3 Here, in three consecutive sentences, a legal institution is explained 
as (1) a historical relic; (2 ) an instrument of conscious social planning;
(3 ) a product of other social and economic changes. My objection is not that 
different explanations are offered, for the reasons may differ empirically 
in differcr t o ies, nor is it doctrinaire opposition to eclecticism; it is a 
Tar that 1 «ck of ci trity about the goal defeats any attempt to achieve rigor 
in pursuing 1 This Part, therefore, tries to unravel the kinds of explanation 
advanced in order to lay a basis for evaluating Rhcinstcin’s empirical 
theories and propositions.
A. “T h e  Com parative  M e th od  of Legal Research”
Rheinstein invokes this phrase to describe what he is doing.08 And 
though he offers no further elaboration, nor any reference to other dis­
cussions of the comparative method, it is possible to extract his notion of 
that approach from his practice of it. The materials that he uses are of 
two kinds, historical and contextual.
History holds the explanation,’' he asserts dramatically at the begin­
ning of the book.07 By this he appears to mean that every social phenomenon 
is best understood as the end product of a unique sequence of many, perhaps 
all, of the events which preceded it. Explanation is the narration of those 
prior events. Everything cannot be included, but Rheinstein presents no 
clear criteria for his choices. Frequently, die factors he selects do help me 
to understand the phenomenon in question. Thus I am persuaded that the 
explanation for the particular form of the divorce law implanted in the 
French Civil Code of 1 8 0 4 is the conservative reaction to the excesses of 
the French Revolution, a reaction which succeeded in confining divorce 
within the narrow forms of the “ancient ecclesiastical institution of judicial 
separation.” 08 Indeed, I would follow Rheinstein further and agree that
65. p. 405
66. P. xi.
67. P. 6.
68. P. 210,
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history offers the only explanation for the precise wording of the statute. At 
other times, however, his choice seems arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Rhein­
stein writes:
Both of the Japanese institutions, divorce by agreement and the Family Court, 
are adaptations of ancient Japanese traditions to m odern  conditions. Divorce by 
private act and w ithout intervention of public authority historically constituted 
an integral part of that type of social organization which has been called the 
“ family system” and which continued substantially the same until the end of 
W orld  W a r  II.09
But his own data contradict this relationship. Divorce by private act was 
historically available only to men; divorce was not available to women 
at all ' The family law reform of 1 9 4 7 which granted the right of divorce 
to men and women equally is thus not explained by the factors which 
Rheinstein has adduced. Although this particular failing might be cured 
by locat ditional data to account for changes in the role of women, 
1 think it sh’l reveal:, the drawbacks of the method: its limitation to the 
unique phenomenon being explained, and its lack of clear standards for 
deciding what should go into that explanation.
Another n ode of explanation is conveyed by the title Rheinstein 
gives to the central portion of his book: “Divorce in the Cultural Context.” 71 
This approach, which explains law by the enumeration of elements in its 
contemporary milieu, is closely analogous to history, which explains by 
the narration of antecedent facts. Here, again, everything cannot be in­
cluded, and again there are no clear criteria for selection.
1 his sort of explanation is strikingly reminiscent of the early manifestoes 
of functionalism. Malinowski, its most vehement exponent, wrote:
fW  >  are dem anding  a new line of anthropological field-work: the study by direct 
observation of the rules of custom as they function in actual life. Such study 
reveals that the com m andm ents  of law and custom are always organically con­
nected and not isolated; that their very nature consists in the many tentacles which 
they th row  out into the context of social life; that they only exist in the chain of 
social transactions in which they are but a link .72
This insistence upon viewing any phenomenon in its social and cultural con­
text is doubtless a necessary corrective to the misleading practice of analyz- 
cornparing isolated artifacts ripped from their environment; and 
indeed legal scholars, with their tradition of parochial self-absorption, are 
probabl y more in need of the warning than anthropologists, whose interests 
have alvays been catholic. Rheinstein’s erudition and breadth of learning
69. P. 115.
70. Ere p. 116. W om en could obtain a divorce by taking refuge in one of two divorce temples, 
but the number who could, and did, choose this remedy was insignificant.
71. Pp. 107-243 (pt. II).
72. B. M alinow ski, Crime and Custom in Savage S o c iety  125 (1926).
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equip him superbly for this task. Consider the following exposition of the 
absolute prohibition against divorce which prevailed in Italy at the time
of its unification:
Divorce was no acute problem even for the liberal intellectuals who constituted 
the valentior pars of Italy, and still less to the masses, irrespective of whether they 
were good Catholics or anticlerical socialists. Italian men did not need legalized 
remarriage if their marriages turned out to be unsatisfactory. Besides, the great 
majority of marriage expectations were likely to be modest and disappointment 
consequently rare. T he  age at marriage was high, especially for men. One ought 
to be able to support a family. Mate selection was a family affair rather than the 
outcome of falling in love. T he  latter was the privilege of the heroes of opera, 
w ho would dramatically illustrate the evil consequences of such folly. Marriage 
was one th ing and love another, and nothing but mischief would result if the 
two happened to be mixed. But there were the substitutes, at least for the men; 
houses of prostitution and the mistress system. T h e  wives were expected to be 
v ■ rtuoii.'; ; d :o find satisfaction in the children and in the constant contacts with 
si . 'us, g ' ■: mi nts, etc. If consolation was necessary, it could be found 
through the church.78
The number and diversity of factors which are assembled to explain the
conjunction of rule and behavior is impressive: the availability of sexual 
o v t]p'.r, <11 1 v <>f marriage, and of channels for the sublimation of sexual 
dr vi.-;. :he age at marriage; the economic structure of the family; popular 
expectations concerning marriage; the cultural image of love; the influence 
of religion; sexual role differentiation; and the class structure. But does 
n o t  this ap p ro ach  lead to an embarras de richessel Everything cannot be, 
and of urse is not, invoked in the explanation; yet no principle of selection 
i -rated, or justified. A  catholic sensitivity to context may be a necessary 
p i ' . r e q u b 'te  to u n d e rs ta n d in g  any social fact, but it is not yet that under­
s tand ing  itself.
Both narra tive  history and functional contextualism aim at description, 
not exp lanation . They hpict the unique event or phenomenon; they do 
not seek to subsume it as an instance of a more general law. There are ac­
cepted artistic notions of what should or should not be included in the 
description, but there is no test for the appropriateness of a particular schol­
ar's choice. These characteristics restrict the kind of comparison that is 
possible. Because the descriptive data are extensive and appear to be rather 
ni cT !• its comparison is intuitive and the results suggestive at best—  
often no more than a rediscovery of autre tem ps, autre moeurs. Perceived 
differences cannot be attributed with any certainty to one factor or set of 
factors rather than another. Little attempt is made to control the com­
parison. as required in the physical and social sciences. Perhaps because the 
results are so difficult to achieve and seem so unimpressive, little comparison 
has in fact been attempted in history or in anthropology; the monograph,
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bounded in time, society, or culture, remains the scholarly paradigm. De­
spite Rheinstein’s claim to use the “comparative method of legal research,” 
his book, too, consists largely of descriptions of discrete national legal sys­
tems, albeit in historical and cultural context, with little comparison among
them.74
B. Scientific Explanation
Yet Rheinstein’s own analysis of legal phenomena frequently exceeds 
the limited goals he sets himself. Notwithstanding the disclaimer that 
he is neither statistician nor sociologist,75 he seeks to explain, to subsume 
the particular fact under a more general law, not just to describe it in its 
uniqueness. Although these generalizations are frequently implied, some­
times they are stated quite clearly:79
U n iversa lly, it can ' " said, statutory schemes of divorce sanction have been trans­
formed no 5 hemes, in actual practice, of divorce faillite, in England, in the
United States, in G erm any and elsewhere.77
As s-rm s inevitable in any system of divorce based on the principle of break- 
- i n d e n t  v to consider one party guilty also appeared in the USSR.78
! \] strict statute law of divorce is not an effective means to prevent or even to
reduce the incidence of marriage b reakdow n,78
It should be clear where my sympathies lie among these methodological 
alternatives. I believe that description, though a necessary prerequisite to 
understanding, is a dead end unless it leads toward scientific explanation.80
M y  be lief does not appear to be shared by the majority of legal scholars, 
even those caught up in the contemporary enthusiasm for social science. 
The few who try to incorporate a social scientific approach in their own 
writings commonly select the methods of narrative history and functional 
contextual ism, which readily lend themselves to such incorporation with­
out making significant new demands upon the scholar. Legal rationaliza­
tion, the ordering of legal rules, remains the central enterprise; the descrip­
tion of other social facts, whether historical or contemporaneous, is subor­
dinated to it. Facts are selected in order to illustrate the rationalization;
74. This is not so much a criticism of Rheinstein as of a whole school. Comparative law is rarely 
comparative; instead, the term tends to signify that the law is foreign to the scholar studying it, or to
the audience for whom the study is intended.
75. P. xi.
76. I am concerned with the form of these propositions, not with their truth. Scattered, as they 
are, throughout the hook, they may escape the reader’s notice; once assembled, however, they seem  
to offer a beginning for more general theories about law and social action.
77. P. 210 (emphasis added in part). Rheinstein uses the French phrases in much the same way 
as American lawyers use the terms “fault” and “no-fault” divorce.
78. P. 235 (emphasis added).
79. P. 406.
80. In stating this preference, I am going well beyond my original definition of books about law , 
which I described as works borrowing the perspective of another discipline, whether humanistic or 
social scientific. I do not mean to denigrate the value of humanistic studies— of which narrative history
and function,.! ontexrunii n ire examples; I simply choose to follow  another approach.
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indeed, where the rationalizing principle is a substantive purpose, such 
facts are essential to the task. Narrative history and contextual functional­
ism are ideally suited to this role since they offer the scholar an unlimited 
source of data without straitjacketing him within rules which dictate the 
selection and use of his data. This illustrative use of social facts can be 
found everywhere: in the “cases and materials” approach to legal education, 
in judicial opinionwriting and legislative reform, and in law books.
Nevertheless, many of these scholars, like Rheinstein, drift impercep­
tibly from description into explanation. There may be many reasons for 
this: commonsense notions of explanation pervade our everyday speech and 
thought; explanation seems to offer greater comprehension; the intellectual 
status of physical science lends an aura of superiority to all imitations. Rut 
the difference between the two intellectual orientations is more radical than 
ncrally acknowledge. Scientific explanation cannot be subor- 
rimated t ’he task of k t. rationalization: it offers its own mode of under- 
stnnding which, when confirmed by the necessary evidence, may demon­
strate that the legal system is not functioning in conformance with the 
precepts r he rationalization. In order to justify this claim to superior 
story power, it h v eloped its own autonomous, rigorous criteria 
knowledge, both theoretical n 1 methodological. In what follows, there­
fore, I shall set out and employ those criteria in evaluating Rheinstein’s 
explanations of legal and other social phenomena.
I V .  P r o p o s i t i o n s
A. L a w  as an Explanation of Behavior
I think that Rheinstein’s initial explanatory scheme can fairly, if simply,
be described by the model :ei
law--------- >  behavior
I argued earlier that his values led him to begin by investigating substantive 
legal standards as the explanatory factor; they also pointed to the behavior 
to be explained: the threat to his ideal of the family was originally con­
ceived as located in divorce itself.
The high divorce rate and its seemingly continuous growth had created the im- 
[ ic.'-' ion that something was w rong in society, that there was some evil that was 
to be fought. Naively we took it for granted that the evil was divorce. In that 
we si .1 red the belief of almost everyone who had ever thought about divorce
legislation in the United States and elsewhere.82
81. By a model, I mean nothing more pretentious than a schematic representation of several 
social scientific concepts and their connections. A model is not a theory, but it may aid the development 
of theory by increasing the clarity and explicitncss with which wc see those connections. Models 
necessarily simplify, but they also reveal gross oversimplification and thereby help us to correct it.
82. P. 262. This apologia claims a uniformity of thought greater than that which actually existed.
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The elements which contributed to this choice are of interest because they 
influence the development of his model: divorce is behavior within the legal 
system; it therefore has immediate legal significance and would appear to 
be relatively accessible to legal control; for similar reasons, the divorce rate 
is an official statistic, which brings it to public attention and facilitates its 
use as a variable for analysis.83
One might expect this choice of variables to lead naturally to a narrow 
concern with drafting statutory language which would produce the desired 
divorce rate. It is greatly to Rheinstein’s credit, therefore, that he dethroned 
the relationship between law and behavior from the level of a pervasive, 
strongly held ideology,81 and made it an empirical proposition:
1. The more stringent the requirements of the substantive law of divorce, the 
lower will be the divorce rate of the society; the less stringent, the higher that
rate.
1 fe it ;tcT this r> opositlon in two ways. First, in order to falsify it, he offered 
what must be considere d little more than anecdotes about different societies:
I 1 r -  r h which a marriage can be terminated under Japanese
law, t- c divorce rate is h  no means high . . . .  Since 1938, the rate per 1,000
, pula • ha:; consistent!} brw abovt one-third of that of the United  States, 
slightly lower than that of the G erm an Reich.85
The Scandinavian situation indicates that a divorce law clearly based upon the 
individual view of live and  let live has, at least so far, been compatible with the 
mainte ance of the institution of marriage, even if it is accompanied by a far- 
rcaching alleviation of traditional sex taboos.86
I iere is the use of social science data  in a tho ro u g h ly  unscientific manner—  
w ha  M ax G lu c k m a n , in ano the r  context, derogates as apt illustration.87 The 
influence o 4 he substantive law  upon  the divorce rate  can only be discovered 
if the  varia tion  in  o ther  re levant factors is held  constant, or at least ascer­
But I think Rheinstein is basically correct about the prevailing assumptions. His assertion is thus con­
sistent with my argument in the preceding Part that legal and social scientific thought have tended to 
direct research about law ai a single, narrow problem.
83. There is a close parallel between studies of divorce and studies of crime; both refer to legal 
acts which are tabulated in official statistics. The consequences of allowing such factors to determine 
our choice of variables, and thus the direction of our research, have been equally unfortunate in both 
instances On the unfortunate con sequences of using crime rates, see, e .g ., J. S k o l n i c k , Ju s t i c e  
W i t h o u t  1 r i a l  164-81 (1966); Black, P roduction  o f Crime R ates, 35 A m . S o c i o l o g i c a l  R e v . 733
(1970). ( i. the unfortunate consequences of continuing to use variables defined by commonscnsc, 
what Stine! combe calls “natural variables," see A .  Stjnchcom be, C o n stru c tin g  S o c ia l T h e o r i e s  41 
(1968) natural variables th a t create a d m in istra tive  prob lem s  generally are not the same variables 
th a t have a u n ique se t o f causes. Sometimes applied researchers formulate this by saying that a natural 
variable ‘has multiple causes.' From a scientific point of view, this means that the applied researcher 
is trying to explain the wrong thing."
84. P. 406.
85. Pp. 119-20.
86. Pp. 127-29.
87. Gluckman, Introduction, in T h e  C r a f t  o f  S o c i a l  A n t h r o p o l o g y  at xi, xiii (A . Epstein ed. 
1967). Elsewhere, Rheinstein him self criticizes this error. See, e .g ., p. 217.
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tained. The failure to do either vitiates much of the evidence Rheinstein ex­
tracts from the available social science literature.88
He sought to meet such criticism by conducting his own empirical re­
search into changes in the divorce rate which accompanied the enactment 
of the German Civil Code of 1 9 0 0. Prior to diat date, the several German 
states had each had different laws for divorce, some more stringent, some 
more liberal than the Code. Nevertheless, the number of petitions for di­
vorce filed per unit population, and the proportion of those petitions 
granted, did not change significantly with the imposition of the new law; 
and the limited changes that did occur could not be explained by increases 
or decreases in die severity of the law. He interpreted these results as fol­
lows:
T he shape of the law of divorce was neither the cause of the divorce wave nor 
even o re  of its essential conditions. In the main, the influence of the law did not 
make e f felt as / ii >i that of other circumstances, . . . N either was it possible 
ipon a broad scope to prevent spouses who were ready to resort to divorce from
doing it . , . .80
Having reached this conclusion, Rheinstein forthrightly reconsidered
the choice of variables that had led him to it, Still unwilling to dislodge 
substantive legal standards as the explanatory factor, he altered his behav­
ioral focus: divorce was seen as the terminus of a behavioral sequence that 
had its roots at an earlier stage.00 With the vehemence of a late convert to 
the cause, he castigates Edmund G. Brown, former Governor of California, 
for perpetuating the fallacy that '‘divorce produces not only broken homes 
but broken lives”:
'v/c 1 endlf. ss repetition cannot make true the proposition that lives or homes are 
destroyed by divorce. W h a t  may destroy homes or lives is something quite  d if­
ferent: the breakdown of a marriage, an event in the realm of fact which is d if­
ferent from and regularly precedes that event in the realm of law which is called
divorce . . . .01
88. See the discussion of some of the available evidence at pp. 288-307.
89. Pp. 299-300. In making this assertion, Rheinstein was certainly not unaware of the lim iting  
case in which the law can affect the rate of divorce by prohibiting divorces absolutely. Indeed, a 
chapter of the book is devoted to Italy, which he characterizes as a D ivorceless C ou n try . See  pp. x58—
93-
90. Criminological studies have developed along similar lines, arguing for a shift of attention 
from criminal behavior to the sources of crime.
91 Rheinstein is a late convert indeed. Forty years ago, Karl Llewellyn wrote: “ [D ]iscussion  
of divorce has too often started from the premise that divorce was an evil in itself, as if it was 
d ivorce  that mattered. Whereas what matters is wedlock. The clearer-sighted have indeed insisted 
either that divorce was in essence a symptom rather than an ill, or that it was in the nature of official 
recognition of marriages broken in fact before officials came to act." Llewellyn, B ehin d  th e  L a w  of  
Divorce, 33 C o l u m . L. R e v . 249, 262 (1 9 3 3 ). He cited, in support of this claim, books written as 
many as 80 years before Rheinstein’s volume. Id. at 262 n.30, c itin g  G . H o w a r d , A H i s t o r y  o f  
M atrim on ia l In st itu t io n s  (1 9 0 4 ); J. L i c h t e n b f r c e r , D i v o r c e : A S o c i a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  (1 9 3 1 );  
W illcox, The Divorce Problem, in 1 S t u d i e s  i n  H i s t o r y , E c o n o m i c s  a n d  P u b l i c  L a w  9  (Columbia 
Coll. Study No. i ,  1891). And similar views were expressed by moderates at the National Congress 
on Divorce Laws, held in W ashington in February 1906. See N . B l a k e , supra  note 45, at 141-44.
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H e n c e  m arr iage  b re a k d o w n  becomes the behavior to be exp la ined . 
H o w e v er ,  R he in s te in ’s defin ition  of tha t  concept reveals tha t  his b reak  
w i th  the past was n o t  as th o ro u g h  as die change  in te rm ino logy  m ig h t  
suggest:
Factual marriage breakdown is not easy to define. In one sense we may regard 
every marriage as having broken down that has failed to give the spouses the 
degree of happiness or satisfaction they hoped for when they took the fateful step 
of matrimony. F requent quarrels or mere disharmony may sap the energies of 
spouses and adversely affect their happiness and their effectiveness as citizens. If 
there are children, their mental and physical well-being is likely to be impaired, 
. . , F rom  society's point of view sueh situations are evil; they have attracted the 
attention of moralists, psychiatrists, and reformers bent upon the im provem ent of 
the hum an lot. But they concern us here only when they result in abandonm ent 
or separation. It is in this sense that marriage breakdown is linked to divorce. 
Besides, situations of internal dissension are not susceptible to exact observation 
and statistical com " rh cnsion. W e are concerned with marriage b reakdow n as a 
mass phenomenon and  the problem of how, if at all, its incidence m igh t  be 
reduced. 1 is for ibis compelling reason of statistical observability that wc 
shall limit ourselves to inquiry concerning marriage breakdown in the sense of 
physic < tion <>i the spouses’ life in common, i.e., of abandonm ent and sep­
aration.03
R h d n s t e in ’s values influence this conceptual reformulation, just as they did 
his orig inal choice, Marriage b rea k d o w n  is not identical with divorce; if it 
were, there w o u ld  be no reason to substitute the former for the latter, espe­
cially since it is m ore  difficult to m easure. The linkage between them is 
also not is simple as R heinste in  appears to suggest: geographic separation 
is not a necessary cond it ion  for divorce— many disaffected couples live 
toge the r  until they are divorced, and  even after, for economic or other 
reas ns“ nor is it a sufficient cond it ion— m an y  separated couples never 
divorce. N e i th e r  is the change  justified by Rheinstein’s makeweight me- 
thodologic il a rg u m e n t :  scientific concepts are not limited to those statistics 
already com piled  by the Bureau of the Census, and exact observations can 
certain ly  be m ad e  about the behavior of couples still living together. The 
defin ition , instead, appears deliberately designed to avoid any inquiry into 
the  con ten t  of human relationships either before or after the separation.84 
It also carries the implicit suggestion that factual separation somehow di­
92. Pp. 262-63.
93 Because of the housing shortage in Russia, divorced couples are often unable to find alterna­
tive accommodation, and must continue to live together, som etim es for several years. See, e.g., G. 
F e if e r ,  Jus net- tv M oscow 154 (1964) On the other hand, a N ew  York court has adopted Rhein­
stein ’s reasoning and has refused to grant a legal separation on the grounds o f intolerable cruelty  
w here the couple was still liv in g  together because unable to find a second apartm ent. See Berman v. 
Berman. 277 App. Div. 560, 101 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep’t 1950), reprinted in J. G o ld ste in  &. J. K atz, 
supra note 3, at 412.
9 4 . W illiam G oode also chooses not to study the happiness or unhappiness of the marital relation­
ship, but for very different reasons. See W . G oode, supra note 9, at 5 -7 .
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vides those marriages which should be terminated f ro m  those w h ic h  shou ld  
not.
However, if the particular definition is open to criticism, the  new  
concept did help Rheinstein to sec the improbability of the  rela tionsh ip
between legal standards and behavior that he h a d  previously hypo thes ized .1'5
If .1 married couple does not wish to live together, they cannot be compelled to 
do so. T h e  law can preclude divorce, but it cannot prevent factual marriage break­
down. T h e  law can deny freedom of remarriage, but it cannot thereby prevent a 
m an and a w om an from living together in a union which may be called irregular 
but which may resemble m atrim ony in every respect except the absence of the 
legal bond.09
Aldiough Rheinstein felt certain of this relationship, he adhered to proper 
scientific procedures and proceded to test the implicit proposition:
2. The mure stringent the requirements of the substantive law of divorce, the 
lower will be the rate of factual separation; the less stringent, the higher the
rate,
He tested this by means of a careful cross-cultural study:
T h e  plan was to compare for the decade of 1947 to 1956 the eases of marriage 
breakdown that had occurred in the easy-divorce Swiss canton of T icino and the 
divorceless Italian provinces of Como and Varese (Com aseo), i,e„ a region of 
comparatively homogenous [j/V] ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic structure.87
U nfo r tu n a te ly ,  errors  in data  collection rendered the results inconclusive. 
Even  w i th o u t  th a t  obstacle, however, the study indicated the enormous 
difficulties of controlled  comparison. Despite Rheinstein’s assertion that the 
tw o  regions were sufficiently similar with regard to other significant factors,
he  w rites  only  sentences later:
[Comaseo] is a region o f considerable male migration. Traditionally  a sizable 
num ber  of Comaschi have been engaged in the building trades, as simple masons 
or as highly skilled decorators or sculptors. They  exercise their trade all over Italy 
and many migrate to other countries. T h e  w om en stay at home and wait for their 
husbands’ return, which may never occur.08
Rheinstein refers to this only as an ambiguity which complicated the identi­
fication of instances of factual separation; to me it reveals a structural
95. H 'tc , again, there are close parallels w ith  the developm ent o f crim inology. In itia lly , both  
employed analytic categories derived from  law : the granting o f a divorce; the arrest or conviction  for 
violation  of a crim inal law . E ventually  it was realized that the significant actors— the m arried coup le, 
the offender— do not structure their behavior in terms of the law . For the married couple, the b e­
havior of each is oriented toward the other, and toward relatives and friends; for the offender, b e­
havior is oriented toward peers, significant authority, etc. O nly by studying the origin  of such behavior  
can w e hope to understand divorce, or crim e, either o f w hich  m ay be little more than an incidental 
result.
96. P. 277.
97. P .305.
98. P. 306.
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difference between the two regions which makes meaningful comparison 
impossible.
Yet if Rheinstein has not falsified either proposition conclusively, he has 
advanced knowledge in a different way. He has pointed to the distinction
between w h a t  he calls events “in the realm of fact,” such as separation or 
some other fo rm  of disagreement, and events “in the realm of law,” such as 
divorce. 1 H e  has also shown th a t  the relationship between substantive law  
and either of these behaviors is not likely to be a simple causal one. Never­
theless, substantive law remains significant because it helps to apportion 
marriage breakdown between factual separation and legal divorce, Thus 
Rheinstcin's efforts to test the proposition with which he began, and to 
refine the concepts it employs, lead to a new model of divorce law in society 
which can be fo rm u la ted  roughly as follows:
^divorce
marriage behavior +  legal standards *+* ? — |^actua^
N . separation
X (>ther
marriage 
behavior
B. T he L egal System  as an In tervening Variable
Tin's revised model appears to o m it  some crucial elements; although 
R heins te in ’s em pirica l investigations are not conclusive, they certainly sug­
gest h i t  legal standards, by themselves, are not a sufficient explanation for 
die w ay in w h ic h  marriage behavior is distributed among the possible out­
com es.1 One source for the missing variables is the structure of the legal 
institutions w hich  administer those standards. Such structural factors have 
generally  been overlooked, perhaps as a consequence of the prevailing legal 
rationalizations. The mechanical jurisprudence of 1 9th-century formalism 
saw the judge as a cipher between the legal standard and the decision; his 
behavior, and that of other legal professionals, would perfectly mirror the 
law.101 Contemporary jurisprudence has abandoned that conception, and 
acknow ledges  that judges retain some leeway for action within the confines 
of statute and precedent.  But while granting fuller recognition to the sig­
nificance of institutional framework for professional action, this view also 
demands a new rationalization which will show that the freedom now 
accorded legal professionals is not exercised in a random or arbitrary
99 - P -  5.
100. The exception is the lim iting case discussed in note 89 supra.
101. Just as Rheinstein began by assuming that law could regulate behavior outside the legal 
arena, so this rationalization assumed that law could regulate the behavior of legal professionals.
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fashion. As I indicated above,10* this rationalization is articulated in terms 
of principles and policies subserving social purposes: judges advance legis­
lative purpose; when the legislature has not spoken they follow public 
policy; and, according to Rheinstein, even when the legislature has acted 
judges can ignore the law and articulate unspoken values.101 Unfortunately, 
although this new rationalization no longer denies the significance of insti­
tutional factors, it still distorts analysis. The courtroom is seen as a forum 
for covert political compromise; only a blind ideological commitment to 
democracy can explain such a view.
But when Rheinstein sets aside his a priori image and instead reports 
die way courts hear “the monotonous mass of uncontestcd divorces,” we 
get a very different picture of the institution:
[T ]h ey  are handled on the assembly line. N obody knows of the tragedies and the 
misery -x q it  the parties and the judge. H e  cannot avoid being aware of all the 
sadness, the disappointed hopes and expectations, the yearning for freedom. H e 
hears the testimony. H e knows that it may be false. But it may be true. It often is, 
W hy hculd he go behind it? Even if he wanted to, he has neither the tools nor 
the thy** T he devic; s which statutes and procedural history have given him, have 
been wi -tied awav by nonuse. Here is the plaintiff, mostly the wom an, from 
the working  class in the majority of cases, visibly miserable and unhappy. She 
has told her story, corroborated by the necessary num ber of witnesses. T h e  husband 
has been properly served with process, but he has not come to court. So why not 
grant the divorce? A judge new in the divorce court may care, may order the 
husband to appear, may ask questions and attem pt conciliation. Once divorcing 
has be- ome routine, the judge is not likely to continue wasting such time and 
effort. So the divorce court becomes Siberia. T h e  judge is anxious to escape into 
less distasteful divisions of the court, and the mill grinds on.104
This brief description of a functioning court may help to elaborate Rhein­
stein’s proposition that:
3. “ Universally, it can be said, statutory schemes of divorce sanction have been 
transformed into schemes, in actual practice, of divorce jaillite . . . .” 108
Among the institutional variables which may be implicit in that proposi­
tion, Rheinstein’s description suggests the following:106
102. See text accompanying notes 41-54 supra.
103. Pp. 252-55.
104. Pp. 255-56 (footnote om itted).
105. P. 210.
106. Rbeinstein’s observations are hardly original. For reasons that are not entirely clear to
me, the initial burst of enthusiasm for legal realism was directed in large part at those institutions 
which administer family law. For good empirical studies of working courts which resulted, see, e.g ., 
W . G e l l h o r n , C h i l d r e n  a n d  F a m i l i e s  in t h e  C o u r t s  or N e w  Y o r k  C i t y  (1 9 5 4 ); O. M c. G ri :.o o r , 
L. B l o m -C o o p e r  & C. G i b s o n , S e p a r a t e d  S p o u s e s : A S t u d y  or t h e . M a t r i m o n i a l  Ju r i s d i c t i o n  or
M a g i s t r a t e s ’ C o u r t s  (1 9 7 0 ); L. M a r s h a l l  Si G M a y , T h e  D i v o r c e  C o u r t  (vol. I M .inland, 10*2; 
vol. II: Ohio, 1933); M. V i r t u e , F a m i l y  C as es  i n  C o u r t  (1956); Fcinsingcr, O bservations on ju d ic ia l  
A d m in istra tio n  o f D ivorce  L aw s in W iscon sin , 8 Wis. L. R e v . 27 (1 9 3 2 ); Fcinsingcr Si Young, 
R ecrim ination  a n d  R e la ted  D octrines in th e  W isconsin  Im w  o f D ivorce as A d m in is te re d  in D ane
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(a.) The availability of evidence about past conduct. This is a charac­
teristic of legal institutions, but it reflects such social structural variables as 
the physical privacy of the home, the intimacy of the marital relationship, 
the decreasing importance of the extended family, etc.
(b.) The reliability of such evidence. This is limited by the absence of 
the opposing party, who alone could rebut, and the failure to use available 
procedures to test the evidence.
(c.) The degree of interest in asserting legal standards. Low interest is 
a consequence of the fact that the proceeding is rarely adversarial, since one 
spouse usually defaults or fails to contest, and those officers of the court 
assigned to assist in this role fail to perform it.
(d.) The caseload, />,, the number of cases a judge is expected to pro­
cess per unit time. This depends on the personnel and money which the 
government allocate to the task, as well as the number of cases which 
plaintiffs Hie.
(e.) The routinization of cases. This is a function of the repetitiveness 
of the evidence (because of its inevitable superficiality) and caseload pres­
sures. Routine reinforces itself; it strengthens the expectation of each legal 
professional that the others will adhere to customary patterns; anyone who 
deviates from these patterns will be sanctioned, including the judge.
(f.) The low status of the domestic relations bench and bar107 within 
the professional hierarchy. This is a function of the preceding variable. 
Because of this status, the more competent judge is elevated above that 
bench, and the ambitious lawyer seeks a more prestigious practice. Those 
who remain have no hope of advancement, and no reason to display ex­
cessive zeal.
(g.) The social distance between judge and plaintiff. This includes, 
among other factors, differences in sex, socioeconomic status, and education. 
The greater the distance, the more difficult it is for the judge to treat the 
party as an individual; the results are stereotyping and a mechanical pro­
cessing of the case.108
As we have already seen, Rheinstein offers the obverse proposition as 
well:
4. “ As seems inevitable in any system of divorce based on the principle of break­
down, the tendency to consider one party guilty also appeared . . . .” 109
C ou n ty, 6 Wis. L. Rf.v. 195 (1931); Parnas, Judicial R esponse to  In tra-F am ily  V iolence , 54 M in n . L. 
Rev. 585 (1 9 7 0 ); Note, T h e A d m in istra tio n  of D ivorce: A P hiladelph ia  S tu d y , joi U. Pa. L. Rev.
1204 ( 1 9 5 3 ) -
107. The domestic relations bar has been studied in an excellent monograph, H. O’Gorman, 
Lawyers and Matrimonial Cases: A Study of Informal P ressures in Private Professional
Practice (1 9 6 3 ).
108. I have developed this notion at greater length in A  C om para tive  Social T h e o ry  of th e  
D isp u te  Process, 8 L. & Soc’y Rev. (Feb. 1974) (forthcom ing).
109. P . 235.
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This, too, may involve a number of institutional variables:
(a.) The extent to which the legal institution is differentiated from the 
larger society. Such differentiation will determine how social norms, and 
the attitudes of the particular disputants, influence the proceeding.
(b.) The social distance between lawyer and client. The diligence with 
which a lawyer represents the interests of his client may vary inversely with 
the social distance between them; on the other hand, ideology may in­
fluence a lawyer to display unusual energy in order to demonstrate that 
loyalty to his lower status client outweighs competing loyalties to his legal 
brethren, both lawyer and judge.
(c.) The extent to which a lawyer’s professional status and income 
depend on what he can achieve for his client. This will in turn vary with 
the nature of professional training, the structure of the profession, the num­
ber and kind of issues resolved at the hearing, and the way the lawyer is 
compensated for his work.
(d.) The role definition of the legal professional who hears the case. 
Domestic relations judges may seek to overcome their low status by imitat­
ing the style of other judges, for instance those on the criminal bench.110
(e.) The career structure of the judiciary, This may make the bench 
unrepresentative in terms of age, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, etc., there­
by skewing the values judges bring to the task of adjudication.
These institutional variables, to some degree implicit in Rheinstein’s 
propositions, contribute to our understanding of behavior w ithin  the legal 
arena. But Rheinstein fails to explore the factors that influence when mar­
riages will be brought within the purview of that institution. We might 
formulate a tentative hypothesis that:
5. T h e frequency w ith  which m arriage behavior is brought w ithin  the legal insti­
tution w ill depend on w ho has the responsibility to do so, the incentives that 
person has for d o in g  so, and his resources relative to the costs o f d o ing  so.
The variables on which this proposition rests include:
(a.) Who initiates legal inquiry into the condition of a marriage. Un­
like the criminal law, this responsibility rests largely with the parties, not 
the state. As between the parties, we know empirically that the vast major­
ity of divorce proceedings are begun by wives.
(b.) The incentives for recourse to law. We are concerned here not 
only with the goods which the legal institution dispenses—the right to 
remarry, financial support, division of property, rights to children, moral
110. I have heard, th irdhand , th at a conference of state court judges objected ro a scheme of 
no-fault divorce because it w ould reduce them  to adm inistrators. O f course, they arc adm inistrators 
now , since few divorces are seriously contested, but such a law w ould  constitute open acknow ledge­
m ent that they do not perform  an adjudicative role.
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divorce
vindication— but with the way in which people perceive these goods and 
value them relative to the goods offered by other institutions.
(c.) The relative accessibility of the legal institution. This includes 
cost, location, and social and cultural distance of the court, the necessity of 
legal representation, and (if such representation is necessary) the cost, loca­
tion, and social and cultural distance of lawyers, as well as their attitudes 
toward substantive rules and legal procedures. Again, popular conceptions 
of the values for these variables are more important than the actual values.
This brief and necessarily superficial review of the institutions which
administer divorce lav/ leads us to reformulate our model once more to
incorporate their structural variation.
structure of 
legal and .
. . . . .  . 1 1 , other institu- factualmarriage behavior ■+ legal standards +  , • u <-------- ►
tions which separation
handle marriage j
behavior marriage
behavior
C. Cultural C lim ate  as an Explanation of L a w
Two terms'" in the model have not yet been subjected to analysis: mar­
riage behavior and legal standards. Rheinstein states explicitly where he 
intends to louk for an explanation of the latter.
[ 11n the field of divorce, we find a bewildering variety, in the substantive laws, 
in procedures, and in actual practices. W hy  . . . ?
The answer lies, of course, in the diversity of social factors by which the pat­
terns of the various societies are determined. A m ong  these factors ethical and 
religious value judgments are as im portant as, or even more than, objective facts 
of social, economic, and political development. These value judgments arc widely 
held without conscious reflection or rational deliberation. They may be felt deeply 
or professed superficially. Upon the living they have been implanted in that pro­
cess of acculturation which has shaped the civilization of those successive genera­
tions by which civilizations have been built and developed.
In W estern civilizations two trends can be traced, two sets of drives, ideas, 
and ideals which have shaped our present institution of monogamous marriage 
including divorce. T h e  struggle between and in term ingling of these two trends 
has brought about results which have varied from time to time and which now 
vary from place to place. O ne of these two trends has prevailed for centuries. 
In recent decades the pendulum  has come to swing in the direction of the other,
i n .  Legal institutions, which were just used as an explanatory variable, could, of course, be
explained as well. I will not do so here because of the limits of space, the possibility of an infinite re­
gression, and because Rheinstein provides no material with which to do so. Elsewhere I have offered 
the beginnings of a theory of dispute institutions in society. See A  C om para tive  Social T h eo ry  of the 
D ispu te  Process, su pra  note 108.
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but there has not been a complete reversal of the ideas that have been dom inant 
for the last fifteen hundred  years.
T h e  two competing ideologies may be called the Christian-conservative and 
the eudemonistic-liberal.112
This adds a new element, which Rheinstein calls variously values, attitudes,
ideology, and cultural climate. He defines it as follows:
T he term “cultural climate” is used here as a shorthand reference to the totality 
of subjective and objective phenomena by which the culture of a society, its style 
of living, are determined. T he  cultural climate of medieval Europe was different 
from that of the mid-twentieth century. T he  cultural climate of Com m unist China 
differs from that of W estern Europe or N orth  America. T o  lesser degrees, the 
cultural climate of Sweden differs from that of Italy, that of Maine from that of 
California,
Theoretical analysis o f  the concept of cultural climate belongs to the field of 
social psychology. W hat we mean by the cultural climate as related to marriage 
stability and the divorce law is demonstrated by the concrete illustrations presented
in the preceding chapters . ” 8
1 would like to concentrate first upon certain theoretical problems which
originate with the choice and definition of this concept, not simply to carp, 
but because they illustrate the extreme difficulty of meaningful explanation, 
and the seductiveness of less taxing modes of exposition.
Every scientific concept must have meaning, that is, an unambiguous 
content stipulated by definition and thereafter clear to all who encounter 
it. Cultural climate docs not. Indeed, Rheinstein offers no definition: his 
attempt to define by reference to prior use seems to me an abdication of 
responsibility which merely increases confusion. The following examples 
of cultural climates which Rheinstein claims to distinguish illustrate that 
confusion:
In Japan, the sacred institution has been patrilineal succession, the permanency of 
the male line m aintain ing the tradition of the house and the worship of the an ­
cestors. M arriage supplemented by adoption, has been the device by which the 
continuance of the male line is secured. T h e  wife, it is true, entered the house of 
the husband, but there was no reason why she should be kept in it if she tu rned  
out to be barren or otherwise unsatisfactory. T o  replace her in the interest of the 
house involved no moral stigma. As the old adage said: “T h e  wom b is only bor­
rowed.” In such a system it was self-evident that a marriage could be unilaterally 
terminated by the husband .114
T h e  J Roman Catholic] church [in post-World W ar  II Italy] has also firmly m ain­
tained the traditional image of the family within which the principle of indissolu­
112. Pp. 10-11. This last concept is more familiar to us as utilitarianism.
113. P. 285. This seems to me to be a paraphrase of the concept of Z eitge ist. See F. Savicny, 
O f the Vocation o f  O ur Ace f o r  Legislation and Jurisprudence (A . Hayward transl. 1831); 
Kantorowicz, S avign y a n d  th e  H istorical School of L aw , 53 L.Q. Rf.v. 326 (1937).
114. P. 124 (footnote om itted).
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bility is tenable: that of the closely knit patriarchal unit whose primary purpose 
is the procreation and education of issue and in which, as in society in general, 
the roles and rights of men and wom en are unequal. 115
While I would not deny that the value systems which Rheinstein attributes 
to Japan and Italy differ in significant detail, they nevertheless share the 
following basic characteristics: patrilineality, patriarchalism, male suprem­
acy, and the primacy of procreation over other familial functions. Yet 
Rheinstein calls the first set of values liberal and the second conservative,119 
and uses this distinction to explain easy divorce in Japan and the prohibi­
tion of divorce in Italy. Unless wc can assign an expression of value 
unambiguously to one of the two opposing ideologies before we look at the 
legal standards, we can never verify the assertion that an ideology explains 
a legal standard. Rheinstein’s failure to define the ideologies is an invita­
tion to post factum interpretation.117
An explanatory concept must also be clearly distinguishable from the 
phenomenon it seeks to explain; violation of this precept will reduce ex­
planation to tautology. Tautology is almost inevitable, therefore, once 
Rheinstein has defined cultural climate as “the totality of subjective and 
objective phenomena by which the culture of a society, its style of living, 
are determined."1” Such a concept is fatal to the goal of understanding; 
for if cultural climate is the totality, what is left for it to explain? Rhein­
stein’s book often falls into this tautological trap. “Explaining" the Italian 
Civil Code of 1865, he writes:
[M ]arriage was henceforth to be indissoluble for all Italians, including the small 
group of non-Catholics. The principle of indissolubility seems to have corresponded 
with the spirit of the times. There was no powerful public demand to introduce 
an institution which was alien to the tradition of the Catholic nation . . . .llft
No clear distinctions arc drawn between the Code, the spirit of the times, 
public demand, and the tradition of the nation. Unless these concepts can 
be measured separately one cannot explain another, for it may be that other.
Another problem is not merely definitional, and thus easily remedied, 
but inheres in the concept of cultural climate itself. Explanation in terms 
of ideology is a mode of telic reasoning in which ideological goals become 
the purposes which explain institutional action. Two examples may illus­
trate the drawbacks of this approach. Rheinstein explains legislative reform 
in Sw eden, Denmark, and Norway as follows:
1 1 5 . p. 1 8 8 .
116. See note 112 supra and accom panying text.
117. See M erton, The Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research, in Readings i n  t h e  
Philosophy op the Social Sciences 465, 473 (M . Brodbcck ed. 1968).
118. P. 285. T his em phasis on totality  is characteristic of historical and contextual description—  
intellectual form s w hich Rheinstein frequently  practices.
119. P. 162,
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A ll three countries were ready resolutely to reshape their laws in accordance w ith  
the new spirit, A  clear insight into the key role of the family resulted in the choice 
of family law as the first topic to be reformed, just as family law, together with  
the land law, was to be the first field to be reshaped in post-World War U Japan, 
or as it is now being reshaped in the countries of Africa and Asia.120
Similarly, he explains both stagnancy and change in the legislature and 
courts of New York:
Nobody wished to waken the sleeping dogs and through open discussion disturb 
the long-standing compromise. But, at last the changing cultural climate broke 
the equilibrium between conservatives and liberals and when, in 1965 , the state’s 
highest court openly revealed the inanity of the strict law of the N ew  York books, 
the way was opened for the reform law of 1966.181
In each of these examples a goal is postulated—social reform, political 
tranquility, an end to legal hypocrisy—in order to explain some behavior- 
legislative action, legislative inaction, judicial action, But the attribution of 
institutional purpose is a risky enterprise, The institution, after all, does 
not have a purpose; only the individuals who compose it have goals, which 
arc always to sonic degree divergent and often diametrically opposed,iaa 
Confronted with this difficulty, Rheinstein makes no real effort to ascertain 
purpose empirically. Instead, he uses the multiplicity of divergent indi­
vidual purposes which contribute to the complexity of institutional purpose 
as a convenient excuse for post factum interpretation. When the evidence 
of purpose is taken from the law to be explained, compounding post factum 
interpretation, tautology, and conceptual fuzziness, analysis truly grinds to 
a halt.
In the United States the compromise of legal duality [between a strict law  on the 
books and a liberal law in action] must be maintained as long as conservatism is 
sufficiently powerful to prevent liberalism from com ing to the fore. D oes that 
situation still exist today, in 1 9 7 1  ? Much seems to indicate that conservatism has 
weakened to the point of allowing the liberalism of the law in action to be recog­
nized and find expression in the law of the books. For the advance of liberalism  
and the retreat of conservatism evidence can be found in both the life of the coun­
try in general and in recent developments of official divorce law in particular. 
But the recent developments in the divorce field also indicate that conservatism  
is still a power to be reckoned w ith .123
Existing legislation is explained by conservative ideology evidenced by the 
legislation; incipient legislative reform is explained by liberal ideology
120. p . 138.
121. P. 353 (footnotes o m itted ).
122. Stinchcom be has criticized this rejection of institu tional value as a useful sociological co n ­
cept and has suggested ways to m easure it. See A. S t i n c h c o m b e ,  supra note 83, a t 184 n.16 . W h at I 
object to in Rheinstein is no t the concept, bu t the failure to construct a m easure of institu tional value 
independent of the institutional behavior it is offered to explain, so as to avoid the risk o f tautology.
123. P. 258.
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evidenced by that reform; the anticipated limits of reform are explained by 
a mix of ideologies evidenced by those anticipations. This is description 
and speculation, not explanation.
It is not surprising that legal scholars are attracted to telic reasoning; 
I argued earlier that it constitutes the prevailing rationalization of our legal 
system.124 Moreover, social science is often equally uncritical in invoking 
such images to explain institutional behavior, as I indicated in my analysis 
of the organic fallacy.128 Indeed, we all find it difficult to avoid telic ex­
pression completely, for ordinary language and thought are filled with 
characterizations of purposive behavior. But it is vitally important to recog­
nize that the attribution of purpose is rationalization, not scientific explana­
tion, Conscious of this, wc must strive to limit our use of purpose to where 
it may be most fruitful—in the generation of hypotheses—and then scru­
pulously reformulate those hypotheses by means of concepts that more 
readily allow for verification.
Let me turn now from these fundamental requirements of social analysis 
to consider the substance of Rhcinstcin’s explanation—how he uses ideology 
to understand law. To some extent I will have to tease hypotheses out of a 
variety of scattered, basically descriptive statements.
6. At least in the western world, the two opposed ideologies set the outer lim its 
for substantive legal standards: limits of what can be conceived (cognitive) and
w hat can be valued (n o rm ative ) .126
7. “ [E x p e r ie n c e  seems to indicate tha t human beings differ in  their basic atti­
tudes and  that it has been due to their divergency that laws o f divorce have so 
often been expressions of compromise rather than of the consistently rational
implementation of a clearly conceived policy.”127
R e sp o n d in g  to the cautions urged above, it might well be possible to devise 
an in d ep e n d e n t  measure of “basic attitudes” and test whether the law at 
any given  t im e  does express their relative strengths. It might also be worth­
while to test Rheinstein’s belief that neither attitude can be wholly elim­
inated f ro m  consciousness—the belief which leads him to dismiss radical
reform as naive utopianism,
8. Ideology is acquired and held irrationally; it is not altered by reasoned analysis.
Rheinstein asserts this point very firmly. “Religious faith does not need 
evidence. A tenet of faith cannot and need not be proved. Its force is beyond
124. See text accom panying notes 51-54  supra.
125. See text accom panying notes 58-61 supra.
126. See text accom panying note 112 supra. T h is lim itation  to the  W estern  w orld  is R heinste in’s, 
not m ine. A lthough a com parativist, he deliberately excludes certain non-W estern  societies from  his 
scope. P. 413. Rheinstein explains that such cultures arc “ totally d ifferen t from  ours.”  If th a t were 
true, I w ould th in k  it all the m ore reason to include them  in  developing o u r theories; R heinstein’s 
parochialism  is unjustifiable.
127. Pp. 196-97.
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and above reason. So, too, is a secular faith held as a basic world view.”1”  
Yet elsewhere he displays considerable ambivalence, pointing to scientific 
and philosophical progress as an influential factor in the history of ideology.
With the renewal of Greek and Roman learning [in France during the Enlighten­
ment], memories of the dissolubility of marriage among the ancients were re­
kindled. With the growing emancipation of thought from religious dogma and 
precept, new ideas about man and his role in society and in the universe began to 
develop. Nature, along with Holy Writ and, later on, without or against it, came 
to be consulted as to what would be the natural system of law by which men were 
to live.139
[In America, at the turn of the century, the] certainty of the belief in the universal 
necessity of traditional Christian morals was shaken by social scientists like Wil­
liam E. L e c k y , comparatists like Henry Maine, and literary men like Henrik 
Ibsen, G. B. Shaw, or H. G. Wells. Doubts as to the effectiveness of legislative 
efforts to repress divorce were raised by the findings of social science, which wai 
coining to maturity.580
It is impossible to reconcile these statements, which appear to be produced 
by alternations of optimism and pessimism. 
In the end, however, Rheinstein is extremely cautious in his expectations 
about ideological change:
W e  cannot exclude th e  possibility of some ca ta c ly sm ic  e v e n t by w h ic h  th e  current 
t r e n d  to w a rd  lib e ra l in d iv id u a l is m  m ig h t  be reversed. T h e  country may be devas­
ta te d  by  n u c le a r  a t ta c k , c o n q u e re d  by  an enemy, or shaken by revolution, A 
p ro p h e t  m a y  k in d le  re lig io u s  fe rv o r  a m o n g  th e  m asses ; a d ic ta to r  m a y  use  th e  
to o ls  o f  p ro p a g a n d a  to  e s ta b lish  a new c re e d . A ll th a t  is p o ss ib le , a n d  in  th e  se q u e l 
th e  c u ltu ra l  c lim a te  o f  th e  c o u n try  m a y  b e  p ro fo u n d ly  a ffec ted . B u t as lo n g  as w e  
h a v e  an  e v e n  m o d e ra te ly  p eace fu l life  o r  m o re  o r  less tr a d i t io n a l  A m e ric a n  d e ­
m o c ra c y , n o b o d y  h as  it in  h is  p o w e r  to  rev e rse  th e  d ire c tio n  in w h ic h  th e  c u l tu ra l  
c lim a te  h a s  b een  d e v e lo p in g . 131
I hope it is not unfair to summarize Rheinstein’s perception of ideology in 
the following propositions:182
9 . Id e o lo g y  is re la tiv e ly  a u to n o m o u s  in  its  d e v e lo p m e n t, b a r r in g  c a ta s tro p h e s .188
1 0 . Id e o lo g ic a l d e v e lo p m e n t o ccu rs  a c c o rd in g  to  an  in te rn a l log ic .
1 1 . C h a n g e  in  id e o lo g y  is s lo w  a n d  c o n tin u o u s .
1 2 . B ecau se  n e ith e r  o f  th e  tw o  b as ic  a t t i tu d e s  c an  b e  w h o lly  e lim in a te d , th e  p re ­
v a il in g  id eo lo g y  is a c o m p ro m ise  b e tw e e n  th e m  w h ic h  is c o n s ta n tly  p u sh e d  in  
o n e  d ire c tio n  o r  th e  o th e r ,  p ro d u c in g  a p a t te rn  o f  c h a n g e  th a t  is cyclical.
128. Pp. 253-54 .
129. P. 199.
130. p. 48.
131. P. 408.
132. T he gist of these propositions adds little to the views advanced almost 70 years ago in A.V, 
D ic e y ,  L e c t u r e s  o n  t h e  R e l a t i o n  B e t w e e n  L a w  a n d  P u b l i c  O p in io n  in  E n g l a n d  D u r i n g  the 
N in e te e n th  C en tu ry  (19 0 5 ).
133. T his seems to be a paraphrase of the old chestnut, “ you can 't legislate m orals,"
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What is most striking to me about this notion of ideology is its extreme 
divergence from what I understand to be the characteristics of positive 
law, indeed, its total inversion of those characteristics. There are no limits 
to the forms that positive law can assume; it can express a single absolute 
value rather than compromising among several; contemporary lawmakers 
claim to pursue ends in rational fashion; and law is certainly not autono­
mous—it changes at the whim of judge or legislator, often quickly, with 
abrupt reversals of direction and according to no clear pattern.
What, then, is the connection between these two disparate phenomena; 
how can ideology explain law ? One gets a sense from the book that Rhein­
stein would like law to mirror ideology, for then law would become an 
effective means to control behavior and the gap problem would be solved. 
At times he even appears to suggest that the divergence between them is 
merely a consequence of the failure of lawmakers to perceive ideology 
correctly, or to follow it conscientiously.184
But this completely misconceives the relationship between law and 
ideology. They differ in content because they are different in nature, funda­
mentally and unalterably. First, there are differences in form and function 
among public ideology, private norms, written legislation, oral judicial 
opinions, etc., which result from differences in the settings in which each 
kind of standard is formulated and held. Second, and more important, 
positive law is an expression of power as well as ideology. Rheinstein is 
certainly not ignorant of this, but his discussion of power is grossly inade­
quate. In the United States and other “representative” or “mass” democ­
racies, he sees power as a reflection of numbers.
In  a sy s te m  o f  re p re s e n ta t iv e  d e m o c ra c y  th e  p o litic a l c o m p ro m ise s  a re  su p p o s e d  
to  be  w o rk e d  o u t  in  th e  le g is la tiv e  b o d ie s , in  w h o se  c o m m itte e s  c o n s ta n t  e f fo r ts  
a re  m a d e  to  a ch ie v e  th e  w id e s t  a c c o m m o d a tio n  to  m in o r i ty  in te re s ts  th a t  is p o s­
sib le  in  th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s . A t  tim e s , c e r ta in  m in o r i t ie s , esp ec ia lly  e th n ic ,  h a v e  n o t  
been  su ffic ien tly  o rg a n iz e d  to  e x p re s s  th e m se lv e s  in  th e  le g is la tu re s  a n d  o th e r  
p o lic y -m a k in g  o rg a n s . S u c h  m in o r i t ie s ,  as a t  o n e  tim e  la b o r  a n d  n o w  th e  N e g ro e s  
a n d  sec to rs  o f  s tu d e n t  y o u th , h a v e  lo n g  b een  q u ie s c e n t. W h e n  th e y  a w o k e  to  
p o li tic a l co n sc io u sn ess , th e y  re s o r te d  to  sp e c ta c u la r  d ev ice s  to  s t r e n g th e n  th e i r  
o w n  so lid a r ity , to  a t t r a c t  a t te n t io n ,  a n d  to  d e m o n s tra te  th e  d a n g e rs  th a t  m ig h t  
fo llo w  c o n tin u e d  n e g le c t o f  th e i r  d e m a n d s . O n c e  th e  s tre e t p a ra d e s , s t r ik e s  a n d  
nets o f  v io len ce  h a v e  s e rv e d  th e i r  p u rp o s e , th e  g ro u p  is in c o rp o ra te d  in  th e  b o d y  
p o litic  a n d  p a r t ic ip a te s  in  th e  n e v e r - e n d in g  p ro cess  o f  w o r k in g  o u t  c o m p ro m ise s . 
S u c h , a t  le a s t, h a s  so fa r  b een  th e  c o u rse  o f  A m e ric a n  p o litic a l life . T h e  q u e s t io n  
o f  w h e th e r  i t  w ill  c o n tin u e  th u s  to  fu n c t io n  is n o t  p u rs u e d  in  th is  b o o k .188
134. R heinstein explains the "liberal b reak th ro u g h ” in N ew  Y ork as follow s: "B ut, a t last the 
changing cultural clim ate broke the equ ilib rium  betw een the conservatives and liberals and w hen , in 
1965, the state’s highest court openly revealed the inanity  o f the strict law  of the N ew  Y ork books, 
th e  way was opened for the  reform  law of 1966." P. 353 (footnotes om itted ). Once the legislature 
was helped by the court to see the new  ideology, it changed the law to conform  to th at ideology.
135. Pp.252-53.
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The final sentence renders inescapable the conclusion that this is not a prop­
osition about how the political system works, but a value—an assumption 
which Rheinstein is not willing to expose to critical examination. Further­
more, he offers us little guidance in determining whether or not a given 
society is a mass democracy in which power is measured by numbers:
Both Sweden and the United States are fully established democracies, but Sweden 
is not a mass democracy. Traditionalist elements are still conspicuous in Sweden, 
among the upper classes and, even more so, among the peasantry. In a country 
of mass democracy such elements may be able to prevent the liberalization of the 
divorce law of the books. If in such a country liberalism is strong, the compromise 
will be worked out in the courts rather than the legislature and the law in action 
will cease to correspond to the law of the books. This is what has happened in 
Germany, in France, and in the United States. In Sweden, political life is deter­
mined by a pshntior pars which is almost uniformly liberal and whose foothold 
on political leadership is so firm that it can disregard nonliberal views held by 
even sizable segments of the public.1”
This definition of the political structure of a society is unfortunately tauto­
logical: the relationship between law and ideology is made to depend on 
whether the society engages in mass or elitist politics; but that in turn is 
determined by the degree of congruence between law and ideology.
Although Rheinstein’s attempt to understand the legal standards of 
society thus seems to me to fail, it nonetheless serves to point to further 
elements whieh must be included in our model;
structure of the
ideology +  power +  ^ st t^u- ------- > legal standards
tions that
declare standards
It is noteworthy that once we add these variables our expectation about the 
gap changes: ideology will differ from legal standards in all but the limiting 
situation where power and structural variables are negligible.137 The signi­
ficant question for books about law then becomes the way in which dif­
ferent configurations of power and institutional structure produce different 
relationships between ideology and legal standards. Rheinstein does not 
address that question.
D. Cultural Climate as an Explanation of Behavior
Rheinstein’s empirical studies led to the falsification of his initial pro­
position that the content of the substantive law of divorce determines the
136. p . 155.
137. Pow er can be ignored w here it is d istributed equally to every m em ber o f the population—  
in fact, and no t just in  political ideology. T h e  structure o f legal institutions can be ignored w here  these 
institutions are in no w ay differentiated— w hen, th a t is, they no longer have an autonom ous struc­
ture. I deal w ith  this la tter p o in t a t g reater length  in  A Comparative Social Theory of the Dispute 
Process, supra note 108.
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incidence of such behavior as divorce, factual separation, and other forms 
of marriage breakdown. Rather, he came to see law as apportioning mar­
riage behavior among those outcomes. Where, then, does he look for an 
explanation of marriage behavior itself ? The quotation with which I began 
the previous section188 suggests that Rheinstein again resorts to cultural 
climate. This use of a single variable to explain both behavior and legal 
standards is consistent with the expectation of homology between them, a 
belief that the gap is an anomaly which may be eliminated. Yet Rheinstein 
does not maintain that position; on the contrary, he sees cultural climate 
as producing quite disparate results:
[T ]h e  inclination to break up a marriage and to yield to such temptation is, like 
the opposite attitude, a result of those views and circumstances which in their 
totality make up the cultural climate of a given society. The divorce law, too, 
tends to be influenced by the cultural climate. H owever, the degree of strictness 
or liberality of the law does not always or necessarily have fully to correspond 
with the actual behavior. The cultural climate may be so complex that it affects 
actual marriage stability in one way and the configuration of the law in another.181
Here Rheinstein appears to concede what I argued in the previous section, 
that cultural climate is not a single unitary concept which leads to similar 
consequences under similar conditions, but a category of concepts, each of 
which produces its own characteristic, often divergent, results. And indeed, 
when we look at the content Rheinstein gives cultural climate, we find 
that it consists of two fundamentally different ingredients. Often it refers 
to the mental state of the actor; the use of ideology to explain legal stan­
dards was one example, and we will see others below. But elsewhere, despite 
Rheinstein’s insistence that “ethical and religious value judgments are as 
important as, or even more than, objective facts of social, economic, and 
political development,”140 it is the latter which he invokes to explain be­
havior.
The first of these approaches, the attempt to explain individual behavior 
in terms of individual motivation, is troubled by the same theoretical prob­
lems I raised in the previous section, even though here they are less obvious. 
We are all aware that our own behavior is goal directed and we use that 
awareness to interpret the behavior of others by assuming that they hold 
similar goals. Such imaginative identification is, of course, a cornerstone of 
literature, and in the hands of a sensitive artist can wonderfully illuminate 
human behavior. At the very least, however, it does require empathy with 
the person whose behavior is being explained, an empathy which can over­
come our natural egocentrism—the interpersonal equivalent of ethnocen- 
trism. Rheinstein’s values drastically constrict his ability to empathize,
138. See  text accompanying note 112 supra,
139. P. 284.
140. P. 10.
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biasing  his u n d e rs ta n d in g  in favor of m en  over w o m e n , the  old over the 
young , the  average over the  deviant, the m id d le  class over the  poor or the 
r ich , etc. T h e  fo llow ing  is an ex trem e b u t  certa in ly  no t u n iq u e  exam ple  of 
his insensitivity:
Efforts made through the administration of welfare laws to achieve higher regard 
for the sex and marriage code of white society have produced some results, but 
they are weakened by the resistance of the protagonists of Black Power and the 
allegedly different cultural needs of w hat is called the black community. T h e  
grow ing  strength of these tendencies am ong young Negroes is likely not only to 
counteract but to overbalance the eagerness of middle-class Negroes to adopt the 
standards of the white majority. T h e  liberalizing influence which Negroes have 
had upon the cultural climate of the nation th rough  their sex-stimulating music 
will probably be strengthened if the effort at integration should turn  out to be 
successful, It may decrease, however, if the black sector of the American people 
comes to live in the scheme of apartheid which now seems to be the aim of some 
of its leaders.141
Even a scholar endow ed  w ith  the necessary em p a th y  w ill  f requen tly  be 
lured in to  post fac tum  in te rp re ta tion  by reliance upon  telic reasoning , in
p a r: because of the substantial difficulties of verification. I will try to d e m ­
onstrate this by an a ly z in g  one of R heinste in 's  exp lanations:
W hile reliable statistics are lacking, it is obvious that long before the Civil 
W ar  divorce had become a common phenom enon of American life. , . .
W hile  the incidence of divorce was high, it does not appear excessive if one 
consider? the great extent of migration. Change of environment, often of an entire 
way of life, involves a temptation to be free of old ties of marriage and to establish 
new ones in the new community. Divorce was not the only device to open the 
door to remarriage. If communications are poor and registration of the populace 
is rudimentary or nonexistent, the male m igran t  who has left his wife behind may 
easily forget his intention to let her follow at a later time, and he may go th rough  
a new ceremony of marriage, or simply establish a common-law marriage with a 
new partner in his new place, without first having resorted to divorce. H e  is, of 
course, a bigamist. Nobody knows the num ber of undiscovered cases of bigamy. 
T here  is no doubt, however, that it is high, and that it was m uch higher in the 
nineteenth century when registration of civil status was rudim entary in the U nited  
States and disappearance was an easy substitute for divorce.142
R he .ns te in  seeks to explain  the con junc t ion  of h ig h  rates of divorce, factual 
separation, and  b igam ous rem arr iag e  or cohabita tion  on  the A m e ric an  
fron tie r  by a t t r ib u t in g  a m otive to the  f ron t ie rsm an , the “ tem p ta t io n  to be 
free of old ties of m arr iage  and  to establish new  ones in the  new  c o m m u ­
n ity .” 143 B ut suppose ano the r  analyst observ ing  the  same behavior w as to 
offer any of the  fo llow ing  alternative exp lana tions :  the experience of the
141. Pp. 411-12.
142. p. 35.
143. Id.
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frontier changed men so radically as to create a fundamental incompati­
bility with the wives who stayed behind, and couples mutually abandoned 
a marriage which had become an empty shell; men who went to the fron­
tier were misfits in the old society to begin with, and were fleeing an empty 
marriage which had broken down because they had never been able to 
fulfill the expectations of their wives; the wives left at home were unwilling 
to tolerate the separation and renounced the marriage; the ethic of the 
frontier idealized a view of manhood which was inconsistent with the roles 
of husband and father.
How is the reader to choose among these conflicting interpretations ? 
The only criterion offered is his ow n  empathetic understanding—neither 
the actor in history nor the individual in an alien society can be confronted 
and asked what his goals are. Radcliffc-Brown called this the “if-I-were-a- 
horse" argument after the “story of a Middle West farmer whose horse 
strayed out of its paddock. The farmer went into the middle of the pad­
dock, chewed some grass, and asked himself: ‘Now if I were a horse, where 
would I go?’ "m If farmers offer different guesses, there is no basis upon 
which to prefer one. Hypotheses which are verified by the same means 
which led to their formulation arc not verified at all.1*5
It is not clear whether Rheinstein is even interested in verification; 
having postulated the explanation of behavior, a priori, he also postulates 
the behavior it is intended to explain:
While reliable statistics are lacking, it is obvious that long before the Civil War 
divorce had become a common phenomenon of American life. . . .
. . . Nobody knows the number of undiscovered cases of bigamy. There is 
no doubt, however, that it is high and that it was much higher in the nineteenth 
century . . . .14#
Rheinstein’s analysis is really a form of legal rationalization, a mode of 
thought produced by the determination to make an assertion, to reach a 
decision, whether or not there is adequate information. Legal professionals 
are commonly forced into such a situation by external constraints: the law­
yer or trial judge who must ascertain the facts of the case and make a 
prediction about the behavior of the actors; the appellate judge, legislator,
144. M. G l u c k m a n ,  P o l i t i c s ,  L a w  a n d  R i t u a l  in  T r i b a l  S o c i e t y  2 (1 9 6 s) .
145. O ther m odes of verification arc conceivable. If we w ere able to obtain the fron tie rsm an’s 
d iary, or the letters he w rote hom e, we w ould have a m easure of his state of m ind th at was indepen­
den t of his actions. I am dubious about the value of such explanation, how ever: the goals that can be 
identified are com m only so general that they could m otivate alm ost any behavior; the behavior is so 
com plex that it could fu rther num erous, conflicting goals. I w ould prefer to rephrase the hypothesis 
so th a t it allowed of verification w ithou t inquiry  into the im m ediate m otivations of the actors. T h u s 
I w ould w ant to know  w hether m en on the frontier, or their wives at hom e, actually rem arried , and  
w h ether those m arriages lasted; and I w ould w ant to com pare the behavior of couples separated by 
m igration  w ith the behavior of couples not so separated.
146. P . 35 (em phasis add ed ).
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or administrator who must frame broad policy without the necessary statis­
tical data. Each of these frequently resorts to the same device: he assigns a 
motive to the individual or group consistent with their actions, and then 
deduces actions from that motivation. Motive and behavior reinforce one 
another in a circular, but artistically satisfying, manner. This is not expla­
nation. The scholar is fortunate in being protected from the pressures to 
reach conclusions without adequate data; he should resist any temptation 
to do so.
Despite his assertion of the primacy of values, Rheinstein does look 
beyond individual motivation for an explanation of behavior. He begins 
by referring to major social forces that act throughout a society and even 
across widely different societies, such as urbanization, industrialization, 
war, and anomie.147 Concepts this abstract require careful definition if they 
are to be meaningful. Were we, for instance, to determine empirically that 
a period we chose to characterize as one of increasing industrialization also 
exhibited more instances of marriage breakdown, would we really know 
anything? Which of the multitude of variables related to industrialization 
would be responsible for the change in behavior ? Rheinstein clearly per­
ceives the extreme complexity of the process of industrialization for he 
believes that it may, in the future, cease to be a cause of marriage break­
down, and ultimately even contribute to marriage stability.14" Yet he docs 
not attempt to circumscribe the notion, nor does he select among its nu­
merous constituent ingredients. A concept cannot explain when it is neither 
bounded nor analyzed, and when it can produce such inconsistent results.
Elsewhere Rheinstein does suggest concepts that mediate between the 
abstractions of industrialization or urbanization and data that may be 
concretely observed.
13. Marriage breakdown is positively correlated with a change from institutional 
to companionate marriage. This change may be measured in two ways.
(a) The extent to which the family has lost functions which it previously 
performed, such as
(1) alimentation
(2) education
(3) production
(4) recreation
(b) The extent to which it has come to monopolize the function of emotional 
sustenance.149
147. Pp. 120 (Jap an ), 134-35 (S w eden), 188 (Ita ly ), 240 (R ussia), 320 (E n g lan d ).
148. See pp. 422-23 . See also p . 120 n.26. H ere, as elsewhere, Rheinstein echoes the faith of the 
progressives. W illiam  O ’Neill writes or James P. L ichtcnhcrger, one of the first two scholars to study 
divorce em pirically: “ H e  believed [ th a t divorce] was a tem porary phenom enon produced by the 
industrial revolution and  the em ancipation of w om en. Once this transitional period was over, the 
fam ily w ould be reconstructed on the basis of perfect freedom  and equality ." W . O ’N e i i . l ,  D i v o r c e  
i n  t h e  P r o g r e s s i v e  E r a  180 (1 9 6 7 ); see L ichtenberger, Divorce: A Study in Social Causation in  35 
S t u d i e s  i n  H i s t o r y ,  E c o n o m ic s  a n d  P u b l i c  L a w  (C olum bia Coll. Study N o. 94, 1909).
149. See p p . 2 7 3 -7 4 . W illiam  Bates has poin ted  ou t that in  losing the  function  of recreation,
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The concepts in this proposition can be linked logically to the concepts 
in which we are interested. Thus we might hypothesize that the radical 
economic and social restructuring associated with the industrial revolution 
produces a shift from institutional to companionate marriage; and that 
companionate marriages tend to break down more frequently than insti­
tutional ones because the number and variety of ties binding the partners is 
drastically reduced while expectations concerning the emotional bond, 
which alone remains, are greatly increased. Furthermore, these hypotheses 
are framed in terms of variables capable of definition and measurement: 
the extent to which members eat, learn, play, produce, and obtain emo­
tional gratification inside the family or out; and instances of marriage 
breakdown as a proportion of existing marriages.
Change in the functional attributes of the family is only one of the 
social variables which Rheinstein selects from the existing social science 
literature. The probability of breakdown may be negatively correlated 
with the age at which the parties marry, for a variety of reasons: expecta­
tions about marriage may decrease with age;"0 adverse environmental 
factors, such as parental interference or economic hardship, may be more 
easily controlled or perhaps the psychological traits which lead to youth­
ful marriage also lead to breakdown,"8 The progressive emancipation of 
women may be correlated positively with marriage breakdown because: 
women come to share the expectations of men about the marriage relation­
ship;163 women reject the double standard of morality and exercise the 
same degree of sexual freedom as do men;164 and women demand and 
enjoy better educational and occupational opportunities;156 as a result of 
these changes acute uncertainty develops about the role of women and, 
correspondingly, about that of men.150 Finally, marriage breakdown may 
be positively correlated with the direct impact of adverse environmental 
factors, such as inadequate or overcrowded housing,157 alcoholism and drug 
addiction,158 or catastrophes of health.159
If these propositions are unobjectionable, it is because they are wholly 
unoriginal.160 In seeking to explain marriage behavior, Rheinstein has
m arriage w ould appear to have become less com panionate ra th e r than  m ore. I th in k #this is a legiti­
m ate  criticism  of R heinstein, and  also reveals th at concepts like com panionate and institutional m ar­
riage are  still quite  am orphous, even though  m ore concrete th an  industrialization  and urbanization .
150. Cf. p. 187.
151. Seep. 414.
152. P. 415.
153. Rheinstein suggests this by im plication w hen he contrasts the present high ra te  of divorce 
w ith  a past w here “m en had easy ways to find satisfactory pleasures outside of m arriage, and the 
w om en were accustomed to suffering in  silence.” P . 160.
154. See p. 136.
155. See pp. 135-36, 272-73 .
156. See p. 427.
157. See p. 333.
158. See p. 421.
159. Seep. 155.
160. Some idea o f the im m ensity  o f the  literature w hich seeks to explain fam ily behavior by
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drawn upon the existing sociological literature, but he has added neither 
theory nor data. Nevertheless, in recognizing that divorce, desertion, and 
other forms of breakdown grow out of marriage behavior, which in turn 
reflects the social environment, he has pointed us toward a further expan­
sion of our model:
social variables--------------- ► marriage behavior
E. Toward a New Model for Boo\s About Law
In the previous sections I have tried to draw from Rheinstein’s detailed 
descriptions a set of propositions, related to each other by means of more 
general theory, yet formulated in precisely defined concepts which allow 
empirical verification. In each section I explored explanations which relate 
one category of variable to another; thus I analyzed marriage behavior in 
terms of social structure, and legal standards in terms of ideology. One 
refinement upon this approach would be to combine several explanatory 
factors; indeed, I have already done so in urging that legal standards be 
explained by a composite of ideology, power, and the structure of legal 
institutions. Other propositions which incorporate multiple variables come 
readily to mind. For instance, if I were interested in explaining behavior 
within the legal system, such as the failure of most defendants to contest 
their divorces, I would look at the following elements: behavior outside 
the legal system—the fact that divorce is frequently preceded by significant 
periods of factual separation, and often by abandonment; the legal stan­
dards for divorce—the fact that it is an either/or proposition, in which a 
contest may lead to denial of the divorce to both parties; and the structure 
of legal institutions—the necessity to hire a lawyer in order to defend. Such 
a proposition still traces only the most obvious linkages among the vari­
ables: legal behavior is explained by other behavior, legal standards, and 
the structure of legal institutions. But if we look at these elements with a 
fresh eye we may come upon connections which are less commonsensical, 
and therefore more interesting. In order to stimulate such perceptions, let 
me review the categories of variables in what is admittedly a somewhat 
arbitrary arrangement:
m eans of o ther social variables can be obtained from  any o f the follow ing: W . G o o d e ,  E. H o p k i n s  & 
H . M c C l u r e ,  supra note 55; J. M o g e y ,  S o c io lo g y  o f  M a r r i a g e  a n d  F a m t l y  B e h a v i o r ,  1957-68
(1 9 7 1 ); Changes in the Family, 14 I n t ’l  S o c i a l  S c i .  J. 411 (1 9 6 2 ); H ill, Sociology of Marriage and 
Family Behaviour, 1945-56, 7 C u r r e n t  S o c i o l o g y  i  (1 9 5 8 ). Indeed, studies of the fam ily are the 
largest subdiscipline w ith in  sociology.
W hat is m ost disappointing  about R heinste in’s use of sociological findings is his biased selec­
tivity. In large p a rt he  is m erely repeating  the  m yths o f past generations about the destruction  of 
“ the classical fam ily ideal of w estern nostalgia,” unaffected by several decades of revisionist research 
and theory. See W . G o o d e ,  W o r l d  R e v o l u t i o n  a n d  F a m i l y  P a t t e r n s  6 (1 9 6 3 ).
R heinstein’s anecdotal and unsystem atic borrow ings from social science are very rem iniscent 
o f the landm ark  article in this field by Karl Llew ellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (p ts. 1 - 2 ) ,  32 
C o l u m .  L. R e v . 1281 (1 9 3 2 ) ,  33 C o l u m . L. R e v . 24 9  (1 9 3 3 ) .
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Culture
ideologies about 
m arr iage
Legal standards
substantive laws of 
m arr iage  and  divorce
Social structure
degree  of u rban iza t ion  or 
industr ia liza tion , 
d istr ibu tion  of pow er 
w ith in  society
Structure of legal institu tions  
characteristics of 
courts, legislatures, 
city c le rk ’s 
offices
Behavior outside legal Behavior w ith in  legal
institutions
varieties of m arr iage
behavior
institutions
varieties of marrying 
or divorcing
W e  have seen that Rheinstein merely repeats accepted sociological learn­
ing aboir t'-e bearing of social structure upon marriage behavior.101 If, in­
stead. we consider the influence of social structural variables upon behavior
v i th in  legal institutions, w e m ay  be able to construct propositions of greater 
novelty  For instance, the educational and economic advances which women 
have ed in  the  last cen tury  m ay  not only increase their expectations 
about m arr iage ,  b u t  also perm it  them  greater access to the legal process, 
to in itia te  or defend  legal actions. T h e  attrac tion  of legal remedies, and 
thus their  use, m ay  also vary w ith  age: the young  m ay be childless, eco­
nom ica lly  self-sufficient and , in a period of rapid  change, estranged  from 
prevailing  n o rm s ;  for these reasons they m ay  be unin terested  in m arr iag e  
or, if m arr ied  and  separated, in the  legal leg itim ation  of status, in custody, 
c r  in support .  T h e  old m ay  share these characteristics and also have ab an ­
doned  the hope  for a fresh start in m arriage .
A d  of the  propositions analyzed  thus far explain  behavior in te rm s of 
o ther  k inds  of variables, b u t  the  reverse re la tionship  is certainly conceivable. 
Rheinste in  m akes a variety of observations th a t  suggest ways in w h ic h  be­
hav ior  m ay  exp la in  legal standards.
1 4 . T h e  more that
( a )  judges in g ran ting  divorce, or
( b)  people in factually separating
deviate from the law of divorce, so as to increase the gap between law and
behavior, the greater the likelihood that those standards will be changed so
as to facilitate divorce .162
T h is  proposition  is aga in  consistent w i th  R he in s te in ’s view of the  gap  as an  
abno rm a li ty  w h ic h  creates pressure for its ow n e lim ina tion  w ith  an u rg en cy  
p roportiona l  to  its m ag n i tu d e .  H ow ever ,  the  proposition com bines, and
161. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
162. Cf. pp. 49-50, 257-58, 353.
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thereby confuses, two different gaps which must be sharply distinguished.
The gap between legislative standards and behavior within the legal 
arena (proposition 1 4(a)) may well be a force for change. Judges and law­
yers are trained in the prevailing legal rationalization: the failure of legal 
standards to control behavior within the legal system seriously threatens 
the rationalization; to the extent that deviant behavior persists, and obtains 
its own normative justification, it also creates a normative conflict which 
offends another legal value— consistency.10' If these characteristics of the 
first gap do stimulate legal professionals to action, they are in an excellent 
position to effect legislative change,104
The second half of proposition 1 4, however, refers to an entirely dif­
f e r e n t  k i n d  of gap, t h a t  between behavior outside the legal arena-factual 
separation— and the prescriptions of positive law. If that gap has any bear­
i n g  o n  lev; ' c h a n g e ,  h e  connection is different from, and vastly more com­
p le x  t h a n ,  hr re l a t ion ; ’-hip sketched above; I outline one possible linkage 
in the following propositions:
163. Riv n irip has deep respect for the law, and highly values consistency between law and
prartit Ti • ■ str 'kin,:' <-v *• Vnc<- f this is a passage in the book in which he mock* that value,
and c  111:1 have made his peace with il-e cap; “Is not all this make-believe a part, probably an
ind isputable one, of the compromise that has been worked out silently, one might even say sur- 
reptitiously, it. the courts rather than openly ii the legislatures? As any good compromise should, the 
compromise on divorce satisfied, although not fully, both sides, . . . The only ones who feel troubled 
art those occasional academics who view with alarm the hypocrisy of the system, the light-hearted 
w.r 1:1 vs! ;cii t rrmrit ' are committed and condoned, and who fear for the integrity of the law and 
the respect in which the law and its priests should be held by the public. At one time I was a member 
of this band. With advancing age I have come not only to accept but to admire the compromise. It has 
p esct ed ice In respect of an explosive issue, explosive just because it is an issue between beliefs 
deep ! I: .:r.d :hus unshakable by discussion and incapable of open adjustment.” P.254. The language 
in which he embraces the compromise seems to me to reveal deep ambivalence. It is still "make-
worked out "silently" and "surreptitiously” ; elsewhere he wrote of a "conspiracy of
and the “shadow world of practice." P. 257. It remains a form of "hypocrisy" which "con­
doned' peri'jry ard imperils the “integrity" of the law. Rheinstein has been brought to accept it only 
with tv. > 1.ii- age. Anri the levity of his language, in referring to the “alarm" of "occasional aca­
demics" wh ' ar" for the "respect" of the "priests" of the law, hardly belies his concern for these 
matters.
164, Rheinstein also a corollary to proposition 14 (a ): to the extent that legal standards
do n< t change so as to conform to behavior within the legal arena, there will be a loss of respect 
for law. He offers as evidence the attempt of the German Civil Code of 1900 to deter divorce. 
"In large groups of the population, especially among parties to marriages disrupted without fault, 
the statutory limitation of the grounds for divorce was felt to be unjust. The authority of the law was 
thus weakened, and the parties and their attorneys were made to feel they were in a situation of 
morally justified self-defense. The rise anti growth of collusive practices and the courts’ acquiescence 
therein appear to have been essentially caused by this factual situation.” P. 303. The notion is a 
familiai one: nullification of a particular law, whether by evasion or nonenforcement, breeds d is­
respect for and disobedience to that law, and law in general.
T i  n , both proposition 14(a) and this corollary seem to derive from "if-I-were-a-horse” 
thinking. 1 ither than from careful analysis and testing. Rheinstein is a law professor: every article he 
writes, every class he teaches, depends upon a substantial consistency between norm and praxis. If 
he were forced to go through such shenanigans, he would be deeply troubled and seek reform, as he 
has done, or !o'e faith. But do young lawyers, often confronted with the gap for the first time during 
their early years in practice, lose their respect for law? What about nonprofcssionals: does the party 
or witness who participates in a divorce have any respect for law in the first place; does his experience 
deviate from his expectations; do those expectations alter; does his new perception affect his subse­
quent conduct? I think it is time we saw the warning, "nullification breeds contempt,” for what it 
is— a statement of political ideology— and instead devised methods for testing empirically the con­
sequences, if any, of relative deviation of behavior from law.
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15. A change in legal standards will be more probable to the extent t h a t  th o s e  
persons who experience marriage breakdow n a n d /o r  factually separate come to
(a )  perceive their behavior as deviant according to the standards o f p o s itiv e  
law, and
(b )  value the legitimacy or other advantages which attach to  leg a l re c o g n i tio n
in the form of divorce.
Rheinstein frequently stresses the importance of social stratification for a 
proper understanding of the consequences of the gap. He recognizes that 
in a stratified society law can fully reflect the ideology of only one class and 
that other classes, whose behavior the law labels deviant, may justify them­
selves by means of their own values and remain indifferent to the need for 
a legal imprimatur/ ' Although this situation is potentially quite stable, 
a number of factors may disturb it and thereby generate the desire for legal 
change, Revolution may invert the classes, depriving the dominant class
h it had been accustomed. Even without such a 
violent tr.n formatio social mobility may bring into the dominant class 
persons v V retain their deviant behavioral traits but come to value official 
le,-; 1,iS Cult i d changes may be equally significant! the dominant
class ma reject the prevailing standards;1"7 the growth of an egali-
t rr :i idem' yy may render leg . legitimation attractive to a wider range 
of people,1"8
Yet the desire for legal recognition is not itself sufficient to secure such
legitimation:
i'j. A change in legal standards will tend to occur to the extent that persons desir­
ing such change also possess the power to effect it.
J rere, ns before/ 9 Rheinstein’s analysis of power is seriously limited. At 
time he sees it as a function of numbers— for instance, when he explains 
legislative reform in Sweden: “A  laboring class appeared and organized 
itself into a powerful political party. ... In 1905 the new spirit found 
expression at the polls. The Agrarian Party, which had dominated the 
political scene, was defeated."170 Elsewhere, however, he recounts instances 
where significant legislation has been passed without obvious electoral 
support:
Two years before the outbreak of W orld  W a r  II, the first major reform occurred
in tl : divorce law of England. T he  Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, generally
known, as H e rb e r t’s Act, was sponsored by A.P. (later Sir A lan) H erbert ,  the
165. See pp. 160 (19th-century Italy), 199-200 (18th-century France).
166. C j. pp. 268-69 (the United States, as well as other nations).
167. See p. 189 (Italy).
168. See p. 136 (Sw eden). This seems to explain the interest in legal reform recently displayed
by a variety f groups whose behavior departs from legal standards— ethnic minorities, wom en, hom o­
sexuals, and youth.
169. See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
170. Pp. 135-36.
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w ell-know n contributor to Punch. In his book H oly D ead loc \ (1 934 )  he had held 
up to ridicule the law and the collusive practices which it invited. W h en  he had 
him self  elected to Parliament from Oxford University, he introduced the private 
m em ber’s bill which, enacted into law, added to adultery the fo llow in g  new  
grounds for divorce: [desertion, cruelty, insanity] .171
Herbert himself could not have created a better parody of political power: 
the apolitical intellectual achieves legislative reform by writing a book, 
entering Parliament via a special constituency, and introducing a bill which 
lacks the backing of a political party.172 I fear that an explanation such as 
Rheinstein’s, which takes democratic ideology as a description of reality, 
is likely to be far too simple.
At times, however, Rheinstein does take account of social structural 
variables which affect the kind of legal change a given quantum of power 
can accomplish,
1;. Vv i 1 group ( A i i e s  legal change and possesses a significant am ount of  
pc ■ r it will Ik able to effect such change in judicial behavior, but not in
legislation, unless
(a ) the society is extremely hom ogeneous, or
( b )  the society, although democratic, is elitist, or
(c) the change does not involve basic values.178
As evidence for this Rheinstein contrasts mass democracies— the United 
States, France, Germany, which he sees as resting on a precarious consensus
preserved by a tacit understanding that issues which involve ultimate values 
will not be debated in public— with Sweden, a democracy dominated by 
an elite which is able to lead its mass following; Japan, a mass democracy 
in a homogeneous society where there is substantial agreement on funda­
mental values; and Russia, heterogeneous but a dictatorship.
Rheinstein formulated proposition 17 to explain the circumvention of 
strict divorce law by judges and lawyers. I would disagree with part of it. 
I see no reason to believe that, under these circumstances, change must 
invariably occur in judicial practice rather than in legislative standards; 
quite the reverse may be true. Many of the legal reforms demanded, and 
obtained, by minority groups— such as racial integration and women’s lib-
171. Pp. 319-20.
172. indeed, Herbert used it as the basis for a political lam poon: A .P .  H e r b e r t , T h e  A y e s
H a v e  It  ( 1 9 3 8 ) .
173. See pp. 2 5 1 -5 5 . R heinstcin ’s notion that institutional evasion is m ore likely in heterogeneous  
societies h a r. been anticipated in R. W i l l i a m s , A m e r i c a n  S o c i e t y  3 7 2 -9 6  ( i 9 6 0 ) ,  referred to in  J. 
GusriELD, supra note 37, at 1 1 4 -1 5 .
Furtherm ore, here, as in the previous proposition, R heinstein's concept o f pow er is shaped by 
his com m itm en t to dem ocratic ideology. A ccording to that ideology, judges and law yers are supposed  
to  fo llow  the w ritten  law  enacted by legislators w ho express the popular w ill. If they fail to do so, 
it is necessary to conclude both  that the legislators do not express the popular w ill, and that the 
judges and law yers do. T h e  latter assum ption is so inherently im probable that I can on ly  understand  
it as a reflection o f ideology.
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cration— took place in the legislative arena, and the compromise which 
occurred, or which may be anticipated, is found instead in the judicial or 
administrative bodies which apply those standards. Indeed, the relatively 
powerless are frequently conceded legislative reform precisely because they 
lack power. The proposition also fails to explain those instances in which 
fundamental issues dividing the population are the subject of legislative 
debates leading to changes in the law which are observed by the officials 
who apply them— e.g., divorce reform in New York after 1 9 6 6, and since 
then in other American states; abortion reform; the decriminalization of 
homosexuality. Rheinstein characterizes such occurrences as “remarkable” 
and “explains” them as indicating a shift in political power;1’* the explana­
tion may well be valid, but again we need an independent measure of power 
before we can test it.
Here as elsewhere, however, I am concerned less with the accuracy of 
these proj uions as empirical statements than with the way that they 
require us to broaden our picture of law in society. I argued at the outset 
of Part IV that to phrase the prevailing legal rationalization in terms of 
the model:
legal standards-----------behavior
was to reject it as a description of reality. By a continuing process of state­
ment, criticism, and refinement, we have arrived at our present model, 
which is nothing more than a schematic representation of the categories of 
variables listed at the beginning of this section. (See next page.)
The tentative exploration above of a few of the linkages in the model 
suggests that an explanation of change in legal standards must involve not 
only the element of behavior outside the legal arena, but also behavior 
inside it, the structure of legal institutions, ideology, attitudes toward law, 
and the social and political structure of the larger society. This transforma­
tion of our model therefore compels an equally radical transformation of 
the way in which we define problems for books about law. Rheinstein 
began with the expectation that legal standards could explain behavior; 
much of his book is therefore devoted to a discovery that they do not, an 
explanation for the gap’s existence, and recommendations for eliminating 
it. Our new model contains many more elements, and recognizes the possi­
bility of a wide variety of relationships among them. The gap is merely 
one such relationship. It is no longer seen as surprising, aberrant, unde­
sirable, and remediable, but rather an inevitable aspect of any real legal 
system.1 ~ W e  are therefore not interested in further rediscovery of its
174. See p. 365.
175. I have elsewhere delineated the lim iting case in which the gap would disappear, and have 
explained why it is an ideal type which cannot be found in reality. See A  C om para tive  Social T h eo ry
o f  the D isp u te  Process, supra  note 108.
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f  le g a l \  
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/  s tru c tu re  
f  of legal
in s t i tu t io n s
b o u n d a ry  of the  legal system
behavioral
variables
social s tru c tu ra l  
variables
b o u n d a ry  of the  social system
existence: the gap ceases to be a satisfactory ending for analysis. Instead it 
becomes a constituent relationship— not always a significant one— within 
the configuration of elements which make up the legal system and the 
environing society. The problem for books about law’ becomes how’ to iden­
tify alternative configurations, and explain them.
V. P o l ic y
Although I have devoted most of this essay to the development of socio­
logical propositions, Rheinstein himself consistently subordinates his desire 
to understand to his desire to act. It is to his prescriptions for action that I 
now turn. In contemporary social scientific scholarship, values commonly 
direct empirical inquiry toward factual knowledge which influences the 
creation of policies designed to achieve practical goals consistent with those 
values. Rheinstein, however, formulates policies which give symbolic ex­
pression to his values, while ignoring the substantive findings of his research 
about the practical consequences of such policies. I will try to demonstrate
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this by indicating discrepancies between findings and prescription, noting 
Rheinstein’s failure to test those prescriptions empirically by the criteria 
he requires for explanation, and suggesting parallels between his prescrip­
tions and values.
Rheinstein concludes unambiguously that legal standards do not sig­
nificantly influence marriage behavior. Instead he sees both standards and 
behavior as products of the cultural climate, an amalgam of cultural (ideo­
logical) and social (structural, economic, political) factors which are fun­
damental to the society and not susceptible to easy or rapid change.178 
Among the latter, the massive and seemingly irreversible transformation 
which accompanies industrialization predominates:
The process of industrialization involves so m uch m igration, uprooting o f tradi­
tional modes of living, obliterating of traditional m ores, etc. that w e m ust assum e 
almost v : i: certaintv tha t it not only induces people to regularize situations of 
a ciuai ' la 'ow n  w hich  have occurred in any case, but it is also a cause, nay, the
cause, of increased incidence of factual m arriage breakdow n.ITT
In the heterogeneous mass democracies with which he is primarily con-
cerned, p . v and social struc are inevitably lead to a compromise between 
scrvativc and liberal ideologies which produces a gap between legal 
standards and behavior.
Had Rheinstein’s policies grown out of this analysis, he would have 
advocated radical social change in order to diminish marriage breakdown 
or, with resignation, accepted the status quo. But he does neither. He asserts 
instead that, without changing the cultural climate, “it may still be possible 
to some, perhaps to a considerable, degree to eliminate or reduce the tempta­
tion toward marriage breakup which exists in certain specific situations. " 178 
He also hopes that, without changing polity or social structure, new legis­
lation “may succeed in eliminating or at least reducing the conflict between 
the law of the books and the law' in action.” 179
Perhaps I can show this lack of congruence more clearly by comparing 
concrete scientific findings with specific recommendations. The discussion 
above reveals that Rheinstein offers as explanations for marriage break­
down such consequences of industrialization as functional specialization 
in the marriage relationship, reduction in the age at marriage, female 
emancip: tion, and the environment of poverty. Howrever, Rheinstein’s 
recommendations do not speak to these factors: “For the strengthening of
176. Sec  p. 408.
177. P. 422.
178. P. 412.
179. P. 552 This hope is grounded in Rheinstein’s misperception of the gap problem. Merton’s 
criticism seems appropriate: “To seek social change, without clue recognition of the manifest and 
latent functions performed by the social organization undergoing change, is to indulge in social ritual 
rather than social engineering." R. M e r t o n , supra  note 63, a t  135.
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marriage stability, then, effective tools are available. Laws tending to make 
divorce difficult should not be considered one of them. Social policy and, 
above all, family counseling and family life education are effective means 
at our disposal.” 180 Of these, only social policy could be considered a re­
sponse to the environment of poverty. The disjunction between diagnosis 
and therapy could hardly be more pronounced.
If policy does not proceed from analysis, neither is it subjected to em­
pirical verification. Indeed, Rheinstein himself offers persuasive evidence 
for the inefficacy of what he recommends. First, he is extremely dubious 
about the impact of a comprehensive system of state welfare upon marriage 
breakdown. He notes that: “Temporary setbacks do not seem to increase 
the incidence of family breakdown. Such calamities as natural catastrophes, 
war, mass expulsion, or economic depression seem rather to cement family 
coherence.” M Hence welfare schemes that protect poor families against 
such harddrps nay actually lead to greater disruption. Enduring poverty 
is clear'y destructive of the family, but so too is the enhanced standard of 
living made possible by industrialization.
W -  do not know to w hat extent, if any, the breakup process among subprole*
1. rians is :duccd by improvement of social conditions. . , . T h e  reduction of that 
incidence which is caused by the rise of the bottom groups of society may thus 
be upset, or more than upset, by the d isrupting effects of industrialization. . . , 
[T Jh is  factor may lose relevance once the society has reached a high level of m a­
ture industrialization. . . .
. . . [H ow ever,]  more hum an  needs are fulfilled in our time than ever before. 
Yet dissatisfaction seems also to be more general and more intense. The very 
fulfillment of once pressing needs has made expectations run ahead of reality . 182
In the fully industrialized state acute hedonism may represent an even 
greater danger than want.
Similar doubts are expressed about family counseling. Writing about 
the Swedish counseling scheme in the descriptive portion of his book he 
observes:
U nder  the law, married people may turn  to the conciliator not only as a preliminary 
to judicial separation and divorce but also for the adjustm ent of disputes and
180. P. 443. In prescribing education as a cure for ills produced by economics, Rheinstein sounds 
singularly tike a turn-of-the-ccntury progressive. William O'Neill writes of George E. Howard, author 
of the n.-ss-vf 1004 f / ’i!r ry of M atrim on ia l Institutions', “Like many others, Howard found the roots 
of the probU .n buried deeply in economics, but this did not prevent him from believing that its solu­
tion was an educational matter. The apparent discrepancy between cause and cure troubled Howard 
not at all, for it was central to the whole progressive mystique that there was no social problem, no 
matter how t;ingled or complex, that could not be removed if only it were properly understood. Once 
an enlightened public opinion had been created through education, appropriate solutions would m ani­
fest themselves. Right thinking, coeducation, and eugenics would liberate the ‘vitalizing, regenerative 
power of a more efficient moral, physical and social training of the young.’ ” W. O 'N f.ill , supra  note 
148, at 175-75. O'Neill goes on to add that “this combination of sex education and traditional moral 
inspiration was a common recipe . . . ."Id. at 183.
181. P. 421.
182. Pp. 422, 428.
N o v e m b e r 1973] B O O K S  A B O U T  L A W 225
quarrels they may wish to have settled just for the purpose of preserving their 
marriage. But as little use seems to be made of this opportunity  as of its Swiss 
counterpart, where adjustm ent of marital quarrels belongs to the judge . . . . 188
And in the conclusion he adds:
Judgments about the effectiveness of conciliation proceedings in general and 
about compulsory conciliation in particular are divided. . . . [ I ]n France and 
G erm any they are widely held to be of little use . . . .
American conciliation systems have been praised highly, especially by their 
initiators. But the favorable judgm ents have also met with skepticism . 184
Finally, Rheinstein is equally ambivalent about the utility of family life 
education, which he sees as the responsibility of parents, churches, and
schools.
In this era of cultural change too m any parents have lost direction, are unable or 
unwilling to give guidance, are far from living an exemplary life. Only a fraction 
■ ; g h tve contact with ministers and mostly these contacts are fragile or
the ministers are unprepared. Sunday schools also reach but a part and tend to 
be curst.iy. So the schools have to step in and to systematize w hat they have done 
before. . . [But i jn  the present cultural climate the teachers are as uncertain
about ’ ■ • values as re the people at large. Few  are those am ong  them who have 
the gift of inspiration or the t to do more than instruct in skills and know l­
edge . 186
Notwithstanding such realism, he turns around and makes the astonishing 
claim: “But the schools do have influence, fair play is being developed by 
athletic coaches, civic responsibility by teachers of social studies, rationality 
.in courses on mathematics, and a good portion of information necessary 
for successful marriage is presented in special courses of education for 
family living.” 18'5 Given these doubts about each of the proposals, what 
evidence does Rheinstein offer to justify his prescriptions?
If  the causes of marriage breakdow n are to be kept within bounds, marriage coun­
seling and family-life education are regarded as effective means, together with a 
comprehensive scheme of measures designed to relieve the individual citizen of 
those disruptive catastrophes of the economy or of health which experience has 
shown release a chain of events likely to end in the breakdown of personalities, 
of marriages, and of homes. The steadiness of the Swedish divorce rate over the 
tivo decades from 1 9 4 5  to 1 9 6 5  seems to indicate that these efforts have not been 
w ithout success. 1*1
183. P. 148 (footnote om itted).
184. P. 440.
185. Pp. 434-35.
186. P. 435. At the risk of gratuitous overkill, I offer the follow ing observation by Durkheim , 
who was not on', one of the founders of sociology, but also professor of education at the Sorbnnne. 
H e wrote, in another context, that education “is only the image and reflection of society. It imitates and 
reproduces the latter in abbreviated form; it does not create it. The evil [suicide] is moral and deep- 
seated, and to expect education, which, after all, has bift a part of each of its students, and but for a 
short time, to overcome deficiencies in the whole social order is absurd." E. D u r k h e i m ,  S u i c i d e  372 
(J .  Spaulding & G .  Simpson transls. 1951), quoted in R .  N i s b e t ,  T h e  S o c i o l o g i c a l  T r a d i t i o n  155 
(19 6 6 ).
187. P. 155 (emphasis added).
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If Rheinstein’s proposals are not sociological propositions about change, 
derived from his data and subjected to empirical testing, can we say that 
they express his values? Such an assertion, by its very nature, cannot be 
proved. Nevertheless, there is a striking similarity between his values and 
policies. Rheinstein is still interested in strengthening the American family, 
but he no longer believes that every marriage can be preserved intact until 
the death of one of the parties. His solution is quintessential^  American: 
marriage has a built-in obsolescence; it should be terminated when it has 
broken down, i.e., resulted in factual separation ; each partner will then be 
free to enter a new, better marriage, reenacting the American myth of per­
petual renewal, the clean slate, and the capacity for infinite progress, “Inso­
far as divorce opens the door to legitimate remarriage and thus to the 
creation of new homes free of any taint of illegitimacy, it is a social good 
rather than an evil.,!!n' Rheinstein therefore advocates a more liberal di- 
vorcr law which he hopes will eliminate the gap and avoid the undesirable 
behavioral consequentes of that gap; at the least, it will grant legal recogni­
tion to status and approval to behavior, both of which arc presently illegal 
or a legal marriages which have broken down but not terminated, rela­
tionships which have begun but are not formalized.180
But what are the consequences of liberalizing the law? At the outset, 
Rheinstein makes light of the fears of others: “ ‘Divorce breeds divorce.’ 
This assertion had been made time and again, with deep conviction and 
without evidence.” 1 ' The empirical studies that he collected or conducted 
to test the proposition “that easy availability of divorce encourages marriage 
breakdown' led him to conclude that it does nothing of the sort: it only 
permits those factually separated to legitimate their separation bv divorce.191
Nevertheless, with the same deep conviction, and now against the evi­
dence, Rheinstein asserts: “the impression prevails that in modern life 
marriages are concluded with less consideration than they once were. Un ­
questionably, the knowledge that in case of failure a divorce can be obtained 
with ease has contributed to the development of this inclination to take 
the step of marrying less seriously.”10' He therefore qualifies his advocacy 
of liberalization with a proposal of other means to control behavior. The 
means he chooses— especially education and counseling— differ from law 
in sevtial very significant respects. First, they are preeminently avenues 
for the ( Kpression of value; but unlike law, a gap between preachment and 
practice does not discredit the whole enterprise. Second, law is constrained 
by libern! tenets to offer men the freedom to disobey and suffer the penalty.
188. P. 276.
189. See pp. 333 (irregular unions), 432 (trial marriage).
190. P . 277.
191. Cf. pp. 306-07 .
192. P. 419.
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Rheinstein recognizes that this is not an effective way to secure obedience. 
Education and counseling, by altering the values, the goals, and the irra­
tional drives of men, promise to be far more successful.
Another avenue ought to be explored too: in w hat ways can we reduce the psycho­
logical tensions which may be a source of marriage breakdow n even more sig­
nificant than economic adversity? Such tensions may be created by sexual mal­
adjustment. Education promises to have prophylactic effects. Therapy may be 
provided by physicians, especially psychiatrists, the treatment possibly through 
marriage counseling, including premarital counseling.
, . . W h a t  is needed is a school curriculum in which education for family living 
constitutes an integral part of all teaching, from nursery school all the way up to 
college. In play, songs, stories children of every age can be shown w hat makes
and what destroys a harmonious home,
Th most u sc I c ’■ sen  ice a conciliator can render is that of m ak ing  clients 
realize that their marital difficulties have their roots in decpscated personality de­
fects. w. ith  can rarely be corrected in ways other than psychotherapy or counseling 
extending over some period of time. T h e  conciliation service is therefore success- 
fu w h n  i: s the clients see that they, and perhaps their parents as well, have 
to change psychologically.108
This approach also allows Rheinstein to place the blame for marriage break­
down upon the human psyche rather than the social structure, and thus to 
argue for psychological manipulation in place of radical social change.11’* 
Rheins te in ’s choice of the ways to control marriage behavior solves other 
dilemmas as well. He had found the gap to be inevitable in heterogeneous 
mass democracies because of the inability of a public legislature to debate 
and resolve such emotionally charged issues. By contrast, the alternative 
mean of control he advocates are thoroughly elitist, private, and unrespon­
sive to any constituency: psychological counselors are largely invisible to 
the public, educators can take refuge behind a screen of alleged expertise, 
and welfare administrators can safely ignore their politically impotent 
clients. Counselors, educators, and administrators can therefore respond 
to, or even initiate, change in values without the need for continual com­
promise. Furthermore, whereas legal standards are expected to be universal 
and neutral, education and counseling can individualize their treatment 
of those in different social strata. Welfare administration, of course, only 
affects the limited segment of the population unfortunate enough to depend 
on it. “The impact of social welfare measures upon family stability is 
potentially enormous. Through well-considered use they could constitute 
an effective device of rational family policy and prove much more effective
193. Pp. 426,435,441.
194. Dahrendorf makes a similar criticism of those writers on capitalist society who analyze 
class conflict within it as “an (alm ost psychological) phenomenon of ‘deviance’ from a normal state
of integration and cooperation.” Sec R. D a h r e n d o r f ,  supra note 8, at x 12-13.
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than manipulation of the laws on divorce.”19' Thus the upper and middle 
classes will be trained to value the desired model of family behavior while 
the poor, who are culturally impervious to such training, 10'1 will be induced 
to conform by manipulations of the welfare system to which they are
powerless to object.
VI. C o n c l u s i o n
Rheinstein’s book is, to me, a source of both disappointment and hope. 
I am disappointed because, despite its claims, it is still a law book with all 
the limitations of this form. Values are not made explicit, and therefore 
continue to dominate the research design unconsciously. The problem re­
mains that posed by the legal realists almost 50 years ago: the gap between 
the law on the books and the law in action.10" It is approached in an eclectic 
fashion which fails to face up to the requirements of scientific explanation. 
The explanations given are often inadequate because they are biased by 
unstated values, because the questions asked were not theoretically fruitful, 
and because there was insufficient methodological care. The policy rccom- 
raendatirns simply restate initial values, uninfluenced by the findings of 
research. At the same time, 1 doubt that Rhcinstein’s book would please the 
tradition; 1 legal scholar, who will look in vain for original analysis of legal 
doctrine. The book is therefore plagued by the perennial dilemma of inter­
disciplinary research: in its attempt to satisfy the standards of two disci­
plines, it fails to satisfy either, and risks being disowned by both.
Yet the study holds out the promise of what a book about law might be. 
Although values are not articulated with precision, neither are they hidden 
behind a facade of neutrality. The problem is stated simplistically at first, 
but is progressively refined. Notions of what constitutes an explanation 
are present, even if not scrupulously observed. An implicit theory about 
the interrelationship of legal and other social phenomena can be found. 
Empirical data to test that theory are sought outside the law library. The 
conclusions of the study could be used to formulate policy more intelli­
gently. Only if we can perceive and accept the differences between law 
books and books about law, and insist that each intellectual enterprise obey 
its own appropriate criteria, can we advance either, and thereby hope to 
advance both.
195. P. 425. A  strik ing exam ple o f the m anipulation o f the politically im potent is the recent 
sterilization of poor black w om en  in the South by the M ontgom ery (A labam a) Fam ilv P lann ing  
C linic and by D r. C lovis H . Pierce o f A ik en , South Carolina, w ho was paid by Federal M edicaid. 
See  N .Y . T im es, July 2, 1973, at 10, col. 1; id., A ug. 1, 1973, at 27, col. 1.
196. “T he m otivational force o f the consideration o f social respectability o f  a new  relationship  
varies am ong different groups of the population. It tends to be w eakest in the bottom  econom ic group. 
In the present-day U nited  States this group is to som e extent characterized by color." P. 279. It is, 
of course, egregious class prejudice to proclaim  that the poor are not concerned w ith  social respect­
ability.
197. T his is also the topic for the 1974 conference o f the Law  and Society A ssociation.
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East A fric a n  C ases on the L a w  o f  T o r t. By E. Veitch. (Law in Africa No. 31). London, 
Sweet & Maxwell. 1972. xxiii, 295 pp. £4-00 (paperback edition available only 
in Africa, £2-50).
T he problem with this book lies in what it is not. I accept that it is generally 
unfair to criticize an author for not writing some other book—one the reviewer 
might prefer. But the present author has set forth his own goals and then failed to 
live up to them. T he goal implicit in the title— a comprehensive exposition of tort
law in East Africa—is reaffirmed in the Preface:
“This casebook is intended for students and teachers of tort law in East 
Africa, although it may be of value to the practitioner because of the un­
reported material herein, as well as to others interested in the comparative 
method within the Continent.“ l 
In fact, the book consists of extct sive excerpti from, and  commentary upon, cases 
from the Hieh < oun of hr three Last African countries, reported and unreported 
concerning the received law I have no reason to think that the coverage is other than 
excellent.2 But is this “the law of tort’’ in Last Africa? Veitch asserts:
“ I’he law of tort in East Africa today comprises law of both alien and 
customary origin: however, while customary law has retained its power in 
the fields of family law and succe ssion,  and to a limited extent, in the criminal 
law, it cannot be claimed that it has been allowed to exert any real influence 
on the development of this part of the civil law,“a 
I disagree. 1 will substantiate m y  disagreement with data from Kenya, the only East 
African legal system with which I feel adequately familiar; but I believe my view 
applies, in greater or lesser degree, to Tanzania and U ganda  as well.
The law of Kenya is established by statute:
“The High Court and all subordinate courts shall be guided by African 
customary law in civil cases in which one or more of the parties is subject 
to it or affected bv it, so far as it is applicable and not repugnant to justice 
and morality or inconsistent with any written law . .
“A District Magistrate’s Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and 
powers in proceedings of a civil nature where . . . the proceedings concern a 
claim under customary lawf . .
“ In this Act, except where the context otherwise requires— ‘claim under 
a w ’ means a claim concerning any of the following matters under 
African customary law—
(a) land held under customary tenure;
(b) marriage, divorce, maintenance or dowry;
(c) seduction or pregnancy of an unmarried woman or girl;
(d) enticement of or adultery with a married woman;
(e' matters affecting status, and in particular the status of women, widows 
and children, including guardianship, custody, adoption and 
legitimacy;
(f : succession, both testate and intestate, and administration of estates, 
except us regards property disposed of by a will made under a written
law; . . ,’’8
1 F ast A frican Cases on the L aw  o f  Tort, p . v  (h erea fter  c ited  b y  p a g e  n u m b er  o n ly ) ,
2 It does, however, se em  c o n s id e r a b ly  m o re  e x te n s iv e  for U g a n d a  th a n  for the  o th e r  tw o  
c o u n tr ie s ;  th is is u n d e r sta n d a b le  in  v ie w  o f  th e  d iff ic u lty  o f  c o lle c t in g  u n rep o rtcd  m a ter ia ls .
3 P. 1.
* J u d ic a tu r e  A c t 1967, s. 3 (2 ) .
5 M a g is tr a te ’s C ourts A c t  1967 , s. 10 (1) (a ).
6 M a g is tr a te ’s C ou rts A c t 1967, s. 2.
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The precise import of these statutes is not at all clear. The Judicature Act appears to 
make customary law applicable in all cases where one of the parties is “subject” to
it or “affected” by it— vague concepts, but potentially quite broad. The Magistrate’s 
Courts Act, however, enumerates five categories of cases which involve a “claim under 
customary law”.
H o w  will these statutes be reconciled? Will the categories be understood as merely 
illustrative of the general concept of customary law, or as an exhaustive listing of all 
possible claims under customary law? The “plain meaning” of the statutory language 
might suggest the latter interpretation. I would argue, however, that the extirpation 
of a significant body of indigenous law requires wording that is more explicit, less 
ambiguous. Certainly nothing in the legislative debates indicates any awareness that 
the Acts would have this result, though I am told that some government officials 
had it in mind. When I was last in Kenya in January, 1971, I learned that this precise 
issue was to be heard b> the High Court.1 The case involved a claim for kore (blood- 
money) under Duruma customary law. The District Magistrate granted the award, 
and the Resident Mac;is*rate denied an appeal which argued explicitly that the lower 
court had lacked jurisdiction to entertain a “claim under customary law" that did 
not fall within au> ufi’w .-numerated categories. I have been unable to find out what 
happened in the case B it surek th-s issue should have been discussed in the book; 
and whichever way .t n eventual!-, resolved, Veitch’s denial that the customary law  
has had “any real influence” is hardly correct.
Perhaps hi-. us.->< r-.i betic; -.plained as an observation about the particular 
courts he chose to examine For he adm its;
“The vast majority of cases reaching the High Courts are decided in terms 
of the received law although the cases coming before courts of inferior juris­
diction and disputes settled in the customary tribunals are determined 
according to principles of the customary law.” 8 
Why, then, did he decide to study only the High Courts? It is understandable, if also 
regrettable, that a lawyer would feel poorly equipped to study customary tribunals. 
But whatever the reason for the decision to ignore the lower courts, and it can only 
be surmised, I think it is mistaken.3 I believe that the number of cases heard by a 
category of courts may be used as one index of the importance of those courts in the 
administration of justice. The following are the most recent statistics I have for Kenya.
T a b l e  I: C o m p a r i s o n  o f  C i v i l  C a s e s  H e a r d 4
District High Court
.Magistrate's Courts (Original and Appeal)
1 9 6 9  . . . 47.678 2,957
1 9 6 8  . . .  42.71 2  2.256
1 9 6 7 . .  . .  59 . 1 10  2.45 1
1 The decision from which the appeal was being taken was: Kamanza s/o Chiwaya v. Manza 
w'o Tsuma, Mombasa Resident Magistrate’s Civil Appeal No. 8/6g (18.9.70), dismissing 
appeal from Kinango District Magistrate’s Civil Case No. 198/68 (no date). Other claims 
for bloodmoney had been heard twice before by the court at Kwale. Each was granted, and 
in each case a appeal was taken to the Resident Magistrate at Moinbasa. Different magis­
trates heard the two appeals, one allowing the appeal, the other dismissing it. See Mombasa 
Resident Magistrate’s Civil Appeal No. 66/68, dismissing appeal from Kwale District 
Magistrate’s Civil Case No. 35/68, and Mombasa Resident Magistrate's Civil Appeal No. 
13/69, allowing appeal from Kwale District Magistrate’s Civil Case No. 123/68. (The same 
District Magistrate si: at Kwale and Kinango, which arc both w ithin Kwale District and 
serve the Duruma people.)
* P. 1.
* I have stated my reasons more fully in a review ol Spalding, Hoover and Piper, * “ O ne
Nation, One Judiciary” : The I.owrr Courts of Zambia’, in a forthcoming issue of African
Law Studies.
4 These figui what was then an unpublished report of the Judicial
Department for the years 1966-70.
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According to this admittedly crude index, the lower courts are roughly twenty times 
as important as the High Court. But, it might be answered, the lower courts are 
required by the doctrine of precedent to follow' the decisions of the High Court; 
therefore it is twenty limes more efficient to study only the decisions of the latter. 
We know, however, that precedent is only a doctrine, not a reality. And Veitch 
himself, after deploring the inadequacy of law reporting in East Africa, and noting 
several egregious deviations from precedent, states: “ the dangers to systems leaning 
on sta re  d tc i.\is o f non-reporting cannot be overlooked’’.1 I have elsewhere given m y  
evidence for believing that the lower courts of Kenya are even more erratic in follow­
ing decisions of the superior courts than is the High Court in following its own or 
those of the East African Court of Appeal.3 The customary law of torts applied by 
the lower courts of Kenya can therefore be understood only by studying the decisions 
of those courts.
But is that law important? Veitch is sure it is not; his evidence, however, is
unconvincing:
“The tort actions involving elements of customary law which have come 
before the Hi, Courts in t! e last decade have been limited to interference 
with familial n . ations and damages for fatal accidents. This conforms with 
the experience of other h * vstems in Africa that customary law is strongest 
in the field of personal law.3 . . .
Custom is formally guaranteed in the statute books, but it cannot be 
pretended lh.. hie ruston law - fighting back with any success against 
the power of the received law. For reasons which are social, economic and 
political it is clear that customary tort law will remain limited to such areas 
a:, elopement, adultery, seduction and the assessment of damages for personal 
injuries and wrongful death.’’4 
For the reasons given above, 1 think it is absurd to look at cases brought to the High 
Court as representative of the kinds of customary law- cases involving tort which are 
litigated in Kenya. Veitch, himself, has already admitted that they are not. How 
could they be, when the District Magistrate’s Courts are easily accessible to almost 
everyone in Kenya, but the High Court remains the forum of the elite as a result of 
so mam' cumulative factors: location, court costs, the need to be represented by 
counsel, language, subject-matter jurisdiction, cultural dificrences, delay, etc. And 
indeed, when we look at an analysis of tort litigation in the African Courts of Kenya 
for 1966 we see a very different picture.
1 P. 7.
* See R. L. \ >e method research in the customary laws of wrongs in Kenya, Part
II: statistical analysis’', (1970I 6 E.A, L.J. 20, 36-50.
3 P. 2.
*P- 3-
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T a b l e  II: F r e q u e n c y  o k  K i n d s  o f  C i v i l  L i t i g a t i o n  i n  A f r i c a n  C o u r t s  o f  K e n y a ,
19661
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demonstrates that Veitch is wrong about the importance of
Court (and tribe)
Hamisi (Luyia) 
Mumias (Luyia) 
Kakamega (Luyia) 
Kosi-le (Luo) 
Maseno (Luo)
Kisii (Gusii) 
Kiambu (Kikuyu) 
Kericho (Kipsigis) 
Sotik (Kipsigis) 
Kilifi (Ciriama) 
Kaloleni (Giriama) 
Gwirani (Digo) 
Kinango (Duruma) 
Wundanyi (Taita) 
Ivcti (Kamba)
customary tort law in two critical respects. First, it h a s had a very real influence upon 
the development of the law for, in the 15 courts about which I have data, it represents 
a very significant portion of the total litigation, varying between 18 and 5 4%, with 
a median of 38%. Second, it is simply not true that customary torts arc limited to 
interference with family relations and personal injury. .As the table indicates, it is 
impossible to generalize about the kinds of tort action which predominate in the 
different courts. Thus interference with a husband’s exclusive sexual rights over his 
wife represents 70% of the tort cases in the Giriama court at Kilifi; impregnation of 
an unmarried girl represents 40% of all tort cases in the Kikuyu court at Kiambu; 
assault constitutes more than half o f all tort cases in the Kipsigis court at Kericho; 
and abuse accounts for more than a quarter of all tort cases in the Luo court at Doho 
Kosele. At the least, this heterogeneity falsifies Vcitch’s generalization.
The data in Table II, however, are from 1966. The following year, as I indicated 
above, legislation was enacted which mav have altered the capacity of the courts to 
entertain actions founded upon customary conceptions of wrong. But whichever wray 
the High Court ultimately construes that legislation, I have argued that problems 
of communication with and control over the lower courts dilute the influence of 
legislation upon the kinds of tort cases those courts arc actually handling. Unfortu­
nately, when I returned to Kenya in 1971, I found that legal scholars w-ere no longer 
allowed free access to court records, as a result of the following memorandum:
1 This table is compiled from the record books of the individual African Courts, supple­
mented where necessary by case records. Because of the difficulty of classifying cases taken 
from different customary legal systems, it should be read as only a rough indication of the 
diversity of litigation. It is not even an exhaustive enumeration of customary tort cases, for
many cases brought as private prosecutions under the Penal Code also seek compensation 
according to customary tort law.
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“Circular to Magistrates No. 9 of 1969 :*
High Court Practice Note
His Lordship the Chief Justice has directed that provisions of rule 2 of part 3 
of the Rules of Court should in future be strictly adhered to.
This will mean
(a) that application for reference to an archive must be in writing;
(b) that in the case of decided cases a fee of Shs. 6 /- must be charged and 
in the case of pending cases a fee of Shs. 4  - must be charccd unless the 
Judge remits or reduces this Shs. 4 /- fee on account of the poverty of 
the applicant;
(c) the Deputy Registrar in charge of the Civil Section will seek the 
approval of the judge prior to granting leave to refer to any archive;
(d) the principles upon which leave may be granted and under which 
archives may be inspected are set out in rule 2 and will be strictly
adhered to;
(e) Magistrates should note that under paragraph  t ‘Ju d g e ’ includes
‘Magistrate’,”
The r< earch whuh provided the data for Table II required the examination of 
many thousands of case record such research is now rendered prohibitively ex* 
pensi\ r, even where r ;s .-.till permitted. It will be impossible in the future to determine 
anything about unreported litigation in the lower courts, This barrier can only
perpetuate ! - n di that legishuion and reported High Court decisions not only 
prescribe what the lower courts ought to do, but also describe what they are doing in 
fact. The mvth may comfort those who believe, or wish to believe, that customary 
tort law no longer has any real influence in Kenya; but it is grounded upon 
deliberate, self-imposed blindness to reality,
Throughout the book Veitch declares himself in favour of the Africanisation of tort 
law , and decries both the ethnocentrism of colonial judges and the preference for 
English precedents which has persisted even after independence. But surely no part 
of the legal svstem of East Africa is more African than the indigenous customary law'. 
The author's uninformed dismissal of customary law is inconsistent with his sell- 
proclaimed values.
R i c h a r d  A b e l
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Spalding, Francis 0., Earl L. Hoover and John C. Piper, "One 
Nation, One Judiciary: The Lower Courts of Zambia", ZAMBIA
LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 2, Nos. 1 & 2. Lusaka, Zambia, School of 
Law, University of Zambia, Box 2379, 1970. xiv, 289 p. $6.00
Upon a superficial glance, the lower courts of Zambia have in 
common only the fact that they are lower in the judicial hie­
rarchy than the High Court. Consisting of three classes of 
subordinate courts (the magistracy) and two categories of lo­
cal courts (urban and rural), they vary widely with respect 
to almost any significant judicial characteristic: jurisdic­
tion - territorial, subject matter, and whether original or 
appellate, location, personnel, procedure, and even substantive 
law, Nevertheless, these courts are usefully studied together 
for several reasons. The sixty magistrates^ and 'approximately 
825 local court justices^ rather outnumber the six High Court 
judges, It is the former who handle the vast mass of litiga­
tion: in 1969 the local courts heard 73,439 cases and the
subordinate courts 33,758, while only 2,741 cases were filed 
in the High Court,J One explanation for this disproportion 
is the fact that the lower courts are geographically and eco­
nomically far more accessible to the ordinary Zambian: magis­
trates are located in twenty-nine of Zambia's fifty-four dis­
tricts, and everyone is near at least one of the four hundred 
and two local courts; lawyers are not necessary, and rarely 
appear, and court costs are low.4* The High Court, by contrast, 
sits only in Lusaka and a few other cities, and must be ap­
proached through an advocate.
Yet despite the predominant role which such courts play in ad­
ministering justice to the people, legal scholarship has large­
ly ignored them. In the West this disregard has been justified 
by an ideology which asserts that the lower courts are pallid 
imitations subservient to their appellate superiors, within
1. P. 127. (The book under review wTill be cited by page
number only.)
2. P. 175.
3. P. 284.
4. P. 127, 168.
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which alone significant judicial behavior occurs. Most Afri­
can legal studies have unfortunately adopted this view, con­
centrating on the appellate decisions of the highest court 
of one or more countries. But the model of a lower court 
meticulously adhering to precedent in substantive law, and 
to administrative decree in procedure —  a gross distortion 
even in western legal systems —  simply cannot be maintained 
in Africa. For all these reasons, the authors are to be ap­
plauded for their decision to study the lower courts, and 
even more for their.recognition that the institutional struc­
ture of those courts is at least as important in understanding 
their operations as are the substantive legal standards which 
purport to guide them.5
Among the possible approaches to the study of legal institu­
tions, three seem relevant here: explication of the legal
doctrines which state the norms of operation; description 
of the ways in which the institutions actually operate; and 
explanation of such operations as social phenomena, The au­
thors —  a law teacher and two law students —  quite naturally 
begin with the first of these, and devote more than a third 
of the book to a history of the statutes relating to court 
structure and the ideologies which have guided the development 
of that structure. This is unquestionably a useful starting 
point: statutes do establish boundaries for action; ideology
does influence legislative and administrative change. But the 
exegesis of doctrine should not become an end in itself, as 
happens in the last quarter of the book, which analyzes fine 
points in the jurisdiction of the lower courts. Spalding jus­
tifies this excursion as follows:
An answer to the question whether a court 
has judicial power is a necessary prelimi­
nary to the exercise of judicial power by 
that court —  at least where the question 
is raised....
5. It is interesting to note that, on those rare occasions 
when legal studies take institutional structure into account, 
the institution studied is almost always a court. Legal scho­
lars have largely ignored the structure of legislatures, admi­
nistrative agencies (with the exception of the police and cor­
rectional institutions), and the larger society.
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Moreover, unclear jurisdictional rules a r e  
both a trap for the unwary and a devastating 
technical tool in the hands of a skilled 
practitioner.6
But he then admits, with some embarrassment:
It is true in the Zambian legal system as 
elsewhere, of course, that jurisdictional 
rules or dicta in the cases are often over­
shadowed or obscured by the more compelling 
substantive issues within which they lie 
embedded....[T]he jurisdictional aspects 
do not always appear even in such indices 
as are available.'7
[I]t is remarkable how infrequently questions
of conflicts and choices of law have arisen 
in the cases. Even less frequently, perhaps, 
has there been any discussion of the question 
here —  the jurisdiction or power to apply 
a body of rules of law.^
If the issue of jurisdiction is rarely recognized and discussed, 
the concept would seem to be of singularly little use in under­
standing judicial behavior. Why, then, does Spalding spend his 
time analyzing it? Apparently because of the delight he takes 
in applying the skills of a highly competent American lawyer 
to virgin territory —  "a subject with complexities enough to 
suit the must fully developed legal system"^ —  in an effort to 
construct a typically .American legal product —  "an extensive, 
reasonably cohesive, reasonably harmonious body of case law of 
the jurisdiction of courts."10
6 . P. 219.
7. P. 221.
8 . P. 229.
9. P. 2.
1 0 . P. 220.
1 0 0
The distinguishing strength of this book, however, is that it 
goes well beyond the preoccupation w^ ith refinements of doc­
trine, on which legal scholarship has generally foundered.
More than a third consists of an outstanding description of 
law in action —  the actual structures and operations of the 
lower courts. Here we are given exhaustive data, indispensable 
but nonetheless frequently overlooked, concerning: the number
of courts, their location, and relative accessibility to clients 
and professionals; the physical setting of the courts; the 
characteristics of such personnel as judges, clerks, prosecutors, 
and advocates, including their age, experience, training, lang­
uage skills, and political ties; the career structure of those 
professionals — - salary, perquisites, opportunities for promo­
tion, transfers; the nature of the business which the court 
conducts —  overall caseload and kinds of cases; the procedures 
followed, including interpretation, record keeping, participa­
tion of the judge in examination of witnesses, and of the clerk 
in decision; the length of time required to get a ease heard 
and decided; and the mode of review or revision, Furthermore, 
this structural skeleton is fleshed out with a narrative account 
of a dav in court in the style of Sybille Bedford-1 or George 
Feifer.12
My enthusiasm for this considerable accomplishment is tempered 
only by my disappointment that the authors have so unnecessarily 
limited their ambitions to pure description, and have declined 
to attempt the third approach —  the explanation of legal ins­
titutions as social phenomena. Indeed, they explicitly disclaim 
such a goal.
Although the most important part of our study 
was based upon field interviews, we did not use 
the full rigorous methodology of the modern so­
cial sciences. In part this reflected our own 
lack of expertise, but in larger part (for we 
could no doubt have found skilled methodologists 
to advise us) this is a result of the nature of 
our inquiry. We began without hypotheses to be 
be tested, simply because our knowledge (which 
we think embraced substantially all published
H *  The Faces of Justice: a Traveller's Report (1961).
12. Justice in Moscow (1964).
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learning in the field) was insufficient to ^  
enable us to generate meaningful hypotheses.
The reason given for the failure to formulate hypotheses in ad­
vance is nugatory. For the authors’ boast to have exhausted 
"substantially all published learning in the field"^ reveals 
itself, upon scrutiny, to be grounded either in ignorance or 
in a philistine rejection of several significant sources of 
data and theory. First, the lower courts are studied in iso­
lation from other social institutions, even those indigenous 
equivalents of official legal institutions which perform the 
same functions of formulating, changing, and applying behavioral 
norms. I find it incredible that the authors choose to pass 
over Max Gluckman’s classic studies of Barotse legal institu­
tions with a single cavalier footnote:
The work of Epstein's mentor, Max Gluckman,
of course deserves mention....Gluckman, 
though remarkably sensitive to the legal 
viewpoint, is not a lawyer; nor were the 
Barotse courts, during the period of his
study at least, really modern courts as
that term is here u s e d .
Moreover, the wealth of anthropological literature produced 
by Gluckman, his students, and others at the Zambian Institute 
for Social Research (formerly the Rhodes-Livingston Institute) 
is largely ignored. Second, the authors specifically avoid 
comparison between legal developments in Zambia and those in
other African countries, at least at this stage of their w o r k . 15
Finally, they appear to be unacquainted with the growing body
13. P. viii.
14. The book displays a disconcerting compulsiveness in seve­
ral ways: collections of citations and authorities (p. 27, n.
180; p. 28, n, 181); an inordinate emphasis on comprehen­
siveness and orderliness (p. 29); and a pedantic concern for 
citation form (p. viii; p. 30, n. 185).
15. P. 31, n. 192.
16. P. 27-28. Data from other countries is used only as a 
source of ideology for judicial development, pp. 25-119.
102
of social science theory concerning legal institutions.
These oversights are unfortunate in the extreme. Students of 
the American legal system increasingly realize that it is im­
possible to understand that system without paying attention to 
unofficial or informal legal processes, as well as to the so­
ciety in which they operate. This is true a fortiori in Zambia, 
where the governmental legal system is a callow newcomer among 
the numerous indigenous legal institutions which continue to 
serve the vast majority of the population. Similarities and 
differences between Zambia and other African nations fairly 
leap out at anyone familiar with the relevant literature, and 
such comparisons frequently serve to generate hypotheses. I 
was especially struck by the parallel between this study and 
the superb report by Arthur Phillips on the comparable courts 
in Kenya three decides earlier —  a report which is nowhere 
cited.-*-" Furthermore, 1 have found the writings of sociologists 
and anthropologist in extremely fertile source of hypotheses 
about judicial behavior —  hypotheses which could well have 
been used to analyze the data contained in the present study 
in terms of such concepts as specialization, differentiation, 
and bureaucratization.^-®
But the authors' modest insistence that they "began without 
hypotheses" should not be taken at face value. Some notion of 
what is important must have instructed their decision to col­
lect this data rather than other information. Indeed, it is 
not possible to engage in intellectual inquiry without hypo­
theses. It jjs possible, though ill-advised, to allow those 
hypotheses to remain implicit rather than stating them plainly. 
The implicit hypothesis underlying the present study can be 
seen in the following:
[Our research led us], perhaps most impor­
tantly, into the field, to observe and record
some of what actually happens as the lower
courts go about their business —  processes
17. Report on Native Tribunals (1945).
18. I have developed these ideas in an unpublished paper, 
"Toward a Comparative Social Theory of the Dispute Process" 
(1972).
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usually consistent with the law, but also 
in between the law, above and beyond the 
law and occasionally contrary to the l a w .
The authors take the official legal standards as a model of 
what the lower courts ought to be doing, and then look at ins­
titutional variables to discern why judicial behavior deviates 
from those standards. I have elsewhere characterized this as 
the problem of the "gap" between law on the books and law in 
action, and have argued that dismay at the gap constitutes 
the single most prevasive approach in social studies of legal 
phenomena.20 Among the many disadvantages of this approach 
is a disturbing constriction of vision: the researcher is
directed toward departures from the legal standard, and thereby 
distracted from developing a more general theory which would 
explain the behavior of judicial institutions in terms of the 
structure of those institutions.
This formulation of the central problem of the Study is in 
turn an outgrowth of the authors' primary interest in recom­
mending policies rather than advancing our general understand­
ing of judicial institutions. Such a concern is entirely na­
tural in a team of lawyers, and is highly commendable when 
those lawyers are also expatriate scholars seeking to justify 
their research to their Zambian hosts. But it does create a 
serious dilemma: what right do American lawyers have to make
recommendations for the development of African legal insti­
tutions? The authors are highly sensitive to this dilemma, 
but I do not find their solution very satisfactory. In part 
they fall prev to the technocratic delusion that it is pos- 
sibl e to make policy recommendations without choosing between 
values. In the final proposal for their study the authors in­
cluded among their purposes: "To report ... perceived strengths
and weaknesses in the operation of these courts.... To analyse 
as thoroughly as possible and report any operational problems 
.... To offer any recommendations generated...."21 But
19. P. 2.
20. "Law Books and Books About Law," Yale Law Journal (forth­
coming) [a reviw article on Max Rheinstein's Marriage Stability, 
Divorce and the Law].
2 1 . P.  120 .
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strengths, weaknesses, problems, and recomnendations can only 
have meaning with respect to values. In an effort to avoid
imposing their own, the authors look for other sources of value.
Some are claimed to have general acceptance, e.g.,
more or less universal principles of justice 
—  that is, the rule of law. The widespread 
veneration given the doctrine of separation 
of powers suggests that the human attributes 
which give rise to the problem —  which re­
sult, as it were, in poisoning the well of
justice —  are of widespread occurrence.22
Where such vague slogans fail to offer adequate guidance, and 
they usually fail, Spalding engages in a lengthy analysis of 
the myriad recommendations for the reform of judicial systems 
in Africa in the hope of synthesizing a consensus of views.
He succeeds, but only by denying representation to a variety 
of significant dissenters. His consensus consists of "colonial 
and independent government administrators, [legal] academicians, 
and [legal] c o n f e r e n c e s ."23 it excludes anthropologists, so­
ciologists, and those dissident African politicians who do not 
manage to become administrators. Surely, if the latter were 
allowed a voice, Spalding could no longer write so confidently 
that "everyone talks about professionalization - and favorably."
Where pan-African consensus cannot be achieved, or is embar­
rassingly mute, the authors try to discern and follow Zambian 
values. But the same problems persist: whose values to choose
among the diversity of Zambian opinion, and what to do when 
those values cannot readily be identified or are overly broad.
In the end they opt for a compromise, justifying it on the 
ground that it "might achieve the best of both worlds without 
straining any segment of a society in t r a n s i t i o n ."25 But even 
a compromise necessarily represents a choice between values, 
itself an expression of value.
22. P. 59.
23. P. 29.
24. P. 52.
25. P. 217.
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Once we sweep aside this pretence of value-neutrality, it be­
comes clear that the values which the authors claim to find in 
other spokesmen are in fact their own. I believe it is impor­
tant to state those values as clearly as possible, although I 
do not claim any standing by which to judge them.
(1) Reform of judicial institutions is important for 
national development.
[T]he magistracy has unquestionably made subs­
tantial contributions in this period to the 
overall long-term development of the Zambian 
legal system —  albeit that the precise nature 
and dimensions of the contribution are not now 
easily perceived,
The consequences of success in this respect
may not seem large, given the benefit of hind­
sight; but the consequences of a failure, had 
it occurred, could have been devastating to 
much of the rest of the natienfs effort toward 
self-development,26
This is an assertion of faith, which is necessary to justify 
undertaking the study in the first place.
(2) Judicial institutions ought to be unified.
[W]e convinced ourselves, as have many before 
us, what an important aspiration it is to 
Zambia's future development as one nation.
In the end our main hope is that our work, em­
bracing as it does the work of so many others, 
may be of help to those who continue to labour 
toward the goal — "One Nation, One J u d i c i a r y " . 27
(3) There should be a separation of powers between judi­
ciary and executive.28
26. P. 151 (I have reversed the order of these two sentences) .
27. P. 3.
28. P. 155, 175, 214.
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(4) The judiciary should be professionalized.
Zambia's history proves that it is possible 
to have a magistracy composed largely of lay­
men. But to do so in a modern, complex legal 
system is a kind of juridical tour de force 
.... Nothing can argue that that tour de 
force should be perpetuated one day longer than 
necessary. Always assuming that Zambian gra­
duates will have a Zambian —  and not a Bri­
tish or ’American —  legal education, Zambian
professionals will be far and away better 
equipped to handle the duties of the magistrate 
than will any layman.29
When the values are stated in this fashion, I think it can be
seen that they express an idealization of the American judicial
system.
This study of the lower courts of Zambia, then, though animated 
by the best intentions and executed with great energy and intel­
ligence, is marred by two flaws common to contemporary legal 
scholarship. One is the belief that legal institutions can be 
understood in isolation from other social institutions, unin­
formed by the insights obtained from comparative data, and in 
ignorance of the burgeoning theories of social science. The 
other is the delusion that a scholar can avoid expressing his 
own values in designing the problems he studies, choosing the 
kind of explanation he seeks, and making recommendations. But 
despite these flaws, the report will be an invaluable source 
of data for the comparative social study of judicial institu­
tions even if, because of them, it is not itself such a study.
Richard L. Abel
Associate Professor of Law 
Yale Law School
29 . P . 156.
Rejoinder to Trofessor Spalding
Professor Spalding's response to tnv review is marred by some 
egregious errors - e.g., bis confusion of the concerts of 'hypothesis'' 
and "value," which are used interchangeably and often incorrectly.
He also indulges in intemperate and inappropriate language, as X believe 
a careful reading of ny review and his reply will show, I hone, how­
ever, that the handful of readers whose interest is piqued by this 
debate are not simply entertained by its rhetoric, but are moved to 
go and study Professor Spalding's book, If they do, I would oak 
them to bear in mind the following statements of value (in the sense 
of subjective, ynteatable assumptions and preferences) which I 
brought to my criticism of his book:
1. The exegesis of legal doctrine is only worthwhile if the 
doctrine has some bearing upon behavior wc wish to understand - i.e., 
if the content of the rules is one of the variables neccssarv to 
understand that behavior.
2. The development of a specific p o l i c y  to solve a narrowly 
defined social problem, and the construction of general theory, are 
alternative foci which alwavs diverge to some extent. Everv scholar 
must constantly choose to emphasize one at the expense of the other.
3. More important than either of these decisions is the question 
of how we nay gain the fullest understanding of legal phenomena. In
my review I wrote that "Students of the American legal system in­
creasingly realize that it is impossible to understand that system 
without paying attention to unofficial or informal legal processes, 
as well as to the society in which they operate." Professor Spalding
2 .
quotes this remark, apparently to indicate his disagreement with it.
He anks r.e for citation of authority. Unfortunately, the question 
of appropriate method, unlike the question of "what the legal rule 
is,” cannot be answered by citation. It must instead be answered 
by every scholar as he poses problems and seeks to solve them. In 
trying to understand legal phenomena in Kenya and the United States,
I have examined such phenomena in conjunction with other s o c i a l  
institutions, sought illumination from comparatives material, and drawn 
upon the theories of social science,1 I believe that Professor 
Spalding's book - a good one - would have been better had he done 
the came.
Richard L. Abel
A s s o c i a t e  P r o f e s s o r  o f  Law 
Y a l e  Law S c h o o l
1.  "A Comparat ive  Theory  o f  D i s p u t e  I n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  S o c i e t y , "  8 ( 2 )
Lav and S o c i e t v  Ho v i e w  ( ' . ' inter  1974) ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) ;  "Lav Looks  
and Rooks About Law," 26 S t a n f o r d  I.aw Review 175 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  "Case  
Method R esear ch  in the  Customary Laws o f  'Prongs in Kenya -  P a r t  I :  
I n d i v i d u a l  Case A n a l y s i s ;  P ar t  I I :  S t a t i s t i c a l  A n a l y s i s , "  V(4)
East  A f r i c a n  Law J o u r n a l  247 ( I 9 6 0 ) ,  V I ( 1 )  Ea s t  A f r i c a n  Law J o u r n a l
20 (1 9 7 0 )  (an a b r i d g e d  v e r s i o n  a p p ear s  i n  17 American J o u r n a l  o f  
Comparat ive  Law 573 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ) .
BOOK REVIEW
PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA: a study 
of the legal framework of governm ent from colonial times to
the present. By Y. P. Ghai and J. P. W. B. McAuslan
Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970, xxviii 4- 536 pp.
There can be no doubt  that this is one of the best studies of the role 
of public law in an African nation. The authors’ research has been 
comprehensive, their analysis is careful and perceptive, and their 
criticism is deeply felt and responsible. Because it is obviously impos­
sible to offer a detailed review of more than five hundred densely written 
pages, 1 will instead try to measure the book against the above three 
criteria, which the authors, in the preface, have adopted as their own.
The explicit justification for this volume is to supply useful in­
formation not otherwise available: " no  book on the policies and govern­
ment  of an independent  Kenya written by political scientists or 
historians was, so far as we could discover, in the offing, and this 
seemed to be a gap which it was worth trying to f il l . .  . The authors 
have succeeded abundantly.  They exploit legislation, parliamentary 
debates, reports and High Court  cases wnth great sophistication to 
inquire into aspects of public law which have thus far been neglected, 
for instance: the East African Communi ty  (clearly an essential counter­
part to any national study); the legal profession (frequently ignored by 
more parochial treatments); and human rights, sometimes skirted as 
too delicate an issue. The events of the past seven years arc skillfully 
related to the colonial background, drawn from such specialized studies 
as Oliver and Mathew- and M ungcam 3 on history; Arthur  Phillips’ 
superb report on the judicial system;4 and Sorrenson’s recent, detailed 
examinat ion of land administ ra tion.5 This juxtaposition permits the 
book to demonstrate  the inevitable continuities in institutions and 
practices which s traddled the barr ier  of independence, despite the 
rhetoric of change.
1. p.v. This expectation is not wholly credible, since Cheny Gertzel. whose help the 
authors acknowledge, published her book, The Politics of Independent Kenya. 
1963-1968 the same year. 1 odcr a brief comparison cf the two books below.
2. History of East Africa, vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1963.
3. British Rule in Kenya. 1895-1912. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966.
4. Report on Native Tribunals. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1945.
5. Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country. Nairobi: Oxford Univ. P., 1967.
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Secondly. Ghai and McAuslan claim to offer a new approach to the 
tired subject of constitutional law. They believe:
“ that legal scholarship and public lawyers have much to contribute 
to these topics, but that this will never appear  to be the case if 
we lawyers continue to produce formal analyses of L_\ I lex. ' ,  which, 
like so much modern packaged food has been processed and 
packaged in a vacuum, and is consequently tasteless. With somewhat  
less conviction, we would also think that it is a mistake of equal 
proportions for lawyers, in a desperate effort to prove their relevance 
to other  social scientists in this field, to go overboard for the latest 
methodology and systems analysis of those social sciences . . . .
What  is needed in our  view is country by c o u n t r y , . .  studies of 
aspects of public law set in their historical, political and economic 
c o n te x t . , .  ,’’B
I disagree, The authors’ choice of a middle road between doctrinal 
exegesis and empirical analysis is supported by an unfair picture of 
the utility of the social sciences for an understanding of law, No one 
would argue that lawyers should go overboard in a desperate effort 
to be relevant. But I would assert that a full comprehension of the 
operation of law in society must be the goal of every legal scholar. 
And it is precisely this contemporary social frame of reference which 
is sometimes missing in their analysis. The omission was, to me. most 
glaring in the chapter  on the judicial system, which seeks to analyze 
the operation of the African Courts without discussing a single case 
decided by those courts, or referring to any of the sociological or 
anthropological literature which might help to illuminate the back­
ground against which these courts function. This is an example of the 
lawyer’s perspective at its most myopic. But the authors clearly recog­
nize their failing, for at the end of the section they write: “ What  is 
needed i s . . .  much more empirical research into the operation of the 
law in Kenya . . . into the extent to which actual practice in the field 
has been affected, and people’s attitudes changed, by modern statutory 
r e f o r m s . . .  .” 7 To this I can only add my full agreement.
The  outstanding merit of this book, however, lies not in exposition 
nor analysis, but in its willingness to criticize past and present govern­
mental practices. Ghai and McAuslan are impartially severe on the
6 . pp.  v-vi.
7. p. 380 fn. 49.
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colonial regime and on the politicians of independent Kenya. I find 
most illuminating their general conclusion that the role of law through­
out the history of Kenya has not been, as frequently claimed, the 
dispensation of justice and the regulation of governmental activity, 
but that law has rather served to facilitate administration, bowing to 
the needs of the moment whenever this was found expedient.* In their 
strictures upon recent actions of the government of Kenya, they display 
a courage which contrasts sharply with that shown by another author, 
Cherry Gertzel, in her recent book, The Politics of Independent Kenya 
1963-68,9 The difference can be seen most clearly by comparing the way 
in which each book treats the arrest of Bildad Kaggia, then Vice-Presi­
dent of the KPU, for holding a public meeting without a permit, and 
his subsequent sentence to six months’ imprisonment. Ghai and 
McAuslan note, at the outset, the extent to which the Public Order 
Act,15 under which he was charged, has emasculated the right to engage 
in political activity. “Given the wide discretions vested in administrative 
and police officers as to the holding and conduct of meetings, very 
severe limitations can be imposed on the right to meet and discuss. 
It is common knowledge that permission is consistently denied to the 
members of the opposition to hold meetings, even just before elections, 
( f n, , ,  The Government has prevented the leader of the opposition from 
talking to the University or schools.)”11 The authors contend that, 
despite the breadth of the Act, Kaggia’s presence in a KPU sub-branch 
office, at the invitation of the party, and his fifteen minute talk to the 
people present, did not necessarily constitute a violation, and quaere 
wfiether the court “ought not to have leaned in favour of the accused 
given the spirit of the Bill of Rights.”12 Finally, they criticize the 
defence for failing to challenge the validity of the Act: “Any form of 
prior censorship or approval has an inherent tendency towards denial 
of freedoms and rights, and it may be questioned whether the require­
ments in the Act do not infringe these rights under the Constitution.”15 
Gertzel’s treatment of this incident is rather more summary: “Kaggia 
was arrested early in 1968 and charged with holding an illegal meeting 
for which he was imprisoned for six months.”
8. T h is  p o in t  m a y  be so m ew hat  overstated .  T h e  Afr ican  C o u r t  system c ou ld  not
hav e  been entirely  a n  in s t ru m en t  of  adm in is t ra t ion  when ,  in the 1960s, a b o u t  fifty
th o u sa n d  p eop le  a y ear  were  voluntari ly  subm itt ing  Lhcir grievances to  these courts  
f o r  settlement.
9. N a i ro b i :  E as t  A f r ic a n  Publ ish ing  H o u se  a n d  H e in em an n ,  1970.
10. cap .  66.
11. p. 449.
12. p. 448.
13. p. 450.
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Because I share the doubts expressed by Ghai and McAuslan as 
to the legality and propriety of this prosecution, I find Gertzel’s 
omissions a form of subtle bias, the more to be deplored because it 
hides behind a mask of neutral historicism,14 The ultimate justification 
for candid criticism found throughout the book is offered by the authors 
themselves:
“There are, alas, some countries in which sycophancy is regarded as 
objective and adverse criticism as sedition; we do not believe Kenya 
to be such a country, and we would stress that if our judgments 
are regarded as austere the standards employed are for the most part 
those set by the leaders of Kenya themselves, and if they are regarded 
as erroneous they should be seen, not as motivated by ill-will, but as 
a stimulant to debate on public matters in Kenya.” 15
The publication of this book is itself the strongest evidence that 
Kenya does not fall within the category of nations who have forfeited 
their freedom.
RICHARD L. ABEL 
[Mr. Abel is Associate Professor, Yale Law School.]
14. N u m e r o u s  o th e r  exam ples  o f  these different a p p ro a c h e s  c o u ld  b e  given. O n  the  
d isqualif ication  of K P U  cand ida tes  in the  local g o v e rn m e n t  e lect ions o f  1963 
co m p a re  Gertzel p. 166 with G h a i  Sc M c A u s lan  p. 517; o n  the  w i thd raw al  o f  the  
p assp o r t  o f  Oginga O dinga  o n  the eve o f  his d e p a r tu re  to  add ress  a  university  
aud ience  in Am erica ,  c o m p a re  Gertze l  p. 148 with G h a i  Sc M c A u s la n  p. 417. 
G ertze l  simply fails to  discuss m a n y  o f  those  incidents  m o s t  em b ar ra s s in g  f o r  
K A N U ,  e.g.,  tite repeated ex tension  a n d  use  o f  the Prese rva t ion  o f  Public  Security  
A c t ,  cap . 57 (G h a i  & M c A u s la n  p. 434); the  de ten t io n  o f  M r .  O o k o  u n d e r  th a t  
A c t  (G h a i  Sc M cA u s lan  p. 437 if .) ;  the d isso lu t ion  o f  the  K enya  F e d e ra t io n  o f  
L a b o u r  a n d  the  K en y a  A fr ican  W o r k e r s ’ C ongress  (G h a i  &  M c A u s la n  p p .  446- 
47), etc.
15. p. viii.
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REPLY TO M A X  GLUCKMAN
Max Gluckman p a y s  me the high compliment of devoting 
a good portion of his recent article (1973) to a re-analysis of 
my interpretation (1969) of a case drawn from the records of 
the p r i m a r y  co u r t s  of K e n y a .  And he is extremely flattering 
in his  c o m m e n t s  u p o n  t h a t  interpretation. A reply would there­
fo re  s e em  u n n e c e s s a r y  at  t h e  least, and possibly ungrateful. I 
k n o w  I ani  no t  t h e  la t t e r ,  a n d  I hope the reply is not wholly 
supe r f luous .
With the distance created by  time, I now see my article, 
G l u c k m a n ’s criticism, a n d  m y  reply, as a dialectic. In writing
m y  ar t ic le ,  I was r e a c t i n g  to  a body  of s c h o la r sh ip  that was 
a lm o s t  to ta l ly  p reoc c up ie d  w i t h  ru les .  A l t h o u g h  I only quoted 
at. l e n g th  f rom  the  w o r k  of Charles D u n d a s  (a co lonia l  adminis­
t r a t o r ) ,  I also c i ted  n u m e r o u s  o t h e r  e x a m p l e s  by bo th  lawyers
a n d  anthropologists. And Gluckman, himse lf ,  a c k n o w l e d g e s  t h a t  
“some lawyers tend to be concerned in A fr ica  to r e c o r d  ru le s ,  
as the Res ta tem en t  of A fr ican  L a w  s h o w s  . . (1973: 635). I
therefore do not agree that it has  been “ long  e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  
accepted” that ‘a study of abstract r u le s  is no t  e n o u g h ” 
(1973: 624).
In reacting to this p r e o c c u p a t io n  w i t h  ru le s ,  I confess  t h a t  
I went to the other extreme, a n d  g a v e  the  i m p r e s s io n  t h a t  I 
believed "that cases a re  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  r u le s , ” for  w h ic h  
Gluckman has quite r igh t ly  criticized m e  (1973: 634). B u t  I 
n e v e r  c o n te n d e d  t h a t  “ th e  s tu d y  of t h e  case, o r  t h e  d i spu te ,  or  
t h e  conflict should be t h e  on ly  focus  of the  s tu d y  of l a w ” (1973: 
613), nor  did I asse r t  “ t h a t  cases  a lo n e  wil l  give r u l e s ” (1973: 
622). Indeed, I could h a r d l y  h a v e  done  so, for,  as G l u c k m a n  
wr i te s ,  the “analysis by Abel ,  does  no t  o b s e rv e  t h e  r u l e  
(note!) he promulgates” (1973: 613). T h e  r e a s o n  it does  no t  is 
t h a t  I p r o m u l g a t e  no such  ru le .
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If my reaction to earlier scholarship was exaggerated, so, 
I believe, was Gluckman’s reaction to my article. Recognizing 
that Dundas’ work “particularly raises [my] ire," Gluckman 
attempts to explicate Dundas’ report that, in Kikuyu law, “if a 
man were seized by a lion, and his friend wishing to save him 
were to throw a spear, he would be liable for compensation 
if he inadvertently struck the man instead of the lion” (1915: 
263-64), Gluckman writes:
one would like to know if Dundas was told the rule by the 
elders in reply to his putting an hypothetical case, or whether 
they were discussing with him the absolute liability of a man 
of one group for blood-compensation if he kills a member 
of another group, or whether it cropped up spontaneously 
from the elders in a discussion of the relationships of groups 
involved in potcntinl feud as against payment of blood-com- 
pensotion (11*73: 024).
I, too, would like to know this, for I agr.ee with Gluckman th a t  
context is vitally important. Gluckman has perceptively s u g ­
gested some of the possible contexts, each of which would a lt e r  
the meaning of the rule. Lacking a knowledge of the a c tu a l  
context, I stick to my original contention that such rules a r e  
“absurd” (1969: 575). Nor will it do to guess at the c o n te x t ,  
Gluckman argues “that it must have been a statement in  o n e  
of these contexts, or a very similar context” (1973: 624), but 
he offers no evidence for this, and the contexts themselves 
differ significantly. Alternatively, Gluckman tries to illuminate 
the rule by describing the context in which another rule — 
which he views as similar — was employed in a case involving 
another tribe, the Pokot. This simply will not do. True, the 
Pokot, like the Kikuyu, live in Kenya; but there the resem­
blance ends. The Pokot are members of the Nilo-Hamitic 
linguistic group, pastoralists of the western Rift Valley. The 
Kikuyu are a Bantu people, agriculturalists on the slopes of 
Mount Kenya. These differences affect both social structure 
and culture; nor is there any record of significant contact be­
tween them, A case from one cannot illuminate a rule from the 
other.
Yet despite these quibbles, I arrive at complete agreement 
with Gluckman's fundamental position, and do so largely by 
reason of his thoughtful criticism of my earlier article. “We are 
caught in a circle, in which law, it is true, can only be under­
stood through cases — but cases can be understood only through 
law, and both have to be set in the matrix of social process” 
(1973: 622).
Having allowed myself the indulgence of a reply, perhaps
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I am in no position to call for an end to controversy. But I find 
myself applauding the Cheshire Cat's response to Alice:
“Cheshire Puss,” she began, rather timidly . . . .  
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to walk 
from here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to 
get to,” said the Cat.
“I don’t much care where,” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t m atter which way you walk," said 
the Cat.
“— so long as I get som ew here,” Alice added as an 
explanation.
“Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if you 
only walk long enough!” (Carroll, 1946: 64).
Perhaps we should turn to the question of where we want 
to get to.
R ichard L. A b e l 
Yale Law School
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